Opinion
No. 283.
Submitted under sec. (Rule) 251.54 March 29, 1973. —
Decided May 21, 1973.
APPEAL from an order of the circuit court for Waukesha county: WILLIAM E. GRAMLING, Circuit Judge. Affirmed.
For the appellant the cause was submitted on the brief of Paul Medved of Waukesha, pro se.
For the respondents the cause was submitted on the brief of Willis J. Zick, Waukesha county corporation counsel.
The order appealed from dismissed the plaintiff's complaints with prejudice because of his failure to comply with prior orders of the court directing his complaints to be made more definite and certain.
The plaintiff-appellant, Paul Medved, has appeared throughout these proceedings pro se. During August of 1970, he served and filed a summons naming ten defendants in separate complaints as members of the Waukesha county sheriff's department.
The Waukesha county corporation counsel, on behalf of all the defendants, demurred upon the ground that the complaints failed to state a cause of action.
From the several complaints it appears the plaintiff attempts to allege that the defendants, as members of the sheriff's department, individually or in concert, deprived him of two days' loss of good time on a county jail sentence, censorship of his mail while in jail, no cause for holding him in emergency detention, forcibly being committed to a county mental hospital for examination, a deputy sheriff carrying a firearm into jail, a loss of liberty, abuse of police power, and intentional infliction of mental and physical distress. He states that the grounds for his cause of action are "under the common law and Wis. Stats.," and then cites several statutes, most of them dealing with criminal law.
On November 12, 1970, the trial court overruled the demurrer but ordered the plaintiff to make his complaints more definite and certain in thirty days. Within the thirty days the plaintiff served eight amended complaints naming the eight defendants appearing on appeal. The amended complaints are almost the same as the originals, making basically the same allegations in the same vague and confused manner.
On December 29, 1970, the defendants again demurred upon the ground that the complaints do not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action and that several causes of action have been improperly united. The court heard arguments on February 8, 1971, and on March 15th acknowledging the plaintiff did not have an attorney and overruled the demurrer. The court stated it was simply impossible for anyone to intelligently answer, deny, or admit the allegations of the complaints and again ordered the plaintiff to make his complaints more definite and certain within thirty days.
The grounds for the demurrer may be inconsistent but that is of no moment here.
The plaintiff sent the court and the defendants a letter on March 22d, stating:
"The plaintiff, to the best of his ability has made great effort to comply with the law in regard to filing a complaint and is unable to improve said complaint, is unable to make it more definite and certain.
"On February 8, 1971, at hearing on demurrer the plaintiff submitted defense of his position and belief that his complaint was sufficient and in compliance with requirements of sec. 263.03.
"The plaintiff requests that the court make a final decision as to the sufficiency of the complaint."
In response, on March 24th the court, by decision, stated the March 15th decision and order would stand, and unless the plaintiff filed amended complaints by April 15th the action would be dismissed. On June 23d the plaintiff made a motion to the court which stated:
"In a request to the above court dated March 22, 1971, plaintiff asked for a final decision as to sufficiency of his complaint.
". . .
"Since plaintiff has prepared his complaint with painstaking diligence and to the best of his ability and cannot improve upon it, he makes motion that the court allow this case to proceed by requiring the defendants to file an answer to the complaint."
A hearing was held on July 12th on this motion and the court dismissed the motion and then ordered the complaints dismissed with prejudice because of the plaintiff's failure to comply with the March 15th orders and the March 24th decision. On October 12th, plaintiff, pro se, filed notice of appeal seeking review of the July 12th order.
Ordinarily either an order granting or refusing to grant a motion to make a pleading more definite and certain is not appealable because it does not prevent a judgment from being taken and that the order can then be reviewed upon an appeal from the judgment. Even an order or a judgment that dismisses a complaint for failure to comply with an order to make more definite and certain is not appealable if it is not a final judgment so as to preclude further action between the parties upon the subject matter being litigated. However, where, as in this case, the order dismissed the complaints upon the merits it is a final judgment and the order directing the pleading to be made more definite and certain can be reviewed upon appeal for an abuse of discretion.
Motowski v. People's Dentists (1924), 183 Wis. 477, 198 N.W. 465.
Schlecht v. Anderson (1929), 197 Wis. 556, 222 N.W. 802.
Puhr v. Chicago N.W.R. Co. (1918), 168 Wis. 101, 169 N.W. 305.
State v. Golden Guernsey Dairy Co-operative (1950), 257 Wis. 254, 43 N.W.2d 31.
The plaintiff contends, in effect, that the trial court abused its discretion in ordering him to make his complaints more definite and certain. We think not.
The statute provides, in substance, that the court may order the pleading to be made more definite and certain when the pleading is so indefinite or uncertain that the precise nature of the complaint or the defense thereto is not apparent.
Sec. 263.43, Stats.
After an analysis of the complaints the court concluded, "It simply is impossible for anyone to intelligently answer . . . , deny the allegations contained therein, or admit them." We, too, have examined all of the complaints. The allegations are too diffused, dissuasive and argumentative. They are disjointed, intermingled and aim in too many directions. The initial and amended complaints sound more like criminal complaints than civil. Only under very liberal and strained interpretations can one infer imperfectly alleged but possible causes of action for conversion, malicious prosecution, false imprisonment or intentional infliction of mental and physical distress. Without question this is the type of pleading that should be made more definite and certain. The trial court did not abuse its discretion; in fact, if it had refused to grant a motion to make these pleadings more definite it probably would have been an abuse of discretion.
The rule is well settled that when a complaint is challenged by a demurrer as not stating a cause of action all allegations stated in the complaint must be taken as true, the complaint is to be liberally construed with a view to do substantial justice between the parties, and the complaint is entitled to all reasonable inferences to support it which can be drawn from the facts pleaded. Secs. 263.07 and 263.27, Stats.; Sorenson v. National Life Ins. Co. (1972), 56 Wis.2d 92, 201 N.W.2d 510; and Kelly v. Mohrhusen (1971), 50 Wis.2d 337, 184 N.W.2d 149.
The final issue is whether the trial court abused its discretion in dismissing the complaints with prejudice. Again we think not.
The trial court ordered the amended complaints to be made more definite and certain. The plaintiff was given thirty days and at least two extensions of time to do so and with the advice that the complaints would be dismissed if he failed within the time allotted. He did not comply with those orders.
As set forth in the defendants' brief, this court stated in Latham v. Casey King Corp. (1964), 23 Wis.2d 311, 314, 127 N.W.2d 225:
Also see: Motowski v. People's Dentists, supra, and Alexander v. Farmers Mut. Automobile Ins. Co. (1964), 25 Wis.2d 623, 131 N.W.2d 373.
". . . It is considered well established that a court has the inherent power to resort to a dismissal of an action in the interest of orderly administration of justice. The general control of the judicial business before it is essential to the court if it is to function. `Every court has inherent power, exercisable in its sound discretion, consistent within the Constitution and statutes, to control disposition of causes on its docket with economy of time and effort.' . . . Many times the power of dismissal is applied for noncompliance with an order relating to pleadings, such as an order to amend, to make more definite and certain, or furnish a bill of particulars. . . ."
It was not an abuse of discretion to dismiss the plaintiff's complaints for failure to comply with prior procedural orders.
By the Court. — Order affirmed.