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observing that this Court and the federal district court had previously rejected defendant's argument that his three separate sentences for first-degree robbery, relating to three bank tellers who relinquished the bank's money, should be merged into one sentence based on double-jeopardy principles
Summary of this case from Yelardy v. StateOpinion
No. 108, 2002.
Submitted: April 24, 2002.
Decided: May 2, 2002.
Court Below — Superior Court of the State of Delaware, in and for New Castle County Cr. ID No. 82002889DI.
Affirmed.
Unpublished Opinion is below.
ROBERT R. MEADES, Defendant Below-Appellant, v. STATE OF DELAWARE, Plaintiff Below-Appellee. No. 108, 2002. Supreme Court of the State of Delaware. Submitted: April 24, 2002. Decided: May 2, 2002.
Before HOLLAND, BERGER, and STEELE, Justices.
RANDY J. HOLLAND, Justice:
ORDER
This second day of May 2002, upon consideration of the appellant's opening brief, the State's motion to affirm, and the record below, it appears to the Court that:
Meades also filed a motion for appointment of counsel. The constitutional right to counsel does not extend to collateral attacks on convictions. Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 555 (1987). We find no compelling reason to justify the appointment of counsel in this appeal.
(1) A Superior Court jury convicted the defendant-appellant, Robert Meades, in 1982 of three counts of first degree robbery and one count of conspiracy. The Superior Court sentenced Meades to a total period of 32 years imprisonment. Meades' convictions and sentence were affirmed on direct appeal. Thereafter, Meades filed unsuccessful petitions for state postconviction relief and federal habeas corpus relief. In January 2002, Meades filed a motion for correction of sentence, which the Superior Court summarily denied. Meades appeals that decision. We find no merit to Meades' appeal. Accordingly, we affirm the Superior Court's judgment.
Meades v. State, Del. Supr., No. 365, 1982, Moore, J. (May 31, 1983).
(2) In his opening brief on appeal, Meades contends that his three separate, ten-year sentences for first degree robbery should be merged into one ten-year sentence. Meades contends that he has been subjected to multiple punishments for one offense in violation of double jeopardy principles. Meades appears to assert that, although there were three bank tellers who were victimized by his robbery, the only property taken in the robbery (i.e., money) belonged to the bank. Therefore, Meades argues, there could be only one victim, the bank, and thus only one robbery. The Superior Court summarily rejected Meades' motion to modify his sentence.
(3) The Superior Court's decision was entirely correct. Both this Court, in reviewing Meades' postconviction appeal, and the federal district court, in reviewing Meades' habeas corpus petition, rejected Meades' double jeopardy claim. Accordingly, Meades' double jeopardy claim is barred by the law of the case doctrine and cannot be relitigated. The State's motion to affirm, therefore, must be granted. The issue on appeal is clearly controlled by settled Delaware law.
Meades v. State, Del. Supr., No. 334, 1987, Horsey, J. (Apr. 22, 1988).
Meades v. Young, D. Del., C.A. No. 88-233-JLL, Robinson, U.S. Mag. (Mar. 14, 1989).
Brittingham v. State, 705 A.2d 577, 579 (Del. 1997).
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that Meades' motion for appointment of counsel is DENIED, and the judgment of the Superior Court is AFFIRMED.