Opinion
No. C 01-0468 CRB (PR)
September 23, 2002
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (Doc. #18)
Plaintiff, a prisoner at California State Prison, Los Angeles County in Lancaster, California ("CSP — LAC"), filed the instant action for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 while incarcerated at Salinas Valley State Prison in Soledad, California ("SVSP"). In his First Amended Complaint ("FAC"), plaintiff alleges that he was attacked and stabbed by three inmates due to defendants' deliberate indifference to his safety concerns, and that defendants placed him in segregation without a hearing and denied him access to another yard at SVSP to practice his religion.
Per order filed on October 9, 2001, the court found that plaintiff's allegations, when liberally construed, stated cognizable claims under § 1983 and ordered the United States Marshal to serve defendants. Defendants now move for summary judgment on the ground that there are no material facts in dispute and that they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Plaintiff has filed an opposition (and amendment to the opposition) and defendants have filed a reply.
The court dismissed plaintiff's allegations of deprivation of property for failure to state a claim under § 1983. See Oct. 9, 2001 Order at 2 (citing Barnett v. Centoni, 31 F.3d 813, 816-17 (9th Cir. 1994)). And to whatever extent plaintiff still seeks injunctive relief, those claims are dismissed as moot due to his transfer to CSP — LAC. See Dilley v. Gunn, 64 F.3d 1365, 1368-69 (9th Cir. 1995). This action is limited to damages.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff's allegations in his verified FAC can be summarized as follows:
On March 10, 2000, plaintiff told Correctional Counselor C. Macugay to "move one of these Northern Gang members out of [his] cell . . . [b]ecause the floor staff Esparza and Faulkner both had illegally . . . [p]laced him inside with out [plaintiff's] permission nor approval." Macugay responded that she had spoken with Esparza and Faulkner and that they had looked into his concerns and concluded that there was no basis for moving plaintiff's cell mate.
On March 22, 2000, plaintiff again asked Macugay "to help [him] get this Northern Gang member out of [his] cell." Macugay responded that Esparza and Faulkner were aware of his "situation" and for him "not to worry about nothing."
On March 25, 2000, plaintiff was assaulted and stabbed by three inmates. Plaintiff claims that this was due to defendants' deliberate indifference to his safety concerns, including the failure of "higher-ups" to intervene. Plaintiff alleges that Faulkner "had asked plaintiff's . . . cell mate the Northern Gang member" why plaintiff wanted to be moved out of the cell and that, by so doing, Faulkner had put plaintiff's safety in danger. Plaintiff also alleges that defendants knew or should have known that Northern Gang members had a "get tough" policy against "turn coats" and "R suffixes," i.e., inmates considered "snitches" and inmates convicted of sexual crimes. (Plaintiff was convicted of rape and sodomy with an unconscious person.)
After the stabbing, plaintiff was treated and immediately moved to the administrative segregation unit. That same day, plaintiff was issued a rule violation "write up" charging him with "mutual combat." Plaintiff was found "not guilty" on May 17, 2000. However, he claims that he was denied due process because he did not receive a hearing before he was placed in segregation and because he remained in segregation after he was found "not guilty."
On April 26, 2000, plaintiff went in front of the Institution Classification Committee and asked "if [he] could be sent to a different yard" at SVSP where his "religious beli[e]fs ha[d] been established." Plaintiff claims that associate wardens J. Tynes and Mandeville denied his request and thereby deprived him of his constitutional right to practice his religion.
DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review
Summary judgment is proper where the pleadings, discovery and affidavits show that there is "no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). Material facts are those which may affect the outcome of the case. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A dispute as to a material fact is genuine if there is sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Id.
The moving party for summary judgment bears the initial burden of identifying those portions of the pleadings, discovery and affidavits which demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.Celotex Corp. v. Cattrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Where the moving party will have the burden of proof on an issue at trial, it must affirmatively demonstrate that no reasonable trier of fact could find other than for the moving party. But on an issue for which the opposing party will have the burden of proof at trial, as is the case here, the moving party need only point out "that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case." Id.
Once the moving party meets its initial burden, the nonmoving party must go beyond the pleadings and, by its own affidavits or discovery, "set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e). If the nonmoving party fails to make this showing, "the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 323.
B. Claims and Analysis
Plaintiff states three cognizable claims for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983: (1) deliberate indifference to safety; (2) denial of due process, and (3) denial of the right to free exercise of religion.
1. Deliberate indifference to safety
The Eighth Amendment requires that prison officials take reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of prisoners. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994). In particular, prison officials have a duty to protect prisoners from violence at the hands of other prisoners. Id. at 833. However, not every injury suffered by one prisoner at the hands of another translates into constitutional liability for prison officials responsible for the victim's safety. Id. at 834. A prison official violates the Eighth Amendment only when two requirements are met: (1) the deprivation alleged is, objectively, sufficiently serious; and (2) the prison official is, subjectively, deliberately indifferent to the prisoner's safety. Id.
In order for a prison official to be liable for failure to prevent harm, a prisoner must show: (1) that he was incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm, id.; and (2) that the prison official knew of and disregarded such a risk, id. at 837. The prison official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference. Id. He need not "believe to a moral certainty that one inmate intends to attack another at a given place at a time certain before [he] is obligated to take steps to prevent such an assault." Berg v. Kincheloe, 794 F.2d 457, 459 (9th Cir. 1986). But he must have more than a "mere suspicion" that an attack will occur. Id.
Showing that the prison official knew of a substantial risk of serious harm is not enough without showing indifference by that official. A prison official "who actually knew of a substantial risk to inmate health or safety may be found free from liability if [he] responded reasonably to the risk, even if the harm ultimately was not averted." Farmer, 511 U.S. at 844. A prison official's duty under the Eighth Amendment is to ensure "reasonable safety," a standard that incorporates due regard for prison officials' "unenviable task of keeping dangerous men in safe custody under humane conditions." Id. at 844-45 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). "Whether one puts it in terms of duty or deliberate indifference, prison officials who act reasonably cannot be found liable under the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause." Id. at 845.
Finally, in order to prevail and recover damages against any of the named prison officials, plaintiff also must prove that the specific prison official's deliberate indifference was the "actual and proximate cause" of the deprivation of plaintiff's Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 634 (9th Cir. 1988).
Defendants claim that they are entitled to summary judgment because plaintiff cannot show that they were deliberately indifferent to his safety, or that there is a causal connection between them and the alleged deprivation of plaintiff's right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. In support, defendants submit several declarations and accompanying evidence showing that: (1) plaintiff never told defendants that he was in any "specific" danger from his cell mate or any other inmate; (2) plaintiff told Macugay that he was in danger, but when she asked him if anyone had threatened him, he could not identify anyone or any specific threat; (3) plaintiff told Faulkner that he wanted his cell mate moved out of the cell, but when Faulkner asked him whether there was a problem with his cell mate, plaintiff said he just did not like him; (4) plaintiff never told Faulkner that he was afraid of his cell mate or that any threats had been made against him; (5) Faulkner nonetheless gave plaintiff an opportunity to move to a different housing unit, but plaintiff refused; and (6) defendants did not know of any policy of the Northern Gang to "get tough . . . on R suffixes." In sum, defendants show that they did not know of and disregard a substantial risk of serious harm to plaintiff. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837.
Defendants are entitled to summary judgment because plaintiff has not "set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial" on his claim that defendants were deliberately indifferent to his safety. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e). Plaintiff's conclusory allegation that defendants knew or should have known that Northern Gang members had a "get tough" policy against "turn coats" and "R suffixes" is not enough to create a triable issue of fact on whether defendants knew of and disregarded an excessive risk to plaintiff's safety. See Leer, 844 F.2d at 634 (conclusory allegations insufficient to defeat summary judgment). Nor is the declaration from plaintiff's former cell mate, Maruin Rodriguez. Rodriguez alleges that Faulkner's inquiry about why plaintiff wanted to move out of their cell had "the potential for big problems" for plaintiff because plaintiff could be considered a "snitch." But even if Faulkner's inquiry was unwise, there is no evidence that he had an improper motive or that his brief conversation with Rodriguez served to inform Faulkner or any other defendant that plaintiff faced a substantial risk of serious harm. After all, Rodriguez does not allege that plaintiff was labeled a "snitch" and plaintiff sets forth no other evidence showing that he was labeled a "snitch."
Even when viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiff, the evidence in the record does not show that any defendant knew of and disregard a substantial risk of serious harm to plaintiff. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. At most, the evidence suggests that plaintiff's expressed general concern about his safety raised in the minds of some of the defendants a "mere suspicion that an attack [might] occur." Berg, 794 F.2d at 459. This is not enough as a matter of law. Id.
Defendants also are entitled to summary judgment because plaintiff has not set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial on whether any of the named defendants "was the actual and proximate cause of any constitutional violation." Leer, 844 F.2d at 634. As defendants correctly point out, for example, plaintiff sets forth no evidence showing that the interaction between Faulkner and Rodriguez actually precipitated the attack on plaintiff. Plaintiff does not even allege that Rodriguez or any of his affiliates attacked him. Plaintiff merely speculates that Faulkner's "improper" conversation with Rodriguez must have precipitated the attack. This is not enough. See id.
2. Denial of due process
A prisoner is entitled to due process protections in connection with placement and retention in administrative segregation only if his placement and retention in administrative segregation amount to "atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life." Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995). Even then, due process merely requires that prison officials provide the prisoner with some notice of the charges against him and an opportunity to present his views to the prison official charged with deciding whether to transfer him to administrative segregation. Barnett v. Centoni, 31 F.3d 813, 815 (9th Cir. 1994). Due process does not require detailed written notice of charges, representation by counsel or counsel-substitute, an opportunity to present witnesses, a written decision describing the reasons for placing the prisoner in administrative segregation or disclosure of the identity of any person providing information leading to placement of the prisoner in administrative segregation. Toussaint v. McCarthy, 801 F.2d 1080, 1100-01 (9th Cir. 1986) ("Toussaint I"). Following placement in administrative segregation, prison officials also must engage in some sort of periodic review of the prisoner's confinement. Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 477 n. 9 (1983); Toussaint I, 801 F.2d at 1101. Due process is satisfied if the decision to segregate the prisoner is reviewed every 120 days, see Toussaint v. McCarthy, 926 F.2d 800, 803 (9th Cir. 1990) ("Toussaint II"), and the review amounts to more than "meaningless gestures,"Toussaint v. Rowland, 711 F. Supp. 536, 540 n. 11 (N.D. Cal. 1989) (citing Toussaint I, 801 F.2d at 1102).
These requirements must be satisfied within a reasonable time after the prisoner is segregated. See Toussaint v. McCarthy, 801 F.2d 1080, 1100 (9th Cir. 1986) ("Toussaint I").
Defendants claim that they are entitled to summary judgment because plaintiff has not shown that he was entitled to due process protections under Sandin, and because the undisputed facts show that, even if he did, he received all the process due him. The court agrees.
After Sandin, allegations by a prisoner that he was denied due process in connection with the decision to administratively segregate him do not present a constitutional claim, absent a showing that the specific deprivation at play amounted to atypical and significant hardship in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life. See, e.g., May v. Baldwin, 109 F.3d 557, 565 (9th Cir. 1997) (mere placement in administrative segregation not enough to state claim after Sandin); Luken v. Scott, 71 F.3d 192, 193 (5th Cir. 1995) (loss of mere opportunity to earn good time credits because of placement in administrative segregation does not create protected liberty interest after Sandin). Plaintiff makes no such showing.
In addition, defendants set forth specific undisputed facts showing that: (1) plaintiff was placed in administrative segregation on March 25, 2000 for his own safety because he had been attacked; (2) a correctional captain reviewed the placement on March 28, 2000 and provided plaintiff notice of the reason he was placed in administrative segregation; (3) plaintiff received a hearing before the Institutional Classification Committee on March 30, 2000 and "communicated effectively" with the committee; and (4) plaintiff's case was reviewed by a classification committee or a classification representative each month he remained in administrative segregation. Plaintiff received all the process he may have been due. See Barnett, 31 F.3d at 815; Toussaint II, 926 F.2d at 803.
Plaintiff was transferred to SVSP's Transitional Program Unit in March 2001 and to a "sensitive needs yard" at CSP — LAC shortly thereafter.
3. Denial of the right to free exercise of religion
In order to establish a violation of the First Amendment right to free exercise of religion, a prisoner must show the defendants burdened the practice of his religion by preventing him from engaging in conduct mandated by his faith, without any justification reasonably related to legitimate penological interests. See Freeman v. Arpaio, 125 F.3d 732 , 736 (9th Cir. 1997). To reach the level of a constitutional violation, "the interference with one's practice of religion `must be more than an inconvenience; the burden must be substantial and an interference with a tenet or belief that is central to religious doctrine.'" Id. at 737 (quoting Graham v. C.I.R., 822 F.2d 844, 851 (9th Cir. 1987)).
Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on plaintiff's free exercise claim because plaintiff has not set forth specific facts showing that defendants substantially burdened his practice of religion. Plaintiff has not even identified his religion and practices. In addition, defendants are entitled to summary judgment because they have set forth undisputed facts showing that their rejection of plaintiff's request to be moved to another yard at SVSP to "practice his religion" was reasonably related to legitimate penological interests of prison safety and security — plaintiff was being held in SVSP's administrative segregation unit for his own safety and pending a transfer to a "sensitive needs" yard at another correctional facility. See O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 349 (1987) (citing Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987)) (prison practice or regulation that impinges on prisoner's 1st Amendment rights valid if reasonably related to legitimate penological interests).
Plaintiff's reference to the Religious Freedom Restoration Act ("RFRA"), 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-2000bb-4, does not compel a different result. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997) (declaring RFRA unconstitutional); see also Freeman, 125 F.3d at 736 (impact ofFlores on prisoner cases is to restore the O'Lone reasonableness test).See Freeman, 125 F.3d at 736.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, defendants' motion for summary judgment (doc #18) is GRANTED.The Clerk shall enter judgment in favor of defendants and close the file.
SO ORDERED.
JUDGMENT IN A CIVIL CASE
IT IS SO ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that defendant's motion for summary judgment (doc #18) is granted.