Opinion
2013-04-17
In the Matter of Samson MOLINSKY, petitioner, v. NEW YORK STATE DEPARTMENT OF MOTOR VEHICLES, respondent.
Joseph I. Sussman, P.C., New York, N.Y. (Eliyahu R. Babad of counsel), for petitioner. Eric T. Schneiderman, Attorney General, New York, N.Y. (Michael S. Belohlavek and Laura R. Johnson of counsel), for respondent.
Joseph I. Sussman, P.C., New York, N.Y. (Eliyahu R. Babad of counsel), for petitioner. Eric T. Schneiderman, Attorney General, New York, N.Y. (Michael S. Belohlavek and Laura R. Johnson of counsel), for respondent.
REINALDO E. RIVERA, J.P., THOMAS A. DICKERSON, JOHN M. LEVENTHAL, and SYLVIA HINDS–RADIX, JJ.
Proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 to review a determination of the New York State Department of Motor Vehicles Appeals Board, dated December 27, 2010, confirming a determination of an Administrative Law Judge dated June 29, 2010, which, after a hearing, found that the petitioner had violated Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1180(d)(2), and imposed a fine in the sum of $90, plus a surcharge.
ADJUDGED that the determination is confirmed, the petition is denied, and the proceeding is dismissed on the merits, with costs.
Contrary to the petitioner's contention, the determination that he violated Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1180(d)(2) by speeding is supported by substantial evidence ( see Matter of Kobel v. State of N.Y. Dept. of Motor Vehs. Appeals Bd., 85 A.D.3d 916, 925 N.Y.S.2d 602;Matter of Hall v. Swartz, 61 A.D.3d 868, 877 N.Y.S.2d 410;Matter of Namer v. Martinez, 26 A.D.3d 498, 809 N.Y.S.2d 457;Matter of Clarke v. Martinez, 14 A.D.3d 612, 789 N.Y.S.2d 207;Matter of Koenigsberg v. State of N.Y. Dept. of Motor Vehs. Appeals Bd., 8 A.D.3d 383, 777 N.Y.S.2d 745;Matter of Mataragas v. New York State Dept. of Motor Vehs., 6 A.D.3d 537, 538, 774 N.Y.S.2d 409). The Administrative Law Judge properly relied on the police officer's testimony concerning his visual estimate of the speed of the petitioner's vehicle as well as the reading of the radar device in the officer's vehicle. This testimony was sufficient to sustain the determination that the petitioner violated Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1180(d)(2) ( see Matter of Kobel v. State of N.Y. Dept. of Motor Vehs. Appeals Bd., 85 A.D.3d at 916, 925 N.Y.S.2d 602;Matter of Hall v. Swartz, 61 A.D.3d at 868–869, 877 N.Y.S.2d 410;Matter of Clarke v. Martinez, 14 A.D.3d at 612–613, 789 N.Y.S.2d 207).
The petitioner's remaining contentions are without merit, or are not properly before this Court because they were not raised at the administrative hearing ( see Matter of Klapak v. Blum, 65 N.Y.2d 670, 672, 491 N.Y.S.2d 615, 481 N.E.2d 247; Matter of Kearney v. Village of Cold Spring Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 83 A.D.3d 711, 714, 920 N.Y.S.2d 379).