No. 13-07-00705-CR
Opinion delivered and filed: August 26, 2008. DO NOT PUBLISH. Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b).
On appeal from the 105th District Court of Nueces County, Texas.
Before Justices RODRIGUEZ, GARZA, and VELA.
Opinion by Justice GARZA.
Appellant, Michael Molina, was charged by indictment with burglary of a habitation, a second degree felony. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 30.02(a), (c)(2) (Vernon 2003). A jury found Molina guilty. On September 13, 2007, the jury sentenced Molina, a habitual felony offender, to seventy-five years' imprisonment in the Institutional Division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice. See id. § 12.42(d) (Vernon Supp. 2007) ("[I]f it is shown on the trial of a felony offense . . . that the defendant has previously been finally convicted of two felony offenses, and the second previous felony conviction is for an offense that occurred subsequent to the first previous conviction having become final, on conviction he shall be punished by imprisonment . . . for any term of not more than 99 years or less than 25 years."). The trial court certified Molina's right to appeal on the same day. On October 10, 2007, Molina filed a motion for new trial, alleging that newly discovered evidence — specifically, an admission by his fourteen-year-old niece, C.P., that she committed the offense — proved that he was not the one who burglarized the habitation. On November 20, 2007, after a hearing in which C.P. testified, the trial court denied Molina's motion for new trial, noting that C.P. was not a credible witness. Molina now appeals the judgment of the trial court.
At the punishment phase of the trial, Molina pleaded "true" to being a habitual felony offender and to six prior convictions.
I. Anders Brief
Pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967), Molina's court-appointed appellate counsel has filed a brief with this Court, stating that her review of the record yielded "no error" and "that the instant appeal is without merit." Although counsel's brief does not advance any arguable grounds of error, it does present a professional evaluation of the record demonstrating why there are no arguable grounds to be advanced on appeal. See Stafford v. State, 813 S.W.2d 503, 510 n. 3 (Tex.Crim.App. 1991). In compliance with High v. State, 573 S.W.2d 807, 813 (Tex.Crim.App. 1978), appellant's counsel has carefully discussed why, under controlling authority, there are no errors in the trial court's judgment. Counsel has informed this Court that she has: (1) examined the record and found no arguable grounds to advance on appeal, (2) served a copy of the brief on appellant, and (3) informed appellant of his right to review the record and to file a pro se brief. See Anders, 386 U.S. at 744; Stafford, 813 S.W.2d at 510 n. 3. This Court set a June 30, 2008 deadline for Molina to file his pro se brief. No pro se brief was filed. II. Independent Review
Upon receiving an Anders brief, we must conduct a full examination of all the proceedings to determine whether the case is wholly frivolous. Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 80 (1988). We have reviewed the entire record and counsel's brief and have found nothing that would arguably support an appeal. See Bledsoe v. State, 178 S.W.3d 824, 826-28 (Tex.Crim.App. 2005) ("Due to the nature of Anders briefs, by indicating in the opinion that it considered the issues raised in the briefs and reviewed the record for reversible error but found none, the court of appeals met the requirement of Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 47.1."); Stafford, 813 S.W.2d at 509. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. III. Motion to Withdraw
In accordance with Anders, appellant's attorney has asked this Court for permission to withdraw as counsel for appellant. See Anders, 386 U.S. at 744. We grant her motion to withdraw. We further order counsel to notify appellant of the disposition of this appeal and the availability of discretionary review. See Ex parte Wilson, 956 S.W.2d 25, 27 (Tex.Crim.App. 1997) (per curiam).