Opinion
No. 1:02-CV-01751-SEB-VSS.
September 30, 2004
ENTRY GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
This matter comes before the Court on Defendant Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.'s ("Wal-Mart") Motion for Summary Judgment on Plaintiff Dean Hudson's ("Hudson") Frampton claim. Mr. Hudson alleges that Wal-Mart discharged him in retaliation for filing a worker's compensation claim following an injury he sustained in the workplace. Wal-Mart contends it terminated Hudson for violating the policy prohibiting violence in the workplace. For the reasons given below, we GRANT Defendant's motion.
Factual Background
Defendant Wal-Mart is a retail chain incorporated in Delaware and headquartered in Bentonville, Arkanasa. Wal-Mart Store #1581 is located at 3221 W. 86th Street in Indianapolis, Indiana and Plaintiff Hudson was employed there as a full-time sales associate in the sporting goods department from January 10, 2002, until his termination on May 6, 2002.
On April 27, 2002, Mr. Hudson and a co-worker, Nicholas Ramirez ("Ramirez"), were involved in a workplace physical altercation which resulted in Hudson's being taken to the emergency room of St. Vincent Hospital by ambulance. Pl.'s Compl. ¶¶ 2-4, 6; Def.'s Answer ¶¶ 2-4, 6; Def.'s Br. in Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J. ("Def.'s Br.") at 4.
Ramirez had been employed as a Stocker at the Wal-Mart since April 10, 2002, and was often assigned in or near the Sporting Goods Department. Def.'s Br. at 4. In the sixteen days the two men were co-employees, they had about a dozen contacts [Def.'s App., Tab B, Hudson Dep. p. 194] and one argument about the proper way to complete fishing license applications and the fact that Hudson's cash register drawer was short-changed two (2) dollars after Ramirez had used it. Id. pp. 190-192. Hudson also had complained to Ramirez about his general work performance because he felt that Ramirez was never around to help him bag customers' goods when he was completing a sale. Pl.'s App. Tab 1, Hudson Dep. p. 166.
Other Wal-Mart employees have stated that Hudson insulted Ramirez on previous occasions, using "foul language" [Pl.'s App, Pate Dep. p. 9, 25-26], telling him "he wasn't nothing and never would be nothing" [Id., Owens Dep. p. 14], and calling him a "little black boy" [Id., Barnes Dep. p. 12]. Hudson denies having made these and other comments about or to Ramirez. Id., Tab 13, Hudson Aff. He maintains that his complaints about Ramirez to co-workers and supervisory personnel related only to Ramirez's productivity in the workplace. Pl. App., Hudson Dep. pp. 167-170.
On the night of April 26th, a co-employee, Portia Pate ("Pate"), was working as the back-up customer service manager. Pate claims that Hudson had been complaining about Ramirez's unhelpfulness during the work shift. Pl.'s App. Tab 5, Pate Dep. pp. 9, 23. Hudson confirms that he complained about Ramirez that night not only to Pate but also to the assistant manager, Matt Stenson and employee Tina Crouch. Hudson Dep. pp. 167-170. He also admits that Pate told her to leave Ramirez alone and let management handle him. Id. p. 180. In her written statement the day following the altercation, Pate stated that Hudson had complained that Ramirez was "worthless" and "no good" and that he wanted a manger to "get rid of Nick." Def.'s App. Tab D, Pate Dep., Ex. 1. Hudson recalls that "an argument erupted" with Ramirez about 8 or 8:30 p.m. Hudson Dep. p. 171. In addition, she stated that Ramirez seemed angry that Hudson had been saying negative things about him. When the fight occurred, however, Pate was not present.
Another co-employee, Saressa Owens ("Owens"), also states that Hudson often made negative comments about Ramirez, calling him a "nothing" who wouldn't make anything of his life. Pl.'s App. Tab 5, Owens Dep. p. 7, 14. In her written statement, Owens claims that on the night of April 26th, Hudson told her that he and Ramirez had gotten into an argument earlier in the afternoon and that Hudson had told Ramirez that "he wasn't shit" and "he'll never be shit." Def.'s App. Tab E, Owens Dep., Ex. 1. Hudson denies having said this to Owens. Pl.'s App, Tab 13, Hudson Aff. According to Owens, Hudson continued complaining about Ramirez and Ramirez, who was off-duty but waiting for a ride home, overheard it all. The next thing Owens claims she heard was Hudson threatening Ramirez that he would "kick his ass" when he got off work at 2:00 a.m., followed by what sounded like "wrestling." Owens then saw Dean on the floor and heard him saying "alright, man, alright" and Ramirez standing over him, saying "I told you not to mess with me." Ramirez left the store and Owens sat with Hudson until the ambulance arrived. Like Pate, she did not witness the altercation. Def.'s App. Tab E, Owens Dep., Ex. 1. Finally, Stenson reports in his written statement of April 28, 2002, that on the night of the altercation, Hudson had approached him and urged him "to do something with Nick [Ramirez]" because they were unable to work together. In an effort to separate the two men, Stenson assigned Hudson to stock inventory in the Hardware Dept. Def.'s App. Tab F, Ex. 1.
The accounts of Pate, Owens and Stenson, supra, were gathered at the direction of the store manager, Shannon Creemens ("Creemens"), in his investigation of the April 26/27th Ramirez/Hudson altercation. Creemens consulted his co-manager, Michael Jodrey, and the assistant managers, Tina Crouch and Matt Stenson, and asked them to solicit statements from personnel who had been working on the night of April 26, 2002. He then reviewed the written statements and concluded that Hudson had provoked the fight and he would terminate the employment of both Hudson and Ramirez for violating the Workplace Violence Policy.
On May 6, 2002, Mr. Hudson returned to Wal-Mart for the first time after the April 26th fight and his hospitalization, and learned from co-manager Jodrey that his employment was terminated. Def.'s App. Tab 2; Creemens Aff. ¶¶ 3-5, -10.
Plaintiff's version of the altercation was first recounted in the early morning of April 27, 2002, during a conversation with Jodrey who had come to visit Hudson in the hospital. Jodrey asked Mr. Hudson to explain to him what had happened earlier that day. Mr. Hudson told Jodrey that while he was stocking inventory in the Hardware department, Ramirez had approached him with raised his fists and yelling at him, that he "wanted to fight," but that he had walked away. A bit later, while he was stocking plungers in the toilet seat area, Hudson heard a noise, turned around with the plunger in his hand and raised his hand as he watched Ramirez's fist come toward his face. Hudson Dep. pp. 183-186. Hudson urged Jodrey to review the security videotape, certain that it would corroborate his version of the event. Defendant contends no video cameras recorded the Hardware Area. Pl.'s App. Tab 14; Letter from Wal-Mart Counsel.
Both parties agree that Mr. Hudson telephoned Lori Kord ("Kord"), an employee in the Personnel Department, a few days after the April 26/27th altercation to ask how to go about filing a claim for worker's compensation benefits. Pl.'s App. Tab 1, Hudson Dep. p. 85; Def.'s App. Tab B, Hudson Dep. pp. 80, 85-86, 88. Plaintiff recalls Kord telling him that, according to the insurance representative with whom she had spoken, any claim he submitted probably was not covered given the circumstances in which the injury occurred, i.e., a fight between two co-workers. Hudson Dep. p. 89, 155-156. However, Hudson concedes that he understood that, ultimately, it was the insurance carrier who would decide on the eligibility of his claim and not Kord or even Jodrey. In addition, Hudson admits that although Kord may not have offered him the necessary paperwork for filing a worker's compensation claim she also never refused to give it to him. Id. p. 154-56.
The evidence is unclear regarding Hudson's meeting with Jodrey following the April 26/27th altercation; in Hudson's deposition there is discussion of a May 1 meeting, but the rest of the deposition testimony and other evidence more reliably indicates that May 6, 2002, was the first time Plaintiff returned to Wal-Mart to meet with Jodrey to discuss his returning to work. Jodrey had been on vacation for one week following the Hudson/Ramirez incident. It was during this meeting that Hudson first learned he was being terminated for violating the workplace violence "rule," an outcome which Hudson found unfair because, according to him, he had not caused the fight. The Wal-Mart Workplace Violence Policy (the "Policy") prohibits not only physical violence but also threats, veiled threats, intimidation, provocation of fights and other similarly inappropriate conduct. Hudson was both aware of the existence of the Policy and that a violation of the Policy, e.g., fighting, threats towards others, serious harassment and rude or abusive conduct toward customers or co-workers, was grounds for immediate termination. Def. App. Tab A, Ex.1; Tab B, Hudson Dep. p. 200.
To Hudson's contention that he had no part in provoking the altercation, Jodfrey responded by informing him that there were witnesses who thought otherwise. Jodrey then presented Mr. Hudson with an exit interview form, which Hudson refused to sign, and the plaintiff left the store. Mr. Hudson claims he also asked about paperwork for filing a worker's compensation claim during this meeting but it was not given to him. Hudson Dep. 88, 93-96.
Hudson appealed his termination first to the district manager, Curtis Reid, and later to the Regional Personnel Manager, Greg Sullivan, both times protesting that it was unjust to be terminated for the fight with Ramirez; he did, however, admit to both men that he had not been completely without fault yet nevertheless had not deserved the beating. Hudson Dep. p. 99, 101, 103, 105. His termination was upheld over his appeals. In his conversations with Reid and Sullivan, Hudson never characterized his termination as resulting from his seeking worker's compensation benefits.
On May 15, 2002, Hudson went to Wal-Mart and completed the initial paperwork requesting worker's compensation. While there, he admits to having said to another employee that he had "something up his sleeve" with regard to his termination, and explains that the comment referred to his plan for filing charges against Ramirez for attacking him. Hudson Dep. p. 213. Hudson subsequently filed charges and Ramirez was prosecuted for and pled guilty to criminal battery. Pl.'s App. Tab 12, Ramirez's Order of Judgment and Conviction.
The first paperwork related to Hudson's worker's compensation claim was submitted on May 15, 2002 (Hudson's Statement) to the insurance carrier. The Application for Adjustment of Claim with the Indiana Worker's Compensation Board was filed August 1, 2002. At the hearing on June 18, 2003, the Single Hearing Judge rendered a decision in Plaintiff's favor, which was appealed to the Full Board by Wal-Mart. The Full Board affirmed the decision in Hudson's favor on November 3, 2003, and Wal-Mart has appealed the decision to the Indiana Court of Appeals. Pl.'s Br. at 6.
Legal Analysis
Summary Judgment Standard
Summary judgment is appropriate "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); see Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). The court's function is not to weigh the evidence but merely to determine if "there is a genuine issue for trial." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986). We must ask whether "there are genuine factual issues that can properly be resolved only by a finder of fact because they may reasonably be resolved in favor of either party." Id. at 250. In assessing whether a genuine issue of material fact exists, we must construe all facts and draw all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, in this case, Mr. Hudson. See id. at 255;Goetzke v. Ferro Corp., 280 F.3d 766, 774 (7th Cir. 2002).
Plaintiff's Retaliatory Discharge Claim
Mr. Hudson's common law retaliatory discharge action is commonly called a "Frampton" claim. Frampton v. Central Indiana Gas Co., 297 N.E.2d 425, 428 (1973). In the case from which the action derives its name, the Indiana Supreme Court held that an employer may not discharge an employee in retaliation for filing a worker's compensation claim. See Markley Enterprises, Inc. v. Grover, 716 N.E.2d 559, 565 (Ind.Ct.App. 1999). Mr. Hudson bears the burden of showing that there is a causal connection between his filing the worker's compensation claim and being discharged. Meanwhile, Wal-Mart must have some "independent lawful reason" to justify the discharge.Watkins v. Sommer Metalcraft Corp., 844 F.Supp. 1321, 1325 (S.D. Ind. 1994); see also Mullins v. Lobdell Emery, Inc. 2002 WL 459040 (S.D. Ind. 2002) (Barker, J.).
The prima facie case for a Frampton claim consists of three elements. Mullins at *4. There is no question that Mr. Hudson shows the first two: he filed a worker's compensation claim and he was terminated from his Wal-Mart employment. The third element is that there is a causal connection between filing the claim and being fired.
Thus, in order to survive a motion for summary judgment in aFrampton case, Mr. Hudson must show more than a filing of a worker's compensation claim and the discharge itself; he must present evidence which either directly or indirectly implies the necessary inference of causation between the two acts.
Mr. Hudson has no direct evidence so we shall consider the primary examples of indirect proof of causation: a) proximity in time between the two acts, and b) an employer's proffered reason for termination which is patently inconsistent with the evidence before the court. Hamann v. Gates Chevrolet, Inc. 910 F.2d 1417, 1420 (7th Cir. 1990).
Temporal Proximity
Mr. Hudson asks us to infer the requisite causation from the close proximity in time between receiving his worker's compensation payment and his discharge. He tells us that he was fired on May 6, 2002, which is nine days before he submitted the paperwork for filing a claim but potentially a week after he first stated his intention to file for worker's compensation benefits. Pl.'s Opp'n Br. at 15. If he was fired before Wal-Mart knew of his intention, clearly no inference of causation is possible. However, for the purposes of summary judgment, we draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-movant, Mr. Hudson. Thus, let us consider that Mr. Hudson suggested to Wal-Mart that he might file a claim at some point before May 6, 2002.
Plaintiff's Frampton claim remains viable, under these facts, according to Stivers v. Stevens, 581 N.E.2d 1253, 1254 (Ind.App. 1991) (holding that terminating an employee for filing a claim obviously has a deleterious effect on the exercise of this important statutory right and the discharge of an employee merely for suggesting she might file a claim has an even stronger deleterious effect).
Mr. Hudson argues in his brief that Wal-Mart, on three occasions, unreasonably resisted his request for the paperwork to file a claim. Pl.'s Br. at 19. This suggests that his intention to file was well-known to those responsible for his termination. However, the plaintiff's evidence is that he asked Kord how to go about filing a claim in a phone conversation at some unspecified time after the altercation but before May 6, 2002. On that occasion, after he explained what had occurred on the night of April 26th, Kord reported that, according to the insurance representative with whom she had spoken, any claim he submitted probably was not covered given the circumstances in which the injury occurred, i.e., a fight between two co-workers. Hudson Dep. p. 89, 155-156. Hudson concedes that Kord was neither responsible for his termination nor for deciding on the eligibility of his claim. In addition, Hudson also admits that Kord never refused to give him the necessary paperwork for filing a worker's compensation claim, only that she did not offer it to him. Id. p. 154-56.
Jodrey, the co-manager of the Wal-Mart store, might have played a role in Hudson's termination, however there is no evidence to demonstrate that Jodfrey knew anything about Mr. Hudson's intention to file a worker's compensation claim between the morning of his visit to Hudson in the hospital on April 27, 2002 and the exit interview on May 6, 2002 during which he informed Mr. Hudson of his termination. Indeed, it appears that Jodrey was on vacation during the one-week interval. Co-Manager Creemens directed the investigation into the altercation and states that he had decided to terminate Hudson's employment prior to the exit interview on May 6, 2002, based on the written statements of employees who had worked the night of the altercation. Def.'s App. Tab F, Creemens Decl. ¶¶ 4, 9. Hudson also concedes, in deposition testimony, that Jodrey did not refused to give him the paperwork either.
The proximity in time between Plaintiff's inquiries regarding worker's compensation benefits and his termination, without more, is insufficient to support the inference of causation. He has not produced evidence to suggest that Creemens made the decision to terminate his employment based on his intention to file for worker's compensation, nor has he demonstrated that Cremeens was even aware of Plaintiffs intention to file a worker's compensation claim. Thus, Mr. Hudson has failed to establish a prima facie Frampton claim.
Pretextual Reason for Termination
Even if Mr. Hudson's evidence were sufficient to raise a prima facie inference of retaliation, he offers no evidence from which a jury could reasonably infer that Wal-Mart's explanation for why it terminated him was pretextual. In other words, even given an initial inference of causation, Mr. Hudson must still show that the employer's explanation for taking the adverse employment action was pretextual so that a jury could reasonably infer a causal connection between the employee's engaging in protected conduct and the adverse action. Mullins at *5 (citing Parkins v. Civil Constructors of Illinois, Inc., 163 F.3d 1027, 1032 (7th Cir. 1998); Sanchez v. Henderson, 188 F.3d 740, 746 (7th Cir. 1999)). Wal-Mart says that it terminated Mr. Hudson because he violated the Workplace Violence Policy.
Plaintiff seems to suggest that Wal-Mart should not have terminated him unless he was the aggressor in the altercation on April 26/27th. It is true that Creemens came to believe that Hudson had provoked the altercation (Creemens Decl. ¶ 9). However, there is a difference between provoking an altercation and being the first person to let fly a fist or draw blood. We do not question that Ramirez was the "aggressor." We also accept as true the fact that there was a good deal of tension between Ramirez and Hudson during the work shift that preceded the altercation. The written statements of Stenson, Pate and Owens attest to an argument between the two men, and Plaintiff admits to it as well. Creemens states that, based on the investigation he conducted immediately following the altercation, he believed Hudson had violated the Policy. The Policy prohibits not only actual fighting in the workplace, but also threats towards others, serious harassment and rude or abusive conduct toward customers or co-workers, and all of these are grounds for immediate termination. Def. App. Tab B, Hudson Dep. p. 200.
The law provides that if an employer honestly believes its reasons for an adverse employment action then an employee/plaintiff cannot prove pretext. Goetzke, 280 F.3d at 777; Mullins at *5. Creemens had a factual basis for deciding to terminate Mr. Hudson based on the investigation he conducted. He investigated and reasonably relied on the statements of other employees to conclude that Hudson had provoked or goaded Ramirez into hitting him. We are aware that there were no true eyewitnesses to the altercation; that the persons who gave statements witnessed only the prelude and the aftermath of the altercation. However, the investigation was initiated immediately and the statements were taken the very next day, raising the presumption that Creemens had an independent, lawful reason to terminate Mr. Hudson. We deliberately have not taken into account other more egregious testimony regarding Hudson's alleged provocation of Ramirez; neither crediting Pate's later recollection in deposition testimony that Mr. Hudson used racial slurs nor suggestions that they had several previous altercations. Weeding through the information available to Creemens when he decided to terminate both Hudson and Ramirez for violating Wal-Mart policy, we conclude that there is insufficient evidence of pretext.
In sum, there is no evidentiary basis from which a jury could reasonably infer that Wal-Mart fired Mr. Hudson in retaliation for Hudson's intending to file a worker's compensation claim.
Conclusion
For the reasons addressed, we find that Mr. Hudson has presented legally insufficient evidence to support his Frampton claim. Accordingly, we GRANT Defendant's motion for summary judgment.It is so ORDERED.