Opinion
No. 126723
September 3, 2004
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT #122
The plaintiff in the current action, Steven Miller, has filed claims against the defendants, Natchaug Hospital, Inc. (Natchaug) and Perception Programs, Inc. (Perception), for a slip and fall injury he received on January 22, 2001, during his participation in a juvenile mentoring program associated with and operated by the defendants. On January 24, 2003, the plaintiff filed a two-count complaint against the defendants. In count one, the plaintiff claimed that Natchaug, as the owner of Perception, was vicariously liable for its acts of negligence. In count two, the plaintiff claimed that Perception was negligent in its operation of the mentoring program. On April 7, 2003, Natchaug filed a motion to strike the count filed against it, on the ground that the plaintiff did not allege facts sufficient to pierce the protection of the corporate veil afforded to Natchaug as the corporate owner of the independent subsidiary. This court, on August 11, 2003, granted Natchaug's motion to strike.
On January 21, 2004, the plaintiff filed a revised complaint. Count one of the revised complaint alleges that Natchaug was itself negligent in its operation of the mentoring program, and count two realleges that Perception was negligent in its operation of the mentoring program. On January 26, 2004, Natchaug filed a motion for summary judgment, with a memorandum of law in support, on the ground that the revised complaint filed by the plaintiff is barred by the statute of limitations, since the claims contained in the revised complaint do not relate back to the original claim filed by the plaintiff. Natchaug argues that the relation back doctrine does not apply to the revised complaint because it states a new cause of action against Natchaug. The plaintiff argues in his memorandum of law in opposition to the motion for summary judgment that in his revised complaint he has merely amplified or expanded his original claim of negligence against Natchaug, and that the revised claim is not time barred because the relation back doctrine does apply.
"Summary judgment may be granted where the claim is barred by the statute of limitations." Doty v. Mucci, 238 Conn. 800, 806, 679 A.2d 945 (1996). Summary judgment is appropriate on statute of limitation grounds when the "material facts concerning the statute of limitations [are] not in dispute . . ." Burns v. Hartford Hospital, 192 Conn. 451, 452, 472 A.2d 1257 (1984). "The question of whether a party's claim is barred by the statute of limitations is a question of law . . ." John H. Kolb Sons, Inc. v. GL Excavating, Inc., 76 Conn.App. 599, 609, 821 A.2d 774 (2003).
Practice Book § 17-49 "provides that summary judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, affidavits and any other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law . . . In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the trial court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party . . . The party seeking summary judgment has the burden of showing the absence of any genuine issue [of] material facts which, under applicable principles of substantive law, entitle him to a judgment as a matter of law . . . and the party opposing such a motion must provide an evidentiary foundation to demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue of material fact." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Barrett v. Montesano, 269 Conn. 787, 791-92, 849 A.2d 839 (2004).
As stated above, the original complaint initially alleged vicarious liability on the part of Natchaug: Natchaug would be liable only if Perception were found liable and the necessary relationship between Natchaug and Perception were proved. In the original complaint no independent acts of negligence on the part of Natchaug were alleged by the plaintiff. In the revised complaint, however, the plaintiff alleges that Natchaug itself was negligent. See infra Kolek v. Welch Enterprises, Inc., Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Docket No. CV 98 0584406 (June 18, 2002, Beach, J.) ( 32 Conn. L. Rptr. 459) (identical factual scenario). The parties have not put into dispute the dates relevant to the application of the statute of limitations. The parties have, however, put into dispute whether the claim in the revised complaint merely amplifies or expands the original claim, or whether the new claim presents a new cause of action. Should the revised complaint state a different cause of action, as a matter of law, the relation back doctrine would not apply and the claim against Natchaug would, therefore, be time barred.
The relation back doctrine has been well established by the courts of the state.
A cause of action is that single group of facts which is claimed to have brought about an unlawful injury to the plaintiff and which entitles the plaintiff to relief . . . A right of action at law arises from the existence of a primary right in the plaintiff, and an invasion of that right by some delict on the part of the defendant. The facts which establish the existence of that right and that delict constitute the cause of action . . . A change in, or an addition to, a ground of negligence or an act of negligence arising out of the single group of facts which was originally claimed to have brought about the unlawful injury to the plaintiff does not change the cause of action . . . It is proper to amplify or expand what has already been alleged in support of a cause of action, provided the identity of the cause of action remains substantially the same, but where an entirely new and different factual situation is presented, a new and different cause of action is stated . . . Our relation back doctrine provides that an amendment relates back when the original complaint has given the party fair notice that a claim is being asserted stemming from a particular transaction or occurrence, thereby serving the objectives of our statute of limitations, namely, to protect parties from having to defend against stale claims . . .
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Alswanger v. Semego, 257 Conn. 58, 64-65, 776 A.2d 444 (2001).
The case of Kolek v. Welch Enterprises, Inc., supra, presented facts similar to those currently before the court. In that case, the plaintiff filed an original complaint that alleged negligence against a driver of a vehicle who was acting within the scope of his employment, and vicarious liability against the driver's employer. After the employee was released from the suit, the employer moved for summary judgment on the ground that release of an agent in a principal-agent relationship also releases the principal. The plaintiff subsequently filed a request to amend the complaint along with an amended complaint, which alleged that the employer was itself negligent in that it "allowed" the defendant employee to operate the vehicle which was the cause of the accident. The employer objected to the filing of the new complaint, arguing that the cause of action in the proposed amended complaint alleged "new and different" allegations against the employer, and as such the relation back doctrine did not apply, and the claim was barred by the statute of limitations. The objection to the request to amend was sustained. See also Lowden v. Carter, Superior Court, judicial district of New London at New London, Docket No. 562492 (August 7, 2003, Hurley, J.T.R.) (also sustaining an objection to a request to amend the complaint on identical ground).
In the case before the court, the original complaint alleged that Natchaug was vicariously liable for the negligence of Perception. The complaint alleged that Natchaug owned Perception, and that Perception acted negligently. No separate allegations were included in the original complaint asserting that Natchaug committed a breach of some distinct duty owed to the plaintiff. In the revised complaint, however, the plaintiff not only alleges the negligence of Perception, but also alleges the negligence of Natchaug. The plaintiff has pleaded in the revised complaint that Natchaug's own "carelessness and negligence" was the cause of the plaintiff's injury. In the original complaint, the only "carelessness and negligence" complained of by the plaintiff was that of Perception. The facts that establish the existence of the plaintiff's legal right against Natchaug are clearly not the same in the two complaints.
It is the conclusion of this court that in his revised complaint the plaintiff has pleaded a new and different cause of action than was pleaded in his original complaint. The new allegations of negligence in the revised complaint do not merely expand or amplify the original claim filed against Natchaug. Rather, it alerts them to a new theory of liability. The plaintiff is now claiming that Natchaug has breached some specific duty owed to the plaintiff and has factually and proximately caused his injuries. The plaintiff did not claim this, however, in his original complaint. This court must therefore conclude that the relation back doctrine does not apply to the plaintiff's revised complaint and as such, the revised claim against Natchaug is barred by the statute of limitations. Accordingly, the motion for summary judgment is granted in favor of Natchaug.
D. Michael Hurley, JTR