Opinion
C.A. No. 03A-11-004 RFS.
Submitted April 1, 2004.
July 29, 2004.
Heidi Ann Morra, Greenwood, DE.
Mary Page Bailey, Esquire, Department of Justice, Wilmington, DE.
Dear Ms. Morra and Counsel:
This is my decision on Heidi Ann Morra's ("Morra") appeal of the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board's (the "Board") decision to deny Morra's late appeal pursuant to 19 Del. C. § 3318(c), thereby declining to assume jurisdiction of the case. The Board's decision is affirmed for the reasons stated herein.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Claimant Morra was hired as a part-time employee for Girgis Family Practice ("Girgis") and worked until April 9, 2002, at which time she went on maternity leave. Morra was working approximately 30 hours a week. However, Morra was asked if she would consider working full time in the future, and she assured them that she would. Yet, once another employee out on leave returned, Morra's hours were reduced. Morra spoke with the office manager, and her hours were significantly cut again.
Thereafter, Morra went out on maternity leave and was released to return to work six weeks after April 15, 2002. However, Morra failed to contact the employer about returning to work. The Claims Deputy found that Morra resigned when she did not return to work following her maternity leave due to the reduction in hours over the course of her employment. Therefore, Morra had good cause for leaving her employment and was entitled to the receipt of benefits during her period of unemployment.
However, the Appeals Referee disagreed and found that by failing to contact the employer regarding her ability to return to work, Morra prevented herself from continuing to work for the employer and thereby voluntarily quit her job. Therefore, the Appeals Referee reversed the Claims Deputy's decision on January 29, 2003. There was no appeal of that determination. The Claims Deputy issued two determinations on July 10, 2003 relating to Morra's original and extended benefits. An overpayment for nonfraudulent reasons was found as to both cases. As a result, Morra filed an appeal on July 18, 2003 to the Appeals Referee of the finding of an overpayment. The Appeals Referee heard the appeal on August 11, 2003 and issued a decision on August 13, 2003, in which she found that Morra had been overpaid. The last day to file an appeal to the Board on this issue was August 23, 2003, as indicated on the front of the Referee's decision. However, since August 23rd was a Saturday, Morra had until August 25, 2003 to file an appeal. The Board did not receive an appeal until September 11, 2003.
The postmark on the letter was dated September 9, 2003.
The Board reviewed the matter on October 1, 2003 and, by decision issued November 6, 2003, denied Morra's late appeal pursuant to 19 Del. C. § 3318(c), thereby declining to assume jurisdiction of the case. Morra has filed a pro se appeal to this Court from the Board's decision, claiming that (1) her appeal was not untimely, (2) her claim was not handled fairly or in its entirety, (3) an overpayment issue was not heard and was dismissed without explanation prior to the hearing that this would be the case, and (4) she was treated unprofessionally and with disrespect. Although Morra brings forth four claims for review, three of the four claims are beyond the scope of the appeal and will not be discussed. The only issues to be addressed are (1) whether the Board properly determined that Morra failed to timely appeal the Appeals Referee's decision on or before August 25, 2003, and (2) if the appeal was properly found to be untimely, whether or not the Board abused its discretion in denying the late appeal.
On appeal, the scope of review of findings of the Board is limited to a determination of whether or not the Board's findings are supported by substantial evidence. Unemployment Ins. Appeal Bd. of Dep't of Labor v. Duncan, 337 A.2d 308 (Del. 1975). In the case at bar, the only finding made by the Board was that Morra's appeal was not timely filed.
DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review
The Supreme Court and this Court repeatedly have emphasized the limited appellate review of the factual findings of an administrative agency. The function of the reviewing Court is to determine whether the agency's decision is supported by substantial evidence, and to review questions of law de novo. Substantial evidence means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. The appellate court does not weigh the evidence, determine questions of credibility, or make its own factual findings. It merely determines if the evidence is legally adequate to support the agency's factual findings and whether errors of law exist.
Johnson v. Chrysler Corp., 312 A.2d 64, 66-67 (Del. 1965); General Motors v. Freeman, 164 A.2d 686, 688 (Del. 1960).
In re Beattie, 180 A.2d 741, 744 (Del.Super.Ct. 1962).
Oceanport Indus. v. Wilmington Stevedores, 636 A.2d 892, 899 (Del. 1994); Battista v. Chrysler Corp., 517 A.2d 295, 297 (Del.), app. dism., 515 A.2d 397 (Del. 1986)
Johnson, 213 A.2d at 66.
In reviewing the Board's decision, the Court's analysis is twofold. First, it is necessary to determine whether or not the finding that the appeal was untimely is supported by the facts in the record. Second, "the Court must determine whether the Board abused its discretion by not exercising, sua sponte, its power to review the record for an injustice despite the untimely appeal." This Court will not disturb a discretionary ruling of an administrative agency unless it is "based on clearly unreasonable or capricious grounds." Furthermore, "an abuse of discretion occurs where the Board exceeds `the bounds of reason in view of the circumstances and has ignored recognized rules of law or practice so as to produce injustice.'"
Anderson v. Comfort Suites, 2004 WL 304359, at *2 (Del.Super.Ct.).
Anderson, 2004 WL at *2.
Id., citing Robledo v. Stratus, 2001 WL 428684, at *1 (Del.Super.Ct.).
K-Mart, Inc. v. Bowles, 1995 WL 269872, at *2 (Del.Super.Ct.), quoting Berry v. State, Del. Super. Ct., C.A. No. 85A-AU-2, Bush, J. (June 29, 1987) at 5 (citing In Re Kennedy, 472 A.2d 1317, 1331 (Del. 1984), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1205 and Raymond Heartless Inc. v. State, 401 A.2d 921 (Del. 1979)).
K-Mart, Inc., 1995 WL at *2, quoting McDowell v. State, Del. Super. Ct., C.A. No. 88A-JN-3, Steele, J. (March 14, 1991) (Order) at 4 (citations omitted).
B. There Are Facts to Support the Board's Finding that Morra's Appeal Was Not Timely
Upon a careful review of the record, the Board's decision to deny Morra's late appeal is supported by substantial evidence. Delaware law clearly provides that a claimant has ten days after an adverse decision from the Appeals Referee is mailed to appeal that decision to the Board. If a claimant fails to file an appeal within this statutory time period, the Appeals Referee's determination shall be deemed to be final. The record shows that the Appeals Referee's decision was dated and mailed to Morra's address on August 13, 2003. Morra had until August 25, 2003 to appeal the decision. Morra claims that she sent an appeal on August 19, 2003. However, there is no evidence to suggest that any appeal was filed prior to September 9, 2003, even though Morra included a letter dated August 18, 2003 along with her appeal. The only documentation presented to the Board by Morra was a letter dated August 18, 2003 with an original signature. The Board found this letter to be a copy and not an original, and was therefore late. Moreover, following a review of Morra's file, the Board found no copy of the appeal allegedly sent by Morra on August 19, 2003. Based on the evidence presented in the record, the Board's decision that Morra's appeal was not timely is supported by substantial evidence and free from legal error.
Id.
C. The Board Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Denying Morra's Late Appeal
19 Del. C. § 3320 grants the Board authority to "act sua sponte beyond the ten day appeal period to consider a case where no valid appeal has been filed by the parties." However, the Board exercises this authority only "where there has been some administrative error on the part of the Department of Labor which deprived the claimant of the opportunity to file a timely appeal, or in those cases where the interest of justice would not be served by inaction." It is well established that absent an abuse of discretion by the Board, "the Court must uphold a decision of an administrative tribunal." Morra claims that she spoke with a representative of the Department of Labor in regard to her appeal allegedly filed on August 19, 2004, and she was informed that no appeal had been received by the Department. However, the Board found that there was no departmental error or other grounds that would require it to assume jurisdiction of the case sua sponte.
Funk v. UIAB, 591 A.2d 222, 225 (Del. 1991) (en banc).
Anderson, 2004 WL at *3, quoting Funk, 591 A.2d at 225.
Id.
The record clearly shows that the Appeals Referee's decision was properly mailed to Morra's address on August 13, 2003 and that no appeal was received until September 11, 2003. In fact, Morra has failed to show any evidence of error on the part of the Department of Labor that might have caused her appeal to be filed untimely. Morra also failed to present any evidence of "severe circumstances" to the Board, other than the loss of benefits and the requirement of overpayment by Morra. In Lacsamana v. Dept. of Labor, Del. Super. Ct., C.A. No. 97A-07-003, Silverman, J. (Feb. 20, 1998), aff'd, 713 A.2d 932 (Del. 1998) (Table), this Court found that the loss of benefits alone was insufficient to demonstrate a severe circumstance. Unlike Morra, the appellant in Lacsamana was charged with fraudulently obtaining unemployment benefits. The appellant was subject to the consequences of the fraud and lost the ability to apply for unemployment benefits for one year. Morra's circumstances are obviously less severe. Therefore, it is the Court's determination that, in the present circumstances, the Board did not abuse its discretion by applying the time limitation of 19 Del. C. § 3318(c) and refusing to consider Morra's late appeal sua sponte.
Lacsamana v. Dept. of Labor, Del. Super. Ct., C.A. No. 97A-07-003, Silverman, J. (Feb. 20, 1998), aff'd, 713 A.2d 932 (Del. 1998) (Table).