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Morales v. Knight

COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION FIVE
Jan 6, 2012
B230816 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 6, 2012)

Opinion

B230816

01-06-2012

NATASHA LOUISA MORALES, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. GENEA DUTREA KNIGHT, Defendant and Appellant.

Genea Dutrea Knight, in pro. per., for Defendant and Appellant. No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.


NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

(Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. MS007672)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County. Robert A. McSorley, Commissioner. Affirmed.

Genea Dutrea Knight, in pro. per., for Defendant and Appellant.

No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.

Genea Knight appeals from the issuance of a restraining order under Code of Civil Procedure section 527.6, ordering her to, inter alia, stay at least 100 yards from Natasha Morales and members of her family. (Morales has not filed a brief on appeal.) We affirm, as we explain:

All further statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure unless otherwise indicated.

In August of 2010, appellant and Morales were involved in a traffic accident. According to Morales's testimony at the hearing on her application for a restraining order, after the traffic accident, appellant threatened her with a screwdriver. Morales went to the sheriff's station to report the accident. When she left, appellant drove up next to her, yelling and screaming, and saying such things as "I'm going to find you. I'm going to kill you, bitch."

Following the accident, appellant filed a small claims suit against Morales. Morales cross-complained.

The small claims hearing took place on December 7, 2010. (The matter was taken under submission.) At the hearing on her application for a restraining order, Morales testified that after the small claims hearing, appellant yelled at her, saying such things as "I know where you live," and "I'm going to get you, bitch," and "kick your ass."

Morales filed her application for a restraining order the next day. She wrote, inter alia, that "After court hearing [appellant] began yelling verbal threats directed toward me in court parking lot. She pursued me in her vehicle, put her car in park in front of my vehicle, got out of her car, threatened me with bodily harm, and stated she was going to kill me. [¶] I fear for my safety. She has already threatened me in the past with a weapon. . . . "

Morales's application for a restraining order came for hearing on January 7, 2011.

Morales testified to the matters summarized above, and also testified that after the traffic accident, she was sufficiently concerned for her safety that she purchased a new car, which appellant would not recognize.

Morales called a witness, her fiancé Scott Westbrook, who was with her at the small claims hearing. Westbrook testified that after the hearing, as he and Morales were heading to his car, appellant swore at Morales and yelled things like "Yes, I'm going to find you. You don't think this is over."

As Westbrook and Morales drove from the courthouse parking lot, appellant followed them in her car. Appellant drove up next to them, still screaming, then swerved in front of them, stopped her car, and got out. She again swore and threatened them, then got back into her car and put it in reverse. Westbrook, who was driving, reversed his car to avoid a collision. Appellant then drove away.

Appellant testified that she had not yelled at Morales or threatened to kill her and had not attacked her, and that Morales was lying. She testified that "I never said I was going to kill her. I never even put my hands on her. We did have an altercation like an argument at the scene of the accident," and that Morales had left the scene of the accident.

Appellant's daughter, Jernea Moody, testified that she was with appellant when the traffic accident occurred, that appellant did not attack Morales, and that Morales left the scene of the accident. On the day of the small claims hearing, Westbrook swerved his car in front of appellant's car, almost broadsiding them.

The court found Westbrook's testimony credible, and found that appellant had threatened and harassed Morales, and issued the order.

On appeal, appellant contends that the evidence supports a ruling in her favor, not a ruling in Morales's favor. She argues that if she had assaulted Morales at the scene of the accident, she would have been arrested at that time, and that if Morales had been in fear for her safety, she would not have waited until the small claims hearing to apply for a restraining order. She contends that there is no evidence that there was a physical assault.

Under section 527.6, an injunction prohibiting harassment will issue where there is clear and convincing evidence that unlawful harassment exists. (§ 527.6, subd. (d).) "Harassment" is defined as "unlawful violence, a credible threat of violence, or a knowing and willful course of conduct directed at a specific person that seriously alarms, annoys, or harasses the person, and that serves no legitimate purpose. The course of conduct must be such as would cause a reasonable person to suffer substantial emotional distress, and must actually cause substantial emotional distress to the plaintiff." (§ 527.6, subd. (b).)

"Credible threat of violence" is defined. It is "a knowing and willful statement or course of conduct that would place a reasonable person in fear for his or her safety, or the safety of his or her immediate family, and that serves no legitimate purpose." (§ 527.6, subd. (b)(2).) "Course of conduct" is also defined. It is "a pattern of conduct composed of a series of acts over a period of time, however short, evidencing a continuity of purpose, . . ." (§ 527.6, subd. (b)(3).)

The applicable standard of review is the substantial evidence standard, in which "[w]e resolve all factual conflicts and questions of credibility in favor of the prevailing party and indulge in all legitimate and reasonable inferences to uphold the finding of the trial court if it is supported by substantial evidence which is reasonable, credible and of solid value." (Schild v. Rubin (1991) 232 Cal.App.3d 755, 762.)

We find substantial evidence for the trial court ruling. Westbrook's testimony, which the court found credible, was that appellant made a credible threat of violence when she threatened Morales after the small claims hearing. Westbrook and Morales both testified to a course of conduct which seriously harassed Morales, in that they testified that appellant followed Morales and threatened her after the accident and after the small claims hearing. The conduct, which consisted not only of threats but of pursuit, was surely such that a reasonable person would suffer serious emotional distress. Morales's testimony was that she did suffer such distress.

Appellant essentially asks us to reweigh the evidence, and to find that she and Moody were credible and that Morales and Westbrook were not. However, an appellate court defers to trier of fact regarding credibility of witnesses (Lenk v. Total-Western, Inc. (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 959, 968), and may not reweigh evidence. (Howard v. Owens Corning (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 621, 631.)

Disposition

The judgment is affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

ARMSTRONG, J. We concur:

TURNER, P. J.

MOSK, J.


Summaries of

Morales v. Knight

COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION FIVE
Jan 6, 2012
B230816 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 6, 2012)
Case details for

Morales v. Knight

Case Details

Full title:NATASHA LOUISA MORALES, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. GENEA DUTREA KNIGHT…

Court:COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION FIVE

Date published: Jan 6, 2012

Citations

B230816 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 6, 2012)