Opinion
Case No. 4D99-007.
Opinion filed June 28, 2000.
Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, Palm Beach County; Howard C. Berman, Judge; L.T. Case No. 97-1759 CFA02.
Richard G. Lubin and John Olea of Lubin and Gano, P.A., West Palm Beach, for appellant.
Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Heidi L. Bettendorf, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellee.
WARNER, C.J., and GUNTHER, J., concur.
Joseph Millien, a minister, was tried by jury and convicted of sexual misconduct with a fifteen-year-old female member of his congregation. Millien argues, among other points, that the trial court deprived him of his right to present a defense by excluding evidence that other female members of his congregation were offered money to fabricate similar stories of sexual misconduct. Because Millien was allowed to present this defense, except where the supporting evidence was hearsay, we affirm.
The State's case-in-chief consisted primarily of (1) the testimony of the victim, G.J., (2) two Williams' rule witnesses, O.P. and N.L., who both testified that Millien had improper sexual contact with them when they were teenagers attending his church, and (3) Millien's confession. Millien challenged the confession at trial, but does not raise an issue concerning it on appeal. One of Millien's theories of defense was that the victim and the two Williams' rule witnesses fabricated their stories as part of a larger conspiracy between several friends and relatives of G.J., O.P., and N.L. to dethrone him and to collect insurance money from the church's one million dollar liability insurance policy. Among other issues on appeal, Millien challenges the trial court's refusal to admit proffered testimony from several potential witnesses who said that certain friends and relatives of the victim and the Williams' rule witnesses asked them to accuse Millien of sexual wrongdoing. We agree with the trial court that this evidence was inadmissible hearsay. See § 90.801(1)(c), Fla. Stat. (1997).
Millien presented several witnesses to prove his "conspiracy theory." Gina Louissaent testified that she had known O.P. for about four years and that they were good friends. Gina testified that after Millien's arrest, O.P. told her that if she would say that Millien had sex with her, she would receive $10,000. Nadege Albert testified that he and the victim, G.J., were best friends. According to Nadege, one week after the allegations surfaced, G.J. said that Millien did not do anything to her and that she was being forced to lie by Kennedy Demosthene, N.L., and a person named Pierre Valencia. G.J. told Nadege that she could not go to her parents because they had been offered $50,000 by the alleged conspirators. Julienne Joseph testified that G.J. was "like a daughter," that G.J. told her that Millien did not touch her in any way, and that she was making the allegations because "money talks." Magalie Poulard testified that she and G.J. were once very good friends. On the Thursday after Millien was arrested, G.J. called her on the telephone and admitted that the allegations were false. G.J. said that she was being forced to lie by Alex Albert and Pierre Valencia.
The proffered testimony that was excluded included (1) testimony from Nadege Albert that N.L.'s husband, Kennedy Demosthene, offered her $50,00 to lie about having sex with Millien; (2) testimony from Magalie Poulard that Kennedy, Alex Albert, and Pierre Valencia asked her to accuse Millien of sexual improprieties; (3) testimony from Gina Louissaent that Nixon Jauquette, O.P.'s husband, tried to force her to testify falsely against Millien; and (4) testimony from Rosemarie Naddy that Kennedy asked her to say that Millien had made improper sexual advances toward her.
Millien contends that the excluded testimony from witnesses that they had been asked to falsely accuse Millien was admissible under the exception to the hearsay rule for out-of-court statements of a declarant's then-existing state of mind to prove subsequent conduct. See § 90.803(3), Flat. Stat. Millien argues that the hearsay statements were offered to prove that the declarants had a plan to discredit him and that the proffered testimony was admissible to show that those declarants carried out their plan by forcing the victims to lie in furtherance of the conspiracy. The problem with Millien's argument is that the record does not support a finding that the hearsay statements at issue were made prior to the time that the declarants would have allegedly encouraged the victims to falsely implicate Millien. Rather, the record supports the opposite — that the case against Millien was already pending when the relatives encouraged these other witnesses to join in the case against Millien by raising false allegations against him. Thus, the proffered testimony would not have tended to prove the declarants' subsequent conduct in furtherance of their design or plan.
As relevant here, section 90.803(3) allows an exception to the hearsay rule for:
(a) A statement of the declarant's then-existing state of mind, . . ., including a statement of intent, plan, motive, [or] design, . . ., when such evidence is offered to:
(1) Prove the declarant's state of mind, emotion, or physical sensation at that time or at any other time when such state is an issue in the action.
(2) Prove or explain acts of subsequent conduct of the declarant.
Furthermore, in view of all the testimony concerning "the conspiracy" which was allowed into evidence, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in excluding the proffered testimony even if it did qualify as an exception to the hearsay rule. In addition to finding that the proffered testimony was hearsay, the judge found that the evidence was "collateral." While a defendant in a criminal case has the right to present his theory of defense, see Vannier v. State, 714 So.2d 470 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998), this right is subject to the reasonable discretion of the trial judge in controlling the hearing and limiting unnecessary, cumulative, and repetitive testimony. See § 90.403, Fla. Stat. Vannier is distinguishable from the instant case because, there, the trial court excluded a whole category of evidence: suicide letters tending to support the defendant's theory that the victim killed herself. Here, the trial court did not prevent appellant from presenting his conspiracy theory defense by excluding entire categories of evidence. The jury heard that the victim, the Williams' rule witnesses, and at least one other woman had been encouraged or offered money to testify falsely against Millien.
We have considered the other issues raised on appeal, and we find no error.
AFFIRMED.
NOT FINAL UNTIL THE DISPOSITION OF ANY TIMELY FILED MOTION FOR REHEARING.