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Milner v. McKennan Hosp

Minnesota Court of Appeals
Apr 4, 1995
529 N.W.2d 498 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995)

Opinion

No. CX-94-2221.

April 4, 1995.

Appeal from the District Court, Hennepin County, Beryl A. Nord, J.

David R. Vail, Minneapolis, for plaintiff Michelle Milner.

David B. Kempston, Gilmore, Aafedt, Forde, Anderson Gray, Minneapolis, for appellants Schwan's Sales Enterprises, Inc., et al.

William J. Wetering, Worthington, Robert Nelson, David Kroon, Sioux Falls, SD, for respondents Neurology Associates, et al.

Considered and decided by NORTON, P.J., and SCHUMACHER and MANSUR, JJ.

Retired judge of the district court, serving as judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals by appointment pursuant to Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.


OPINION


Appellants petitioned the district court to convert a workers' compensation court order to a judgment under Minn.Stat. § 176.451. The order precludes medical care providers from seeking reimbursement for medical services provided to the employee because they failed to intervene in a workers' compensation proceeding despite notice. The district court concluded that Minn.Stat. § 176.451 did not authorize the entry of judgment. We affirm.

FACTS

Michelle Milner sustained a work-related injury in July 1991. She was employed by appellant Schwan's Sales Enterprises; Schwan's workers' compensation carrier was appellant Liberty Mutual Insurance Company. Milner claimed her injury consisted of carpal tunnel syndrome, tendonitis, and thoracic outlet syndrome. Appellants admitted only tendonitis as Milner's work-related injury.

A hearing was scheduled for Milner's workers' compensation benefits claim before a workers' compensation court, then canceled when the court learned not all of Milner's medical care providers, including several South Dakota providers, had been served with notice of the hearing and their right to intervene. Service was accomplished on these providers, and three intervened. No response was received from the others, including respondent McKennan Hospital. The workers' compensation court found their failure to respond materially prejudiced the rights and interests of the other parties, and issued an order ruling that the non-responding parties were precluded from intervening in the action and from claiming reimbursement from the employee, the employer, the insurer, or any of the intervenors. The remaining parties settled, and the award on stipulation was approved.

Milner had an outstanding balance with McKennan Hospital, a South Dakota entity. When she accepted services from McKennan Hospital in South Dakota, she signed an agreement acknowledging that she would be personally responsible for any amounts not paid by her insurer. The agreement also stated that McKennan Hospital would process Milner's insurance, but Milner would be billed regardless of the status of her insurance claim. McKennan Hospital assigned its interest in Milner's balance to Accounts Management, Inc. (AMI), which obtained a default judgment against Milner in South Dakota.

After learning AMI had obtained a default judgment, appellants filed a petition for entry of judgment in Hennepin County, seeking to convert the workers' compensation court order into a judgment under Minn.Stat. § 176.451. By doing so, they sought to preclude AMI from docketing the South Dakota judgment in Minnesota and collecting from Milner. AMI and McKennan Hospital appeared specially, contending the district court did not have subject matter or personal jurisdiction, and that it lacked statutory authority to enter the judgment requested. Two of the other named defendants were dismissed with prejudice in accordance with a stipulation by the parties. It does not appear from the record that the other defendants/respondents participated in the appeal.

The district court held it lacked authority to enter the judgment because Minn.Stat. § 176.451 did not apply and that it would not have had authority to enter the judgment even if the statute had applied. It did not address the issue of personal jurisdiction.

ISSUE

Did the trial court err in determining that appellants were not entitled to the relief sought under Minn.Stat. § 176.451?

ANALYSIS

Appellants contend the district court erred in finding Minn.Stat. § 176.451 did not provide it with the authority to enter judgment on the workers' compensation court's order. The construction of a statute is a question of law, fully reviewable on appeal. Hibbing Educ. Ass'n v. Public Employment Relations Bd., 369 N.W.2d 527, 529 (Minn. 1985).

Minn.Stat. § 176.451, subd. 1 (1992) states: Where there has been a default of more than 30 days in the payment of compensation due under an award, the employee, or the employee's dependent, or other person entitled to the payment of money under the award, may apply to the judge of any district court for the entry of judgment upon the award.

The statute provisions are not met here: neither Milner nor appellants are entitled to "payment of money" under the workers' compensation order; neither is seeking such a payment; and no default could have occurred because no payment was due.

Appellants do not claim they have met the literal terms of the statute; instead, they argue the district court's interpretation is unduly narrow. They contend the workers' compensation order is essentially a default judgment, because McKennan Hospital failed to respond and intervene in the workers' compensation court proceeding. This argument ignores the clear language of the statute, which identifies specific conditions that must exist before a judgment can be entered under the statute. This court cannot adopt appellants' reasoning and ignore the plain language of the statute. See Kirkwold Constr. Co. v. M.G.A Constr., 513 N.W.2d 241, 244 (Minn. 1994) ("The plain language of [a] statute should not be disregarded if the meaning is clear.").

Appellants argue that a narrow reading of the statute is contrary to legislative policy, contending Milner will lose the benefit of the order if their petition is not granted. This result is inequitable, they argue, and not permitted under the statute. This may be a good argument for legislative change, but it fails to address the constraints under which courts interpret statutory provisions. Our function in construing a statute is ascertaining and effectuating the legislature's intent. Metropolitan Sports Facilities Comm'n v. General Mills, Inc., 470 N.W.2d 118, 125 (Minn. 1991). Section 176.451's purpose is to provide an employee with the ability to obtain delinquent payments, not to protect the employee from medical providers seeking reimbursements for services provided. It is beyond our authority to read the statute as appellants propose. See Minn.Stat. § 645.16 (1994) (court cannot disregard an unambiguous statute's clear meaning to pursue the "spirit" of the law); Ullom v. Independent Sch. Dist. No. 112, 515 N.W.2d 615, 617 (Minn.App. 1994) (court has no authority to "modify the plain words of a statute to reflect the policy that we believe it is intended to promote").

Appellants cite section 176.021, subdivision 1a for the proposition that questions of law arising under the workers' compensation act must be applied in an evenhanded manner. This statute does not change our analysis. Section 176.021, which refers to the principles of Minn.Stat. § 176.001, is directed at earlier case law finding the act's remedial nature favored claimants, and not situations such as the one presented here. See Minn.Stat. § 176.001 (1994) (workers' compensation laws are not remedial and should not be interpreted to favor either the employer or the employee over the other).

If the legislature wanted to give district courts a broader range of authority to enter judgments based on orders issued in workers' compensation proceedings, it could have done so. The district court correctly concluded that it did not have authority under Minn.Stat. § 176.451 to grant appellants' petition. Because we agree the statute did not apply, we do not address the district court's additional conclusion that it could have not have entered the judgment even had the statute applied.

On appeal, appellants contend the district court had authority, under its general subject matter jurisdiction, to enter the judgment requested even if Minn.Stat. § 176.451 did not apply. As AMI and McKennan Hospital point out, however, the only basis for relief cited in the petition to the district court was Minn.Stat. § 176.451. Appellants did not petition for a declaratory judgment or sue for an injunction. If the district court had entered the judgment, it would have been issuing an advisory opinion that appellants would be entitled to collateral estoppel in any future action by the South Dakota providers to collect from Milner. However, "[t]he judicial function does not comprehend the giving of advisory opinions." Izaak Walton League of Am. Endowment v. State Dep't of Natural Resources, 312 Minn. 587, 589, 252 N.W.2d 852, 854 (1977).

AMI may docket its judgment in Minnesota, as appellants predict. But appellants do not explain why they cannot then contest enforcement of the South Dakota judgment by seeking a stay under Minn.Stat. § 548.29, subd. 2 (1994), or injunctive relief. We agree, however, that the claim was not properly raised in the district court by appellants' petition pursuant to Minn.Stat. § 176.451.

Because we affirm, we do not address the question of personal jurisdiction. Finally, we conclude that AMI and McKennan Hospital are not entitled to attorney fees for their costs in responding to this appeal.

DECISION

The district court did not err by denying appellants' petition for judgment under Minn.Stat. § 176.451 because the statute does not apply.

Affirmed.


Summaries of

Milner v. McKennan Hosp

Minnesota Court of Appeals
Apr 4, 1995
529 N.W.2d 498 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995)
Case details for

Milner v. McKennan Hosp

Case Details

Full title:Michelle MILNER, Plaintiff, Schwan's Sales Enterprises, Inc., et al.…

Court:Minnesota Court of Appeals

Date published: Apr 4, 1995

Citations

529 N.W.2d 498 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995)