Summary
In Mitchell, the appellant claimed the family court was not able to comply with KRS 403.180(2), thus voiding that portion of the decree, because it lacked the information needed to divide the couple's property in just proportions where the appellee failed to provide financial information in compliance with FCRPP 2(1) or 2(3).
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NO. 2016-CA-000627-MR
04-13-2018
MILDRED D. MITCHELL APPELLANT v. JEFFREY W. MITCHELL APPELLEE
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT: William D. Tingley Louisville, Kentucky BRIEF FOR APPELLEE: Elmer J. George Lebanon, Kentucky
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED APPEAL FROM MARION CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE ALLAN RAY BERTRAM, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 11-CI-00046 OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: CLAYTON, COMBS, AND D. LAMBERT, JUDGES. LAMBERT, D., JUDGE: Mildred Mitchell appeals the order of the Marion Circuit Court denying her motion for post-judgment relief pursuant to CR 60.02, which sought to vacate the property settlement portion of the decree dissolving her marriage to Jeffrey Mitchell. Mildred asks this Court to determine whether the trial court had jurisdiction to enter the portion of the decree incorporating the separation agreement. Having reviewed the record, we find that it did, and thereby committed no reversible error. Consequently, we affirm.
Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The parties married in 1992 and had no children. On February 10, 2011, Jeffrey filed four documents with the Marion Circuit Clerk: a petition for dissolution, an entry of appearance and waiver (executed by Mildred), an affidavit, and a fully executed and notarized separation agreement. Jeffrey did not file a final Verified Disclosure Statement ("VDS") with these documents. Significantly, the rules do not require that the financial disclosure form be filed with the clerk, and, anticipate the exchange of the disclosure forms by each party. Subsequently, the trial court entered the decree of dissolution, which incorporated the separation agreement, on the same day the case was filed. Each of the documents filed was prepared by Jeffrey's counsel, and Mildred acted pro se.
Mildred later retained counsel and filed a CR 60.02 motion and an accompanying affidavit on November 28, 2012, arguing that the separation agreement was unconscionable because the majority of marital assets went to Jeffrey and—without evidentiary support—she alleged her incompetence, resulting from a combination of a head injury and antidepressant medication. The parties continued filing pleadings, and the trial court held several case management conferences until the trial court finally denied Mildred's CR 60.02 on April 8, 2016.
The trial court made findings of fact that Mildred offered no evidence to "demonstrate her claims of inequity or health issues" and that Mildred had "failed to show that the agreement is unjust and inequitable or unconscionable." In the order's "Conclusions of Law" section, the trial court concluded that subsections (a), (b), and (c) of CR 60.02 could not apply because the motion was filed more than one year after the entry of the decree. It further concluded that subsection (d) did not apply because Mildred did not allege fraud. The trial court also concluded that Mildred was not entitled to relief under the catch-all provision of CR 60.02(f) because her allegations amounted to an assertion that she simply had made a bad bargain for herself. Most importantly for our purposes, the trial court concluded that Mildred was not entitled to relief pursuant to CR 60.02(e) because she had not claimed the judgment was void.
After a change of counsel for Mildred, this appeal ensued. On appeal Mildred argues that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to enter the portion of the decree that incorporated the separation agreement, because of procedural deficiencies precluding the trial court from finding the agreement conscionable. For that reason, she contends, that portion of the decree dealing with the separation agreement is void.
II. ANALYSIS
A. STANDARD OF REVIEW
In normal circumstances, appellate courts examine a trial court's denial of a CR 60.02 motion for abuse of discretion. Commonwealth v. Bustamonte, 140 S.W.3d 581 (Ky. App. 2004). However, when a trial court is asked to re-examine its entry of a potentially void judgment, the standard is de novo, because "[a] void judgment is a legal nullity, and a court has no discretion in determining whether it should be set aside." Solieau v. Bowman, 382 S.W.3d 888, 890 (Ky. App. 2012) (quoting Foremost Ins. Co. v. Whitaker, 892 S.W.2d 607 (Ky. App. 1995)).
Our analysis must, therefore, dispense with the issue of jurisdiction first, then determine whether the trial court properly found the agreement conscionable.
B. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY EXERCISED JURISDICTION
Family courts, because they are circuit courts, have general jurisdiction over divorce actions and the equitable division of property in such actions, pursuant to Section 112(6) of the Kentucky Constitution. KRS 23A.100. Further, the General Assembly explicitly stated that family court jurisdiction is to be "liberally construed and applied to promote its underlying purposes" which include promoting amicable settlement of disputes between family members, and mitigation of potential harm to the spouses and their children caused by the divorce. KRS 23A.110.
Mildred argues that the trial court lacked the information it needed to comply with the mandate of KRS 403.180(2) to consider the economic circumstances of the parties, because Jeffrey failed to comply with FCRPP 2(1) or 2(3) to provide their financial information. Generously reading Day v. Day, 937 S.W.2d 717 (Ky. 1997), Mildred extends her argument to stand for the position that because the trial court could not comply with KRS 403.180(2), the portion of the decree incorporating the separation agreement was void.
Family Court Rules of Procedure and Practice. --------
We do not read the Supreme Court's language in Day v. Day so generally. That case dealt with issues unique to adoption. "This mandate [requiring the adoptee child reside with the putative adopting parent for 90 days] is a prerequisite to the trial court's exercise of jurisdiction to hear the petition for adoption." Id. at 719. The Supreme Court held that as a statutory right, adoption proceedings must strictly comply "with the procedures provided [in the statute] in order to protect the rights of the natural parents." Id. (emphasis added). Adoptions reflect a greater need for procedural formalities owing to the fundamental nature of the rights of parents to direct the upbringing of their children. See generally Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651, 92 S.Ct. 1208, 31 L.Ed.2d 551 (1972). There is no parallel statutory prerequisite found in KRS Chapter 403.
The trial court here did comply with the terms of KRS 403.180(2) in making its findings. The trial court's finding complied with the spirit, even if not the letter, of KRS 403.180(2). This is consistent with the legislative mandate to liberally construe an exercise of jurisdiction which meets with the purpose of effectuating amicable settlements of disputes.
C. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN FINDING
THE SEPARATION AGREEMENT CONSCIONABLE
As a threshold matter, we first address an argument advanced by Jeffrey that we lack the authority to adjudicate this issue. Jeffrey bases his argument around the erroneous understanding that Mildred seeks to set aside the entire decree. It is clear from Mildred's brief that she seeks only to vacate the portion by which the trial court incorporated the separation agreement. The appellate courts of Kentucky have long held that divorces are valid even if the inherent property issues are unresolved or improperly resolved. Dodd v. Dodd, 129 S.W.2d 166, 171 (Ky. 1939). It is only the entry of the decree dissolving the marriage itself that we lack the authority to entertain. Id.
The ruling as to the conscionability of a separation agreement is properly left in the hands of the trial court, who is in the best position to evaluate the facts and circumstances at play. Shraberg v. Shraberg, 939 S.W.2d 330 (Ky. 1997). Such conclusions are left in the sound discretion of the trial courts. McFelia v. McFelia, 406 S.W.3d 838 (Ky. 2013); Richardson v. Brunner, 327 S.W.2d 572 (Ky. 1959); Peterson v. Peterson, 583 S.W.2d 707 (Ky. App. 1979).
Additionally, appellate courts have affirmed the conscionability of separation agreements, even where the terms of such agreements have been considered lopsided in favor of one party over the other. Cameron v. Cameron, 265 S.W.3d 797 (Ky. 2008); Money v. Money, 297 S.W.3d 69 (Ky. App. 2009). The trial court was entitled to find the agreement conscionable unless it concluded the agreement to be "manifestly unfair or inequitable." Burke v. Sexton, 814 S.W.2d 290, 292 (Ky. App. 1991) (quoting Wilhoit v. Wilhoit, 506 S.W.2d 511, 513 (1974)).
The trial court specifically found the separation agreement was conscionable. The trial court considered the facts and circumstances available to it at the time; indeed, the only relevant facts not before the trial court were information regarding the incomes of the parties. The separation agreement provided Jeffrey would receive the majority of the couple's martial assets, but it also required him to assume the majority of the couple's marital debts. Further, under the agreement, Mildred received two vehicles and one of the couple's residences, as well as significant personalty.
While neither Jeffrey, nor Mildred, filed the financial disclosure statements under FCRPP 2, the parties had exchanged financial information during the protracted negotiation process which led to the separation agreement. That Mildred clearly indicated assent to the agreement gave the trial court no reason to find the agreement unconscionable.
Bearing these facts in mind, we cannot conclude that the trial court's finding amounted to an abuse of discretion.
III. CONCLUSION
Having examined the record, we conclude that the trial court properly exercised jurisdiction and properly found that the separation agreement was effective and binding and not void. We further conclude that the trial court, as the court in the best position to evaluate the separation agreement for conscionability, did not abuse its discretion in so finding. We therefore affirm.
ALL CONCUR. BRIEF FOR APPELLANT: William D. Tingley
Louisville, Kentucky BRIEF FOR APPELLEE: Elmer J. George
Lebanon, Kentucky