Opinion
05-23-00132-CR
04-22-2024
EX PARTE IRMA MENDEZ, Appellant v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the Criminal District Court No. 2 Dallas County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. WX22-91466-I
ORDER
BONNIE LEE GOLDSTEIN, PRESIDING JUSTICE
After pleading guilty and signing a confession, appellant Irma Mendez was convicted of delivery of a controlled substance on March 16, 1999. Twenty-three years later, she filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus alleging ineffective assistance of counsel and the trial court denied her petition based on laches. In one issue, Mendez argues the trial court erred when it did so. Based on the absence of evidence in the record supporting the trial court's ruling, we abate this appeal and remand to the trial court for a hearing that provides the parties with an opportunity to explain their positions and evidence concerning the delay and prejudice at issue.
On May 24, 2022, Mendez filed her first petition for writ of habeas corpus alleging she received ineffective assistance of counsel because she and her co-defendant brother had inconsistent defenses. Mendez argued she and her brother were nonetheless represented by the same counsel and that this arrangement presented a conflict of interest to which she did not consent. The State filed a timely response then filed a January 18, 2023 supplement arguing for the first time that Mendez's petition should be denied based on the doctrine of laches. One week later, on January 25, 2023, and without holding a hearing, the trial court (1) entered a finding of fact that Mendez failed to present any evidence to justify her twenty-three-year delay in seeking habeas relief; (2) concluded that Mendez's delay "caused a detrimental change in position to the State"; and (3) denied Mendez's petition.
On appeal, Mendez correctly argues the State's supplemental response was untimely because it was filed more than 30 days after her petition, Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 11.072(5)(c), but courts may consider and apply laches sua sponte. Ex parte Smith, 444 S.W.3d 661, 667 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014); Ex parte Bowman, 447 S.W.3d 887, 888 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (per curiam).
Because laches is a question of fact and the trial judge is the sole finder of fact, there must be record support for the trial court's factual findings on laches, other than the length of the delay, from which this court can ascertain whether the trial court abused its discretion in concluding laches bars the claim. See Ex parte Bowman, 447 S.W.3d 887, 888 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (per curiam); Ex parte Saenz, 491 S.W.3d 819, 826 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016); Ex parte Perez, 398 S.W.3d 206, 217-18 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). The record shows only the length of the delay and the State's conclusory allegations in its pleadings. Equity may ultimately require denying relief, but it requires giving the applicant an opportunity to explain her delay and the State to provide factual support for its laches argument. See Ex parte Smith, 444 S.W.3d at 670.
We therefore ABATE this appeal and REMAND this case so that the trial court can hold a hearing within 30 days providing (1) Mendez with an opportunity to explain her delay and (2) the State with an opportunity to establish a basis for laches barring Mendez's requested relief. See Ex parte Bowman, 447 S.W.3d at 888-89; see also Ex parte Padron, No. WR-62,917-02, 2022 WL 4360968, at *1 (Tex. Crim. App. Sept. 21, 2022) (mem. op.). Supplemental appellate briefing from Mendez, if any, is due 15 days after the hearing; the State's response, if any, is due 15 days later.
We DIRECT the Clerk of the Court to send a copy of this order to the Honorable J. J. Koch, Presiding Judge, Criminal District Court No. 2, Felicia Pitre, Dallas County District Clerk, and counsel for all parties.