Opinion
Civil Action 2:21-cv-1282
01-13-2022
RICHARD ARRINGTON, Petitioner, v. COMMONWEALTH et al., Respondents.
NORA BARRY FISCHER JUDGE
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
PATRICIA L. DODGE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
I. RECOMMENDATION
Pending before the Court is the Amended Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus filed by Petitioner Richard Arrington pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. (ECF 20). For the reasons set forth below, it is recommended that the Court summarily dismiss this habeas case without service.
The Amended Petition was received by the Clerk of Court on November 8, 2021. (ECF 4.) The Court granted Petitioner's motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis on January 11, 2022 after he submitted the required supporting documents and the Amended Petition was docketed the following day at ECF 20.
The Court has a pre-service duty to screen and dismiss petitions filed under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 when it plainly appears that the petitioner is not entitled to relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 2243. See also Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases (which also applies to § 2241 cases).
II. REPORT
The information contained herein is taken from the Petition (ECF 20) and the state court docket sheet for Petitioner's criminal case in the Court of Common Pleas of Beaver County, which is available for public review at https://ujsportal.pacourts.us/DocketSheets/CP.aspx. The Court takes judicial notice of the information contained on that docket sheet.
Petitioner, who is proceeding pro se in this habeas case, is a state pretrial detainee incarcerated in the Beaver County Jail. He is awaiting his trial in the Court of Common Pleas of Beaver County at criminal docket number CP-04-CR-1244-2021 on charges of three counts of retail theft and one count of criminal mischief. Attorney Nathan Louis Bible represents Petitioner in his criminal case.
Petitioner has filed with this Court an Amended Petition for a Writ of Habeas under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (ECF 20) and supplements thereto (ECF 7, 10, 12, 13.) He claims that he was unlawfully stopped by the police on June 25, 2021, arrested without probable cause and denied counsel at his arraignment and bond hearing. He also contends that the prosecution has committed misconduct and that his right to a speedy trial has been violated. Further, Petitioner claims, the showers at the Beaver County Jail contain mold, the facility does not follow CDC guidelines or its own grievance procedures, and it does not provide access to a mental health doctor. As relief, Petitioner seeks an order from this Court directing that he be immediately released and that the state charges against him be dismissed.
B. Discussion
“For state prisoners, federal habeas corpus is substantially a post-conviction remedy[.]” Moore v. DeYoung, 515 F.2d 437, 448 (3d Cir. 1975) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254 and Peyton v. Rowe, 391 U.S. 54 (1967)). After a state prisoner has been convicted, sentenced, and has exhausted his remedies in the state courts, he may seek federal habeas relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, which is the federal habeas statute applicable to state prisoners “in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court[.]” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (emphasis added); see, e.g., Coady v. Vaughn, 251 F.3d 480, 484-86 (3d Cir. 2001).
While § 2254 applies to post-trial situations, the more general habeas corpus statute of 28 U.S.C. § 2241 provides federal courts with jurisdiction to issue a writ of habeas corpus before a state judgment is rendered, but only in very limited circumstances. “[T]hat jurisdiction must be exercised sparingly in order to prevent in the ordinary circumstance ‘pre-trial habeas interference by federal courts in the normal functioning of state criminal processes.'” Duran v. Thomas, 393 Fed.Appx. 3 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting Moore, 515 F.2d at 445-46).
Section 2241 provides in relevant part: “The writ of habeas corpus shall not extend to a prisoner unless.., [h]e is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States[.]” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3) (emphasis added). Thus, under this statute, a state criminal defendant has the mechanism in a federal habeas action to challenge the legality of his pretrial confinement by arguing that he should not be in pretrial custody in the first place because, for example: (1) his upcoming trial violates his rights under the Double Jeopardy Clause, see, e.g., United States ex rel. Webb v. Court of Common Pleas, 516 F.2d 1034 (3d Cir.1975); or, (2) he is being deprived of his constitutional right to a speedy trial, see, e.g., Braden v. Judicial Cir. Court of Kentucky, 410 U.S. 484, 492-93 (1973); or, (3) the trial court has unconstitutionally denied or revoked bail, see, e.g., Atkins v. Michigan, 644 F.2d 543, 550 (6th Cir. 1981).
Only one of Petitioner's claims (that he was denied his right to speedy trial) falls within the above categories. However, Petitioner has not exhausted that claim (or any of his other claims, for that matter) and state pretrial detainees like him must first exhaust their state-court remedies before filing a federal habeas petition. Schandelmeier v. Cunningham, 819 F.2d 52, 53 (3d Cir. 1986) (“The state court exhaustion requirement is mandated by statute under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) and has developed through decisional law as to claims brought under 28 U.S.C. § 2241.”) (citing Braden, 410 U.S. at 490-91); Moore, 515 F.2d at 442 (no distinction between § 2254 and § 2241 “insofar as the exhaustion requirement is concerned”). The exhaustion requirement is “grounded in principles of comity; in a federal system, the States should have the first opportunity to address and correct alleged violations of state prisoner's federal rights.” Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 731 (1991). See, e.g., O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 842-49 (1999); Parker v. Kelchner, 429 F.3d 58, 61 (3d Cir. 2005) (“Exhaustion addresses federalism and comity concerns by affording the state courts a meaningful opportunity to consider allegations of legal error without interference from the federal judiciary.”) (internal citations and quotations omitted). The Supreme Court has held that a petitioner must have “invoke[d] one complete round of the State's established appellate review process[, ]” in order to satisfy the exhaustion requirement. O'Sullivan, 526 U.S. at 845 (emphasis added).
It is Petitioner's burden to show that he exhausted available state remedies. See, e.g., Lambert v. Blackwell, 134 F.3d 506, 513 (3d Cir. 1997); Ellison v. Rogers, 484 F.3d 658, 660-62 (3d Cir. 2007); Coady, 251 F.3d at 488. A review of the state court docket shows that he cannot meet his burden with respect to any of his claims, including his claim that his right to a speedy trial has been violated. The state court docket sheet for Petitioner's criminal case shows that his defense counsel, Attorney Bible, has filed no motion on his behalf raising any of the claims at issue. To the extent Petitioner raised some or all of the claims he asserts in the Amended Petition in a pro se motion he filed in his state criminal case, that would not satisfy the exhaustion requirement. That is because Pennsylvania law does not permit “hybrid” representation and, therefore, a state court generally will not review on the merits a pro se motion submitted by a defendant who is represented by counsel. See, e.g., Pa. R. Crim. Pro. 576(4), (5).
Where, as is the case here, state-court remedies are unexhausted, “principles of federalism and comity require district courts to abstain from enjoining pending state criminal proceedings absent extraordinary circumstances.” Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971); Moore, 515 F.2d at 447-48. Younger abstention will apply when: “(1) there are ongoing state proceedings that are judicial in nature; (2) the state proceedings implicate important state interests; and (3) the state proceedings afford an adequate opportunity to raise the federal claims.” Lazaridis v. Wehmer, 591 F.3d 666, 670 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting Addiction Specialists, Inc. v. Twp. of Hampton, 411 F.3d 399, 408 (3d Cir. 2005)). If the three Younger requirements are satisfied, abstention is required unless the petitioner demonstrates that the state proceedings are motivated by bad faith, the state law being challenged is patently unconstitutional, or there is no adequate alternative state forum where the constitutional issues can be raised. Id. at 670 n.4 (citing Schall v. Joyce, 885 F.2d 101, 106 (3d Cir. 1989)). These exceptions are to be construed “very narrowly” and invoked only in “extraordinary circumstances.” Id.; Moore, 515 F.2d at 448. See also Brian R. Means, POSTCONVICTION REMEDIES, § 10.3 Westlaw (database updated June 2021).
Here, there is an ongoing state judicial proceeding. Petitioner is a defendant in a state criminal prosecution and granting his request for relief would interfere with those proceedings. In addition, the state's criminal case against him undoubtedly implicates the important state interests of enforcement of its criminal laws. Petitioner does have the opportunity to raise constitutional claims in the context of his state criminal proceedings in the Court of Common Pleas of Beaver County and then to the Superior Court. Thus, Petitioner's claims concerning his ongoing criminal proceedings satisfy the requirements of abstention.
Finally, to the extent that Petitioner is challenging the conditions of his confinement at the Beaver County Jail, such claims are not cognizable in a habeas action. See, e.g., Houck v. Moser, No. 3:20-cv-255, 2021 WL 1840827, *1 (W.D. Pa. May 7, 2021) (“Even in the COVID-19 era, a writ of habeas corpus is not a generally available remedy outside the immigrant detainee context contemplated in Hope v. Warden York County Prison, 972 F.3d 310, 325 (3d Cir. 2020)[.]”); see also Williams, et al. v. Sec'y Pennsylvania Dep't of Corr., 459 Fed.Appx. 87, 88-89 (3d Cir. 2012) (citing Leamer v. Fauver, 288 F.3d 532, 542 (3d Cir. 2002)); Lopez v. Wetzel, No. 12-cv-96, 2012 WL 345215, *1-5 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 1, 2012). If Petitioner wants to pursue claims regarding the alleged mold at the Beaver County Jail, the mental health care he receives there, or whether the jail follows applicable local, state or federal guidelines or its grievance procedures, he may only do so in separate civil rights case filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Based on all of the foregoing, Petitioner is not entitled to a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Thus, it is recommended that the Court summarily dismiss the petition without prejudice to Petitioner's ability to timely file another habeas petition, under either 28 U.S.C. § 2254 or § 2241 as the circumstances require, following proper exhaustion of available state-court remedies and satisfaction of any other applicable procedural prerequisites.
C. Certificate of Appealability
AEDPA codified standards governing the issuance of a certificate of appealability for appellate review of a district court's disposition of a habeas petition filed by a state prisoner under either § 2254 or § 2241. It provides that “[u]nless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability, an appeal may not be taken to the court of appeals from.. .the final order in a habeas corpus proceeding in which the detention complained of arises out of process issued by a State court[.]” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A). It also provides that “[a] certificate of appealability may issue...only if the applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” Id. § 2253(c)(2). “A district court's order dismissing, without prejudice, a petition for federal habeas relief for failure to exhaust state-court remedies is not a final appealable order, since it explicitly entitles the petitioner to renew habeas proceedings upon completion of review of his claims in the state court system.” Brian R. Means, FEDERAL HABEAS MANUAL, § 12.30 Westlaw (database updated May 2021). See also Gacho v. Butler, 792 F.3d 732, 735-37 (7th Cir. 2015). However, to the extent a certificate of appealability determination is required in this case, Petitioner is not entitled to one because jurists of reason would not find it debatable whether his claims should be dismissed. Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000).
III. CONCLUSION
Based on the above, it is respectfully recommended that the Court dismiss the Amended Petition (ECF 20), as supplemented, without prejudice and deny a certificate of appealability. Pursuant to the Magistrate Judges Act, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and (C), and Rule 72.D.2 of the Local Civil Rules, Petitioner is allowed fourteen (14) days from the date of this Order to file objections to this Report and Recommendation. Failure to do so will waive the right to appeal. Brightwell v. Lehman, 637 F.3d 187, 193 n.7 (3d Cir. 2011).