Opinion
11-P-841
04-09-2012
MICHAEL S. MILONA v. MARIA I. TATAKIS.
NOTICE: Decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to its rule 1:28 are primarily addressed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, rule 1:28 decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 1:28, issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 1:28
After the parties' divorce, the husband filed a contempt action in Probate and Family Court alleging that the wife was in violation of a divorce judgment by failing to turn over certain tax forms to him. It is uncontested that the wife had an obligation to do so only if the husband had satisfied his 'child support obligation.' The husband claimed he had; the wife claimed he had not. This was not a dispute of fact so much as a debate about the scope of the 'child support obligation' that the husband had to satisfy before the wife's duty to turn over the tax forms was triggered. The probate judge interpreted the relevant provisions in the husband's favor, found the wife 'guilty' of contempt, ordered her to turn over the tax forms, and assessed attorney's fees against her. For the reasons set forth below, we vacate the judgment of contempt.
Despite the judge's use of this terminology, this was plainly a civil contempt proceeding.
Background. The parties divorced in 2004, at which time they lived in Connecticut. They entered into a separation agreement that a Connecticut court incorporated into a judgment of divorce. Child support is addressed in Article XI of the parties' agreement, which is entitled 'child support.' Section 11.1 states that the husband 'shall pay child support in accordance with the Connecticut Child Support Guidelines.' It then states that '[s]aid child support shall be in the amount of $307 per week, payable in advance.' However, section 11.1 also includes a subsection 'a' that states:
'In the event the Wife incurs qualified day care pre-school expenses for the minor children, same shall be divided 70% to [husband] and 30% by [wife]. The parties specifically agree that summer camp expenses shall be defined as child care in the event that the Wife is employed.'
Thus, the husband was required to pay base child support of $307 per week, but was also obligated to pay seventy percent of educational/child care expenses. In addition, article XV of the agreement required the husband to maintain medical insurance for the children (including dental and hospitalization coverage) and to pay seventy percent of unreimbursed medical expenses and day care expenses. Article XV also states that 'medical insurance is an element of child support and it is therefore modifiable.'
As noted above, the wife was required to provide the husband with certain tax forms if he was 'current in the payment of his child support obligation' at the relevant time. Such forms were needed to allow him to claim exemptions for one or both of the couple's children.
Whether he took the exemption for one or both children depended on the amount of the wife's income during the relevant tax year.
After the divorce, both parties moved to Massachusetts. In 2006, the wife filed a complaint to recognize, enforce, and modify the Connecticut decree, and the parties each moved for contempt against the other. In 2007, the parties entered into a stipulation that resolved the parties' dispute as to the 2005 and 2006 tax years. As to future tax years, the judgment stated that the terms of the original Connecticut judgment/settlement agreement would control. The stipulation, which was incorporated into a 2007 modification judgment, reiterated the husband's duty to pay 'child support' of $307 per week, and seventy percent of unreimbursed medical and day care expenses (and it clarified the manner in which this would be done).
In 2009, the wife brought a contempt action against the husband for failing to pay his seventy percent share of medical and camp-related expenses. By stipulation dated October 28, 2009, the parties settled that dispute. Under the settlement, the husband agreed to pay the wife $4,000 of the expenses she claimed (in addition to other payments he had already made). The parties agreed that '[a]ll of the children's expenses which [the wife] addressed in the contempt today are up to date bills [sic] and will be fully paid by [the husband] in $500 installments starting [November 13, 2009] for 8 months.'
On June 17, 2010, the husband filed the current contempt action based on the wife's failure to provide the relevant tax forms for the 2007, 2008, and 2009 tax years. The wife acknowledged that she had not provided the forms, but claimed that she was excused from doing so, because the husband had not fully satisfied his obligation to pay child support during the relevant years. In the wife's view, the husband's obligation to pay for seventy percent of unreimbursed medical and day care expenses was part of his 'child support' obligation, and she claimed that she was justified in not turning over the tax forms because the husband had delayed such payments. In her answer to the contempt complaint, she cited to the 2009 stipulation as proof of this alleged noncompliance: 'By [the husband's] own admission, [he] was at least $4,000.00 behind in the payment of expenses for the tax years 2007, 2008 and 2009 per stipulation of the parties dated October 28, 2009.'
In adjudging the wife in contempt, the judge found that, at the relevant times, the husband stayed current in meeting his obligation to pay $307 per week in child support (a finding that the wife does not challenge). The judge expressly rejected the wife's 'argument that any late payments involving summer camp or uninsured medical expenses fall within the definition of child support.' The judge explained: '[t]he agreement clearly states child support obligation in the singular not the plural.'
Discussion. We are not persuaded by the ground on which the judge relied; that is, we do not see how the use of 'obligation in the singular' is outcome determinative. If, as the wife maintains, the husband's duty to pay his share of medical and child care expenses should be considered an element of child support, then paying that element can readily be considered part of the husband's child support 'obligation.' Indeed, it would be a curious result if one who failed to provide a major element of child support were considered to have satisfied his obligation to provide child support. Of course, we can uphold the judge's judgment of contempt on any ground, and we thus turn to examine whether she might have been correct for a different reason.
Although the current judgment in force is one under Massachusetts law, that judgment in pertinent part incorporated the Connecticut judgment, which in turn incorporated the parties' 2004 separation agreement. The operative question is -- when they agreed that the husband's satisfying his 'child support obligation' would trigger the wife's duty to turn over the tax forms -- did the parties intend 'child support obligation' to mean only the $307 base payment, or the husband's seventy percent share of medical and child care expenses as well. Within the four corners of the agreement, there is some linguistic support for each of the competing interpretations. The fact that the child support section of the agreement states that the husband 'shall pay child support' and then states that '[s]aid child support shall be in the amount of $307 per week' provides support for the husband's position. The fact that the husband's obligation to pay for child care expenses is included in the 'child support' section of the agreement, and the fact that the agreement refers to the husband's obligation to provide medical insurance as 'an element of child support' supports the wife's broader reading. In addition, the wife finds some support for her interpretation by reference to Connecticut divorce law, which defines a parent's 'child support award' as 'the entire payment obligation of the noncustodial parent,' including not only regular child support payments but also health care coverage and child care contributions. Conn. Agencies Regs. § 46b-215a-1(6) (1999). Finally, there is at least some force to the wife's argument that her broader interpretation is consistent with the purpose behind the provision (that the husband not be able to claim one or both children as dependents if he had not in fact fully satisfied his obligation to support them).
The relevance of Connecticut law is not that it controls the current Massachusetts judgment, but that it provides insight into what the parties intended in 2004.
--------
We need not resolve the ambiguity in the agreement in the context of the current appeal. 'To constitute civil contempt, there must be a clear and undoubted disobedience of a clear and unequivocal command.' Manchester v. Department of Envtl. Quality Engr., 381 Mass. 208, 212 (1980), quoting from United Factory Outlet, Inc. v. Joy Stores, Inc., 361 Mass. 35, 36 (1972). 'Where the order is ambiguous or the disobedience is doubtful, there cannot be a finding of contempt.' Judge Rotenberg Educ. Ctr., Inc. v. Commissioner of the Dept. of Mental Retardation (no. 1), 424 Mass. 430, 443 (1997). In light of the ambiguities in the text of the judgment that the husband is seeking to enforce (and the wife's nontrivial arguments about how such ambiguities should be resolved in her favor), the finding of contempt cannot stand. We therefore vacate the judgment of contempt.
We acknowledge that our ruling leaves the underlying dispute unresolved, and we further acknowledge that some argument can be made that we can and should reach such issues even in the current contempt context. Compare Colorio v. Marx, 72 Mass. App. Ct. 382, 385-389 (2008) (concluding that a judge treated a complaint for contempt as a motion for clarification and reaching the merits of whether his interpretation was correct). We decline to do so here, but conclude that such issues should be left for the probate judge to address in the first instance. For one thing, we do not know if either party has parol evidence to offer that could resolve the seeming ambiguity in their agreement. See Sax v. Sax, 53 Mass. App. Ct. 765, 771-772 (2002). We vacate the judgment of contempt and remand this matter to the Probate Court for further proceedings consistent with this memorandum and order. We leave it to the discretion of the judge whether to treat the contempt complaint as subsuming a motion for clarification (in which case the judge could address the remaining issues on the current pleadings) or instead to address the underlying issues only upon the filing of a new complaint or motion (in which case the contempt proceedings should be terminated with a judgment in the wife's favor).
So ordered.
By the Court (Grasso, Kafker & Milkey, JJ.),