Opinion
3:24-CV-1141 (AJB/ML)
01-28-2025
JAMIL ABDUL MUHAMMAD, Plaintiff, v. SUFFOLK CNTY. SUPPORT; NEW YORK STATE CHILD SUPPORT PROCESSING CENTER; CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT BUREAU, CSEB Unit; BROOME CNTY. DEP'T OF SERVS. COLLECTION, Unit #124; OHIO CHILD SUPPORT PAYMENT CENT.; CHILD SUPPORT SERVS. UNIT; SUMMIT CNTY. CLERK OF COURT; SUMMIT CNTY. CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT AGENCY, CSEA; NEW YORK STATE DEP'T OF TAXATION AND FINANCE, Child Support Enforcement Section/Defendant-Compliance Agent M. Winner; DEP'T OF TREASURYINTERNAL REVENUE SERV.; and U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, Defendant- Secretary of State/ Anthony Blinken, Defendants.
JAMIL ABDUL MUHAMMAD Plaintiff, Pro Se
JAMIL ABDUL MUHAMMAD Plaintiff, Pro Se
ORDER AND REPORT-RECOMMENDATION
MIROSLAV LOVRIC, United States Magistrate Judge
The Clerk has sent this pro se Complaint (Dkt. No. 1) together with an application to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) (Dkt. No. 2) and Supplemental Filing (Dkt. No. 4) filed by Jamil Abdul Muhammad (“Plaintiff”) to the Court for review. For the reasons discussed below, I (1) grant Plaintiff's IFP application (Dkt. No. 2), and (2) recommend that Plaintiff's Complaint (Dkt. No. 1) be dismissed without leave to amend.
I. BACKGROUND
Liberally construed, Plaintiff's Complaint asserts that his rights were violated by Defendants Suffolk County Support, New York State Child Support Processing Center, Child Support Enforcement Bureau, Broome County Department of Services Collection Unit #124, Ohio Child Support Payment Central, Child Support Services Unit, Summit County Clerk of Court, Summit County Child Support Enforcement Agency, New York State Department of Taxation and Finance, Department of Treasury - Internal Revenue Service, and U.S. Department of State (collectively “Defendants”). (See generally Dkt. No. 1.)
The court must interpret pro se complaints to raise the strongest arguments they suggest. Soto v. Walker, 44 F.3d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1995) (quoting Burgos v. Hopkins, 14 F.3d 787, 790 (2d Cir. 1994)).
The Complaint alleges that Defendants have subjected Plaintiff to unconstitutional and illegal child support orders and negative consequences for failure to remain current on his child support obligations. (Id.) More specifically, the Complaint alleges that at some unspecified time, Plaintiff's 2009 BMW vehicle was impounded from his home by Defendant New York State Department of Finance with a warrant indicating that Plaintiff owed back child support. (Dkt. No. 1 at 10.) Plaintiff alleges that the vehicle was improperly impounded because Defendant New York State Department of Finance was under the incorrect belief that Plaintiff had two vehicles in his name. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that he provided the other vehicle's registration and insurance cards in “the new owner[']s” name and Defendant New York State Department of Finance informed Plaintiff that he must pay $2,000 to obtain his 2009 BMW. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that he obtained $2,000 from his brother “on an emergency based agreement” to obtain possession of his vehicle but continues to face “worry of [his] vehicle being impounded again because the amount of $1,000.00 submitted was only part of the alleged payment owed with an outstanding balance [t]o be paid.” (Dkt. No. 1 at 10-11.)
Based on these factual allegations, the Complaint appears to assert the following five causes of action: (1) a claim that Defendants violated Plaintiff's right to equal protection of the law in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment and 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (2) a claim that Defendants violated Plaintiff's right to due process pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment and 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (3) a claim that Plaintiff's rights pursuant to the Seventh Amendment and 42 U.S.C. § 1983, were violated; (4) a claim that Defendants violated 5 U.S.C. §§ 3331, 7311; and (5) a claim of “extrinsic fraud” against Defendants. (See generally Dkt. No. 1.)
The Seventh Amendment preserves “the right to trial by jury” for certain cases brought in federal court. U.S. Const. amend. VII. Since the federal judiciary determines the extent to which a litigant in federal court may try his or her case before a jury, see e.g., Messa v. Goord, 652 F.3d 305 (2d Cir. 2011), persons acting under the color of state law (i.e., those persons who may be named as defendants in a § 1983 action) generally lack the capacity to violate the Seventh Amendment. See Kampfer v. Argotsinger, 18-CV-0007, 2020 WL 906274 at *10 (N.D.N.Y. Feb. 25, 2020) (The Seventh Amendment does not “provide a [. . .] cause of action cognizable under § 1983.” (citation and quotation omitted)). As a result, I recommend that “‘Plaintiff's citation to the Seventh Amendment [be construed] as support for h[is] request for a civil jury trial,' rather than as an independent basis for relief.” Kampfer, 2020 WL 906274, at *10 (citing White v. City of New York, 13-CV-7156, 2014 WL 4357466, at *8 n.13 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 3, 2014)).
As relief, Plaintiff seeks $100,000,000.00 in damages and a temporary restraining order to stop enforcement of any fraudulent judgments against Plaintiff, reinstate his passport, and return the $2,000 he paid to obtain his improperly impounded vehicle. (Id.)
Plaintiff filed a “Supplement” to the Complaint, which appears to duplicate several pages of the Complaint with the addition of a notary stamp. (Compare Dkt. No. 1 at 8-11, with Dkt. No. 4 at 1-5.) In addition, the supplement appears to contain a photocopy of a Plaintiff's New York State identification card (Dkt. No. 4 at 6) and a letter from the United States Social Security Administration indicating that since April 2021, Plaintiff's Supplemental Security Income payments are in the amount of $595.50 (Dkt. No. 4 at 7-8).
Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P 15(d) “[o]n motion and reasonable notice, the court may . . . permit a party to serve a supplemental pleading setting out any transaction, occurrence, or event that happened after the date of the pleading to be supplemented.” Plaintiff failed to file a motion to supplement. In addition, the “Supplement” filed by Plaintiff does not relate to events that occurred after the Complaint was filed on September 19, 2024.
Plaintiff also filed an application to proceed IFP. (Dkt. No. 2.)
II. PLAINTIFF'S APPLICATION TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS
When a civil action is commenced in a federal district court, the statutory filing fee, currently set at $405, must ordinarily be paid. 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). A court is authorized, however, to permit a litigant to proceed IFP status if a party “is unable to pay” the standard fee for commencing an action. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1). After reviewing Plaintiff's IFP application (Dkt. No. 2), the Court finds that Plaintiff meets this standard. Therefore, Plaintiff's application to proceed IFP is granted. (Id.)
The language of that section is ambiguous because it suggests an intent to limit availability of IFP status to prison inmates. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1) (authorizing the commencement of an action without prepayment of fees “by a person who submits an affidavit that includes a statement of all assets such prisoner possesses”). The courts have construed that section, however, as making IFP status available to any litigant who can meet the governing financial criteria. Hayes v. United States, 71 Fed.Cl. 366, 367 (Fed. Cl. 2006); Fridman v. City of N.Y., 195 F.Supp.2d 534, 536 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
Plaintiff is reminded that, although his IFP application has been granted, he is still required to pay fees that he may incur in this action, including copying and/or witness fees.
Plaintiff is advised that the ability to litigate an action without prepayment of fees is a privilege that can be denied, revoked, or limited based upon a showing of prior abuses. See In re Anderson, 511 U.S. 364, 365-66 (1994) (denying the pro se petitioner's request for leave to proceed IFP where the Court found that, like the previous twenty-two petitions filed during the three immediately preceding years, the instant petition was “patently frivolous”); see also Cuoco v. United States Bureau of Prisons, 328 F.Supp.2d 463, 467 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (“The ability to proceed IFP is a privilege provided for the benefit of indigent persons.”). The authority of a court to deny or limit a request to proceed IFP is implicit in the permissive, rather than compulsory, language of the controlling statute, which provides that “any court of the United States may authorize the commencement, prosecution or defense of any suit, action or proceeding, civil or criminal, or appeal therein, without prepayment of fees or security therefor[.]” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1) (emphasis added); In re McDonald, 489 U.S. 180, 183 (1989). For this reason, courts are regarded as possessing discretionary authority to deny IFP status to litigants who have abused the privilege. See Hurt v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 544 F.3d 308, 309-310 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (quoting Butler v. Dep't of Justice, 492 F.3d 440, 444-45 (D.C. Cir. 2007)) (“This Circuit grants IFP status to various plaintiffs, but asserts its discretion to deny or revoke this privilege for abusive litigants, looking to ‘the number, content, frequency, and disposition of their previous filings[.]'”).
Plaintiff's litigation history in this district suggests that he is on the brink of being found to have abused the privilege of proceeding IFP. In addition to the case currently before the Court, Plaintiff has filed fifteen other lawsuits in this district within approximately the last twelve months. In all fifteen of the other actions, Plaintiff requested, and was granted, permission to proceed without prepayment of fees. (Muhammad I, Dkt. No. 9; Muhammad II, Dkt. No. 9; Muhammad III, Dkt. No. 10; Muhammad IV, Dkt. No. 9; Muhammad V, Dkt. No. 7; Muhammad VI, Dkt. No. 7; Muhammad VII, Dkt. No. 7; Muhammad VIII, Dkt. No. 8; Muhammad IX, Dkt. No. 6; Muhammad X, Dkt. No. 5; Muhammad XI, Dkt. No. 6; Muhammad XII, Dkt. No. 5; Muhammad XIII, Dkt. No. 5; Muhammad XIV, Dkt. No. 5; Muhammad XV, Dkt. No. 5.)
Muhammad v. Seiden, 3:24-CV-0035 (LEK/ML) (“Muhammad I”); Muhammad v. Breen, 3:24-CV-0037 (DNH/ML) (“Muhammad II”); Muhammad v. Securities Exchange Comm'n, 3:24-CV-0089 (DNH/ML) (“Muhammad III”); Muhammad v. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 3:24-CV-0133 (DNH/ML) (“Muhammad IV”); Muhammad v. Fed. Reserve Bank of New York, 3:24-CV-0157 (DNH/ML) (“Muhammad V”); Muhammad v. United States Dep't of Treasury, 3:24-CV-0182 (DNH/ML) (“Muhammad VI”); Muhammad v. Office of Mgmt. and Budget, 3:24-CV-0197 (DNH/ML) (“Muhammad VII”); Muhammad v. Int'l Monetary Fund, 3:24-CV-0208 (DNH/ML) (“Muhammad VIII”); Muhammad v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 3:24-CV-0251 (DNH/ML) (“Muhammad IX”); Muhammad v. Bank of Int'l Settlement, 3:24-CV-0277 (DNH/ML) (“Muhammad X”); Muhammad v. European Central Bank, 3:24-CV-0288 (DNH/ML) (“Muhammad XI”); Muhammad v. Eastern Caribbean Central Bank, 3:24-CV-0298 (DNH/ML) (“Muhammad XII”); Muhammad v. Central Bank of West African States, 3:24-CV-0299 (DNH/ML) (“Muhammad XIII”); Muhammad v. Bank of Central African States, 3:24-CV-0300 (DNH/ML) (“Muhammad XIV”); and Muhammad v. The World Bank Grp., 3:24-CV-0360 (DNH/ML) (“Muhammad XV”).
Common to the other dismissed actions filed by Plaintiff in this district (including, as will be discussed below, the current Complaint under consideration in this report) is his failure to include factual allegations in his complaints that plausibly suggest a claim upon which relief may be granted. Accordingly, Plaintiff is hereby cautioned that (1) proceeding IFP is a privilege that is extended to litigants at the discretion of the court, and (2) any further filing of patently frivolous lawsuits may result in the denial of any request to proceed IFP in an action and/or a recommendation to the Chief District Judge that a filing injunction be issued against Plaintiff, barring him from filing any future lawsuits in this district without prior permission.
The undersigned notes that in Muhammad I, one claim survived sua sponte review. Muhammad I, Dkt. No. 14.
III. LEGAL STANDARD FOR INITIAL REVIEW OF COMPLAINT
“Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that . . . the action . . . (i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2).
In determining whether an action is frivolous, the court must consider whether the complaint lacks an arguable basis in law or in fact. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). Dismissal of frivolous actions is appropriate to prevent abuses of court process as well as to discourage the waste of judicial resources. Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327; Harkins v. Eldridge, 505 F.2d 802, 804 (8th Cir. 1974); see Fitzgerald v. First East Seventh Street Tenants Corp., 221 F.3d 362, 364 (2d Cir. 2000) (a district court “may dismiss a frivolous complaint sua sponte even when the plaintiff has paid the required filing fee[.]”); see also Pflaum v. Town of Stuyvesant, Columbia Cnty., N.Y., 11-CV-0335, 2016 WL 865296, at *1, n.2 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 2, 2016) (Suddaby, C.J.) (finding that the Court had the power to address and dismiss additional theories of the plaintiff's retaliation claim sua sponte because those theories were so lacking in arguable merit as to be frivolous).
In order to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, a complaint must contain, inter alia, “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). The requirement that a plaintiff “show” that he or she is entitled to relief means that a complaint “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (emphasis added) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 [2007]). “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief . . . requires the . . . court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense....[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged-but it has not shown-that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (internal citation and punctuation omitted).
“In reviewing a complaint . . . the court must accept the material facts alleged in the complaint as true and construe all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor.” Hernandez v. Coughlin, 18 F.3d 133, 136 (2d Cir. 1994) (citation omitted). However, “the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions. Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
Courts are “obligated to construe a pro se complaint liberally.” Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009); see also Nance v. Kelly, 912 F.2d 605, 606 (2d Cir. 1990) (per curiam) (reading the plaintiff's pro se complaint “broadly, as we must” and holding that the complaint sufficiently raised a cognizable claim). “[E]xtreme caution should be exercised in ordering sua sponte dismissal of a pro se complaint before the adverse party has been served and [the] parties . . . have had an opportunity to respond.” Anderson v. Coughlin, 700 F.2d 37, 41 (2d Cir. 1983).
IV. ANALYSIS
In addressing the sufficiency of a plaintiff's complaint, the court must construe his pleadings liberally. Sealed Plaintiff v. Sealed Defendant, 537 F.3d 185, 191 (2d Cir. 2008). Having reviewed Plaintiff's Complaint with this principle in mind, I recommend that the Complaint be dismissed in its entirety.
A. Claims Pursuant to 5 U.S.C. §§ 3331, 7311
To the extent that Plaintiff attempts to assert claims pursuant to 5 U.S.C. §§ 3331, 7311, he fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
5 U.S.C. § 3331 requires certain federal officials to swear an oath of allegiance to the Constitution of the United States. Manigault v. Spry, 23-CV-0264, 2024 WL 1345340, at *4 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 28, 2024) (Kahn, J.) (citing 5 U.S.C. § 3331). The Complaint does not allege action taken by any federal officials. (See generally Dkt. No. 1.) Although the Complaint includes Defendants Department of Treasury - Internal Revenue Service and U.S. Department of State, it does not allege any action taken by those entities or employees of those entities, nor does it allege that any federal official employed by those entities failed to take a required oath of allegiance to the Constitution of the United States. (Id.)
5 U.S.C. § 7311 is a criminal provision. Martin v. Piotr Nowak ® v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., 23-CV-5783, 2023 WL 5952055, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 9, 2023) (noting that 5 U.S.C. § 7311 is a criminal provision that restricts federal employees' ability to strike). There is no private right of action to enforce state or federal criminal statutes. See generally Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 619 (1973) (“[A] private citizen lacks a judicially cognizable interest in the prosecution or non[-]prosecution of another.”); see also Walker v. CIBC Ltd., 20-CV-1337, 2021 WL 3518439, at *5 (N.D.N.Y. Apr. 13, 2021) (Hummel, M.J.) (“It appears plaintiff is either seeking the criminal prosecution of an individual or individuals or a law enforcement investigation, which is beyond this Court's jurisdiction.”), report-recommendation adopted by 2021 WL 3204860 (N.D.N.Y. July 29, 2021) (McAvoy, J.); McFadden v. Ortiz, 12-CV-1244, 2013 WL 1789593, at *3 (N.D.N.Y. Apr. 26, 2013) (D'Agostino, J.) (holding that “there is no private right of action to enforce either state or federal criminal statutes.”).
As a result, I recommend dismissal of Plaintiff's claims that are premised on alleged violations of 5 U.S.C. §§ 3331, 7311. See Foskey, 2022 WL 3228271, at *3 (collecting cases holding that “none of these criminal statutes provide a private cause of action).
B. Claims Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983
1. Claims Against Defendants New York State Child Support Processing Center, Ohio Child Support Payment Central, and New York State Department of Taxation and Finance
“It is well settled that the ultimate guarantee of the Eleventh Amendment is that nonconsenting states may not be sued by private individuals in federal court.” Clissuras v. CUNY, 359 F.3d 79, 81 (2d Cir. 2004); see also Murawski v. N.Y. State Bd. of Elections, 285 F.Supp.3d 691, 695 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (“[I]t is well established that a non-consenting state is immune from suits brought by its own citizens in federal court.”). Eleventh Amendment immunity extends “not only to a state but also to entities considered arms of the state,” which include state agencies. Clissuras, 359 F.3d at 81. “This jurisdictional bar applies regardless of the nature of the relief sought.” Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100 (1984). “It is well-established that New York [and Ohio] ha[ve] not consented to § 1983 suits in federal court, and that § 1983 was not intended to override a state's sovereign immunity.” Mamot v. Bd. of Regents, 367 Fed.Appx. 191, 192 (2d Cir. 2010); accord Steinberg v. Elkman, 666 Fed.Appx. 26, 27 (2d Cir. 2016) (“Congress has not abrogated sovereign immunity for § 1983 claims, nor has New York waived immunity.”); Sherrod Estate v. Madden, 24-CV-0651, 2024 WL 5183205, at *3 (S.D. Ohio Dec. 20, 2024) (quoting Smith v. DeWine, 476 F.Supp.3d 635, 652 (S.D. Ohio 2020)) (“Ohio has not consented to suits in federal court nor has Congress abrogated Ohio's immunity under § 1983.”).
Defendants New York State Child Support Processing Center, Ohio Child Support Payment Central, and New York State Department of Taxation and Finance are entities against which claims are barred unless sovereign immunity has been otherwise abrogated. See Gerken v. Gordon, 24-CV-0435, 2024 WL 5001402, at *3 (N.D.N.Y. Dec. 6, 2024) (D'Agostino, J.) (citing Grigoli v. 42 U.S.C. § 654(3) Child Support Enf't Div., 18-CV-3672, 2018 WL 2084172, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. May 1, 2018); Skalaban v. Dep't of Child. & Fams., 314 F.Supp.2d 101, 106 (D. Conn. 2004)) (holding that the plaintiff's “complaint against the New York State Child Support Processing Center, a state entity, is barred by the Eleventh Amendment.”); Anand v. New York State Dep't of Taxation and Finance, 10-CV-5142, 2012 WL 2357720, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. June 18, 2012) (quoting Miller v. State of New York Div. of Tax Appeals, 480 F.Supp.2d 574, 581 (E.D.N.Y. 2007)) (“The Department of Taxation is a state agency entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity.”).
As a result, I recommend that Plaintiff's claims against Defendants New York State Child Support Processing Center, Ohio Child Support Payment Central, and New York State Department of Taxation and Finance be dismissed because sovereign immunity deprives this Court of subject matter jurisdiction.
In the alternative, I recommend that all claims against Defendants New York State Child Support Processing Center and Ohio Child Support Payment Central be dismissed because the Complaint fails to allege facts that plausibly suggest wrongdoing on their part. “Dismissal is appropriate where a defendant is listed in the caption, but the body of the complaint fails to indicate what the defendant did to the plaintiff.” Cipriani v. Buffardi, 06-CV-0889, 2007 WL 607341, at *1 (N.D.N.Y. Feb. 20, 2007) (Kahn, J.) (citing Gonzalez v. City of New York, 97-CV-2246, 1998 WL 382055, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. July 9, 1998)); see also Crown v. Wagenstein, 96-CV-3895, 1998 WL 118169, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 16, 1998) (mere inclusion of warden's name in complaint insufficient to allege personal involvement); Taylor v. City of New York, 953 F.Supp. 95, 99 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (same).
2. Claims Against Defendants Suffolk County Support, Child Support Enforcement Bureau (CSEB) Unit, Broome County Department of Services Collection Unit #124, Child Support Services Unit, and Summit County Child Support Enforcement Agency (CSEA)
I recommend that Plaintiff's claims against Defendants Suffolk County Support, Child Support Enforcement Bureau (CSEB) Unit, Broome County Department of Services Collection Unit #124, Child Support Services Unit, and Summit County Child Support Enforcement Agency (CSEA) be dismissed for three separate and independent reasons.
First, Defendants Suffolk County Support, Child Support Enforcement Bureau (CSEB) Unit, Broome County Department of Services Collection Unit #124, Child Support Services Unit, and Summit County Child Support Enforcement Agency (CSEA), are merely administrative arms of municipalities and are not proper parties amenable to suit. “‘[D]epartments that are merely administrative arms of a municipality do not have a legal identity separate and apart from the municipality and, therefore, cannot be sued.'” Burris v. Nassau Cnty. District Attorney, 14-CV-5540, 2017 WL 9485714, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 12, 2017) (quoting Harris v. Nassau Cnty., 13-CV-4728, 2016 WL 3023265, at *12 (E.D.N.Y. May 24, 2016) (dismissing claims against the Nassau County Police Department because it is an administrative arm of the municipality of Nassau County); citing Pooler v. Hempstead Police Dep't, 897 F.Supp.2d 12, 21 (E.D.N.Y. 2012) (dismissing claims against Hempstead Police Department and holding that the Hempstead Police Department is an “administrative arm” of the Village of Hempstead)); Davis v. Lynbrook Police Dep't, 224 F.Supp.2d 463, 477 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) (dismissing claims against Lynbrook Police Department); Wilson v. City of New York, 800 F.Supp. 1098, 1101 (E.D.N.Y. 1992) (“The court also dismisses the claims against the New York City Police Department which cannot be sued independently because it is an agency of the City of New York”).
While Plaintiff could sue the municipalities-Suffolk County, Broome County, and Summit County-themselves, rather than one of their “departments,” a municipality may only be named as a defendant in certain circumstances. A municipality may not be held liable solely because it employs a tortfeasor. Los Angeles Cnty., Cal. v. Humphries, 562 U.S. 29, 36 (2010). Only when the municipality, through the execution of its policies, actually deprives an individual of his constitutional rights, is it liable for the injury. Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978).
To establish municipal liability, the policy must actually cause the violation of constitutional rights; it must be the moving force behind the violation. Monell, 436 U.S. at 694; Dominguez v. Beame, 603 F.2d 337, 341 (2d Cir. 1979). Official policy includes the decisions of a government's lawmakers, the acts of policymaking officials, and practices that are so widespread as to “practically have the force of law.” Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 61 (2011). Municipal liability may also be shown by establishing that a policymaking official ordered or ratified the employees' actions either expressly or tacitly.
Finally, municipal liability can, under limited circumstances, be based upon a failure to properly train the municipality's employees. Connick, 563 U.S. at 61. However, municipal liability is most tenuous when a claim turns on the failure to train. Id. (citing Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 822-23 (1985) (plurality opinion) (“[A] ‘policy' of ‘inadequate training'” is “far more nebulous, and a good deal further removed from the constitutional violation, than was the policy in Monell”)). To satisfy the statute, a municipality's failure to train its employees must amount to “‘deliberate indifference to the rights of persons with whom the [untrained employees] come into contact.'” Id. (quoting City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989)).
The Complaint here essentially complains of one discrete incident, during which, an individual employed by New York State Department of Finance-which is immune from suit as set forth above in Part IV.B.1. of this Order and Report Recommendation-allegedly did not act properly. There is no indication that Plaintiff can assert a policy or custom which would support municipal liability against Defendants Suffolk County Support, Child Support Enforcement Bureau (CSEB) Unit, Broome County Department of Services Collection Unit #124, Child Support Services Unit, and Summit County Child Support Enforcement Agency (CSEA) based on these facts. In addition, none of Plaintiff's allegations reflect a failure to train or “deliberate indifference” to the rights of persons who would come into contact with Defendants.
As a result, I recommend that, to the extent that Plaintiff's Complaint is construed as asserting claims against Defendants Suffolk County, Broome County, and Summit County, it be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. See Flagg v. NYS Division of Parole, 19-CV-0886, 2019 WL 5002215, at *5 (N.D.N.Y. Aug. 15, 2019) (Baxter, M.J.) (citing DeCarlo v. Fry, 141 F.3d 56, 61 (2d Cir. 1998)) (“A single incident, particularly if it involved individuals below the policy-making level is insufficient to state a Monell claim.”), report and recommendation adopted by, 2019 WL 4963112 (N.D.N.Y. Oct. 8, 2019) (McAvoy, J.).
Second, in the alternative, I recommend that Plaintiff's claims against Defendants Suffolk County Support, Child Support Enforcement Bureau (CSEB) Unit, Broome County Department of Services Collection Unit #124, Child Support Services Unit, and Summit County Child Support Enforcement Agency (CSEA) be dismissed to the extent that it challenges his underlying family court proceeding and is, in effect, an appeal from the state family court's child-support order.
“The Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars federal district courts from hearing cases that in effect are appeals from state court judgments, because the Supreme Court is the only federal court with jurisdiction over such cases.” Dorce v. City of New York, 2 F.4th 82, 101 (2d Cir. 2021); see also Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 291-92 (2005). The Second Circuit “has articulated four requirements that must be met for Rooker-Feldman to apply: (1) the federal-court plaintiff must have lost in state court[;] (2) the plaintiff must complain of injuries caused by a state-court judgment[;] (3) the plaintiff must invite district court review and rejection of that judgment[;] and (4) the state-court judgment must have been rendered before the district court proceedings commenced.” Dorce, 2 F.4th at 101-02 (quoting Hoblock v. Albany Cty. Bd. of Elections, 422 F.3d 77, 85 (2d Cir. 2005)) (alterations in original and internal quotation marks omitted). “The fact that Plaintiff is challenging the constitutional adequacy of the proceedings is of no help to him.” Davis v. Westchester Cnty. Family Court, 16-CV-9487, 2017 WL 4311039, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 26, 2017); see generally Hoblock, 422 F.3d at 87 (“If [a] father sues in federal court . . . on grounds that the state judgment violates his federal substantive due-process rights as a parent, he is complaining of an injury caused by the state judgment and seeking its reversal. This he may not do, regardless of whether he raised any constitutional claims in state court, because only the Supreme Court may hear appeals from state-court judgments.”).
“Courts have applied this doctrine to bar claims challenging the enforcement of childsupport orders by garnishment, seizure, and suspension of a child-support debtor's driver's license.” Ganiyu v. Lopez, 19-CV-11605, 2020 WL 1467356, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 25, 2020) (collecting cases); see also Davis, 2017 WL 4311039, at *8 (“Courts have repeatedly invoked Rooker-Feldman in cases in which plaintiffs challenge family court decrees setting child support arrears”); Hall v. Clinton Cnty., 18-CV-1405, 2020 WL 1923236, at *4 (N.D.N.Y. Apr. 21, 2020) (Suddaby, C.J.); Williams v. NYU Hosp. Ctr. Fin. & Payroll Support, 19-CV-11612, 2020 WL 1878119, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 14, 2020) (citing Remy v. New York State Dep't of Taxation and Fin., 507 Fed.Appx. 16, 18 (2d Cir. 2013) (summary order)).
Here, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars the Court from reviewing any claims arising from Plaintiff's assertion that the child support “ORDERS were illegally enforced by unconstitutional process / proceedings by family courts.” (Dkt. No. 1 at 11.) All of the Rooker-Feldman factors are met in this case. The undersigned can reasonably infer that Plaintiff “lost in state court,” Dorce, 2 F.4th at 101, as judgments and liens have been issued against him, his passport has been “frozen / deactivated,” and his personal vehicle was “illegally impounded” as a result of the “illegal orders of support.” (Dkt. No. 1 at 8.) Moreover, Plaintiff “complain[s] of injuries caused by a state-court judgment.” See Dorce, 2 F.4th at 101. “Once a child support order has been entered . . . [a]ny past due support is treated as a judgment by operation of law and is enforceable in the same manner as a judgment.” O'Brien v. Hansell, 09-CV-0629, 2010 WL 1371366, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2010) (internal citations omitted). Here, Plaintiff complains about the impoundment of his vehicle for past due child support, and asks the Court to enjoin further collection or adverse consequences (like suspension of his driver's license), all of which stem from the state's child support order against him. (Dkt. No. 1 at 8; Dkt. No. 1, Attach. 1 at 14.) In seeking such an order, Plaintiff “invite[s]” the Court to review and reject a family court judgment that “rendered before the district court proceedings commenced,” Dorce, 2 F.4th at 101, given that warrants were issued to collect past due child support dated April 18, 2019. (Dkt. No. 1, Attach. 1 at 2.) Consequently, under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, the Court is barred from reviewing Plaintiff's claim that challenges his underlying family court proceeding because that claim is, in effect, an appeal from the state family court's child-support order.
Third, in the alternative, the domestic relations abstention doctrine bars the Court from considering Plaintiff's claim seeking modification of his child support order. Lions v. New York State Office of Child Support Enforcement, 24-CV-7181, 2025 WL 81421, at *5-6 (S.D.N.Y.Jan. 10, 2025). In American Airlines, Inc. v. Block, the Second Circuit held that “[a] federal court presented with matrimonial issues or issues ‘on the verge' of being matrimonial in nature should abstain from exercising jurisdiction so long as there is no obstacle to their full and fair determination in state courts.” 905 F.2d 12, 14 (2d Cir. 1990) (holding that court erred in not abstaining from adjudicating dispute over ex-spouse's maintenance obligations); see Khalid v. Sessions, 904 F.3d 129, 133 (2d Cir. 2018) (“Family law, after all, is an area of law that federal courts and Congress leave almost exclusively to state law and state courts.”); see also Deem v. DiMella-Deem, 941 F.3d 618, 624 (2d Cir. 2019) (“[T]he existence of a distinct abstention doctrine for certain domestic relations disputes is supported by the Supreme Court's longstanding recognition-in a non-diversity case involving a child custody dispute-that the whole subject of the domestic relations of husband and wife, parent and child, belongs to the laws of the states, and not to the laws of the United States.”) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
Here, Plaintiff's challenge to the amount of his child support obligations falls squarely within the domestic relations doctrine. See, e.g., Simmons v. NYS Dep't of Soc. Servs., 19-CV-3633, 2019 WL 5810307, at *4 n.2 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 5, 2019) (“[E]ven if Rooker-Feldman did not bar Plaintiff's claim asking this Court to review a support order that the Family Court issued, calculation of support payments is the type of domestic relations issue that the Court generally abstains from hearing.”); Myers v. Sara Lee Corp., 08-CV-1421, 2009 WL 10706711, at *10 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 13, 2009) (“[T]he income execution for which enforcement is sought consists of an ongoing support obligation that is subject to modification by the Family Court. Enforcement by this court would thus require interference with the ability of the Family Court to modify ongoing child support obligations, and abstention would be mandated here ....”). Accordingly, I recommend that the Court abstain from reviewing Plaintiff's family court proceeding to the extent that he asserts a claim seeking modification of the underlying family court child support order.
For each of these reasons, I recommend that Plaintiff's claims against Defendants Suffolk County Support, Child Support Enforcement Bureau (CSEB) Unit, Broome County Department of Services Collection Unit #124, Child Support Services Unit, and Summit County Child Support Enforcement Agency (CSEA) be dismissed.
In addition, the Complaint fails to allege any wrongdoing by Defendants Suffolk County Support, Child Support Enforcement Bureau (CSEB) Unit, Broome County Department of Services Collection Unit #124, Child Support Services Unit, and Summit County Child Support Enforcement Agency (CSEA). As a result, I recommend that in the alternative, Plaintiff's claims against them be dismissal for the reasons stated in note 8.
3. Claims Against Defendant Summit County Clerk of Court
To the extent that Plaintiff asserts claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Defendant Summit County Clerk of Court, I recommend that they be dismissed.
Summit County Clerk of Court “enjoys absolute immunity from suits seeking monetary damages on claims arising out of the performance of her quasi-judicial functions.” Gerald v. Akron Bar Ass'n, 18-CV-0414, 2018 WL 2985142, at *2 (N.D. Ohio June 14, 2018) (citing Wappler v. Carniak, 24 Fed.Appx. 294, 295-96 (6th Cir. 2001); Foster v. Walsh, 864 F.2d 416, 417-18 (6th Cir. 1988) (finding court clerk immune)); see Jennings v. Walsh, 2010 WL 2901744, at *2 (N.D. Ohio July 22, 2010) (“Summit County Clerk of Courts is entitled to absolute immunity when performing judicial functions even if acting erroneously, corruptly or in excess of jurisdiction.”).
Based on the allegations set forth in the Complaint, it is impossible to decipher what, if anything, Defendant Summit County Clerk of Court did to Plaintiff. Hence, the undersigned is unable to determine whether Defendant Summit County Clerk of Court is entitled to immunity. Notwithstanding, I recommend that the claims against Defendant Summit County Clerk of Court be dismissed because, other than the caption, the Complaint fails to allege facts plausibly suggesting any wrongdoing by Defendant Summit County Clerk of Court. See, supra, note 8.
4. Claims Against Department of Treasury - Internal Revenue Service and U.S. Department of State
Suits against the United States and federal agencies require “a cause of action, subject matter jurisdiction, and a waiver of sovereign immunity.” Presidential Gardens Assoc. v. Sec'y of Hous. and Urban Dev., 175 F.3d 132, 139 (2d Cir. 1999) (citing United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 212 (1983)); see also Adeleke v. United States, 355 F.3d 144, 150 (2d Cir. 2004). Unless Congress has specifically authorized an agency of the federal government to be sued in its own name, an action may not be maintained against that agency. Blackmar v. Guerre, 342 U.S. 512, 515 (1952). Congress has not specifically authorized suit against Defendants Department of Treasury - Internal Revenue Service and U.S. Department of State and therefore, they are not suable entities. See, e.g., Liffiton v. Keuker, 850 F.2d 73, 77 (2d Cir. 1988) (“It is well-settled that the United States is immune from suit except where congress, by specific statute, has waived sovereign immunity; as to the I.R.S., no such waiver has been enacted for claims such as these.”) (internal citation omitted); Celauro v. U.S. I.R.S., 411 F.Supp.2d 257, 267-68 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) (Spatt, J.), aff'd sub nom. Celauro v. U.S., 214 Fed.Appx. 95 (2d Cir. 2007) (summary order); Toriola v. I.R.S., 99 A.F.T.R.2d 2007-394 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) (Ross, J.).
“The United States, as sovereign, is immune from suit, save as it consents to be sued, and the terms of its consent to be sued in any court define that court's jurisdiction to entertain the suit.” United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 586 (1941). The language of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 does not reach the actions of the federal government. District of Columbia v. Carter, 409 U.S. 418, 425 (1973), reh'g denied, 410 U.S. 959 (1973). The statute was designed to protect private citizens from discrimination by other private citizens acting in an official capacity. The United States has yet to waive its immunity from suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Ricca v. United States, 488 F.Supp. 1317, 1325 (E.D.N.Y.1980).
The undersigned notes that, were the Court to consider Plaintiff's claims against Defendants Department of Treasury - Internal Revenue Service and U.S. Department of State as arising under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 397 (1971), dismissal would still be warranted. “Bivens authorizes suits against the responsible federal official, not against the government itself, and Bivens-type actions against the United States are . . . routinely dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.” Keene Corp. v. United States, 700 F.2d 836, 845 (2d Cir. 1983).
As a result, I recommend that Plaintiff's claims against Defendants Department of Treasury - Internal Revenue Service and U.S. Department of State be dismissed because the United States is immune from suit.
C. Claim of Extrinsic Fraud
Plaintiff appears to assert a claim of “extrinsic fraud” against Defendants. (Dkt. No. 1 at 8, 11.) “Extrinsic fraud” is a legal concept that, in New York, allows for collateral attack on a judgment. Griffith v. Bank of N.Y., 147 F.2d 899, 903 (2d Cir. 1945). The “classic definition of extrinsic fraud [is] ‘by reason of something done by the successful party to a suit, there was in fact no adversary trial or decision of the issue in the case .... [T]he unsuccessful party has been prevented from exhibiting fully his case, by fraud or deception practi[c]ed on him by his opponent.” Chevron Corp. v. Donziger, 974 F.Supp.2d 362, 561 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (quoting United States v. Throckmorton, 98 U.S. 61, 65 (1878)).
Having found that all of Plaintiff's federal claims are subject to dismissal, I recommend that, to the extent that he has asserted any state law claim, the Court decline to exercise jurisdiction over that claim. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) (providing that a district court “may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over [pendent state law claims] if . . . the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction”); Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 n.7 (1988) (“[I]n the usual case in which all federal-law claims are eliminated before trial, the balance of factors to be considered under the pendent jurisdiction doctrine-judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity-will point toward declining to exercise jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims.”); Walker v. Time Life Films, Inc., 784 F.2d 44, 53 (2d Cir. 1986) (citing Kavit v. A.L. Stamm & Co., 491 F.2d 1176, 1180 (1974)) (holding that “federal courts, absent exceptional circumstances, should abstain from exercising pendent jurisdiction when federal claims in a case can be disposed of by summary judgment”).
V. OPPORTUNITY TO AMEND
Generally, a court should not dismiss claims contained in a complaint filed by a pro se litigant without granting leave to amend at least once “when a liberal reading of the complaint gives any indication that a valid claim might be stated.” Branum v. Clark, 927 F.2d 698, 704-05 (2d Cir. 1991); see also Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a)(2) (“The court should freely give leave when justice so requires.”). An opportunity to amend is not required, however, where “the problem with [the plaintiff's] causes of action is substantive” such that “better pleading will not cure it.” Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 112 (2d Cir. 2000); see also Cortec Indus. Inc. v. Sum Holding L.P., 949 F.2d 42, 48 (2d Cir. 1991) (“Of course, where a plaintiff is unable to allege any fact sufficient to support its claim, a complaint should be dismissed with prejudice.”). Stated differently, “[w]here it appears that granting leave to amend is unlikely to be productive, . . . it is not an abuse of discretion to deny leave to amend.” Ruffolo v. Oppenheimer & Co., 987 F.2d 129, 131 (2d Cir. 1993); accord, Brown v. Peters, 95-CV-1641, 1997 WL 599355, at *1 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 22, 1997) (Pooler, J.).
See also Carris v. First Student, Inc., 132 F.Supp.3d 321, 340-41 n.1 (N.D.N.Y. 2015) (Suddaby, C.J.) (explaining that the standard set forth in Gomez v. USAA Fed. Sav. Bank, 171 F.3d 794, 796 (2d Cir. 1999)-that the Court should grant leave to amend “unless the court can rule out any possibility, however unlikely it might be, that an amended complaint would be successful in stating a claim”-is likely not an accurate recitation of the governing law after Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007)), rev'd on other grounds, 682 Fed.Appx. 30.
Here, a better pleading could not cure the deficiencies described above. As a result, I recommend that the Complaint be dismissed without leave to replead.
ACCORDINGLY, it is
ORDERED that Plaintiff's IFP application (Dkt. No. 2) is GRANTED; and it is further respectfully
RECOMMENDED that the Court DISMISS WITHOUT PREJUDICE but WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND the Complaint (Dkt. No. 1) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e); and it is further
ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court shall file a copy of this Order and Report Recommendation on Plaintiff, along with copies of the unpublished decisions cited herein in accordance with the Second Circuit's decision in Lebron v. Sanders, 557 F.3d 76 (2d Cir. 2009) (per curiam).
NOTICE: Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), the parties have fourteen days within which to file written objections to the foregoing report. Such objections shall be filed with the Clerk of the Court. FAILURE TO OBJECT TO THIS REPORT WITHIN FOURTEEN DAYS WILL PRECLUDE APPELLATE REVIEW . 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (Supp. 2013); Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), 6(d), 72; Roldan v. Racette, 984 F.2d 85 (2d Cir. 1993) (citing Small v. Sec'y of Health and Human Servs., 892 F.2d 15 (2d Cir. 1989)).
If you are proceeding pro se and served with this report, recommendation, and order by mail, three additional days will be added to the fourteen-day period, meaning that you have seventeen days from the date that the report, recommendation, and order was mailed to you to serve and file objections. Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(d). If the last day of that prescribed period falls on a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday, then the deadline is extended until the end of the next day that is not a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday. Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a)(1)(C).
(Attachment Omitted)