Opinion
CR-19-0985
09-03-2021
Mario Maldonado Moreno v. State of Alabama
Appeal from Etowah Circuit Court (CV-20-900202)
McCOOL, JUDGE.
Mario Maldonado Moreno appeals from the denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
On or about June 2, 2020, Moreno filed a pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the Etowah Circuit Court, alleging that he was being illegally detained following his arrest that occurred on June 21, 2018, because he was "in jail on a $100, 000.00 cash bond which [was] the same as no bond for many individuals" and had yet to be indicted, which he claimed violated his right to a speedy trial under Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972). (C. 17, 26.) Moreno also appeared to allege that he had been denied effective assistance of counsel during the process. Moreno attached several exhibits to his petition, including copies of a motion for a speedy trial dated May 5, 2020 that he had filed in his underlying district-court cases, and an order dated May 19, 2020, in which the district court denied Moreno's motion for a speedy trial.
On June 17, 2020, the circuit court conducted a Zoom hearing on the matter. However, at the hearing, the court stated that it was going to reset the hearing for a later date because the court did not feel comfortable proceeding given that Moreno did not have an attorney representing him and the court believed an interpreter was necessary to interpret for Moreno at the hearing. Thus, the court subsequently reset the hearing for a later date.
Zoom is a video-conferencing application that can be used in place of in-person conferences or meetings.
On July 14, 2020, the circuit court conducted a second hearing, also via Zoom. Moreno was present, as well as an interpreter to assist Moreno. Moreno, however, did not have counsel present at the hearing. Moreno again complained that his bond amount was too high, that it had taken too long for him to be brought to trial on the charges for which he had been arrested, and that his counsel had been ineffective because no attorneys had come to see him in jail. He also asked the court for help because he needed proper medical treatment, which he said he had been unable to obtain since he was arrested.
At the hearing, the State noted that Moreno had been arrested for trafficking methamphetamine in a large amount, approximately 2, 890 grams or 3 kilos, following a controlled buy that had been arranged using a confidential informant. The State claimed that "there was no known home address" for Moreno; that Moreno had also been charged with carrying a concealed weapon; that the State "did not know anything about his contacts with the community" or where he would be living if he were released on bond; and that the State did not know anything about Moreno's employment history or whether he would have a job if he were released from jail. (R. 24.) The State further argued that Moreno was "just sort of the poster child for someone who would be a bond risk" and that "given the huge amount of meth[amphetamine Moreno] had, he would be a danger to the community." (R. 24-25.) Thus, the State alleged, a substantial bond was "necessary in this case in order to assure that [Moreno] would be available to respond to any charges." (R. 25.)
On July 16, 2020, the circuit court issued the following order denying Moreno's petition:
"This matter having come before the Court on July 14, 2020, on [Moreno's] Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, and [Moreno] appearing pro se with Gloria Allenstein appearing as interpreter for the [Moreno], and Chief Deputy District Attorney Marcus Reid appearing on behalf of the State of Alabama, and the Court having considered testimony ore tenus, and having considered arguments of counsel and pleadings filed to date, it is ORDERED that [Moreno's] Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus is due to be and is hereby DENIED.
"It is further ORDERED that this case is dismissed, costs taxed as paid."(C. 100.) Moreno filed a notice of appeal on August 5, 2020.
On appeal, Moreno reasserts his claim that he is being improperly held in jail and that he is being denied his right to a speedy trial. He also claims that the circuit court improperly denied his petition for a writ of habeas corpus without making specific findings regarding his speedy-trial claim. Moreno does not appear to reassert his ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim that he raised in his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. He also does not appear to raise as a separate issue his claim challenging the amount of his bond, as he addresses the bond amount merely as support for his speedy-trial claim.
We first note that Moreno's claim was properly raised in a petition for habeas corpus. See Williams v. State, 511 So.2d 265, 267 (Ala.Crim.App.1987) ("One whose constitutional right to a speedy trial is violated may be granted relief by habeas corpus where his motion for discharge is denied and no other remedy is available. Blake v. State, 448 So.2d 968 (Ala.Crim.App.1984)."); Aaron v. State, 497 So.2d 603, 605 (Ala.Crim.App.1986) ("Pending trial, the remedy for illegal confinement by reason of the erroneous postponements of trial is habeas corpus where a motion for discharge has been denied and no other remedy is available."); Ex parte Hamilton, 970 So.2d 285 (Ala. 2006) (reversing on certiorari review Court of Criminal Appeals' denial of a petition for writ of habeas corpus asserting speedy-trial violation); Grace v. Alabama, (No. 1: 13-cv-361, Dec. 13, 2013) (not selected for publication in federal supplement)(M.D. Ala. 2013) ("Grace contends that his right to a speedy trial has been violated by Alabama authorities. A criminal defendant in Alabama may file a motion for a speedy trial or a state petition for writ of habeas corpus in the state trial court to address alleged speedy trial violations. See Williams v. State, [511 So.2d 265, 267 (Ala.Crim.App.1987).]"). Moreover, "[t]he writ of habeas corpus is concerned solely with the lawfulness of the present holding of the petitioner. Stinson v. State, 43 Ala.App. 257, 188 So.2d 287, cert. denied, 279 Ala. 691, 188 So.2d 288 (1966)." Watkins v. State, 409 So.2d 901, 902 (Ala.Crim.App.1981). See also Edwards v. State, 866 So.2d 609, 610 (Ala.Crim.App.2003) ("However, the sole function of habeas corpus is to provide relief from unlawful imprisonment or custody, and it cannot be used for any other purpose." (internal quotation marks omitted)).
"This Court generally reviews the denial of a habeas petition under an abuse-of-discretion standard." Shelly v. Alabama Dep't of Corr., 109 So.3d 1145, 1147 (Ala.Crim.App.2012) (citing Miller v. State, 668 So.2d 912, 917 (Ala.Crim.App.1995)). However, where this Court's review involved only an issue of law and the application of the law to undisputed facts, our review is de novo. Ex parte Walker, 928 So.2d 259 (Ala. 2005)("Walker's case involves only issues of law and the application of the law to the undisputed facts. Thus, our review is de novo.").
In Ex parte Walker, the Alabama Supreme Court explained:
"An accused's right to a speedy trial is guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and by Art. I, § 6, of the Alabama Constitution, 1901. As noted, an evaluation of an accused's speedy-trial claim requires us to balance the four factors the United States Supreme Court set forth in Barker[ v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972)]: '[l]ength of delay, the reason for the delay, the defendant's assertion of [her] right, and prejudice to the defendant.' 407 U.S. at 530, 92 S.Ct. 2182 (footnote omitted). See also Ex parte Carrell, 565 So.2d [104] at 105 [(Ala. 1990)]. 'A single factor is not necessarily determinative, because this is a "balancing test, in which the conduct of both the prosecution and the defense are weighed."' Ex parte Clopton, 656 So.2d
[1243] at 1245 [(Ala. 1995)](quoting Barker, 407 U.S. at 530, 92 S.Ct. 2182)."928 So.2d at 263.
This Court has previously held that, where the record does not affirmatively indicate that the trial court weighed each of the Barker factors, a remand is necessary for the circuit court "to make specific, written findings of fact as to each Barker factor with reference to the principles set forth by the Alabama Supreme Court in Ex parte Walker, [928 So.2d 259 (Ala. 2005)]." State v. Robinson, 79 So.3d 686 (Ala.Crim.App.2011). See also State v. Tolliver, 171 So.3d 94 (Ala.Crim.App.2014); Murray v. State, 12 So.3d 150 (Ala.Crim.App.2007); Peterson v. State, 12 So.3d 154 (Ala.Crim.App.2007); State v. Stovall, 947 So.2d 1149 (Ala.Crim.App.2006).
This Court is unable to make a proper determination on the propriety of the circuit court's ruling on Moreno's pretrial petition for writ of habeas corpus based partially on his right to a speedy trial. In his pleadings, Moreno attempts to provide some of the information such as relevant dates, examples of his assertion of his right to a speedy trial, and allegations of prejudice; however, whether the circuit court properly weighed each of the factors as required by Barker is unclear from the record. We note that, at the hearing on the matter, Moreno appeared before the court without the help of his appointed counsel and acknowledged that he understood the hearing was for the purpose of addressing his petition for writ of habeas corpus, in which he had argued that he was being denied his right to a speedy trial. However, the State did not address Moreno's claims regarding his right to a speedy trial at the hearing, and the circuit court did not discuss that particular claim. Further, the circuit court's order fails to inform this Court of any of its findings regarding the Barker factors. Thus, because the record is unclear whether the circuit court properly evaluated each of the factors as required by Barker and there is not sufficient information for this Court to evaluate concerning whether Moreno has been denied his right to a speedy trial, a remand is necessary.
Therefore, this cause is remanded to the circuit court with instructions that the circuit court conduct an evidentiary hearing "during which it takes evidence concerning each Barker factor." Stovall, 947 So. 2d at 1152. Thereafter, it shall make specific, written findings of fact as to each Barker factor with reference to the principles set forth by the Alabama Supreme Court in Ex parte Walker, supra. On remand, should it become necessary, the circuit court is authorized to grant Moreno whatever relief it deems necessary. Additionally, the circuit court shall take all necessary action to see that the circuit clerk makes due return to this court at the earliest possible time and within 56 days after the release of this opinion. The return to remand shall include a transcript of the new evidentiary hearing and the circuit court's specific, written findings of fact.
REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS.
Kellum, Cole, and Minor, JJ., concur. Windom, P.J., dissents.