Opinion
No. 06-19-00202-CR
05-07-2020
JONATHAN EUGENE MITCHELL, Appellant v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the 276th District Court Marion County, Texas
Trial Court No. F15085 Before Morriss, C.J., Burgess and Stevens, JJ.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Jonathan Eugene Mitchell entered open pleas of guilty to and was convicted of two counts of aggravated sexual assault of a child. The trial court sentenced Mitchell to eight years' imprisonment after a punishment hearing. On appeal, Mitchell argues that the trial court erred (1) in failing to admonish him on the range of punishment before accepting his pleas and (2) in finding his pleas knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entered. We find that the trial court erred in failing to admonish Mitchell on the range of punishment and that the error was harmful. As a result, we sustain Mitchell's first point of error, reverse the trial court's judgment, and remand the case to the trial court for a new trial.
"Admissibility of a confession must be based on a 'reliable determination on the voluntariness issue which satisfies the constitutional rights of the defendant.'" Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242 (1969) (quoting Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 387 (1964)). "The requirement that the prosecution spread on the record the prerequisites of a valid waiver is no constitutional innovation." Id.
"Several federal constitutional rights are involved in a waiver that takes place when a plea of guilty is entered in a state criminal trial" including "the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, [which] sets the standard of voluntariness for a waiver of these important federal rights." Anderson v. State, 182 S.W.3d 914, 917 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). "Among other constitutional requirements is one that a defendant who pleads guilty be fully aware of certain consequences of the plea." Id. at 917-18. "[T]his constitutional standard . . . require[s] a court to admonish a guilty-pleading defendant . . . about those direct consequences that are punitive in nature." Id. at 918.
Also, "[a] Texas court . . . must do more than is required to meet the minimum standards of due process of law when a defendant pleads guilty in a felony case." Id. "Prior to accepting a plea of guilty or a plea of nolo contendere, the court shall admonish the defendant of . . . the range of the punishment attached to the offense." TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 26.13(a)(1) (Supp.).
The appellate record demonstrates that no written or oral admonishments on the range of punishment were provided to Mitchell before the trial court accepted his pleas of guilt. The State "concedes that when Appellant was admonished, prior to his plea[s], the Court omitted the statutory admonishment required by Article 26.13." We conclude that the record on appeal reflects that the trial court failed to admonish Mitchell on the range of punishment. As a result, the trial court erred. See id.; Burnett v. State, 88 S.W.3d 633, 637 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002); Hwang v. State, 130 S.W.3d 496, 498-99 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2004, pet. ref'd).
The State argues that Mitchell was not harmed by this omission. The State maintains that the harm analysis is governed by Article 26.13(c), which states, "In admonishing the defendant as herein provided, substantial compliance by the court is sufficient, unless the defendant affirmatively shows that he was not aware of the consequences of his plea and that he was misled or harmed by the admonishment of the court." TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 26.13(c) (Supp.). "'There is a large gray area between letter-perfect compliance and total failure to admonish,' and questions of substantial compliance arise in that gray area." Anderson, 182 S.W.3d at 918 (quoting Taylor v. State, 610 S.W.2d 471, 478 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1980) (op. on reh'g)). Nonetheless, where there is a failure to admonish to the degree present in this case, Article 26.13(c) does not apply. Id.; see Seagraves v. State, 342 S.W.3d 176, 183 n.9 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2011, no pet.).
Instead, "[t]he issue is whether, in a given case, the error affected substantial rights, in which case it is not harmless error." Anderson, 182 S.W.3d at 918; see TEX. R. APP. P. 44.2(b). "No party should have a burden to prove harm from an error, and there ordinarily is no way to prove 'actual' harm." Anderson, 182 S.W.3d at 918. In analyzing harm, "a reviewing court must look to the record as a whole to determine whether the defendant was aware of the particular information upon which he should have been admonished—notwithstanding the lack of an admonishment—prior to the time that the trial court accepted his plea." Davison v. State, 405 S.W.3d 682, 688 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (citing Burnett, 88 S.W.3d at 638). "A record that is completely silent with respect to whether a defendant was actually aware of the range of punishment, notwithstanding the lack of judicial admonishment, supports the inference that he was not in fact so aware for purposes of the Rule 44.2(b) harm analysis." Id. (citing Burnett, 88 S.W.3d at 638) ("Of course, a silent record would support such an inference.")). "The reviewing court also may simultaneously consider record facts from which one would reasonably infer that a defendant did know the consequences of his plea or . . . was actually aware of the range of punishment." Burnett, 88 S.W.3d at 638. "It is ultimately the responsibility of the reviewing court to determine whether the record supports or negates the defendant's assertion of harm." Id. at 639. "If, after a conscientious examination of the record, the reviewing court is left with 'grave doubt' on the matter, the error is not harmless." Id.
The State argues that Davison supports its claim that failure to admonish Mitchell on the range of punishment was harmless error. Davison is easily distinguishable since, "[p]rior to accepting his plea, the trial court admonished [Davison] as to the range of punishment" for the underlying offense. Davison, 405 S.W.3d at 684-85. The issue in Davison involved the failure to admonish on the enhanced punishment range resulting from the State's punishment enhancement allegations, and Davison had received the State's punishment enhancement allegations and expressed no surprise or protest "when mention was made during the punishment hearing of a significantly greater grade of offense and range of punishment." Id. at 689. As shown below, the trial court provided no admonishments on the range of punishment, nothing shows Mitchell was aware of the entire range of punishment prior to or after entry of his pleas, and the record contains several references to Mitchell's desire to withdraw his pleas of guilt, suggesting confusion on the issue even at punishment.
The State argues that the indictment labeled the offenses as "F2" offenses. While correct, nothing shows that Mitchell was aware before his pleas that he could be sentenced to "not more than 20 years or less than 2 years" imprisonment and ordered to pay "a fine not to exceed $10,000." TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 12.33 (Supp.). After the trial court found him guilty of the offenses on July 19, 2019, Mitchell sent a note to the trial court seeking to withdraw his pleas. Before the punishment hearing on August 29, the trial court asked Mitchell if he had "abandoned" his request to withdraw his pleas. Mitchell indicated that he was "[r]eady to go forward." As a result, the punishment phase of the trial began and resulted in the following statements by Mitchell, which the State argues shows that he understood the range of punishment at his July 19 plea hearing:
Q. [BY DEFENSE COUNSEL] If you were put on probation, do you understand that if you ever got investigated or any conduct occurred that was criminal, that you could possibly be sent to the penitentiary if the Judge determined that that was appropriate?This exchange merely informed Mitchell that the punishment range could be up to twenty years in prison "if [he] violate[d] probation," a statement that did not show he was aware during his plea hearing of the possibility of a twenty-year prison sentence in the absence of a community supervision violation.
A. [BY THE DEFENDANT] Yes, sir.
Q. And one other possibility may exist in this case. If the Court were to allow you to withdraw your guilty plea -- would hear your guilty plea and withdraw his finding of guilt, you could be put on deferred adjudication probation, which means that if you violate probation, you could get up to 20 years because this is a second degree felony.
A. Yes, sir.
Critically, nothing showed that Mitchell understood that he would be confined to prison for at least two years if deferred adjudication was not given. As a result, we do not find that the punishment record supports a reasonable inference that Mitchell knew the full range of punishment before he pled guilty. When we find that "nothing in the record suggests that the appellant already knew about the potential consequences at the time he entered his plea[,] . . . [w]e may not infer that the appellant was aware of the consequences of his plea." VanNortrick v. State, 227 S.W.3d 706, 712-13 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) ("In this situation, the strength or weakness of the evidence against the appellant makes little difference to the harm analysis in the context of the whole record.").
We also note that the possibility of community supervision was never mentioned in the record before the punishment hearing. Mitchell was only eligible for deferred adjudication community supervision, but the trial court had already found him guilty of the offense. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. arts. 42A.054(a)(9), 42A.056(4), 42A.102 (Supp.). In closing argument, Mitchell's counsel asked the trial court to "withdraw the finding of guilt and give him deferred adjudication." The trial court did not withdraw its finding of guilt.
Under the unique circumstances of this case, our conscientious examination of the record leaves us with a "grave doubt" about whether Mitchell was actually aware of the full range of punishment. As a result, we sustain Mitchell's first point of error.
As a result of our disposition, we need not address Mitchell's second point of error.
We reverse the trial court's judgment and remand the case for further proceedings.
Scott E. Stevens
Justice Date Submitted: April 28, 2020
Date Decided: May 7, 2020 Do Not Publish