Opinion
Court of Appeals Case No. 21A-JV-457
08-03-2021
M.M., Appellant/Respondent, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee/Petitioner.
Attorney for Appellant: Christopher J. Evans, Dollard Evans Whalin LLP, Noblesville, Indiana Attorneys for Appellee: Theodore E. Rokita, Attorney General of Indiana, Tina L. Mann, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, Indiana
Attorney for Appellant: Christopher J. Evans, Dollard Evans Whalin LLP, Noblesville, Indiana
Attorneys for Appellee: Theodore E. Rokita, Attorney General of Indiana, Tina L. Mann, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, Indiana
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Bradford, Chief Judge.
Case Summary
[1] After fifteen-year-old M.M. committed what would be Class A misdemeanor criminal trespass if committed by an adult, the juvenile court found her to be a juvenile delinquent, revoked the probation imposed in another case, and ordered her committed to the Indiana Department of Correction ("DOC"). M.M. contends that the State produced insufficient evidence to sustain the juvenile court's delinquency finding and that the juvenile court abused its discretion in ordering her committed to the DOC. Because we disagree with both contentions, we affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
I. Cause Number 29C01-1812-JD-1854
("Cause No. 1854")
[2] M.M. was born on April 19, 2005. On March 7, 2019, in Cause No. 1854, M.M. admitted to being a runaway, truancy, and what would be Class C misdemeanor operating a vehicle without ever having received a license if committed by an adult. On March 20, 2019, the juvenile court placed M.M. on nine months of formal probation. The State filed three noncompliance reports in March and April of 2019, and on April 23, 2019, filed a motion to modify M.M.’s dispositional decree. On May 23, 2019, M.M. admitted to the allegations in the motion to modify her dispositional decree, and the juvenile court ordered her to be placed in the Indiana United Methodist Children's Home ("the IUMCH").
[3] On October 11, 2019, the State filed a second motion to modify M.M.’s dispositional decree. On January 23, 2020, the State filed a third motion to modify M.M.’s dispositional decree. On February 18, 2020, M.M. admitted to the allegations in the third petition to modify her dispositional decree, and the second motion to modify was dismissed pursuant to an agreement. The juvenile court ordered M.M. committed to the DOC; suspended the commitment; and ordered M.M. placed into the care, custody, and control of Valle Vista residential treatment facility.
II. Cause Number 29C01-2101-JD-22
("Cause No. 22")
[4] On December 28, 2020, Benjamin Glander received several text messages from M.M. and Zachary Day to "hang out[,]" picked up M.M. in Noblesville and Day in Indianapolis, smoked marijuana with M.M. and Day, and drove the trio back to his home in Arcadia, where he lived with his parents. Tr. Vol. II p. 26. At Glander's home, Glander's father saw Glander arrive with Day and a female. Glander, Day, and M.M. went upstairs, and, after around ninety minutes to two hours, went to sleep. There had been no discussion of M.M. or Day borrowing Glander's car, and he never gave them permission to do so.
[5] At around 9:00 a.m. the next morning, Glander's father saw a male and a female (neither of whom was Glander) leave the house, place some items in Glander's car, and "spe[e]d off through the ditch." Tr. Vol. II p. 53. After Glander woke up and told his father that he had not given Day or M.M. permission to take his car, Glander's father reported it stolen. Several of Glander's possessions were missing from the house, including a rifle, an Xbox with games, a coin collection, and a "couple laptops[.]" Tr. Vol. II p. 36. Later that day, Hamilton County Sheriff's Detective Randall Dings was investigating the report that Glander's vehicle had been stolen when he learned that M.M. had been identified as being involved in the theft and that her father had reported her as a runaway the day before. Glander's car was found parked across the street from Day's residence in Indianapolis. On January 7, 2021, in Cause No. 22, the State alleged that M.M. was a juvenile delinquent for committing runaway and what would be Level 6 felony auto theft, Class A misdemeanor criminal trespass, and Level 6 felony theft of a firearm if committed by an adult.
III. Common Procedural History
[6] On January 13, 2021, the State filed a fourth motion to modify M.M.’s dispositional decree in Cause No. 1854, which motion included the allegations in Cause No. 22. (App. Vol. III 213). On January 14, 2021, the juvenile court consolidated the delinquency petition in Cause No. 22 and the motion to modify her dispositional decree in Cause No. 1854. On January 28, 2021, the juvenile court held a factfinding hearing, after which it found that M.M. had committed what would be Class A misdemeanor criminal trespass if committed by an adult in Cause No. 22 and also violated the terms of her probation in Cause No. 1854 by so doing and by consuming marijuana. On February 19, 2021, the juvenile court terminated M.M.’s probation in Cause No. 1854 and ordered her committed to the DOC.
Discussion and Decision
I. Sufficiency of the Evidence
[7] M.M. contends that the State produced insufficient evidence to sustain a finding that she committed what would be Class A misdemeanor criminal trespass if committed by an adult. When reviewing claims of insufficient evidence in a juvenile case, appellate courts apply the same standard of review as if it were an appeal of a criminal conviction. K.W. v. State , 984 N.E.2d 610, 612 (Ind. 2013). In reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we do not reweigh the evidence or assess the credibility of witnesses. McHenry v. State , 820 N.E.2d 124, 126 (Ind. 2005). "It is the fact-finder's role, not that of appellate courts to assess witness credibility and weigh the evidence to determine whether it is sufficient to support a conviction." Drane v. State , 867 N.E.2d 144, 146 (Ind. 2007). We look only to evidence in a light most favorable to the juvenile court's ruling and must affirm the conviction unless no reasonable fact-finder could find the elements proven beyond a reasonable doubt. McHenry , 820 N.E.2d at 126. The evidence need not overcome every reasonable hypothesis of innocence. Craig v. State , 730 N.E.2d 1262, 1266 (Ind. 2000).
[8] In order to establish that M.M. committed what would be Class A misdemeanor criminal trespass if committed by an adult, the State was required to prove that she "accompanie[d] another person in a vehicle, with knowledge that the other person knowingly or intentionally [wa]s exerting unauthorized control over the vehicle[.]" Ind. Code § 35-42-2-2(b)(3). M.M. contends that the evidence is insufficient to establish that she was the other person in car with Day or that, even if she was the other person, she was aware that he was exerting unauthorized control over it.
[9] We conclude that the evidence is sufficient to sustain a finding that M.M. was the other person in Glander's car with Day. Glander testified that he had brought M.M. and Day to his house the night of December 28, 2020, and that they had all gone to sleep in the same room. Glander's father, although he had apparently not previously met M.M., testified that Glander had brought Day and a female to the house, they had gone upstairs, and he had seen two persons come downstairs and drive away in Glander's car the next morning. Glander's father also identified the duo as "the other two people" when explaining that neither of them was Glander, creating a reasonable inference that they were the persons he had seen the night before, i.e. , Day and M.M. Tr. Vol. II p. 50.
[10] M.M. points out that Glander's father could not positively identify her as the person he had seen leave in Glander's car and also notes his testimony that he had heard the door open and close during the night. Glander's father also testified, however, that the female he had seen the night before had turned away from him and had had a hoodie on in the morning, making identification difficult. Moreover, the door opening and closing during the night is entirely consistent with Day and M.M. moving items to the car. M.M.’s argument in this regard is an invitation to reweigh the evidence, which we will not do. See, e.g. , McHenry , 820 N.E.2d at 126.
[11] M.M. also contends that the evidence is insufficient to establish that, even if she was the other person in the car with Day, she was aware that he was exerting unauthorized control over it. The testimony regarding M.M.’s actions does not support this contention. According to Glander and his father, Day and M.M. snuck out of the house while Glander was asleep and took his car without permission, in addition to several items of his property. Moreover, according to Glander's father, M.M.’s behavior suggests coordinated action between her and Day. Glander's father testified that M.M. had turned away from him when she arrived and had worn a hoodie the next morning, behavior consistent with an attempt to prevent a future identification. Also, even if she had not directly participated in putting several of Glander's possessions into Glander's car, M.M. must have been aware that Day was doing so. In other words, the evidence, at the very least, supports a reasonable inference that M.M. was aware that Day was up to no good, up to and including exerting unauthorized control over Glander's car. Again, M.M.’s argument is an invitation to reweigh the evidence, which we will not do. See id.
II. DOC Commitment
[12] M.M. contends that the juvenile court abused its discretion in ordering her committed to the DOC. A juvenile court is accorded "wide latitude" and "great flexibility" in its dealings with juveniles. J.S. v. State , 881 N.E.2d 26, 28 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008). "[T]he choice of a specific disposition of a juvenile adjudicated a delinquent child is a matter within the sound discretion of the juvenile court and will only be reversed if there has been an abuse of that discretion." Id. The juvenile court's discretion in determining a disposition is subject to the statutory considerations of the welfare of the child, the safety of the community, and the policy of favoring the least-harsh disposition. Id. An abuse of discretion occurs when the juvenile court's action is "clearly erroneous" and against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before it. Id.
[13] The goal of the juvenile process is rehabilitation rather than punishment. R.H. v. State , 937 N.E.2d 386, 388 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010). "Accordingly, juvenile courts have a variety of placement options for juveniles with delinquency problems, none of which are considered sentences." Id. Indiana Code section 31-37-18-6(1)(A) provides that "[i]f consistent with the safety of the community and the best interest of the child, the juvenile court shall enter a dispositional decree that is in the least restrictive (most family like) and most appropriate setting available." "[T]he statute contains language that reveals that a more restrictive placement might be appropriate under certain circumstances." J.S. , 881 N.E.2d at 29. The law requires only that the disposition selected be the least restrictive disposition that is "consistent with the safety of the community and the best interest of the child." D.S. v. State , 829 N.E.2d 1081, 1085 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005).
[14] In light of M.M.’s history and the failure of less-restrictive measures to rehabilitate her, we cannot say that the juvenile court abused its discretion in ordering her committed to the DOC. M.M. was first adjudicated a delinquent for running away, truancy, and operating a vehicle without ever receiving a license on March 7, 2019. M.M. was put on formal probation, ordered to participate in Choices, and released to home detention with electronic monitoring. The very next day, M.M. violated the terms of her probation by having a friend over, and a non-compliance report was filed. Five days after the first non-compliance report was filed, a second was filed due to continued refusal to attend school despite efforts by school staff to accommodate her continued absences. A third non-compliance report was filed on April 5, 2019, again for having a friend over. On April 8, 2019, M.M.’s home detention was transferred from Father's residence to Mother's residence by the juvenile court.
[15] On April 21, 2019, 2019, M.M. posted a video of friends in her bedroom on social media. On April 23, 2019, the Fishers Police Department was called to the home and found marijuana in M.M.’s closet, and the State filed a motion to modify her dispositional decree with the juvenile court, which resulted in her placement in the IUMCH. On October 15, 2019, the State filed a second motion to modify M.M.’s dispositional decree. On January 3, 2020, the juvenile court placed M.M. in secure detention following violations of her safety plan. M.M. failed a drug screen for marijuana, and, on January 24, 2020, the State filed a third petition to modify her dispositional decree. On February 13, 2020, the juvenile court granted the State's third petition to modify M.M.’s dispositional decree and placed her at Valle Vista as a suspended commitment to the DOC. M.M. was successfully discharged from Valle Vista on September 14, 2020, and remained on formal probation at her father's house until December 29, 2020, when she was taken into custody for the actions at issue in Cause No. 22.
[16] In summary, M.M.’s history is one of repeated violations of the terms of probation and home detention, with the only significant periods of compliance occurring during her placements at the IUMCH and Valle Vista. In other words, when M.M. has been given a greater measure of freedom, she has abused it. M.M. has also been given access to services to address her substance abuse and anger through Choices and Valle Vista but tested positive for marijuana on December 29, 2020. If anything, M.M.’s behavior has become more troubling over time, culminating in her actions of December 28 and 29, 2020. M.M. nonetheless argues that the juvenile court abused its discretion because it did not allow her to remain in secure detention rather than be committed to the DOC. Given the repeated failure of less-restrictive placements to rehabilitate M.M., we cannot agree. We conclude that the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in ordering M.M. committed to the DOC. See e.g. , K.S. v. State , 849 N.E.2d 538, 544 (Ind. 2006) (affirming juvenile's commitment to DOC after several probation violations).
[17] We affirm the judgment of the juvenile court.
affirmed
Robb, J., and Altice, J., concur.