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Motorola Mobility Inc. v. Au Optronics Corp. (In re TFT-LCD (Flat Panel) Antitrust Litig.)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
Nov 16, 2011
No. M 07-1827 SI (N.D. Cal. Nov. 16, 2011)

Opinion

No. M 07-1827 SI MDL No. 1827 No. C 09-5840 SI

11-16-2011

In re: TFT-LCD (FLAT PANEL) ANTITRUST LITIGATION This Order Relates To: MOTOROLA MOBILITY, INC., Plaintiff, v. AU OPTRONICS CORPORATION, et al., Defendants.


ORDER DENYING PHILIPS ELECTRONICS NORTH AMERICA CORPORATION'S MOTION TO DISMISS MOTOROLA MOBILITY'S THIRD AMENDED COMPLAINT

Now before the Court is a motion by Philips Electronics North America Corporation ("PENAC") to dismiss Motorola Mobility, Inc.'s Third Amended Complaint ("TAC"). Pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7-1(b), the Court finds this matter suitable for disposition without oral argument and therefore VACATES the hearing currently scheduled for November 18, 2011. Having considered the parties' papers, and for good cause appearing, the Court hereby DENIES PENAC's motion.

The Court GRANTS PENAC's unopposed request for judicial notice.

PENAC's primary argument is that Motorola's TAC lacks any substantive allegations that are specific to PENAC. Instead, the bulk of Motorola's allegations are made against "Philips," which the TAC defines as PENAC, it's ultimate parent corporation, Royal Philips, "and their affiliates, parents, subsidiaries, agents and representatives." TAC at ¶49. PENAC argues that Motorola may not "impute liability to PENAC by alleging conduct by 'Philips.'" Motion at 7. Based largely on this Court's prior order dismissing Nokia's claims against PENAC, PENAC argues that Motorola's TAC fails to adequately allege that it acted in violation of the antitrust laws. See Order Granting Defendants' Joint Motion to Dismiss and Granting Philips Electronics North America Corporation's Motion to Dismiss; Granting Plaintiffs Leave to Amend, Master Docket No. 1824, at 10 (June 29, 2010) ("[A]llegations and assertions about Royal Philips and LG Display are insufficient to state a claim against PENAC unless the complaint alleges a specific connection between PENAC and the alleged conspiracy.").

PENAC's reliance on this Court's Nokia order is misplaced. Nokia's complaint contained absolutely no allegations from which PENAC could have determined its connection to the conspiracy. The sole specific factual allegation against the Philips entities alleged only that "[Royal] Philips had received a Statement of Objections from EU concerning its alleged participation in a conspiracy in violation of Article 81 of the EC Treaty and Article 53 of the Agreement on the European Economic Area." Id. at 9. Other than conclusory allegations of the Philips entities' involvement, there were no further allegations that any Philips entity had actually participated in the conspiracy.

In contrast to the Nokia complaint, Motorola's complaint contains a number of specific allegations that link PENAC to the conspiracy. For example, the TAC alleges that "Philips" engaged in illegal bilateral communications with Epson, Sharp, and Toshiba. See TAC at ¶110. It includes details on those discussions, such as the dates they occurred, the identities of those involved, and the subject matters discussed. Taken in the light most favorable to Motorola, these allegations adequately allege that PENAC participated in the price-fixing conspiracy.

PENAC contends that these allegations are conspicuously made against "Philips," and no such allegations are made against PENAC itself. While true, the Court believes that such matters are factual in nature and better reserved for summary judgment. Indeed, PENAC's motion is accompanied by a factual declaration stating that the two "Philips" employees referenced in the TAC never worked for PENAC. See Declaration of Nancy J. Loughlin in Support of PENAC's Motion, at ¶2. Such arguments are not appropriate for the pleading stage. Cf. Ferrigno v. Philips Electronics North America Corp., 2010 WL 2219975, at *3-4 (N.D. Cal., June 1, 2010) (dismissing complaint against Royal Philips based in part upon factual determination that its relationship with PENAC was insufficient to support a finding of personal jurisdiction).

Accordingly, the Court finds that Motorola's TAC adequately states a claim against PENAC under the federal antitrust laws and the Illinois Antitrust Act. The remainder of PENAC's arguments have already been addressed by this Court. Thus, the Court rejects PENAC's argument that the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act bars Motorola's federal antitrust claims. See Order Denying Defendants' Joint Motion to Dismiss the Second Amended Motorola Complaint, Master Docket No. 2602, at 4-10 (March 28, 2011). The Court also rejects PENAC's motion to the extent it seeks dismissal of Motorola's breach of contract and unjust enrichment claims. See id. at 14; Order Denying Sanyo Consumer Electronics Co., Ltd.'s Motion to Dismiss Motorola Mobility, Inc.'s Third Amended Complaint, Master Docket No. 4145, at 2-3 (November 15, 2011).

PENAC has withdrawn its argument that Motorola's Illinois Antitrust Claim is untimely.
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Based on the foregoing, the Court hereby DENIES PENAC's motion to dismiss Motorola's complaint. Docket No. 168 in 09-5840; No. 3529 in 07-1827.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

SUSAN ILLSTON

United States District Judge


Summaries of

Motorola Mobility Inc. v. Au Optronics Corp. (In re TFT-LCD (Flat Panel) Antitrust Litig.)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
Nov 16, 2011
No. M 07-1827 SI (N.D. Cal. Nov. 16, 2011)
Case details for

Motorola Mobility Inc. v. Au Optronics Corp. (In re TFT-LCD (Flat Panel) Antitrust Litig.)

Case Details

Full title:In re: TFT-LCD (FLAT PANEL) ANTITRUST LITIGATION This Order Relates To…

Court:UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

Date published: Nov 16, 2011

Citations

No. M 07-1827 SI (N.D. Cal. Nov. 16, 2011)