Opinion
22A-CR-2216
03-13-2023
Paul Steven Mills, Appellant-Defendant, v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
Attorney for Appellant Stacy R. Uliana Bargersville, Indiana Attorneys for Appellee Theodore E. Rokita Attorney General of Indiana Steven J. Hosler Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision is not binding precedent for any court and may be cited only for persuasive value or to establish res judicata, collateral estoppel, or law of the case.
Appeal from the Vermillion Circuit Court The Honorable Jill Wesch, Judge The Honorable Robert M. Hall, Special Judge Trial Court Cause No. 83C01-1703-F5-16
Attorney for Appellant Stacy R. Uliana Bargersville, Indiana
Attorneys for Appellee Theodore E. Rokita Attorney General of Indiana Steven J. Hosler Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana
MEMORANDUM DECISION
RILEY, JUDGE
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
[¶1] Appellant-Defendant, Paul Mills (Mills), appeals the trial court's denial of his petition to modify his sentence.
[¶2] We affirm.
ISSUES
[¶3] Mills presents this court with two issues, which we restate as:
(1) Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it denied his petition to modify his sentence; and
(2) Whether the State contravened the terms of Mills' plea agreement by objecting to the modification of his sentence.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
[¶4] On March 10, 2017, the State filed an Information, charging Mills in the instant cause, Cause Number 83C01-1703-F5-16 (Cause -16), with Level 5 felony dealing in methamphetamine, Level 6 felony possession of methamphetamine, Level 6 felony maintaining a common nuisance, and Class A misdemeanor possession of marijuana. On June 5, 2019, the State charged Mills in Cause Number 83C01-1906-F3-3 (Cause -3) with Level 3 felony possession of methamphetamine, Level 6 felony unlawful possession of a syringe, Class B misdemeanor possession of marijuana, and Class C misdemeanor possession of paraphernalia. The State also filed a notice of its intent to have Mills sentenced as an habitual offender in Cause -3. On June 5, 2019, the State also charged Mills in Cause Number 83C01-1906-F5-14 (Cause -14) with Level 5 felony battery resulting in serious bodily injury, Level 6 felony strangulation, Level 6 felony intimidation, and Class A misdemeanor theft.
[¶5] On May 11, 2021, Mills entered into a plea agreement with the State to resolve all three Causes. Mills agreed to plead guilty in Cause -16 to Level 5 felony dealing in methamphetamine and to receive a five-year sentence. Mills also agreed to plead guilty in Cause -3 to Level 5 felony possession of methamphetamine as a lesser-included offense of the original Level 3 felony charge. In exchange, Mills would receive a six-year sentence, to be served consecutively to his five-year sentence in Cause -16. The State also agreed to dismiss Cause -14 in its entirety. Mills' plea agreement contained the following relevant provision:
Further, the parties have agreed that (1.) after [Mills] has completed the RWI/Purposeful Incarceration Program OR (2.) after [Mills] has competed one-half of his sentence (2,007 days), whichever event occurs first, that [Mills] may petition the [c]ourt for a modification of sentence. The State reserves the right to object to a modification of sentence at the time that the same is presented to the [c]ourt; however, the State acknowledges that the absence of any major disciplinary violations and [Mills'] successful participation in substance abuse treatment programs and mental health treatment programs will weigh heavily in favor of a sentence modification.(Appellant's App. Vol. II, p. 218). On August 24, 2021, the trial court accepted Mills' guilty plea. On September 8, 2021, the trial court sentenced Mills according to the terms of his plea agreement.
[¶6] On June 13, 2022, at Mills' request, the trial court ordered the Department of Correction (DOC) to issue a progress report in anticipation of a request by Mills to modify his sentence. On June 27, 2022, the DOC filed its report with the trial court indicating that Mills had been in DOC custody since August 24, 2021, and had had no conduct reports since arriving at the Putnamville Correctional Facility (PCF) on November 17, 2021. On July 1, 2022, the DOC filed its Purposeful Incarceration Report on Mills reflecting that Mills had successfully completed his clinically indicated addiction recovery treatment at PCF on May 10, 2022. Enclosed with the report was a summary of Mills' participation and progress in Purposeful Incarceration, as well as comments on his prognosis and recommendations for Mills' continued recovery. Mills had completed three months of out-patient care to address his methamphetamine and marijuana use. Mills had attended his required classes, contributed meaningfully to group discussions, and had engaged in the required program materials Getting Motivated to Change, 12-Step DBT, Transitional Skills, and Support Group. Mills was looking forward to finding a good sponsor but felt that "the pressure of peers and the moods of others [were] tests to his sobriety." (Appellant's App. Vol. III, p. 74). Mills reported "struggling with procrastination and playing catch-up in service to the work he needs to do." (Appellant's App. Vol. III, p. 74). Mills had acknowledged the repeated patterns in his life that had negatively impacted his sobriety, as well as "the struggle to complete steps, like creating a personal inventory, and subsequent destructive behavior." (Appellant's App. Vol. III, p. 74). It was the opinion of the addiction recovery specialist who prepared the report that Mills had a "GOOD prognosis and that he will be successful if modified. He has shown engagement and enthusiasm for the RWI program." (Appellant's App. Vol. III, p. 75).
[¶7] On July 11, 2022, Mills filed his Petition for Modification of Sentence, citing the reports filed by the DOC, his participation in mental health programming, and his change in attitude towards others and rehabilitation. On July 18, 2022, the State filed its written objection to Mills' petition to modify in which the State argued that it was in the best interest of justice that Mills serve his entire sentence. On July 26, 2022, the trial court denied Mills' petition without holding a hearing, finding that "the original sentence was imposed after deliberation of [Mills'] background and the events of the crime" and that "modification of sentence is not in the best interest of justice." (Appellant's App. Vol. III, p. 83).
[¶8] On July 27, 2022, Mills filed a motion to reconsider and for an evidentiary hearing. On August 4, 2022, the DOC filed a Purposeful Incarceration Report that was identical to the report that it had filed on June 27, 2022. On August 5, 2022, the State filed a renewed objection to Mills' motion. On August 19, 2022, the trial court denied Mills' motion to reconsider without holding a hearing, and it relied on the same rationale it had set forth in its July 26, 2022, denial of Mills' Petition for Modification of Sentence.
[¶9] Mills now appeals. Additional facts will be provided as necessary.
DISCUSSION AND DECISION
I. Standard of Review
[¶10] Mills appeals following the denial of a petition to modify his sentence. As a general matter, we review the denial of a defendant's motion to modify his sentence for an abuse of discretion. Sargent v. State, 158 N.E.3d 783, 785 (Ind.Ct.App. 2020) (citing Gardner v. State, 928 N.E.2d 194, 196 (Ind. 2010)). We will not find an abuse of the trial court's discretion unless its decision is against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before it. Schmitt v. State, 108 N.E.3d 423, 428 (Ind.Ct.App. 2018). Trial courts have "broad discretion to modify a sentence." Id. Insofar as resolution of Mills' claims entails the consideration of the meaning of the terms of his plea agreement, those are matters which we review de novo. Anderson v. State, 141 N.E.3d 862, 867 (Ind.Ct.App. 2020), trans. denied.
II. Denial of Petition
[¶11] Mills contends that the trial court's denial of his modification petition was in contravention of the terms of his plea agreement. "A plea agreement is contractual in nature, binding the defendant, the [S]tate, and the trial court." State v. Lamaster, 84 N.E.3d 630, 633 (Ind.Ct.App. 2017). Once a plea agreement is accepted by the trial court, the court is bound by the terms of that agreement. Id. In considering the meaning of the terms of a plea agreement, we are guided by the principles of contract law. Owens v. State, 886 N.E.2d 64, 67 (Ind.Ct.App. 2008), trans. denied. Our primary goal is to give effect to the intent of the parties. Id. We consider all of the provisions of the agreement together rather than concentrating on individual words and phrases, and we attempt to harmonize the provisions of the agreement, if possible. Id. If the terms of a plea agreement are clear and distinct, we will simply apply the provisions of the agreement. Id.
[¶12] Mills contends that the parties intended to limit the discretion of the trial court to deny a petition to modify his sentence, and, more specifically, that his plea agreement created a rebuttable presumption in favor of modification which bound the trial court once it accepted his plea agreement. Neither party has identified any ambiguity in Mills' plea agreement, and we do not find it to be ambiguous. Therefore, we will simply apply its unambiguous provisions. See id.
[¶13] Normally, a trial court may not modify the sentence of a defendant who pleaded guilty to an offense pursuant to a plea agreement unless the prosecutor consents to it. Ind. Code § 35-38-1-17(e). However, Mills' plea agreement provided that, if Mills completed RWI/Purposeful Incarceration, he could petition to modify his sentence, effectively authorizing Mills to petition to modify his sentence without the prosecutor's permission, nothing more and nothing less. Mills' plea agreement is silent as to limiting the trial court's discretion to deny his petition, let alone providing a rebuttable presumption in favor of modification. When interpreting contracts, we do not read provisions into the agreement that are not there. See Lake Imaging, LLC v. Franciscan Alliance, Inc., 182 N.E.3d 203, 211 (Ind. 2022) (observing that, when construing clear and unambiguous contract provisions, courts cannot "add provisions not agreed upon by the parties"). We decline Mills' invitation to do so here.
[¶14] In addition, Mills' contention that we must give his plea agreement the construction that he desires in order to harmonize the provisions of the agreement is not well-taken. The State's acknowledgment "that the absence of any major disciplinary violations and [Mills'] successful participation in substance abuse treatment programs and mental health treatment programs will weigh heavily in favor of a sentence modification" pertains to the State's position on Mills' future conduct and does not obligate any action by the trial court. (Appellant's App. Vol. II, p. 218). Indeed, even if the prosecutor's consent is required prior to modification, there is nothing in the statute which requires the trial court to grant a sentence modification simply because the State consents to it, so the State's acknowledgment of a defendant's conduct has no dispositive effect on the trial court's exercise of its discretion in this context. See I.C. § 35-38-1-17(e) (providing that a trial court "may reduce or suspend" a sentence if certain conditions are met, not that the trial court must do so).
[¶15] Inasmuch as Mills argues that the trial court was obligated to hold a hearing prior to denying his petition, this claim too is without merit. Mills' plea agreement did not contain a provision obligating the trial court to hold a hearing on his petition. The sentence modification statute does not require the trial court to hold a hearing prior to rendering its decision; rather, the trial court is only required to hold a hearing if the court has made a preliminary decision to modify the defendant's sentence. Merkel v. State, 160 N.E.3d 1139, 1141 (Ind.Ct.App. 2020). There is nothing before us indicating that the trial court had made a preliminary decision to modify Mills' sentence, so it was not required to hold a hearing. See id.
[¶16] Contrary to Mills' assertion on appeal, the trial court was not obligated to enter findings pertaining to Mills' DOC progress and conduct in denying his petition, as the modification statute relieves the trial court of entering any findings and conclusions if it denies a defendant's request to suspend or reduce a sentence. See I.C. § 35-38-1-17(h). Nevertheless, in its denial of Mills' reconsideration motion, the trial court expressly stated that it had considered the DOC reports Mills had submitted. To the extent that Mills argues that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his petition to modify in light of his completion of RWI/Purposeful Incarceration and his good conduct, we observe that in Mills' presentence investigation report, he admitted that he was badly addicted to methamphetamine. The trial court may have reasonably concluded that Mills' completion of a three-month outpatient drug treatment program without incident did not yet merit a reduction in his sentence, despite his progress and good prognosis. See Newman v. State, 177 N.E.3d 888, 891 (Ind.Ct.App. 2021) (affirming the denial of a sentence modification request despite plentiful evidence of Newman's rehabilitative efforts and observing that "the mere fact that the process of rehabilitation, the purpose of incarceration, may have started, does not compel a reduction or other modification [of a defendant's] sentence") (quotation omitted), trans. denied. Accordingly, we find no abuse of the trial court's discretion in denying Mills' petition.
III. State's Objection to Modification
[¶17] Mills next argues that the State's objection to his petition to modify his sentence violated the terms of his plea agreement. Mills' essential contention on this point is that, by the terms of his plea agreement, the State promised not to object to a sentence modification if Mills completed RWI/Purposeful Incarceration and did not receive any incident reports. However, as we have already observed, the terms of Mills' plea agreement are unambiguous, and, therefore, we will simply apply its clear provisions. See Owens, 886 N.E.2d at 67.
[¶18] In Mills' plea agreement, the State specifically reserved its right to object, and, while it acknowledged that Mills' completion of treatment and good conduct "will weigh heavily in favor of a sentence modification[,]" this did not amount to the State promising not to object to sentence modification if Mills completed treatment and had good conduct. (Appellant's App. Vol. III, p. 218). If the parties had meant for the State to waive its right to object to modification if Mills' successfully completed treatment without receiving incident reports, they could have included such a provision in the plea agreement. See, e.g., Lamaster, 84 N.E.3d at 632 (applying plea agreement provision that "[t]he State agrees not to object to modification if [Purposeful Incarceration] is completed without any conduct violations on the part of the Defendant"). Mills' plea agreement contained no such provision, and, therefore, we find this argument to be without merit.
CONCLUSION
[¶19] Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the trial court acted within its discretion in denying Mills' petition to modify his sentence and that the State acted within the scope of Mills' plea agreement when it objected to the modification.
[¶20] Affirmed.
[¶21] Altice, C. J. and Pyle, J. concur