Opinion
Civil Action No. 3:99-CV-1542-P
July 24, 2000.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Now before the Court are the following:
1. Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, filed April 14, 2000; Plaintiff's Response, filed May 15, 2000; and Defendant's Reply, filed May 30, 2000;
2. Plaintiffs Objections to Summary Judgment Evidence, filed May 15, 2000; Defendant's Response, filed May 30, 2000;
3. Defendant's Motion for Leave to File Additional Evidence in Support of Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, filed May 30, 2000;
4. Defendant's Objection to the Affidavit of Maura Weikel, filed May 30, 2000.
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For the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS Defendant's motion for summary judgment. As noted throughout this Order, the Court DENIES Plaintiff's objections to the evidence relied upon by the Court and DENIES AS MOOT the objections to evidence upon which the Court did not rely. The Court DENIES AS MOOT Defendant's motion for leave to file additional evidence and DENIES Defendant's objection to the summary judgment evidence.
I. BACKGROUND
This case arises from a race discrimination claim premised on Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., wherein Plaintiff Charles McGriff ("McGriff"), an African-American male, alleges termination from his employment due to his race. ( See April 14, 2000 Order at 1). The Defendant in the lawsuit is BankOne, McGriff's former employer. ( See Compl. at 2).
The following are the relevant facts of the case, which are essentially undisputed. McGriff was hired by BankOne in May 1981. ( See Pl. Br. at 2). In March 1997, McGriff entered a management training program at BankOne with the intention of becoming a branch manager on the retail side of BankOne's operations. See id. From September 1997 until his termination in January 1999, McGriff served as the branch manager at the Oak Cliff banking center. See id. at 3.
During his holiday vacation, McGriff received a phone call at his residence on December 24, 1998, from BankOne customer Sharon Johnson ("Johnson"). ( See Pl. Br. at 3; McGriff Dep. at 116). Johnson placed this call in order to ensure that someone at BankOne, in McGriff's absence, would be able to assist her to "expedite her transaction because that was the second time [McGriff] had done that." (McGriff Dep. at 116). McGriff was obviously familiar with Johnson and her visits to the bank: "I was assuming that she was coming in there to cash a Merrill Lynch check . . . because she had came [sic] in before with a large Merrill Lynch check." Id. at 120. McGriff insists, however, that he "did not know that Ms. Johnson wanted a cashier's check after speaking to her." ( See McGriff Aff. at 4). After speaking with Johnson, McGriff called James Bowen ("Bowen"), a BankOne employee, to have him attend to Johnson upon her arrival. See id.
Allegedly unbeknownst to McGriff, Bowen assisted Johnson in completing an unethical transaction. See id. According to McGriff, when he returned to work on January 4, 1999, he "learned from Mr. Bowen and Ms. Ayala that Mr. Bowen had issued a $20,000 cashier's check to Ms. Johnson and that Ms. Johnson did not have adequate funds in her account to cover the amount of the cashier's check. . . . Mr. Bowen was holding Ms. Johnson's personal check and waiting for her to make a deposit." Id. After numerous fruitless attempts to encourage Johnson to deposit sufficient funds to cover the check, McGriff finally deposited $17,000 with a personal check from his BankOne line of credit. (See McGriff Dep. at 21). This check covered the balance of the $20,000 cashier's check issued to Johnson on December 24, 1998. See id.
BankOne terminated McGriff's employment on January 28, 1999, a move that McGriff attributes to racial discrimination because he was replaced by Kelly Christianson, a white female. ( See Pl. Br. at 4; McGriff Aff. at 6). BankOne justifies the termination on grounds of McGriff's violations of policies, namely, for giving "preferential treatment in transactions to a customer and assuming liability for borrowings of a customer." (Def. Br. at 5-6; Def App. at 26, 31). McGriff, on the other hand, argues that these reasons are mere pretext for unlawful discrimination. ( See Pl. Br. at 1).
The Court denies McGriff's objection to Exhibit A, which contains BankOne's Code of Ethics. As noted throughout this Order, the Court has denied McGriff's objections to evidence upon which it has relied, and denied as moot those objections to evidence upon which the Court has not relied. In addition, the Court denies as moot BankOne's motion for leave to file additional evidence, as the Court did not need to rely on that evidence in this Order.
After filing an EEOC Complaint and receiving a right to sue letter, McGriff initiated this suit. BankOne, conceding that McGriff established a prima facie case for race discrimination under Title VII, now moves for summary judgment. BankOne argues that it has set forth a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for McGriff's termination, which is not pretextual. ( See Def. Br. at 5; April 14, 2000 Order at 1). Therefore BankOne contends that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
II. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
Summary judgment is proper when the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See FED. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-25 (1986). A dispute about a material fact is "genuine" if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). The moving party must identify the evidence on file in the case which establishes the absence of any genuine issue of material fact. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323.
Once the moving party has made this initial showing, the opposing party must offer evidence sufficient to show the existence of the required elements of the party's case. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986), Mere assertions of a factual dispute unsupported by probative evidence will not prevent summary judgment; the party defending against a motion for summary judgment cannot defeat the motion unless it provides specific facts that show the case presents a genuine issue of material fact, such that a reasonable jury might return a verdict in its favor. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256-57. Conclusory assertions, unsupported by specific facts, presented in affidavits opposing the motion for summary judgment are likewise insufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment. See Lujan v. National Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871, 888 (1990).
All evidence and the inferences to be drawn therefrom "must be viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion." United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962). However, if the nonmoving party this to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to its case on which it will bear the burden of proof at trial, summary judgment must be granted. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-23. Finally, in reviewing the summary judgment evidence, the Court has no duty to search the record for triable issues; rather, it need rely only on those portions of the submitted documents to which the nonmoving party directs its attention. See Guarino v. Brookfield Township Trustees, 980 F.2d 399, 403 (6th Cir. 1992).
III. McGRIFF'S RACE DISCRIMINATION CLAIM UNDER TITLE VII
A. Legal Standard under Title VII
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 makes it "an unlawful employment practice for an employer . . . to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment because of [his] . . . race." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). The Supreme Court originally set out the framework for analyzing Title VII employment discrimination claims in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-04 (1973), and elaborated upon this framework in St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993). Under the McDonnell Douglas/St. Mary's scheme, McGriff must first establish a prima facie case of discrimination. See St. Mary's, 509 U.S. at 506. Such a prima facie case is established if McGriff provides evidence that he (1) was a member of a protected group, African-American; (2) was qualified for his position; (3) suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) was replaced by a similarly qualified white employee. See Ward v. Bechtel Corp., 102 F.3d 199, 202 (5th Cir. 1997).
If McGriff establishes a prima facie case, he will have raised a rebuttable presumption of discrimination and shifted the burden to BankOne to articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for his termination. See St. Mary's, 509 U.S. at 506. If BankOne satisfies this burden of production, McGriff must present evidence that BankOne's proffered reason is a pretext for discrimination and that his termination was in fact informed by discriminatory motives. See id. at 507; Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252-55 (1981). Thus, BankOne's successful rebuttal requires McGriff to present more specific evidence supporting his allegation of discriminatory intent. See Williams v. Time Warner Operation, Inc., 98 F.3d 179, 181 (5th Cir. 1996).
McGriff can avoid summary judgment if the evidence, taken as a whole, (1) creates a fact issue as to whether BankOne's stated reason was what actually motivated the termination, and (2) creates a reasonable inference that his race was a determinative factor in the firing. See, e.g., Rhodes v. Guiberson Oil Tools, 75 F.3d 989, 994 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc). The ultimate burden of persuasion at trial, of course, rests squarely upon McGriff. St. Mary's, 509 U.S. at 508; Marcantel v. Louisiana Dep't of Transp. Dev., 37 F.3d 197, 200 (5th Cir. 1994).
B. Application of Title VII Legal Standard for Race Discrimination to the Facts
BankOne concedes that McGriff has established a prima facie case for race discrimination under Title VII: "he is black; he was qualified to hold the position of Banking Center Manager; he was discharged; and his position was filled by a white female." ( See Def. Br. at 5; see also April 14, 2000 Order at 1). BankOne contends that it has proffered a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for firing McGriff, and that there is no evidence supporting McGriff's allegation that this stated reason is a pretext for unlawful discrimination. ( See Def. Br. at 5-7). Accordingly, BankOne claims that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
1. BankOne's Non-Discriminatory Reason
BankOne asserts that it fired McGriff due to policy violations, not because of his race. ( See Def. Br. at 5-7). Despite McGriff's assertion that he never gave preferential treatment to a customer or assumed liability for a customer's borrowings, (see Pl. Br. at 4), McGriff conceded that BankOne asserted a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for his termination. ( See Pl. Br. at 1). Even without this concession, the Court finds that BankOne's proffered reason is legitimate and non-discriminatory.
It is undisputed that McGriff violated BankOne policies, whether he actually knew about it at the time or not. ( See, e.g. McGriff Dep. at 191). BankOne Corporate Security officers Janet Siegal ("Siegal") and Angel Stiles ("Stiles") conducted an investigation into the violations. ( See Richardson Aff. at 1, ¶ 3). After reviewing the information from the investigation, BankOne vice president Isaac Richardson ("Richardson") conferred with Siegal, Stiles, human resources, and his own supervisor. See id. The record indicates that Richardson then discussed the investigators' findings with other BankOne officials and then relied upon those findings in making his decision to terminate Bowen and McGriff. See id. at 2, ¶¶ 4-5.
McGriff did not object to paragraph 3 of Richardson's Affidavit. To the extent that the Court relies on paragraphs 4 and 5, the Court denies McGriff's hearsay objections because Richardson's statements go to his motivation in firing McGriff.
BankOne cited giving preferential treatment to a customer and assuming liability for a customer's borrowings as reasons for McGriff's termination. ( See Def. Br. at 5-6). Both of these reasons are supported by the information gathered during BankOne's investigation. (See Richardson Aff. at 1, ¶ 4; Siegal Aff. at 2, ¶ 6). BankOne's Code of Ethics explicitly prohibits these actions. ( See Def. App. at 26, 31). McGriff concedes, at least in retrospect, that his treatment of the Johnson situation was grounds for termination. ( See McGriff Dep. at 191). Moreover, in the statement that McGriff gave following the BankOne investigation, he admitted, "I now understand this violates BankOne policy and procedure." (Def. App. at 49). The Court finds that BankOne has articulated a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for firing McGriff.
2. McGriff's Claim that the Reason is Mere Pretex
Under the McDonnell Douglas/St. Mary's framework, the burden now shifts to McGriff to show that BankOne's proffered reason is actually pretext for unlawful discrimination. McGriff may show either that BankOne's proffered reason for the firing is incredible, or that the termination was more likely motivated by discriminatory reasons. See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256. To establish pretext, it is insufficient for McGriff, without more, to rely on his subjective belief that discrimination occurred. See Southard v. Texas Bd. of Criminal Justice, 114 F.3d 539, 555 (5th Cir. 1997).
McGriff essentially proffers three examples as demonstrative of pretext, none of which overcomes the stated reason that BankOne fired McGriff because of his violations of BankOne's Code of Ethics. McGriff fails to show either that BankOne's reasons for firing him are unworthy of credence, or that his race motivated the termination. Simply put, McGriff is unable to refute the undisputed evidence that clearly documents his violations of the Code of Ethics.
a. Acceptable job performance is not dispositive
First, McGriff asserts that while serving as branch manager in Oak Cliff, he "was never told by anyone that [his] job performance was anything less than fully acceptable." (McGriff Aff. at 3). In light of McGriff's approximately nineteen years of working for BankOne, the Court acknowledges that this statement is indicative of adequate performance while at work. Nevertheless, this statement does not offset the negative, and well-investigated, aspect of McGriff's employment. It was precisely the findings of BankOne's investigative unit that concerned BankOne management and gave rise to Richardson's decision to terminate him. ( See, e.g. Richardson Aff. at 1, ¶ 4; Spiegal Aff. at 2, ¶ 6). BankOne can fire McGriff for these violations even if he performed well in other areas of his job, and this Court may not second-guess valid personnel decisions undertaken by an employer. See Walton v. Bisco Indus., Inc., 119 F.3d 368, 372 (5th Cir. 1997).
To the extent that McGriff offers this statement as demonstrative of pretext, the Court analyzes it as such.
b. Ayala's not being fired is insufficient
McGriff's second assertion of pretext is that Tammy Ayala ("Ayala"), a white female, was not fired after this incident unfolded. ( See Pl. Br. at 4). Specifically, McGriff contends that she was a similarly situated white employee who was the the "assistant manager on duty when the cashier's check was issued by Mr. Bowen . . . and knew as much or more than [McGriff] knew about the incident." Id. McGriff's subjective belief as to the extent of Ayala's involvement in the Johnson check scandal, however, is in direct contradiction with the evidence on record.
During her investigation of the matter, Siegal had the opportunity to interview Ayala. ( See Siegal Aff. at 1, ¶ 3) Based on this information and information gathered from other meetings, Siegal and Stiles prepared an investigation report that led to McGriff's and Bowen's termination from BankOne. See id. at 1, ¶ 2. BankOne concedes that Ayala, like McGriff, knew in early January that Bowen was holding Johnson's check without processing it. ( See Richardson Aff. at 22, ¶ 10). Nevertheless, Richardson maintains that Ayala appropriately followed BankOne protocol: "Ayala reported this situation to her supervisor, Mr. McGriff, and was working with him to resolve the problem." Id. Relying on the report provided by Siegal and Stiles, Richardson "determined, based upon the information provided by BankOne Corporate Security, that Ms. Ayala had not violated any BankOne policies but was only trying to resolve the problem created by Mr. Bowen and Mr. McGriff." Id. The evidence shows that Richardson and other BankOne officials weighed the findings of the investigation and made a rationalized decision. This Court will not second-guess valid, well investigated personnel decisions undertaken by an employer. See Walton, 119 F.3d at 372.
The Court denies McGriff's objection to this paragraph because it is a factual summary of the fact-gathering for which Siegal was responsible. Siegal's comments are based on her personal knowledge of the investigation that she helped conduct.
The Court denies McGriff's objection to this paragraph, as it refers to Richardson's motivation in reaching employment decisions for those employees involved in the Johnson check scandal.
McGriff did not present any evidence to dispute BankOne's assertion that the decision not to fire Ayala was based on facts gathered by the BankOne investigators. ( See Siegal Aff. at 1, ¶ 2). Accordingly, the Court does not rely on McGriff's subjective belief that BankOne spared Ayala's job because she is white. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256-57; see also Southard, 114 F.3d at 555. McGRIFF'S conclusory assertion, which is unsupported by specific facts and runs counter to evidence in the record, is insufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment. See Lujan, 497 U.S. at 888. Moreover, McGRIFF'S belief that Ayala was not fired because she is white is illogical in light of the fact that Bowen, a white male, was terminated on the same day as McGriff for the same offense. Due to Bowen's termination, the Court cannot give credence to the argument that Ayala's treatment raises an inference of racial discrimination.
c. Owczar's not being fired is insufficient
McGRIFF'S final example of pretext is BankOne's treatment of Dan Owczar ("Owczar"). ( See McGriff Aff. at 7). McGriff alleges that Owczar, a white male, "issued cashier's checks on two occasions without verifying that the customer had sufficient funds to cover the amounts of the checks and when he should have known that the customer's account was overdrawn. . . . He was not discharged or demoted as a result of issuing the checks." Id. These allegations are corroborated by Maura Weikel ("Weikel"). ( See Weikel Aff. at 8-9). Owczar, at all times relevant to these allegations, was the branch manager at the Grand Prairie BankOne. See id.
This individual's name is spelled at least three different ways in various documents submitted to the Court. The Court accepts this version, as this is the way the name is spelled in McGriff's affidavit.
Although BankOne correctly points out that Weikel has not been identified as possessing facts relevant to this litigation, the Court denies its objection to her affidavit.
The Court assumes the truth of these allegations; however, the Court notes the differences between the alleged activities of McGriff and Osczar. McGriff asserts that Owczar's error in these transactions was his failure to verify the balance of the accounts. ( See McGriff Aff. at 7). BankOne distinguishes Owczar's actions from those of McGriff — McGriff verified Johnson's balance, realized that she had insufficient finds, and intentionally continued to hold her check. ( See Def. Reply at 4). Indeed, McGriff evidences his intentional activity upon learning of Johnson's check in January:
Q. Okay. All right Now, after you first learned from [Bowen] that this situation had occurred, all right, and that [Johnson] didn't have the money in her account yet, what action did you take?
A. I instructed [Bowen] to make sure that he stick with that customer, call that customer, make sure he know [sic] when she's going to bring a deposit and, you know, let's make sure that we get this here before it's charged off basically.
(McGriff Dep. at 145). Not only did McGriff know that Johnson had insufficient funds, he purposely tried to take care of the problem before it "charged off" See id. McGriff also mentioned that through his tellering experience, he knew that Bowen had three to four weeks "to make sure that she gets that money in there." Id. at 128. This covert activity not only indicates that McGriff knew what he was doing, but also strongly suggests that he knew how much time that he and Bowen had to guarantee that BankOne did not uncover the preferential treatment being afforded to Johnson. McGriff did not give evidence of similar covert operations undertaken by Owczar.
McGriff admitted that if he had immediately processed the check rather than attempting to hide the transaction, he probably would not have been fired, even though Johnson's account would have shown insufficient funds. ( See McGriff Dep. at 141).
Moreover, with regard to Owczar, not to mention Ayala, McGriff has altogether failed to offer evidence supporting his allegations that these BankOne employees were not terminated because they are white. Likewise, McGriff has failed to show that he was terminated because he is African-American. In summary, the examples offered by McGriff do not rise to the level of demonstrating discriminatory pretext. As the BankOne investigation of the Johnson scandal concluded, McGriff did not adhere to the policies set forth in BankOne's Code of Ethics. Richardson, having read the investigation and conferred with other BankOne officials, was entitled to rectify the situation. See Walton, 119 F.3d at 372 (discrimination laws are not vehicles for judicial second-guessing of business decisions). In short, McGriff has failed to offer summary judgment evidence suggesting either that BankOne's proffered reasons for terminating him are false, or that race-based animus motivated his termination. See id. at 370. Even if believed, McGriff's evidence does not demonstrate that he was treated differently from others similarly situated at BankOne, and thus does not support an inference of impermissible racial discrimination. See id. at 372.
After considering all of the facts and the relevant case law, this Court must agree with BankOne that pretext cannot be shown, and as such, BankOne is entitled to judgment as a matter of law with respect to McGRIFF'S claim for race discrimination.
VI. CONCLUSION
Upon careful review of the parties' arguments, the summary judgment record, and the relevant law, the Court concludes that Plaintiff Charles McGriff failed to demonstrate that BankOne's proffered reasons for terminating him were mere pretext for unlawful racial discrimination. As such, BankOne's motion for summary judgment for McGriff's claim of race discrimination under Title VII is GRANTED. As noted throughout this Order, the Court DENIES Plaintiff's objections to the evidence relied upon by the Court and DENIES AS MOOT the objections to evidence upon which the Court did not rely. The Court DENIES AS MOOT Defendant's motion for leave to file additional evidence and DENIES Defendant's objection to the summary judgment evidence.
So Ordered.