Opinion
J-S12008-17 No. 1251 MDA 2016
03-31-2017
MOLLIE MCGINLEY Appellee v. PAUL J. PHILPOTT Appellant
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
Appeal from the Order Entered July 11, 2016
In the Court of Common Pleas of Luzerne County
Civil Division at No(s): 10736 of 2013 BEFORE: PANELLA, J., OTT, J., and MUSMANNO, J. MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, J.
Appellant, Paul J. Philpott ("Husband"), appeals pro se from the order entered in the Luzerne County Court of Common Pleas, finalizing his divorce from Appellee, Mollie McGinley ("Wife"). The parties' marriage lasted fewer than five months. Husband argues the court erred in its distribution of the marital estate, and in its refusal to grant him alimony pendente lite ("APL") or spousal support during the proceedings. After a careful review of the record, we affirm.
The facts and procedural history of this case are as follows. Husband and Wife were married for fewer than five months. On September 10, 2013, Wife filed a complaint in divorce, seeking equitable distribution of the marital assets. Husband filed an answer and a counterclaim, seeking spousal support, APL, and alimony. Following a two-year separation, the court issued an order stating that Husband and Wife met the residence requirement in Pennsylvania's divorce code, that the parties lived separate and apart for over two years, and the marriage had been irretrievably broken. The court appointed a Master in divorce to adjudicate the remaining claims at issue, and the Master held a hearing.
Prior to Wife's filing of the divorce complaint at issue in Luzerne County, Husband filed a complaint for spousal support and APL in Lackawanna County. Lackawanna County ultimately denied Husband's request for spousal support and APL following a hearing. Husband attempted to appeal the issue to our Court, and we quashed the appeal as interlocutory. To the extent Husband attempts to raise this issue to our Court in the instant appeal from the divorce action in Luzerne County, this is procedurally erroneous and we will not consider these arguments. The Luzerne County court stated in its opinion that it could not rule on the merits of Husband's issue due to res judicata, given that Husband raised that identical issue and the court entered an order denying it in Lackawanna County. "[I]t is well settled that the doctrine of res judicata applies to prevent litigants from bearing the burden of re-litigating the same issues with the same parties, and to promote judicial economy." In re N.A., 116 A.3d 1144, 1148 (Pa. Super. 2015) (citation omitted). Husband's earlier choice not to coordinate the actions under Pa.R.C.P. 213.1 means that he cannot now appeal his Lackawanna County issue from this Luzerne County action. Following the Luzerne County court's grant of divorce, Husband was then able to appeal from the dismissal of his prior Lackawanna County complaint for spousal support and APL. --------
In his report and recommendations, the Master recommended the court enter a decree in divorce, based on the court's own prior findings. The Master also made the following findings in his report: Husband is employed in various fields, and was evasive when the court questioned him about his current income levels; Wife is employed as a radiologist; neither party identified material liabilities other than a loan on the vehicle Husband retained; neither spouse contributed to the education or increased earning power of the other spouse; Wife continued to provide medical insurance for Husband; neither party acted as a homemaker and the parties acquired little property during the length of the marriage; the parties did not establish a set standard of living given the short length of the marriage; both parties had ample income or the ability to secure ample income to provide for their individual needs; and Husband had not paid any child support to Wife at the time of the hearing. Based on these findings, the Master stated that were the issue of APL or spousal support properly before him, he would find that Husband was not entitled to either. Husband withdrew his claim for alimony at the hearing.
As for equitable distribution of the parties' assets, the Master made additional recommendations, finding: the vehicle Husband retained had a net value for purposes of equitable distribution of $12,166.00; Husband took Wife's personal, non-marital property for his own use and benefit, including furniture Wife had purchased; the personal property Husband took from Wife had a value of $8,206.00 when adjusted for depreciation; Wife had a $10,100.00 increase in her bank accounts which should be regarded as marital property, along with a $64.00 increase in her 401K account, and an IMac computer valued at $1,000.00; Husband submitted no credible evidence to show that Wife's stock acquisition prior to the date of the marriage should be considered marital property; the parties agreed that an engagement ring Wife sold would be placed in a 529 account for the benefit of the parties' son; Husband's contention that he is entitled to a $966.67 refund related to his medical expenses that Wife paid for is without merit; the marital estate should be distributed with 52% going to Husband and 48% to Wife; based on these calculations and the property each party has retained, Husband owes Wife an equalization payment in the amount of $3,973.28.
Husband filed exceptions to the Master's report and recommendation. Thereafter, the trial court denied Husband's exceptions, adopted the Master's report and recommendation as an order of the court, and entered a decree in divorce. Husband timely filed a notice of appeal and complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b).
On appeal, Husband argues a litany of issues, several of which are not properly before us. We decline to address Husband's spousal support and APL claims, given our above footnote regarding the procedural improprieties at issue here. Turning to Husband's contentions regarding the equitable distribution order, our standard of review in equitable distribution matters is as follows.
It is well established that absent an abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court, we will not reverse an award of equitable distribution. [In addition,] [w]hen reviewing the record of the proceedings, we are guided by the fact that trial courts have broad equitable powers to effectuate [economic] justice and we will find an abuse of discretion only if the trial court misapplied the laws or failed to follow proper legal procedures. [Further,] [t]he finder of fact is free to believe all, part, or none of the
evidence and the Superior Court will not disturb the credibility determinations of the court below.Anzalone v. Anzalone , 835 A.2d 773, 780 (Pa. Super. 2003) (citation omitted; brackets in original). "[A] master may be appointed to hear ancillary economic claims prior to the entry of a divorce decree if grounds for divorce have been established." Raines v. Raines , 149 A.3d 375, 379 (Pa. Super. 2016) (citation omitted).
There is no simple formula by which to divide marital property; the method of distribution derives from the facts of the individual case. See Gaydos v. Gaydos , 693 A.2d 1368, 1376 (Pa. Super. 1997). In fashioning an equitable distribution award, the trial court must consider, at a minimum, the eleven factors set forth in 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 3502, Equitable division of marital property, (a) General rule. "The courts attempt to split property equitably, instead of equally, taking into consideration such factors as length of marriage, the contributions of both spouses, ages and health of each spouse." Taper v. Taper , 939 A.2d 969, 974 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citation omitted). Moreover, a trial court may accept all, some, or none of the submitted testimony in determining the value of marital property. See Isralsky v. Isralsky , 824 A.2d 1178, 1185 (Pa. Super. 2003).
In his brief, Husband argues the trial court unreasonably compressed the timeline for trial, and failed to permit him adequate opportunity for discovery. Husband claims this procedural defect prejudiced him by unjustly deflating his equitable distribution award. We disagree. Wife filed for divorce on September 10, 2013. Husband refused to consent to the divorce, and thus proceedings in divorce did not resume until two years later, at which time the court appointed the Master to hold a hearing. Prior to the hearing, Wife's counsel filed answers to all of Husband's discovery requests and provided requested documents. By contrast, Husband failed to provide information on his own assets and earnings prior to and throughout the hearing. Husband did not subpoena any person or records in order to expand on the already provided discovery. Husband had ample opportunity to independently verify Wife's earnings and assets. Therefore, we cannot agree with his present contention that he was unfairly rushed during the discovery process.
Husband also attempts to put forth several tangled claims regarding Wife's business assets and the value of certain marital property. Husband protests Wife's "willful withholding" of her personal financial information, then uses the same allegedly withheld information to advance a claim that the Master miscalculated the business assets eligible for equitable distribution. Additionally, Husband asserts the Master erred by overvaluing Husband's vehicle, misreading bank statements, refusing to count a refund issued to Wife for Husband's medical expenses as marital property, rejecting Husband's testimony regarding the value of the parties' wedding bands, and asserting Husband retained nonmarital property belonging to Wife. Husband concludes the trial court erred by accepting the Master's findings. We disagree.
Instantly, the Master heard testimony from both parties regarding the value of Wife's partnership in her medical firm. See N.T., 2/24/16 at 77-80, 127-135. Both Husband and Wife also testified as to the value of Wife's bank accounts at the beginning and end of the marriage. See id. at 87-99, 135-142. Husband claimed at the hearing that Wife disposed of over $20,000.00 in assets immediately following the conclusion of the parties' marriage. See id. However, in his testimony Husband merely speculated about the necessity of certain expenses and disputed the math Wife's attorney used to calculate Wife's bank balance increase during the duration of the marriage, rather than providing any evidence to support his accusations. The Master found Wife testified credibly about her income and her assets in her bank account and at the firm. The Master also found Husband was unable to substantiate his accusation that Wife concealed assets with any documentation or other evidence. We agree with the Master's assessment, and decline to find any abuse of discretion in the court's decision to adopt these findings.
Similarly, Husband's other issues lack merit. The notes of testimony from the hearing belie Husband's argument regarding the valuation of his vehicle. Husband agreed the $10,384.00 lien value stated by Wife's counsel was "in the ballpark," and failed to present additional information to show otherwise. Id., at 36. Using this agreed-upon value, as well as the undisputed contributions each party provided at time of the vehicle's purchase, the Master calculated the marital property portion of the vehicle. The Master found that both parties were unable to submit credible evidence about the value of their respective wedding bands, and so it excluded these from the equitable distribution calculations. The Master also found Husband retained property that Wife purchased prior to the parties' marriage, based on receipts Wife submitted which gave details regarding the purchases. Husband's contentions to the contrary, including that Wife was not entitled to the value of the nonmarital property Husband retained because she did not make a "serious effort to reclaim" it, are not supported by the record. See Husband's Brief, at 47. Finally, the Master found Husband was not entitled to a refund for medical expenses, as Wife paid nearly all of the medical expenses for both parties.
In its Rule 1925(a) opinion, the court detailed, with extensive references to the record, its reasons for adopting the Master's findings. See Trial Court Opinion, 9/22/16, at 5-12. With regard to these issues, we find no abuse of discretion, misapplication of the law, or failure to follow procedure by the trial court. See Anzalone , 835 A.2d at 780. Consequently, we deny Husband's requested relief, and affirm the trial court's order.
Order affirmed. Judgment Entered. /s/_________
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary Date: 3/31/2017
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