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McRae v. State

New York State Court of Claims
Mar 5, 2015
# 2015-018-614 (N.Y. Ct. Cl. Mar. 5, 2015)

Opinion

# 2015-018-614 Claim No. 125067 Motion No. M-86095

03-05-2015

TROY McRAE v. STATE OF NEW YORK

TROY McRAE Pro Se ERIC T. SCHNEIDERMAN Attorney General of the State of New York By: Ray A. Kyles, Esquire Assistant Attorney General


Synopsis

Claimant may have met his burden on a summary judgment motion; however, the claim must be dismissed pursuant to Court of Claims Act section 11, as the Court lacks subject matter and personal jurisdiction.

Case information

UID:

2015-018-614

Claimant(s):

TROY McRAE

Claimant short name:

McRAE

Footnote (claimant name) :

Defendant(s):

STATE OF NEW YORK

Footnote (defendant name) :

Third-party claimant(s):

Third-party defendant(s):

Claim number(s):

125067

Motion number(s):

M-86095

Cross-motion number(s):

Judge:

DIANE L. FITZPATRICK

Claimant's attorney:

TROY McRAE Pro Se

Defendant's attorney:

ERIC T. SCHNEIDERMAN Attorney General of the State of New York By: Ray A. Kyles, Esquire Assistant Attorney General

Third-party defendant's attorney:

Signature date:

March 5, 2015

City:

Syracuse

Comments:

Official citation:

Appellate results:

See also (multicaptioned case)


Decision

Claimant brings a motion for summary judgment. Defendant opposes the motion. The claim alleges causes of action for unlawful imprisonment, "abuse of authority," and malicious prosecution for which Claimant seeks damages. Claimant asserts that he was unlawfully held in the Special Housing Unit (SHU) at the Cayuga Correctional Facility for more than three weeks after disciplinary charges were dismissed. He alleges that the disciplinary charges were dismissed because the hearing was not held within seven days as required, and he objected to the timing of the hearing. He alleges that he was never provided with any documentation substantiating any reason for his continued retention in the SHU after the termination of the hearing.

Claimant filed a Reply to Defendant's Affirmation in Opposition with the Clerk of the Court on February 9, 2015. The motion was returnable on February 4, 2015, and, therefore, was not considered by the Court in deciding this motion.

In support of his motion, Claimant submits his sworn statement and a copy of a Memorandum from S. Piecuch, SORC, to Claimant, dated October 15, 2014, which reflects that Claimant was to be reimbursed back pay for the time period he was housed in the SHU at Cayuga Correctional Facility because "[a]t that time [he was] not under any disciplinary sanctions." A bookkeeping Adjustment Notification is also attached reflecting that Claimant's account was credited in the amount of $7.65 on October 16, 2014. He has also attached copies of the pleadings.

To be successful on a motion for summary judgment, the proponent, here, Claimant, must first present a prima facie showing of entitlement to judgment as a matter of law, then the other party must present evidentiary proof to establish the existence of a material fact which would require a trial (Zuckerman v City of New York, 49 NY2d 557 [1980]; Sillman v Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 3 NY2d 395 [1957]).

A cause of action for wrongful confinement is a "species" of the tort of false imprisonment (Gittens v State of New York, 132 Misc 2d 399, 407 [Ct Cl 1986]). It is Claimant's burden to show that " (1) the defendant intended to confine him, (2) the [claimant] was conscious of the confinement, (3) the [claimant] did not consent to the confinement and (4) the confinement was not otherwise privileged" (Broughton v State of New York, 37 NY2d 451, 456, cert denied sub nom Schanbarger v Kellogg, 423 US 929). Although Claimant must assert a lack of privilege for the confinement, it is Defendant's burden to prove the confinement was privileged (Donald v State of New York, 17 NY3d 389 [2011]; Gonzalez v State of New York, 110 AD2d 810 [2d Dept 1985]; Kelly v State of New York, 105 AD2d 473 [3d Dept 1984]).

Defendant is entitled to immunity for claims for money damages arising from disciplinary matters within a prison setting that involve discretionary determinations (Arteaga v State of New York, 72 NY2d 212 [1988]; see also McLean v City of New York, 12 NY3d 194 [2009]). The purported failure to timely release a claimant from the SHU, however, may violate nondiscretionary rules and regulations of the Department of Corrections and Community Supervision and may result in liability (see Loret v State of New York, 106 AD3d 1159 [3d Dept 2013]; Gittens,132 Misc 2d at 406).

Here, although Claimant may have met his burden on a summary judgment motion, in searching the record, as the Court must do, an issue of the Court's subject matter jurisdiction has come to light, and the Court must deny Claimant's motion and, instead, grant summary judgment to Defendant (CPLR 3212[b]; Merritt Hill Vineyards, Inc. v Windy Hgts. Vineyards, 61 NY2d 106, 110 [1984]; Davis v Boeheim, 24 NY3d 262, 268 [2014]; see also Court of Claims Act § 11 [a] [i]; Mead v State of New York, UID No. 2009-044-551 [Ct Cl, Schaewe, J., Sept. 9, 2009]).

In reviewing Defendant's answer, it has properly raised, as a "First Affirmative Defense," that the claim was served by ordinary mail instead of by certified mail, return receipt requested, as required by Court of Claims Act section 11 (a) and, as a result, the Court lacks personal and subject matter jurisdiction. In reviewing Claimant's affidavit of service for the claim filed with the Clerk of the Court, Claimant acknowledges that he served the claim by "regular US mailing." Court of Claims Act section 11 (a) (i) states, in relevant part, that "[t]he claim shall be filed with the clerk of the court; and . . . a copy shall be served personally or by certified mail, return receipt requested, upon the attorney general within the times hereinbefore provided for filing with the clerk of the court." It is Defendant's obligation to raise with particularity any objection based upon improper service in the answer (Court of Claims Act § 11 [c]). Here, Defendant has sufficiently raised that objection.

It is well-established that the requirements for service on the Attorney General are jurisdictional and must be strictly construed (Dreger v New York State Thruway Auth., 81 NY2d 721 [1992]). Service by regular mail is not sufficient to commence an action in this Court and the Court cannot ignore the service defect (Zoeckler v State of New York, 109 AD3d 1133 [4th Dept 2013] [claim properly dismissed because it was served by regular mail depriving the court of subject matter jurisdiction and court cannot correct or disregard defect in service]; Spaight v State of New York, 91 AD3d 995 [3d Dept 2012]).

Here, Claimant has attested to service in a manner that is not in compliance with Court of Claims Act section 11 (a). As a result of this improper service, summary judgment is granted to Defendant because the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction and the claim must be dismissed. Nonetheless, Claimant still has time to pursue a late claim application pursuant to Court of Claims Act section 10 (6).

March 5, 2015

Syracuse, New York

DIANE L. FITZPATRICK

Judge of the Court of Claims

The Court has considered the following in deciding this motion:

1) Notice of Motion.

2) Affidavit of Troy McRae, in support, sworn to December 29, 2014, with attachments thereto.

3) Memorandum of Law from Troy McRae, in support, dated December 29, 2014.

4) Affirmation of Ray A. Kyles, Esquire, Assistant Attorney General, in opposition, dated January 29, 2015.


Summaries of

McRae v. State

New York State Court of Claims
Mar 5, 2015
# 2015-018-614 (N.Y. Ct. Cl. Mar. 5, 2015)
Case details for

McRae v. State

Case Details

Full title:TROY McRAE v. STATE OF NEW YORK

Court:New York State Court of Claims

Date published: Mar 5, 2015

Citations

# 2015-018-614 (N.Y. Ct. Cl. Mar. 5, 2015)