Opinion
2000-10915
Submitted December 5, 2001.
December 24, 2001.
In an action to recover damages for breach of contract, the defendants appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (Kitson, J.), entered May 29, 1998, which denied their motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(5) and (7), and granted the plaintiffs' cross motion for leave to amend the complaint.
Paul L. Dashefsky, Smithtown, N.Y., for appellants.
Before: GABRIEL M. KRAUSMAN, J.P., DANIEL F. LUCIANO, THOMAS A. ADAMS, A. GAIL PRUDENTI, JJ.
ORDERED that the order is affirmed, without costs or disbursements.
On a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211, a court must accept as true the facts as alleged within the four corners of the complaint and accord the plaintiffs the benefit of every possible favorable inference to determine whether the allegations fit within any cognizable legal theory (see, Leon v. Martinez, 84 N.Y.2d 83, 87; Guggenheimer v. Ginzburg, 43 N.Y.2d 268, 275; Rovello v. Orofino Realty Co., 40 N.Y.2d 633). Viewing the plaintiffs' complaint under this guideline, we find that they have sufficiently stated causes of action for breach of an oral contract. Furthermore, since the terms of the oral contract as alleged in the complaint may be performed within one year, the Statute of Frauds does not apply (see, Cron v. Hargro Fabrics, 91 N.Y.2d 362, 366; D N Boening v. Kirsch Beverages, 63 N.Y.2d 449, 454; North Shore Bottling Co. v. Schmidt Sons, 22 N.Y.2d 171, 175).
Finally, the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in granting the plaintiffs leave to amend the complaint to clarify the terms of the alleged oral contract (see, CPLR 3025[b]).
KRAUSMAN, J.P., LUCIANO, ADAMS and PRUDENTI, JJ., concur.