Opinion
PD-0610-24
11-20-2024
ARMANDO SAUZAMEDA MENDOZA, Appellant v. THE STATE OF TEXAS
DISSENT TO REFUSAL TO GRANT STATE'S PETITION FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW FROM THE ELEVENTH COURT OF APPEALS MIDLAND COUNTY
Keller, P.J., filed a dissenting opinion in which Yeary and Keel, JJ., joined.
In this case, the court of appeals held that the evidence was insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Appellant was the same person alleged in the State's enhancement notice to have a prior conviction. I disagree. Consequently, I would grant review, reverse the judgment of the court of appeals, and affirm the trial court's judgment of conviction.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Trial
Appellant was charged by indictment with two counts of sexual assault of a child and two counts of indecency with a child. The State filed a notice of intent to enhance punishment, which read:
That before the commission of the offense . . ., the said ARMANDO SAUZAMEDA MENDOZA was convicted of the felony offense of POSSESSION WITH INTENT TO DISTRIBUTE 50 KILOGRAMS AND MORE OF MARIJUANA on or about the 5th day of December, 2013, in Cause Number 2:12CR00587-001RB in the United States District Court of New Mexico.
Appellant was found guilty and pled "not true" to the enhancement paragraph. The State presented the following evidence to prove up the enhancement paragraph:
1) A judgment of conviction in United States of America v. Armando Sauzameda-Mendoza, Case No. 2:12CR00587-001RB, in the United States District Court for the District of New Mexico. The judgment has a PACER heading showing "Case 2:12-cr-00587-RB," a document number, a filed date, and a pagination count. The judgment listed the offense as "Possession With Intent to Distribute 50 Kilograms and More of Marijuana." The date of judgment is listed as December 5, 2013. The judgment listed the "Defense Attorney" as "Felipe Milan (Retained)." The judge listed is the "Honorable Robert C. Brack, United States District Judge."
2) An "Agreement to Forfeit Property (Other Than Real Property) to Obtain a Defendant's Release." The agreement has the same PACER heading as the judgment of conviction. The agreement stated that the signees agreed to forfeit $10,000 if the defendant in that case failed to live up to the terms of his release. The signature block for the "Defendant's signature" reads "Armando S" with the remainder of the word beginning with "S" undecipherable. The property owner's printed name is "Armando Sauzameda-Rodriguez" and the signature block reads "Armando Sauzameda." The date of signature is November 8, 2011.
3) A document entitled "Defendant's Motion to Modify Conditions of Release," also in same case number as the judgment of conviction. The motion also has the same PACER heading as the judgment and the agreement. The motion is signed by "Felipe D.J. Millan," the Attorney for the Defendant. The motion lists "Armando Sauzameda-Mendoza" as the Defendant. The motion states that the Defendant's case is "scheduled for a Jury Trial . . . before the Honorable Robert C. Brack." The motion also states that "Defendant is a resident of Cimarron, Kansas and he is currently working in Odessa, Texas as a Master Electrician."
4) Testimony from Appellant's wife, Anyeli Sauzameda. Anyeli testified that Appellant was an electrician and had been since they were married. Anyeli also testified that Appellant lived in Kansas before residing in Midland. Last, Anyeli testified that Appellant's father's name is Armando Sauzameda-Rodriguez.
The jury found the enhancement paragraph "true" and sentenced Appellant to 65 years in prison. This appeal followed.
B. Appeal
On appeal, Appellant argued that the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he is the same person previously convicted in the punishment enhancement allegation. The court of appeals reversed in part for a new punishment hearing. The court of appeals examined the evidence the State used to link Appellant to the prior conviction and held that "'the pieces of the puzzle' offered by the State, when considered together, do not sufficiently link Appellant to that prior conviction." The court reasoned that the State's evidence was "more closely akin" to cases where the evidence was insufficient-for example, when the State only used a judgment and a defendant's first and last name. The court of appeals concluded that there was not sufficient "independent evidence" that the defendant was the same person in the judgment and that, "[e]ven viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury's finding," the evidence did not link Appellant to the prior conviction beyond a reasonable doubt. The court of appeals reversed for a new punishment hearing.
Mendoza v. State, No. 11-23-00123-CR, 2024 WL 3528561, at *8 (Tex. App.-Eastland July 25, 2024) (mem. op., not designated for publication).
Id. at *6 (emphasis in original).
Id. at *7 (citations omitted).
Id. at *7-8.
See id. at *8 (citing Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 44.29(b); Tex.R.App.P. 43.2).
II. APPLICABLE LAW
As this Court has previously recognized, "[t]o establish that a defendant has been convicted of a prior offense, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that (1) a prior conviction exists, and (2) the defendant is linked to that conviction." No specific document or mode of proof is required to prove these two elements. We have emphasized that even unorthodox methods of proving a prior conviction can be sufficient. The totality of the evidence presented at trial determines whether the State has met its burden. We must "consider all the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court's finding and determine whether a rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements beyond a reasonable doubt."
Flowers v. State, 220 S.W.3d 919, 921 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007).
Id.
See Littles v. State, 726 S.W.2d 26, 32 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987) ("To the extent that . . . any other case can be read as holding that there are exclusive manners of proof of a defendant's identity as to prior felonies used for enhancement, they are overruled. Each case is to be judged on its own individual merits. This is not to say that there are not preferred methods of proving identity with respect to enhancement allegations. But, where as in the instant case, the proof, though unorthodox, was clearly sufficient, no error will be found.") (emphasis in original).
Flowers, 220 S.W.3d at 922-23; Henry v. State, 509 S.W.3d 915, 919 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016).
Wood v. State, 486 S.W.3d 583, 589 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016).
Generally, a certified judgment, on its own, is insufficient to link a defendant to a prior conviction, even if the name on the judgment and the name of the defendant are the same.Evidence to link a defendant to a judgment include: (1) the defendant's own admission; (2) "testimony by people present at the time of the defendant's conviction and who can identify the defendant as the person convicted;" (3) fingerprints supported by expert testimony identifying the defendant as the person previously convicted; or (4) documentary proof or other records that contain sufficient information or descriptors that show the defendant's identity or physical description, such as a photograph of the defendant. Sometimes, the necessary proof "resembles pieces of a jigsaw puzzle. The pieces standing alone usually have little meaning. However, when the pieces are fitted together, they usually form the picture of the person who committed the alleged prior conviction or convictions."
Henry, 509 S.W.3d at 919.
Human v. State, 749 S.W.2d 832, 836 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988).
III. ANALYSIS
The evidence at trial linked Appellant to the prior federal conviction beyond a reasonable doubt. Importantly, all three of the New Mexico documents-the judgment of conviction, the motion to modify conditions of release, and the agreement to forfeit property-originate from the same federal case. All three documents share the same cause number (2:12-cr-00587-RB), the same PACER heading, the same court (the United States District Court for the District of New Mexico), and the same defendant (Armando Sauzameda-Mendoza). So any facts included in the motion and the agreement pertain to the judgment as well, as all three documents are connected.
Both the motion and the agreement include facts that link Appellant to the prior federal conviction. First, Appellant has an unusual name. While not enough on its own, an unusual name can be a significant factor to be considered in linking a defendant to a prior conviction. But both documents also include additional pertinent information. The motion states that the defendant in the federal case is a resident of Kansas and is currently working in Odessa, Texas, as an electrician. The agreement is signed by an "Armando S," and is co-signed by an Armando Sauzameda-Rodriguez. Appellant's wife testified that Appellant previously lived in Kansas and worked as an electrician in Midland before the instant offense, and also testified that Appellant's father is named Armando Sauzameda-Rodriguez.
It is highly unlikely that there exists more than one person who was named Armando Sauzameda Mendoza, working as an electrician in the Midland-Odessa area, who had previously lived in Kansas, and who was closely connected in some way to a person named Armando Sauzameda-Rodriguez. Therefore, a jury could conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Appellant was the same Armando Sauzameda Mendoza convicted on December 5, 2013, of marijuana distribution in the amount of 50 kilograms or more in federal district court in New Mexico.
IV. CONCLUSION
Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, the evidence linking Appellant to the prior federal conviction was sufficient beyond a reasonable doubt. The court of appeals erred in holding otherwise. I would grant review, reverse the judgment of the court of appeals, and affirm the trial court's judgment of conviction. Because the Court declines to do so today, I respectfully dissent.
Wood, 486 S.W.3d at 589.