Opinion
October 13, 1992
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Westchester County (DiFede, J.).
Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.
Although the general rule with respect to the opening of default judgments is not to be applied rigorously in matrimonial actions, whether a particular judgment should be opened remains a matter of discretion (see, Wayasamin v Wayasamin, 167 A.D.2d 460, 462; Black v Black, 141 A.D.2d 689). On appeal, the plaintiff husband contends that because he moved to vacate the default judgment of divorce pursuant to CPLR 5015 (a) (3), he does not have to present a reasonable excuse for his default. This contention would be correct if the movant alleged that the default judgment was procured through "extrinsic fraud" (Shaw v Shaw, 97 A.D.2d 403). However, since the plaintiff husband's primary argument is that the defendant wife's allegations and testimony were false (i.e., intrinsic fraud), he is required to make some showing of a meritorious defense and reasonable excuse for defaulting (see, 5 Weinstein-Korn-Miller, N.Y. Civ Prac ¶ 5015.05b; cf., Shaw v Shaw, supra). Since the plaintiff husband offered no reasonable excuse for his default in this action, we find that the court did not improvidently exercise its discretion in denying the motion to vacate the judgment. Bracken, J.P., Lawrence, Miller, Copertino and Santucci, JJ., concur.