Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County. Robert B. Axel, Temporary Judge (pursuant to Cal. Const., art. VI, § 21), and William A. Allen, Commissioner, Super. Ct. No. VS015673
Lawrence Sanborn Morelock, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Law Office of Lee Harwell, Jr., and Lee Harwell, Jr., for Defendant and Respondent.
ASHMANN-GERST, J.
Appellant Lawrence Sanborn Morelock appeals from a trial court judgment entered against him and in favor of respondent Mark Mastandrea. Because appellant has not satisfied his burden on appeal, we deem all issues purportedly raised in his opening brief waived. Even if we were to reach those issues on the merits, we would conclude that judgment was properly entered.
Accordingly, we affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Appellant was married to Diane Fetter (Fetter), who at some point became respondent’s girlfriend.
Appellant filed a petition for restraining order against respondent, pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 527.6. Despite his request, no temporary restraining order (TRO) was issued.
Trial commenced on appellant’s petition on December 11, 2006. After appellant and respondent were sworn in, appellant advised the trial court that he did not wish to pursue the matter. Thus, the trial court (Hon. Robert B. Axel) ordered any TRO denied and dissolved, and awarded $750 to respondent as prevailing party.
On April 23, 2007, appellant asked the trial court (Hon. William A. Allen) to “reissue” a TRO against respondent (even though no TRO had been issued). In his written judicial council form, appellant claimed that a TRO had been issued on November 21, 2006, and that the last hearing date was December 11, 2006. Appellant represented that the TRO needed to be reissued because he could not get it served before the last hearing date. His request was granted, and a TRO was “reissued” against respondent.
Although appellant indicated that the TRO was issued on “11-21-07” and the last hearing date was “12-11-07,” it is clear that he meant 2006.
Respondent then filed an ex parte request to vacate the April 23, 2007, reissuance of the TRO. Respondent pointed out that on December 11, 2006, any TRO issued against respondent had been dissolved and appellant’s request for a restraining order had been denied. In fact, trial had commenced on December 11, 2006, and appellant informed the trial court that he did not intend to pursue the matter. Respondent also indicated that appellant had been ordered to pay him $750 in attorney fees. Thus, respondent argued, appellant could not relitigate the issues already determined against him.
At the hearing on April 27, 2007, the trial court terminated and vacated the restraining order against respondent. The case was then dismissed.
On May 4, 2007, appellant sought, ex parte, to set aside the trial court’s April 27, 2007, orders. His request was denied.
Appellant timely initiated the instant appeal, challenging the judgment in this case.
DISCUSSION
I. Because appellant failed to present the issues adequately for appellate review, we treat them as waived
After reviewing appellant’s briefs, it is virtually impossible to determine what occurred below and what he is challenging on appeal. The major problem is with appellant’s opening brief. It is for the most part unintelligible and, even a cursory review of the opening brief reveals that it does not provide us with the basic information we need to determine what is being challenged by appellant. As another court observed in describing a similarly inadequate brief, “[i]ndeed, this document is strongly reminiscent of those magazine puzzles of yesteryear where the reader was challenged to ‘guess what is wrong with this picture.’” (People v. Dougherty (1982) 138 Cal.App.3d 278, 280.)
“‘A judgment or order of the lower court is presumed correct. All intendments and presumptions are indulged to support it on matters as to which the record is silent, and error must be affirmatively shown. This is not only a general principle of appellate practice but an ingredient of the constitutional doctrine of reversible error.’” (Denham v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 564.) Thus, in challenging a judgment, the appellant must raise claims of reversible error or other defect, and “present argument and authority on each point made.” (County of Sacramento v. Lackner (1979) 97 Cal.App.3d 576, 591; accord, In re Marriage of Ananeh-Firempong (1990) 219 Cal.App.3d 272, 278.) “[F]ailure of an appellant in a civil action to articulate any pertinent or intelligible legal argument in an opening brief may, in the discretion of the court, be deemed an abandonment of the appeal justifying dismissal.” (Berger v. Godden (1985) 163 Cal.App.3d 1113, 1119.)
Appellant has failed to meet his burden on appeal. In particular, his opening brief is largely devoid of record citations. (Lewis v. County of Sacramento (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 107, 116.) And, conspicuously absent from the opening brief is a table of authorities, presumably because appellant neglected to cite any legal authorities in support of his appeal. “‘The reviewing court is not required to make an independent, unassisted study of the record in search of error or grounds to support the judgment. It is entitled to the assistance of counsel [or the litigant if, as here, the litigant chooses to represent himself]. Accordingly every brief should contain a legal argument with citation of authorities on the points made. If none is furnished on a particular point, the court may treat it as waived, and pass it without consideration.’ [Citation.] [¶] It is the duty of [appellant], not of the courts, ‘by argument and the citation of authorities to show that the claimed error exists.’ [Citation.]” (Sprague v. Equifax, Inc. (1985) 166 Cal.App.3d 1012, 1050.) Since the issues as raised in appellant’s opening brief are not properly presented or sufficiently developed to be cognizable, we decline to consider them and treat them as waived. (People v. Stanley (1995) 10 Cal.4th 764, 793; People v. Turner (1994) 8 Cal.4th 137, 214, fn. 19; In re David L. (1991) 234 Cal.App.3d 1655, 1661.) Nor does appellant’s election to act as his own attorney on appeal entitle him to any leniency as to the rules of practice and procedure; otherwise, ignorance unjustly is rewarded. (Rappleyea v. Campbell (1994) 8 Cal.4th 975, 984–985; Lombardi v. Citizens Nat. Trust etc. Bank (1955) 137 Cal.App.2d 206, 208–209; Gamet v. Blanchard (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 1276, 1284; Nwosu v. Uba (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 1229, 1246–1247.)
II. Even if we were to reach the issues purportedly raised in appellant’s opening brief, we would affirm the judgment
To the extent we can determine what appellant is seeking on appeal, and setting aside the procedural obstacles noted above, appellant is not entitled to the relief requested. First, he asks that the restraining order issued against respondent be reissued. As respondent points out, and as the appellate record confirms, a restraining order was never issued against respondent. Moreover, when the case proceeded to trial on December 11, 2006, appellant indicated his intent not to pursue this matter, and the trial court vacated any TRO that may have been issued.
Admittedly, a restraining order was issued on April 23, 2007. It is clear that that issuance was the result of appellant’s blatant misrepresentations to the trial court and the trial court’s lack of complete and accurate information. Once the trial court was properly advised of what had occurred, the trial court promptly dissolved the TRO and dismissed the case. Under these circumstances, there is no reason whatsoever for us to reissue a restraining order in favor of appellant and against respondent.
Second, appellant urges us to reverse the award of attorney fees ($750) rendered in favor of respondent. Code of Civil Procedure section 527.6, subdivision (i), provides: “The prevailing party in any action brought under this section may be awarded court costs and attorney’s fees, if any.” Given the fact that respondent was the prevailing party below, appellant’s voluntary decision not to pursue this litigation, and respondent’s request for $2,100 in attorney fees, we conclude that the trial court’s award of $750 does not constitute an abuse of discretion.
Finally, throughout his appellate briefs, appellant objects to other trial court orders. There is a litany of reasons as to why we cannot agree with appellant. “‘Our jurisdiction on appeal is limited in scope to the notice of appeal and the judgment or order appealed from.’ [Citation.]” (Soldate v. Fidelity National Financial, Inc. (1998) 62 Cal.App.4th 1069, 1073.) Appellant’s legal arguments are inadequate and incomplete. (Berger v. Godden, supra, 163 Cal.App.3d at p. 1119.) As noted above, appellant neglects to cite any legal authority in support of his arguments. (Sprague v. Equifax, Inc., supra, 166 Cal.App.3d at p. 1050.) And, appellant does not provide record citations for these alleged errors; in fact, our independent review of the appellate record reveals that the challenged orders are not included in the appellate record. (Lewis v. County of Sacramento, supra, 93 Cal.App.4th at p. 116.)
DISPOSITION
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed. Respondent is entitled to costs on appeal.
We concur: DOI TODD, Acting P. J., CHAVEZ, J.