Opinion
Case No. 3:19-01370-JE
04-09-2020
DARNELL W. MOON, Petitioner, v. JOSIAS SALAZAR, Respondent.
Darnell W. Moon 384077-044 USP Marion P.O. Box 1000 Marion, Illinois 62959 Petitioner, Pro Se Billy J. Williams United States Attorney Jared Hager, Assistant United States Attorney 1000 SW Third Avenue, Suite 600 Portland, OR 97204-2902 Attorneys for Respondent
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION Darnell W. Moon
384077-044
USP Marion
P.O. Box 1000
Marion, Illinois 62959
Petitioner, Pro Se Billy J. Williams
United States Attorney
Jared Hager, Assistant United States Attorney
1000 SW Third Avenue, Suite 600
Portland, OR 97204-2902
Attorneys for Respondent JELDERKS, Magistrate Judge.
Petitioner brings this habeas corpus case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 challenging the Bureau of Prisons' ("BOP") alleged refusal to consider him for placement in a residential reentry center ("RRC"). For the reasons that follow, the Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (#13) should be dismissed for lack of exhaustion.
BACKGROUND
Petitioner is housed within the custody of the BOP serving a 77-month sentence for mail fraud and wire fraud, with a projected release date of April 7, 2023. On August 26, 2019, Petitioner filed this 28 U.S.C. § 2241 habeas corpus case listing his place of incarceration as FCI-Sheridan. Shortly thereafter, on September 9, 2019, Petitioner filed a Notice of Change of Address advising the Court of his transfer to USP-Marion.
More than three months later, on December 20, 2019, Petitioner filed his Amended Petition wherein he alleges that the BOP unlawfully refused to consider him for placement in a RRC. He asks the Court to require Respondent to transfer him to a RRC for the remainder of his sentence. Respondent asks the Court to deny relief on the Petition because: (1) the Court lacks jurisdiction over this action because Petitioner is no longer incarcerated at FCI Sheridan; (2) Petitioner failed to exhaust his administrative remedies; and (3) Petitioner's claims lack merit.
DISCUSSION
I. Jurisdiction
Respondent first asks the Court to dismiss or transfer this case for lack of jurisdiction. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, federal courts are empowered to hear habeas corpus petitions brought by petitioners who are within the court's jurisdiction at the time they are filed. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a). "District courts are limited to granting habeas relief 'within their respective jurisdictions.'" Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 442 (2004) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a)). Jurisdiction is established at the time of filing, and if jurisdiction is proper when the petition is filed, a subsequent transfer of the prisoner will not defeat that jurisdiction. Francis v. Rison, 894 F.2d 353, 354 (9th Cir. 1990) ("'jurisdiction attaches on the initial filing for habeas corpus relief, and it is not destroyed by a transfer of the petitioner and the accompanying custodial change.'") (quoting Santillanes v. United States Parole Comm'n, 754 F.2d 887, 888 (10 Cir. 1985)).
Petitioner was incarcerated at FCI-Sheridan when he filed his original Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus in August of 2019, thus that filing in the District of Oregon naming Warden Salazar was proper. Petitioner's subsequent transfer to USP-Marion did not divest this Court of jurisdiction over the original Petition. See Francis, supra. However, more than three months after he filed his Notice of Change of Address to USP-Marion, Petitioner filed his Amended Petition in this District wherein he continues to name Warden Salazar as the Respondent.
Respondent argues that Petitioner's filing of his Amended Petition was an event of jurisdictional significance, apparently because it obligated Petitioner to name his new Warden as the Respondent to this action, and perhaps request that the case be transferred to the Southern District of Illinois. Respondent claims that this is the necessary result because it is only the Warden at USP-Marion who is empowered to provide Petitioner's desired relief, not the named Respondent in this case.
As noted above, "'jurisdiction attaches on the initial filing for habeas corpus relief, and it is not destroyed by a transfer of the petitioner and the accompanying custodial change.'" Francis v. Rison, 894 F.2d 353, 354 (9th Cir. 1990) (quoting Santillanes v. United States Parole Comm'n, 754 F.2d 887, 888 (10 Cir. 1985)). Respondent provides no direct authority for the proposition that the filing of an amended petition following a prisoner's transfer destroys jurisdiction. With respect to the contention that only the Warden at USP-Marion can provide relief in this case, if Petitioner had not amended his Petition, jurisdiction would have been proper and Warden Salazar would have remained the proper Respondent to this action. In this regard, it is difficult to conclude that the act of filing the Amended Petition rendered Warden Salazar powerless where he was otherwise the proper Respondent. Accordingly, the Court should decline to dismiss this case for lack of jurisdiction.
II. Exhaustion
"In order to seek habeas relief under section 2241 . . . a petitioner must first, 'as a prudential matter,' exhaust his or her available administrative remedies." Singh v. Napolitano, 649 F.3d 899, 900 (9 Cir. 2010) (per curiam). Requiring a petitioner to exhaust his administrative remedies aids "judicial review by allowing the appropriate development of a factual record in an expert forum." Ruviwat v. Smith, 701 F.2d 844, 845 (9th Cir. 1983).Use of available administrative remedies conserves "the court's time because of the possibility that the relief applied for may be granted at the administrative level." Id. Moreover, it allows "the administrative agency an opportunity to correct errors occurring in the course of administrative proceedings." Id; United Farm Workers v. Arizona Agric. Employ. Relations Bd., 669 F.2d 1249, 1253 (9th Cir. 1982).
"Exhaustion of administrative remedies is not required where the remedies are inadequate, inefficacious, or futile, where pursuit of them would irreparably injure the plaintiff, or where the administrative proceedings themselves are void." United Farm Workers, 669 F.2d at 1253 (citation omitted); see also Fraley v. United States Bureau of Prisons, 1 F.3d 924, 925 (9th Cir. 1993) (exhaustion waived where request for administrative remedy initially denied by Community Corrections Office based upon official B.O.P. policy and further appeal would almost certainly have been denied based upon the same policy). Courts should not, however, relax the exhaustion requirement where it "would encourage the deliberate bypass of the administrative scheme." Laing v. Ashcroft, 370 F.3d 994, 1000 (9 Cir. 2004).
The parties agree that Petitioner has not exhausted his administrative remedies. Petitioner asserts that he attempted to avail himself of his administrative remedies, but BOP officials prevented him from doing so. A review of the record shows that Petitioner has filed 579 official administrative remedy requests through the BOP during the term of his incarceration, including 21 such requests while he was housed at FCI-Sheridan between December 18, 2018 and July 8, 2019. See Declaration of Jandi Lum, p. 2; Respondent's Exhibit B, p. 21. Many of those requests were not submitted in the proper fashion and therefore not considered but, based upon this history, Petitioner's assertion that the BOP refuses to process his requests is not credible. The Court should dismiss the Petition for lack of exhaustion.
RECOMMENDATION
For the reasons identified above, the Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (#13) should be dismissed, and a judgment should be entered dismissing this case without prejudice.
SCHEDULING ORDER
This Findings and Recommendation will be referred to a district judge. Objections, if any, are due within 17 days. If no objections are filed, then the Findings and Recommendation will go under advisement on that date.
If objections are filed, then a response is due within 14 days after being served with a copy of the objections. When the response is due or filed, whichever date is earlier, the Findings and Recommendation will go under advisement.
DATED this 9th day of April, 2020.
/s/ John Jelderks
John Jelderks
United States Magistrate Judge