Opinion
NO. CIV. S-06-2408 FCD DAD.
May 2, 2008
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This matter is before the court on defendant Vanna M. Walker's ("Walker") motion to dismiss Counts III and V (for fraud and negligent misrepresentation, respectively) of plaintiffs' first amended complaint ("FAC") pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Only Counts I, III and V of the FAC are asserted against Walker. (FAC [Docket #45], filed May 24, 2007.) Walker answered the FAC with respect to Count I for restitution under ERISA Section 502(a)(3). (Answer, filed April 4, 2008 [Docket #77].) However, Walker moves, based on the court's October 5, 2007 Memorandum and Order ("October 5 Order"), to dismiss Counts III and V on the ground these state law claims are preempted by ERISA. In the October 5 Order, the court granted in part and denied in part co-defendants Sierra Railroad Company ("Sierra"), David N. Magaw ("Magaw") and Amber A. Gilles' ("Gilles") motions to dismiss the FAC. (Docket #63.) The court granted the motions as to plaintiffs' state law claims (including Counts III and V), finding those claims preempted by ERISA Section 514(a), but denied the motions as to plaintiffs' ERISA Section 502(a)(3) claim, finding this claim sustainable as a claim for equitable restitution. (October 5 Order at 7-15.)
Because oral argument will not be of material assistance, the court orders this matter submitted on the briefs. E.D. Cal. L.R. 78-230(h).
Alternatively, Walker alleges plaintiffs' FAC fails to allege sufficient facts to sustain a claim of fraud or negligent misrepresentation against her. The court need not reach this argument as it finds these state claims preempted.
At the time these defendants filed their motions, Walker had not appeared in the action. (October 5 Order at 2 n. 1.)
Specifically, with respect to plaintiffs' state law claims, the court found as follows:
[E]ach of plaintiffs' state law claims relate to the [subject ERISA] Plan and are therefore preempted. Plaintiffs' state law claims rest on the foundation that defendants misrepresented facts to plaintiffs or that Walker was ineligible to enroll in the Plan. Each claim requires interpretation of the Plan's eligibility requirements in order to resolve the issues at stake, regardless of any alleged misrepresentation. That is, if Walker met the eligibility requirements, plaintiffs would have no claim. Thus, each state law cause of action is preempted by ERISA [S]ection 514(a).
(Id. at 11:11-20.) Walker's instant motion raises the same essential arguments in favor of preemption as raised by Sierra, Magaw and Gilles. Thus, for the same reasons as set forth in the court's October 5 Order (see id. at 7-11), Walker's motion to dismiss is hereby GRANTED. Counts III and V of the FAC, asserted against Walker, are dismissed as preempted by ERISA. Thus, this action proceeds against defendants Sierra and Walker on Count I of the FAC only.
Defendants Magaw and Gilles were dismissed from the action pursuant to the October 5 Order, as only state law claims were asserted against them.
IT IS SO ORDERED.