Opinion
NO. 2014-CA-001630-MR
05-06-2016
RONALD MEANS APPELLANT v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY APPELLEE
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT: William D. Elkins Winchester, Kentucky BRIEF FOR APPELLEE: Jack Conway Attorney General of Kentucky James C. Shackelford Assistant Attorney General Frankfort, Kentucky
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED APPEAL FROM CLARK CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JEAN CHENAULT LOGUE, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 14-CR-00010-002 OPINION
AFFIRMING
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BEFORE: ACREE, CHIEF JUDGE; JONES AND NICKELL, JUDGES. NICKELL, JUDGE: Ronald Means has appealed from the September 8, 2014, Final Judgment and Sentence of Imprisonment entered by the Clark Circuit Court sentencing him to ten years' imprisonment upon a conditional guilty plea pursuant to RCr 8.09. On appeal, Means argues the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress. Because we discern no error, we affirm.
Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure.
On the evening of December 10, 2014, police officers from the Winchester Police Department and Clark County Sheriff's Office attempted to serve an arrest warrant on Means at his last known address. However, when the officers arrived at that address, Means' mobile home had vanished. In an attempt to determine where the mobile home was now located, one of the officers contacted a confidential informant ("CI") who, in turn, contacted other unknown individuals and ascertained Means' whereabouts. The CI directed officers to a mobile home park in Winchester, Kentucky, and pointed out the trailer known by the CI to belong to Means. The CI warned officers to be careful as there was likely an active methamphetamine lab in the trailer.
Means was known to the officers as a flight risk, so one officer proceeded to the rear of the trailer while three approached the front door. Lights were on in the trailer and officers testified they were able to see through and/or around a closed blind on the window directly beside the front door. Means was observed walking back and forth in the trailer. Upon confirming Means was inside, officers knocked on the door, announced their identity, and stated their purpose of serving an active arrest warrant. Two male voices were heard inside the trailer and officers observed the second man flee toward the rear of the trailer. Means refused to open the front door and leaned against it in an effort to thwart the officers' entry. Ultimately, the door was kicked in and Means was arrested.
Once inside the trailer, officers observed multiple items associated with the manufacture of methamphetamine in plain sight. Officers secured the residence and procured a search warrant for the residence. Additional evidence was located during the subsequent search resulting in charges being lodged against Means for manufacture of methamphetamine, first offense.
The other man located in the residence was also charged with multiple crimes. The co-defendant is not a party to this appeal.
Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 218A.1432, a Class B felony.
On April 10, 2014, Means moved to suppress the evidence seized. In the motion, Means contended the officers had no reason to believe he was in the trailer, thereby rendering their entry onto the curtilage of the property a trespass, citing Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 602-03, 100 S.Ct. 1371, 63 L.Ed.2d 639 (1980). Means argued the officers further infringed upon his rights when they conducted a warrantless search of his property by "peeking" around the closed window blind. Based on these assertions, Means urged suppression was required because the evidence seized resulted from an unlawful search and, therefore, constituted fruit of the poisonous tree. Following an evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied the suppression motion.
Thereafter, Means entered a conditional guilty plea in which he reserved the right to appeal from the trial court's denial of his suppression motion. Following final sentencing, Means initiated this appeal. He alleges the officers conducted an unlawful search by entering upon the curtilage of his home and peering through a window while having no reason to believe he was within the residence, and the trial court's decision on his suppression motion was both unsupported by substantial evidence and incorrect as a matter of law. Means contends reversal is necessary. We disagree.
At the time this case was pending in the trial court, RCr 9.78 was in effect and governed pre-trial motions to suppress. Under that rule, our review of a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress is two-fold. First, factual findings are deemed conclusive if supported by substantial evidence. Substantial evidence is "evidence of substance and relevant consequence, having the fitness to induce conviction in the minds of reasonable men." Kentucky State Racing Comm'n v. Fuller, 481 S.W.2d 298, 308 (Ky. 1972) (quoting O'Nan v. Ecklar Moore, Exp., Inc., 339 S.W.2d 466 (Ky. 1960)). A trial court's findings of fact must be upheld unless they are clearly erroneous. See Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 93 S.Ct. 375, 34 L.Ed.2d 401 (1972); Roark v. Commonwealth, 90 S.W.3d 24, 28 (Ky. 2002). If without evidentiary foundation, the trial court's factual findings are deemed clearly erroneous. Commonwealth v. Banks, 68 S.W.3d 347, 349 (Ky. 2001). Second, we conduct a de novo review to determine whether the trial court's decision was correct as a matter of law. Roberson v. Commonwealth, 185 S.W.3d 634, 637 (Ky. 2006).
Effective January 1, 2015, RCr 9.78 was superseded by RCr 8.27. Unlike its predecessor, RCr 8.27 does not specify an appellate standard of review. However, as provided in CR 52.01, findings of fact shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous. Consequently, application of CR 52.01 leads us to the identical standard applied under RCr 9.78. Thus, although RCr 9.78 has been superseded, the standard of review for a pretrial motion to suppress remains substantively unchanged.
Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure.
We have reviewed the record, including the videotaped suppression hearing. Although conflicting testimony was presented, evidentiary support for each of the trial court's factual findings appears in the record, and we discern no clear error. Thus, we conclude the trial court's findings are supported by substantial evidence and are therefore deemed conclusive.
Having discerned no error with respect to the trial court's factual findings, we now conduct a de novo examination of its legal conclusions. After a careful review, we are unable to discern any error.
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Section 10 of the Kentucky Constitution protect citizens against unreasonable searches and seizures by the government. The "physical entry of the home is the chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed." United States v. U.S. Dist. Court for E. Dist. Of Mich. S. Div., 407 U.S. 397, 313, 92 S.Ct. 2125, 32 L.Ed.2d 752 (1972). Nevertheless, "an arrest warrant founded on probable cause implicitly carries with it the limited authority to enter a dwelling in which the suspect lives when there is reason to believe the suspect is within." Payton, 445 U.S. at 603.
In the case at bar, Means contends the arresting officers did not have adequate "reason to believe" he was within the trailer upon their arrival and only gained such knowledge after trespassing onto the curtilage of his property and conducting an unlawful "search" by peeking through the window. Thus, he argues the trial court erred in refusing to suppress the evidence seized from the trailer. His contentions are without merit.
Police executing a valid arrest warrant may lawfully enter a residence if they have reason to believe the suspect lives there and is presently inside. "Reason to believe" is established by looking at common sense factors and evaluating the totality of the circumstances and requires a less exacting standard of proof than the probable cause standard urged upon us by Means. See United States Pruitt, 458 F.3d 477, 482 (6th Cir. 2006). In Payton, the United States Supreme Court required an arrest warrant to be based on probable cause, but set the standard to justify entry as a reason to believe. 445 U.S. at 603. Clearly, the Court was aware of the differences in these standards yet chose to require separate rules. When police execute a valid arrest warrant, a neutral and detached magistrate has previously made a probable cause determination a crime has been committed by the suspect. Marshall v. Commonwealth, 319 S.W.3d 352, 356 (Ky. 2010). Requiring officers to make a second probable cause determination when attempting to execute a valid arrest warrant would be overly burdensome and we will not accept the invitation to place such a requirement upon them.
Under the facts presented in this case, the police officers had a reason to believe—according to common sense factors and evaluating the totality of the circumstances—Means lived at the location and in the trailer identified by the CI and was currently located inside. Contrary to Means' assertion, actual proof he was inside the home was simply not required.
We are likewise unpersuaded by Means' contention the officers conducted an unlawful warrantless search of his residence by looking into the large window situated immediately adjacent to the front door. Although testimony was given that a blind covered a portion of the window, the officers indicated their view inside was not obscured while they were standing several feet away immediately before knocking on the door. No indication was given that special equipment or furtive maneuvers were required to see inside the trailer. Nevertheless, Means contends the officers' act of what he terms "peeking" in his window, violated his Fourth Amendment rights and requires suppression of all evidence subsequently seized.
Taking Means' assertion to its logical conclusion would require police officers to wear figurative "blinders" when approaching any residence so as to avoid the potential of any constitutional infirmities. To do so would unreasonably increase risks to officer safety associated with an already hazardous profession as they would be unable to fully assess the potential threats to their safety and possible escape routes for suspected criminals possibly housed within the structure. We are loathe to lay such a burden upon those officers who place themselves in dangerous situations on a daily basis. --------
In Quintana v. Commonwealth, 276 S.W.3d 753, 757 (Ky. 2008), our Supreme Court noted "certain areas such as driveways, walkways, or the front door and windows of a home frequently do not carry a reasonable expectation of privacy because they are open to plain view and are properly approachable by any member of the public, unless obvious steps are taken to bar the public from the door." If members of the public may approach these areas, police officers conducting legitimate business may likewise enter them. Id.
[I]n so doing they "are free to keep their eyes open and use their other senses." This means, therefore, that if police utilize "normal means of access to and egress from the house," for some legitimate purpose, such as to make inquiries of the occupant or to introduce an undercover agent into the activities occurring there, it is not a Fourth Amendment search for the police to see or hear or smell from that vantage point what is happening inside the dwelling.Id. at 758 (citation omitted). However, if officers stray from the normal path to the public entrance and enter upon other parts of the curtilage to surreptitiously observe the property or its residents, even the use of the natural senses of sight, hearing or smell to detect what is inside may constitute a search for Fourth Amendment purposes. Id. at 760. No such search occurred in this case.
Upon their approach to the door of the residence, police heard voices inside, noticed lights illuminated in the main room of the trailer, and clearly viewed Means from their vantage point at or in extremely close proximity to the front door—a location open to the public. These circumstances bolstered their belief Means was inside. In addition, and as the trial court correctly noted, no evidence was presented that officers unlawfully trespassed on Means' property or deviated from their path to the door so as to infringe upon the curtilage of the trailer.
Further, when the officers knocked on the door and announced their presence, they heard the sounds of one of the suspects fleeing to the rear of the trailer before Means called out to them announcing his refusal to open the door. These actions confirmed their reasonable belief Means was inside and wished to avoid contact with law enforcement officers. Such factors clearly constituted a reasonable belief which would permit the officers to constitutionally proceed inside to effectuate the arrest based on the valid warrant. Given these facts, the trial court did not err when it denied Means' motion to suppress.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Clark Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR. BRIEF FOR APPELLANT: William D. Elkins
Winchester, Kentucky BRIEF FOR APPELLEE: Jack Conway
Attorney General of Kentucky James C. Shackelford
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky