Opinion
C.A. No. 00A-09-001 HDR
Submitted: January 25, 2001
Decided: March 27, 2001
Upon Appeal from a Decision of the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board AFFIRMED.
Mariana Robledo, Milford, Delaware, pro Se.
James J. Hanley, Esq., Deputy Attorney General, Department of Justice, Wilmington, Delaware, for Appellee Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board.
ORDER
This 27th day of March, 2001, upon consideration of the parties' briefs and the record below, it appears that:
(1) Mariana Robledo ("Claimant") appeals from the decision of the Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board ("Board") which held that her appeal before the Board was untimely and therefore the Board did not have jurisdiction to hear the merits of her case.
(2) On April 1, 2000, the Claimant left her employment with Stratus because she thought she had another job. She then filed a claim for unemployment compensation benefits. Following a fact finding interview, the Claims Deputy denied the Claimant's application because she voluntarily quit her employment without good cause. The Claimant filed a timely appeal from this decision to the Appeals Referee ("Referee"). On July 18, 2000, the Referee affirmed the Claims Deputy's disqualification. On July 31, 2000, the Claimant filed her appeal with the Board. The Board held a hearing and concluded that the Claimant's appeal should be dismissed for failure to comply with the 10-day filing deadline contained in 19 Del. C. § 3318(c). The Claimant now appeals from that decision.
(3) The Court's review of the Board's decision is twofold. First, the Court must determine if there are facts to support the finding that the appeal was untimely. Second, the Court must determine whether the Board abused its discretion by not exercising, sua sponte, its power to review the record for an injustice despite the untimely appeal.
Brown v. City of Wilmington, Del. Super., C.A. No. 95A-01-007, Silverman, J. (Sept. 21, 1995).
(4) In reviewing the factual findings of the Board, the Court must determine whether the findings are supported by substantial evidence and free from legal error. Substantial evidence means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.
Unemployment Ins. App. Bd. v. Duncan, Del. Supr., 337 A.2d 308 (1975).
Breeding v. Contractors-One, Inc., 549 A.2d 1102, 1104 (1988).
(5) 19 Del. C. § 3318(c) states that a Referee's decision "shall be deemed to be final unless within 10 days after the date of notification or mailing of such decision further appeal is initiated pursuant to § 3320 of this title." The ten-day period referred to in § 3318(c) begins to run on the date of the mailing unless the mail fails to reach a party due to the Department of Labor's error.
Funk v. Unemployment Ins. App. Bd., Del. Supr., 591 A.2d 222, 224 (1991).
The Claimant asserts that she was justified in filing her appeal three days past due because she had traveled to Texas, did not return until July 27, 2000, and did not pick up her mail until the appeal deadline of July 28, 2000. Also, the Claimant admits that she failed to pick up her mail at the Texas address which she had provided to the Referee for notice purposes.
(6) Properly addressed mail is presumed to be received by the addressee. The addressee's mere denial of receipt of the notice is insufficient to rebut this presumption. Further, it is "reasonable to expect that a claimant awaiting an important decision from an appeal tribunal would regularly check the locations at which [s]he receives mail."
Brown at *3.
Brown at *3; Jackson v. Unemployment Ins. App. Bd., Del. Super., C.A. No. 85A-NO-9, Bifferato, J. (Sept. 24, 1986) (Letter Op.) at 3.
Funk at 226; Sanders v. Dept. of Labor, Del. Super., C.A. No. 93A-03-6, Herlihy, J. (Feb. 22, 1994).
Here, the decision was properly mailed both to the Claimant's home address and the Texas address she provided. Neither was returned as "undeliverable." Moreover, there is no evidence of error by an employee of the Department of Labor.
Based on the above findings, the Board's determination that the notice was properly mailed to the Claimant and that the subsequent appeal was untimely filed was based on substantial evidence. Therefore, the Board properly held that 19 Del. C. § 3318(c) created a jurisdictional bar to its consideration of the Claimant's untimely appeal.
(7) The Board does have authority under 19 Del. C. § 3320 to "act sua sponte beyond the ten day appeal period to consider a case where no valid appeal has been filed by the parties." However, this authority is used only "where there has been some administrative error on the part of the Department of Labor which deprived the claimant of the opportunity to file a timely appeal, or in those cases where the interest of justice would not be served by inaction." Absent an abuse of discretion, this Court must uphold the Board's decision.
Funk at 225.
Id.
19 Del. C. § 3323(a); Funk at 225; Brown at *2.
Here the Board found that "the facts in this case do not involve circumstances so severe as to require that it assume jurisdiction in this case." The Claimant has admitted that she received the notice on the last day designated for appeal, and further has admitted that she failed to check her mail at the Texas address she provided to the Referee or to notify the Department of any other address in Texas. The Claimant cannot show any error on the part of the Department of Labor that might have delayed the Claimant's receipt of the decision or delayed her filing of the appeal. On these facts there was no abuse of discretion by the Board.
Bd. Dec. at 2.
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the decision of the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board is AFFIRMED.