Opinion
H035496
11-22-2011
KAMY MAY MORAN, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. UPS, INC., Defendant and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
Santa Clara County Super. Ct. No. CV11946
Kamy May Moran sued UPS, Inc. for personal injuries arising out of a 2004 incident in which a UPS deliveryman allegedly caused boxes being carried on two carts to fall and strike her. A court trial ensued and judgment was ultimately entered in favor of UPS.
Moran appealed, challenging, among other things, the denial of an ex parte application for a trial continuance, evidentiary rulings at trial, and the trial judge's decision in favor of UPS. Finding no error, we will affirm the judgment.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Although we routinely present a statement of facts in our opinions—particularly where, as is the case here, an appeal is taken from a judgment entered after a trial on the merits—we are unable to do so in this instance because Moran has failed to designate or provide a reporter's transcript from which such a statement could have been derived.
Moran filed a negligence complaint against UPS on May 22, 2006, in the Superior Court for the County of Alameda. She alleged that while she was working at a Valley Fair Mall showroom, a UPS employee appeared with two carts of boxes that were piled too high. Moran alleged that while the deliveryman was rearranging the boxes, they fell, striking her on the knee, groin, and hip. She alleged that the injuries to her right knee were permanent. Upon UPS's motion to change venue, the case was transferred to the Santa Clara County Superior Court.
On October 6, 2009, the court set the matter for a trial to commence on February 1, 2010. On January 6, 2010, a substitution of attorney was filed in which Moran, as a self-represented litigant, substituted in place of her former attorney. A court trial commenced on February 2, 2010, and the court took the matter under submission after hearing evidence and argument. Thereafter, the court issued a tentative decision, finding in favor of UPS. It concluded, inter alia, that "[w]ithout ruling on whether the defendant was negligent, . . . Plaintiff has failed to prove that the Defendant was the proximate, legal or a substantial cause of her alleged injuries or that the Defendant's conduct caused her to suffer any damages."
Moran filed several post-trial motions for new trial or for reconsideration, each of which was denied. Judgment was entered in favor of UPS on March 26, 2010. Moran filed a timely notice of appeal.
DISCUSSION
I. Issues on Appeal
The claims of error in this appeal are not clearly identified by Moran. This difficulty notwithstanding, we believe the claims of error she asserts are:
1. The court erred in denying Moran's application to continue the trial.
2. The court erred in finding in favor of UPS after a court trial.
3. The court erred in denying an apparent request by Moran at trial to submit her medical bills as evidence.
4. The court erred in allowing the introduction of the testimony of Moran's former supervisor.
We discuss these claims of error below.
II. Moran's Burden as Appellant
Before addressing any substantive issues that may have been raised in this appeal, we are compelled to identify the serious procedural deficiencies existing in Moran's filings with this court. Her opening brief is far from being in compliance with the California Rules of Court. The table of authorities contains a citation of six California cases, only one of which is mentioned in the text of her brief. She also lists in the table 11 other California cases, which appear to be unpublished trial court judgments; they are thus cases that must not be cited in any court filing. (Rule 8.1115(a).) Moran cites other out-of-state cases in the table—unmentioned in the text of the opening brief—and the citations contain case names only without any official citation. (See rule 3.1113(c).)
All further rule references are to the California Rules of Court.
The opening brief contains no citation to the record in support of either Moran's assertions of fact or recitation of procedural matters, in violation of rule 8.204(a)(1)(C). Moran fails either to clearly state each of her arguments with separate headings or subheadings summarizing the points made, or to develop such arguments in a coherent fashion that the court can readily identify and evaluate. (See Opdyk v. California Horse Racing Bd. (1995) 34 Cal.App.4th 1826, 1831, fn. 4.) Furthermore, the opening brief is riddled with conclusory statements that are not supported by a detailed showing, citation to the record, or legal authority. As such, although it is clear to this court that Moran challenges the court's adverse finding after trial and the subsequent judgment entered against her, the legal arguments in support of that challenge are much less clear.
Moran's reply brief is similarly noncompliant. She again presents a lengthy recitation of alleged facts without any citation to the record corroborating that recitation.
UPS is likewise noncompliant with the California Rules of Court; in the respondent's brief, UPS makes a number of factual statements that are unsupported by citation to the record. (Rule 8.204(a)(1)(C).)
We acknowledge that Moran is representing herself in connection with this appeal and therefore has not had the formal legal training that would be beneficial in advocating her position. However, the rules of civil procedure apply with equal force to self-represented parties as they do to those represented by attorneys. (Rappleyea v. Campbell (1994) 8 Cal.4th 975, 984-985.) Thus, a self-represented litigant " 'is entitled to the same, but no greater, consideration than other litigants and attorneys. [Citation.]' [Citations.]" (Nwosu v. Uba (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 1229, 1247.)
Based upon the noncompliant nature of Moran's briefs, it would be appropriate for us to entirely disregard her contentions because they have not been (1) clearly presented, (2) supported with proper citations to the record, or (3) supported with citations to applicable legal authority. In the interests of addressing the merits of the case, we will address below the arguments we have identified in Moran's appellate briefs.
III. Continuance of Trial
Moran argues that the court erred in denying her request to continue the trial. She fails to cite to the record or present any argument in support of this conclusory assertion.
A motion for a continuance is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court. (People v. Courts (1985) 37 Cal.3d 784, 790; Oliveros v. County of Los Angeles (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 1389, 1395; see also Mahoney v. Southland Mental Health Associates Medical Group (1990) 223 Cal.App.3d 167, 170 [no right to continuance as matter of law].) A party seeking a continuance must make a showing of good cause. (County of San Bernardino v. Doria Mining & Engineering Corp. (1977) 72 Cal.App.3d 776, 779; see also rule 3.1332(c).) "[C]ontinuances of trials are disfavored." (Rule 3.1332(c).) A trial court's decision to grant or deny a continuance will not be disturbed on appeal except upon a clear showing of an abuse of discretion. (Lazarus v. Titmus (1998) 64 Cal.App.4th 1242, 1249; Ohmer v. Superior Court (1983) 148 Cal.App.3d 661, 666.) It is the appellant's burden of showing from the record the existence of such an abuse of discretion. (Forthmann v. Boyer (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 977, 984-985.)
The record shows that Moran submitted on January 7, 2010, a short ex parte application requesting a continuance because her former attorney had "show[n] no interest [in] presenting the plaintiff's case in court," which resulted in her discharging him. Moran indicated that she needed additional time to either locate a new attorney or to prepare the case for trial herself. Notwithstanding the verification requirement for trial continuance motions (rule 3.1332(b)), Moran's application had no accompanying declaration.
The court did not abuse its discretion by impliedly finding that Moran had failed to make a showing of good cause warranting a continuance of the trial. Indeed, Moran's failure to submit a declaration in support of the application alone would support a finding that no good cause had been shown. Moran points to nothing in the record that presents a showing—let alone the "clear showing" (Lazarus v. Titmus, supra, 64 Cal.App.4th at p. 1249)—of an abuse of discretion by the court in denying the motion to continue.
IV. Judgment in Favor of UPS
Moran asserts that "the final decision in the Superior Court was made in error and Need[s] to be Overturned in Favor of the Plaintiff to Accomplish Fairness and Justice." (Emphasis omitted.) She takes issue with the court's tentative decision in which the court (she claims) "stat[ed] that the accident never took place?" (Emphasis omitted.) Moran argues that the court arrived at this conclusion after believing the testimony of Moran's ex-supervisor, Doris Cobian, whom Moran characterized as having "[lied] under oath." She requests that the final judgment be reversed and that this court award her damages.
Moran's objection to the trial court's decision in favor of UPS is a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the judgment, i.e., the trial court's conclusion (as noted in the tentative decision) that "[a]s Plaintiff was unable to prove all of the elements of her negligence cause of action, she shall take nothing by way of her complaint." A disputed factual issue that has been resolved by the trial court is reviewed on appeal under the substantial evidence standard. (Winograd v. American Broadcasting Co. (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 624, 632.) As explained by the Supreme Court, "In reviewing the evidence on such an appeal all conflicts must be resolved in favor of the respondent, and all legitimate and reasonable inferences indulged in to uphold the verdict if possible. . . . [W]hen a verdict is attacked as being unsupported, the power of the appellate court begins and ends with a determination as to whether there is any substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted, which will support the conclusion reached by the jury. . . ." (Crawford v. Southern Pacific Co. (1935) 3 Cal.2d 427, 429.)
It is the appellant's burden to establish that the judgment is not supported by substantial evidence. (Adoption of Allison C. (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 1004, 1011.) In meeting that burden, the appellant is charged with presenting an adequate record from which the error is demonstrated. (Maria P. v. Riles (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1281, 1295; see also Wagner v. Wagner (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 249, 259.) In the case of an appellant challenging the sufficiency of the evidence, his or her failure to provide a reporter's transcript of the trial proceedings is fatal. As has been explained, "Where no reporter's transcript has been provided and no error is apparent on the face of the existing appellate record, the judgment must be conclusively presumed correct as to all evidentiary matters. To put it another way, it is presumed that the unreported trial testimony would demonstrate the absence of error. [Citation.] The effect of this rule is that an appellant who attacks a judgment but supplies no reporter's transcript will be precluded from raising an argument as to the sufficiency of the evidence. [Citations.]" (Estate of Fain (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 973, 992.)
Here, the court found in its four-page tentative decision that Moran had "failed to prove that the Defendant was the proximate, legal or a substantial cause of her alleged injuries or that the Defendant's conduct caused her to suffer any damages." Moran elected to proceed without a reporter's transcript. Since the record on appeal contains no testimony whatsoever concerning her negligence claim, we will "presume[] that the unreported trial testimony would demonstrate the absence of error. [Citation.]" (Estate of Fain, supra, 75 Cal.App.4th at p. 992; see also National Secretarial Service, Inc. v. Froehlich (1989) 210 Cal.App.3d 510, 522 [given absence of evidentiary basis for attacking court's rulings, appellate court will "presume the receipt of sufficient evidence in favor of the judgment."].) Moran's sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenge, which is unsupported by any testimony from the record, must therefore fail. (Ibid.)
In her initial designation of the record, Moran requested the preparation of a reporter's transcript of the trial and post-trial proceedings. She subsequently filed an amended designation electing to proceed on appeal without a reporter's transcript.
V. Evidentiary Rulings
Moran apparently asserts that the trial court erred with respect to two evidentiary matters, namely, (1) the denial of an apparent offer by Moran to introduce into evidence her medical bills, and (2) allowing the introduction of evidence from the testimony of Cobian.
Rulings by the trial court concerning the admissibility of evidence are generally reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. (Zhou v. Unisource Worldwide (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 1471, 1476; Gordon v. Nissan Motor Co., Ltd. (2009) 170 Cal.App.4th 1103, 1111.) "Discretion is abused only when in its exercise, the trial court 'exceeds the bounds of reason, all of the circumstances before it being considered.' [Citation.] There must be a showing of a clear case of abuse and miscarriage of justice in order to warrant a reversal. [Citation.]" (Shaw v. County of Santa Cruz (2008) 170 Cal.App.4th 229, 281.)
Given the absence of a reporter's transcript here, there is no record that the court even made any particular evidentiary rulings excluding Moran's medical bills or permitting testimony from Cobian, let alone what those rulings were or the grounds for making them. Thus, we cannot say that the court even exercised its discretion. We cannot address a claim of error based upon nothing more than speculation that the court acted in a particular manner that an appellant claims was prejudicially erroneous. "To overcome the presumption of the correctness of the trial court's orders, [the appellant] needed to make sure the record adequately reflected whatever error he believed the trial court made. [Citation.]" (Estate of Davis (1990) 219 Cal.App.3d 663, 670, fn. 13.) Accordingly, Moran's claim of error fails by reason of her failure to meet their burden of presenting this court with an adequate record demonstrating the error. (See Pringle v. La Chapelle (1999) 73 Cal.App.4th 1000, 1003 [claimed error in evidentiary rulings forfeited by failure to present reporter's transcript necessary for appellate review].)
The tentative decision recited that the court considered Cobian's testimony, and noted that Moran did not "introduce any evidence, including, but not limited to, bills, to support a claim for reimbursement of medical expenses." But there is nothing in the record showing that Moran specifically objected to any of Cobian's testimony and that the court overruled any such objection, or that Moran proffered medical bills that the court refused to admit into evidence.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
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Retired Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Sixth Appellate District, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.
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WE CONCUR:
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Rushing, P.J.
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Premo, J.