Opinion
Civil Action 2:22-cv-290
04-19-2022
DONTE ANTIONNE MOSS, Petitioner, v. WARDEN ORLANDO HARPER, et al., Respondent.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
PATRICIA L. DODGE United States Magistrate Judge.
I. RECOMMENDATION
Donte Antionne Moss (also known as Heba Elohim of the House of Moss Bey) (“Petitioner”), recently filed a Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus (ECF 1) within which he challenges the conditions of his confinement at the Allegheny County Jail (“ACJ”). For the reasons set forth below, it is recommended that the Court summarily dismiss the Petition because the claims for relief that Petitioner asserts in it are not cognizable in a federal habeas proceeding.
The Court has a pre-service duty to screen and dismiss a habeas petition when it plainly appears that the petitioner is not entitled to relief. See also Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases (which also applies to habeas petitions filed under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 cases).
II. REPORT
A. Background
Petitioner is an inmate housed in the ACJ. He initiated this habeas case by filing a Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus (ECF 1) and the $5.00 fee applicable to habeas cases. Petitioner asserts that in the May 2021 election, “Referendum 205 was voted into local law by the citizens of Allegheny County Pennsylvania, thus making the ACJ the first County Jail in the history of the United States to officially ban solitary confinement.” (ECF 1 ¶ 13.) According to Petitioner, Allegheny County, the County Executive and the County Commissioners were “afforded six (6) months [until December 6, 2021] to implement Referendum 205 at the ACJ” but they failed “to adhere to the mandates of the new local law.” (Id.)
Petitioner is one of several ACJ inmates who recently filed the same or similar petition for a writ of habeas corpus. See, e.g., Smith v. Harper, et al., No. 2:22-cv-235 (W.D. Pa.); Ellis v. Harper, et al., No. 2:22-cv-369 (W.D. Pa.); Benton v. Harper, et al., No. 2:22-cv-352 (W.D. Pa.)
Petitioner claims that “ACJ Administration and Allegheny County has engaged in a custom, practice, and policy of disregarding the mandates of Referendum 205 by means of causing inmates who are both sentenced and pretrial to be subject to being locked in jail cells for time periods of 22 to 24 hours per day.” (Id. ¶ 14.) He further claims that he “is one such inmate who is currently being locked in his cell area for periods of time which exceed the maximum limits imposed by Referendum 205.” (Id. ¶ 17.) As relief, Petitioner seeks an order from this Court that directs the ACJ's Warden, Deputy Warden and County Executive Rich Fitzgerald to “immediately cease and desist from all correctional practices which do not comply with . . . Referendum 205” and that also directs them “to ensure that each inmate at the ACJ is provided the minimum of four (4) hours of out of cell time seven days per week.” (Id. at 4.)
B. Discussion
The purpose of a writ of habeas corpus is to challenge the legal authority under which a prisoner is held in custody. See, e.g., Keitel v. Mazurkiewicz, 729 F.3d 278, 280 (3d Cir. 2013) (citing Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973)). A petitioner carries the burden of proving that he is entitled to the writ. See, e.g., Vickers v. Superintendent Graterford SCI, 858 F.3d 841, 848-49 (3d Cir. 2017).
Petitioner does not explain whether he is being held at the ACJ as a pretrial detainee or under a state court judgment of sentence. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 is the federal habeas statute that applies to persons who are “in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court[.]” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). See, e.g., Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651 (1996); Coady v. Vaughn, 251 F.3d 480, 484-85 (3d Cir. 2001). This statute permits a federal court to entertain an application for habeas corpus relief from a state prisoner “only on the ground that he or she is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a)(emphasis added). In contrast, when an individual is in state or local custody for reasons other than a judgment of a state court, such as in pretrial detention, a petition for a writ of habeas corpus is properly brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Moore v. DeYoung, 515 F.2d 437, 441-43 (3d Cir. 1975); Duran v. Thomas, 393 Fed.Appx. 3 (3d Cir. 2010). Section 2241 provides in relevant part: “The writ of habeas corpus shall not extend to a prisoner unless.., [h]e is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States[.]” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3) (emphasis added).
There are important differences between § 2241 and § 2254 cases, but those differences are not relevant to this case. It has long been the rule in the Third Circuit that a state or local prisoner cannot challenge the conditions of his or her confinement in a habeas action and thus Petitioner's claims for habeas relief are not cognizable under either § 2241 or § 2254. See, e.g., Williams, et al. v. Sec'y Pennsylvania Dep't of Corr., 459 Fed.Appx. 87, 88-89 (3d Cir. 2012) (citing Leamer v. Fauver, 288 F.3d 532, 542 (3d Cir. 2002)); Lopez v. Wetzel, No. 12-cv-96, 2012 WL 345215, *1-5 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 1, 2012). See also Brian R. Means, FEDERAL HABEAS MANUAL § 1.35 Westlaw (database updated May 2021).
For example, a prisoner proceeding in a habeas action under § 2241 is not subject to the amendments the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) made applicable to habeas actions filed under § 2254, including the one-year limitations at § 2244(d)(1), the deferential review standards at § 2254(d)(1) and (2), and the limitation on second or successive petitions at § 2244(b)(2).
Petitioner argues that he can litigate his claims in a habeas action. In support of this argument, he relies on the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit's June 2020 decision in Hope v. Warden York County Prison, 972 F.3d 310 (3d Cir. 2020). The Court of Appeals decided Hope in the early stages of the COVID-19 pandemic, when courts were first confronted with the question of whether an individual's detention could be found to be unconstitutional solely due to the threat posed by the virus in the prison setting. In Hope, the Court of Appeals held that federal immigration detainees could challenge their conditions of confinement as they relate to COVID-19 in a habeas petition under § 2241. Id. at 323-25.
Petitioner's reliance upon Hope is misplaced. The immigration detainees who were the petitioners in that case were unequivocal that they sought outright release, and not merely a modification of their conditions of confinement, which is what Petitioner seeks in this case. Id. at 323. Moreover, Petitioner has not directed this Court to any controlling authority that has extended the holding in Hope (1) to state or local prisoners, who are able to challenge the conditions of their confinement in a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, or (2) to circumstances other than those implicated by the extraordinary circumstances brought about by the COVID-19 pandemic. See also Hope, 972 F.3d at 324 (“Although the context of the vast majority of habeas cases involve challenges to criminal judgments, the language of the habeas statute justifies resort to the writ by non-prisoner detainees.”) (emphasis added); id. at 324-25 (“Given the extraordinary circumstances that existed in March 2020 because of the COVID-19 pandemic, we are satisfied that [the petitioners'] § 2241 claim seeking only release on the basis that unconstitutional confinement conditions require it is not improper.”) (emphasis added). See, e.g., Arrington v. Commonwealth., No. 2:21-cv-1282, 2022 WL 317147, at *3 (W.D. Pa. Jan. 13, 2022), report and recommendation adopted, 2022 WL 314675 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 2, 2022) (“If Petitioner wants to pursue claims regarding the alleged mold at the Beaver County Jail, the mental health care he receives there, or whether the jail follows applicable local, state or federal guidelines or its grievance procedures, he may only do so in separate civil rights case filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.”); Rodriguez v. Clark, No. 1:21-cv-34, 2021 WL 2187921, at *2 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 25, 2021), report and recommendation adopted, 2021 WL 2187075 (W.D. Pa. May 28, 2021) (the petitioner “is seeking damages and injunctive relief in connection with two discrete challenges to the conditions of his confinement. Such claims are not cognizable in a habeas corpus action and must be dismissed.”).
Based on all of the foregoing, it is recommended that the Court summarily dismiss the Petition. The dismissal should be without prejudice to Petitioner's ability to assert his claims in a properly supported § 1983 action if he so chooses.
C. Certificate of Appealability
AEDPA provides that “[u]nless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability, an appeal may not be taken to the court of appeals from . . . the final order in a habeas corpus proceeding in which the detention complained of arises out of process issued by a State court[.]” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A). It also provides that “[a] certificate of appealability may issue . . . only if the applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” Id. § 2253(c)(2). See also Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). Here, Petitioner failed to allege the denial of a constitutional right that would entitle him to habeas relief, let alone demonstrate a substantial showing of the denial of such a right. Accordingly, the Court should not grant him a certificate of appealability on his claims.
III. CONCLUSION
Based on the above, it is respectfully recommended that the Court summarily dismiss the Petition (ECF 1) without prejudice to Petitioner's ability to assert his claims in a properly supported § 1983 action. Under the Magistrate Judges Act, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and (C), and Rule 72.D.2 of the Local Civil Rules, Petitioner is allowed fourteen (14) days from the date of this Order to file objections to this Report and Recommendation. Failure to do so will waive the right to appeal. Brightwell v. Lehman, 637 F.3d 187, 193 n.7 (3d Cir. 2011).