Opinion
C/A 8:23-cv-6847-BHH-WSB
10-09-2024
James Roosevelt McCray, Plaintiff, v. Bryan P. Stirling, Hingleton, Joel Anderson, Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
William S. Brown United States Magistrate Judge
This matter is before the Court on Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 74) and Plaintiff's Motion for Declaratory Judgment (ECF No. 77). Plaintiff, a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, seeks relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2)(d) (D.S.C.), this magistrate judge is authorized to review all pretrial matters in cases filed under § 1983 and submit findings and recommendations to the district court.
BACKGROUND AND FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS
Plaintiff is currently incarcerated at McCormick Correctional Institution (“MCI”) in the South Carolina Department of Corrections (“SCDC”). ECF No. 1 at 2. Plaintiff alleges that on October 24, 2022, while incarcerated at Broad River Correctional Institution (“BRCI”), he went to the mail room and was late in returning to his housing unit. Id. at 7, 9. Plaintiff contends that an officer was upset with him and threatened him because he was late, and Plaintiff got upset and “threat[ened the officer] back.” Id. At that point, an “A-team” arrived, detained Plaintiff, and walked him into his housing unit. Id. Plaintiff alleges that before he and the A-team arrived in his housing unit, he asked a mental health staff member if he could speak with her. Id. However, the mental health staff member denied Plaintiff's request. Id. Plaintiff alleges that an A-team officer was pulling his arm while walking him to his housing unit, and Plaintiff became “[e]nrage[d]” and tried to kick that officer. Id. Plaintiff alleges that the A-team officer then used force and put Plaintiff on the ground. Id. Plaintiff submits that an officer then struck him in head with a closed fist more than three times. Id. The A-team carried Plaintiff to his cell and laid him on the ground. Id. Then, Hingleton started kicking Plaintiff in the back of his head, neck, and lower back. Id. at 8. Plaintiff submits that he asked to see medical, but Hingleton denied him medical and mental health treatment. Id.
Plaintiff filed a Complaint on December 21, 2023, alleging deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs and excessive force in violation of his Eighth Amendment rights against Defendants in their individual and official capacities. ECF No. 1 at 4. On August 6, 2024, Defendants filed a Motion for Summary Judgment. ECF No. 74. By an Order filed on August 7, 2024, pursuant to Roseboro v. Garrison, 528 F.2d 309 (4th Cir. 1975), Plaintiff was advised of the motion to dismiss and motion for summary judgment procedures and the possible consequences if he failed to respond adequately. ECF No. 75. Plaintiff filed multiple Responses to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. ECF Nos. 78; 79; 83; 84. On September 13, 2024, Defendants filed a Reply. ECF No. 87. Additionally, on August 7, 2024, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Declaratory Judgment. ECF No. 77. Defendants filed a Response on August 20, 2024. ECF No. 81. These matters are now ripe for review.
APPLICABLE LAW AND ANALYSIS
Summary Judgment Standard
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 states, as to a party who has moved for summary judgment, that “[t]he court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). As to the first of these determinations, a fact is deemed “material” if proof of its existence or nonexistence would affect the disposition of the case under the applicable law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). An issue of material fact is “genuine” if the evidence offered is such that a reasonable jury might return a verdict for the non-movant. Id. at 257. In determining whether a genuine issue has been raised, a court must construe all inferences and ambiguities against the movant and in favor of the non-moving party. United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962).
The party seeking summary judgment shoulders the initial burden of demonstrating to the district court that there is no genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986). Once the movant has made this threshold demonstration, the non-moving party, to survive the motion for summary judgment, may not rest on the allegations averred in his pleadings. Id. at 324. Rather, the non-moving party must demonstrate that specific, material facts exist that give rise to a genuine issue. Id. Under this standard, the existence of a mere scintilla of evidence in support of a plaintiff's position is insufficient to withstand a defendant's summary judgment motion. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252. Likewise, conclusory allegations or denials, without more, are insufficient to preclude the granting of the summary judgment motion. Id. at 248. “Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment. Factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted.” Id.
Section 1983
Plaintiff's Complaint is filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which “‘is not itself a source of substantive rights,' but merely provides ‘a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.'” Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979)). A civil action under § 1983 “creates a private right of action to vindicate violations of ‘rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws' of the United States.” Rehberg v. Paulk, 566 U.S. 356, 361 (2012) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1983). To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).
Official Capacity Claims
Defendants argue that they are entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff's claims against them in their official capacities based on Eleventh Amendment immunity. ECF No. 74-1 at 10-11. The undersigned agrees. The Eleventh Amendment prohibits federal courts from entertaining an action against a state. See e.g., Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781, 782 (1978) (citations omitted). Further, Eleventh Amendment immunity “extends to ‘arm[s] of the State,' including state agencies and state officers acting in their official capacity,” Cromer v. Brown, 88 F.3d 1315, 1332 (4th Cir. 1996) (alteration in original) (internal citations omitted), because “a suit against a state official in his or her official capacity is not a suit against the official but rather is a suit against the official's office ... [and] is no different from a suit against the State itself.” Will v Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989) (internal citation omitted). Plaintiff alleges that at the time of the incident in question, Defendants were SCDC employees at BRCI. ECF No. 1 at 2-3. Accordingly, summary judgment should be entered for Defendants as to Plaintiff's claims against them in their official capacities.
Exhaustion
Regarding Plaintiff's individual capacity claims, Defendants argue that Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. ECF No. 74-1 at 3-4. The Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (1996)), mandates, among other things, that prisoners exhaust their administrative remedies prior to filing civil actions concerning prison conditions under § 1983 or any other federal law. See Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 211 (2007) (“There is no question that exhaustion is mandatory under the PLRA and that unexhausted claims cannot be brought in court”). “[T]he PLRA's exhaustion requirement is mandatory,” Anderson v. XYZ Corr. Health Servs., Inc., 407 F.3d 674, 677 (4th Cir. 2005), abrogated on other grounds by Custis v. Davis, 851 F.3d 358 (4th Cir. 2017), and “applies to all inmate suits about prison life, whether they involve general circumstances or particular episodes, and whether they allege excessive force or some other wrong.” Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 532 (2002).
The PLRA requires “proper exhaustion” of available administrative remedies prior to filing suit. Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 93-94 (2006). As the Supreme Court of the United States of America has noted, “[a]ggrieved parties may prefer not to exhaust administrative remedies for a variety of reasons,” whether it be concerns about efficiency or “bad faith.” Id. at 89-90. This is especially true in a prison context. Id. at 90 n.1. Nevertheless, “[p]roper exhaustion demands compliance with an agency's deadlines and other critical procedural rules because no adjudicative system can function effectively without imposing some orderly structure on the course of its proceedings.” Id. at 90-91.
However, “an administrative remedy is not considered to have been available if a prisoner, through no fault of his own, was prevented from availing himself of it.” Moore v. Bennette, 517 F.3d 717, 725 (4th Cir. 2008). Thus, an administrative remedy is considered unavailable when: (1) “it operates as a simple dead end-with officers unable or consistently unwilling to provide any relief to aggrieved inmates”; (2) it is “so opaque that it becomes, practically speaking, incapable of use”; or (3) “prison administrators thwart inmates from taking advantage of a grievance process through machination, misrepresentation, or intimidation.” Ross v. Blake, 578 U.S. 632, 643-44 (2016).
Felecia McKie (“McKie”), the Agency Inmate Grievance Coordinator and Branch Chief of the Inmate Grievance Branch for SCDC, testified in a declaration that SCDC's inmate grievance policy outlines a three-step process. ECF No. 74-2, McKie Decl. ¶¶ 1, 4. Generally, inmates must first make an effort to resolve grievances informally by writing their complaint on SCDC Form 19-11, Request to Staff Member (“RTSM”) to a staff member related and responsible for the area of their concern within eight working days of the incident. Id. ¶ 4. In cases where informal resolution is not required, inmates must complete a Step One Grievance. Id. ¶ 5. If the inmate is not satisfied with the response received, he may then file a Step Two Grievance to have his grievance reconsidered. Id. ¶ 6.
Here, Plaintiff filed a Step One Grievance, which was received on November 9, 2022. ECF Nos. 74-2 ¶ 7; 84-1 at 3. In this grievance, Plaintiff alleged that while he was detained, an officer struck him in the head more than once in front of other inmates and high-ranking officers. ECF No. 84-1 at 3. Plaintiff alleged that officers then put him in his cell, and the same officer who hit him, along with another officer, kicked him in the head. Id. Plaintiff never filed a Step One Grievance regarding the alleged deliberate indifference to his medical needs. ECF No. 74-4, McKie 2nd Decl. ¶ 5.
Plaintiff's Step One Grievance was forwarded to the Office of Inspector General for investigation. ECF No. 74-2 ¶ 8. Documentation provided by Defendants reflects that service of the Warden's decision regarding Plaintiff's Step One Grievance was attempted on Plaintiff, but Plaintiff refused to accept or sign the document. ECF No. 84-1 at 2. According to Plaintiff, however, no one provided him with any details regarding a decision of his Step One Grievance, which prevented him from proceeding to the next step. ECF No. 79 at 1. It is undisputed that Plaintiff never filed a Step Two Grievance regarding this incident. Id; ECF Nos. 74-2 ¶ 8; 1 at 10.
Because Plaintiff never filed a grievance regarding Defendants' alleged deliberate indifference to his medical needs, this claim should be dismissed based on Plaintiff's failure to exhaust. Further, because Plaintiff failed to file a Step Two Grievance regarding his excessive force claim, that claim is also not exhausted. However, because Plaintiff alleges that, through no fault of his own, he was prevented from filing a Step Two Grievance regarding his excessive force claim, the undersigned will address the merits of Plaintiff's excessive force claim out of an abundance of caution.
Excessive Force
The Eighth Amendment expressly prohibits the infliction of “cruel and unusual punishments.” U.S. Const. amend. VIII. In order to recover on an Eighth Amendment excessive force claim, a plaintiff must establish that the “prison official acted with a sufficiently culpable state of mind (subjective component); and [that] the deprivation suffered or injury inflicted on the inmate was sufficiently serious (objective component).” Iko v. Shreve, 535 F.3d 225, 238 (4th Cir. 2008) (citing Williams v. Benjamin, 77 F.3d 756, 761 (4th Cir. 1996)). “[T]he ‘core judicial inquiry' regarding the subjective component of an excessive force claim is ‘whether force was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.'” Parker v. Stevenson, 625 F. App'x. 196, 198 (4th Cir. 2015) (quoting Iko, 535 F.3d at 239). The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has identified the following four factors to consider when determining whether a prison official's actions were carried out “maliciously and sadistically” to cause harm:
(1) the need for the application of force; (2) the relationship between the need and the amount of force that was used; (3) the extent of any reasonably perceived threat that the application of force was intended to quell; and (4) any efforts made to temper the severity of a forceful response.Id. (quoting Iko, 535 F.3d at 239); see Whitley Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 321 (1986). To establish the objective component, a plaintiff must show “that the alleged wrongdoing is objectively ‘harmful enough' to establish a constitutional violation” in the context of “contemporary standards of decency.” Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 8 (1992) (quoting Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 303 (1991)). When prison officials maliciously and sadistically use force to cause harm, there always exists a constitutional violation, regardless of how significant a plaintiff's injury may be. Id. at 9; see Wilkins v. Gaddy, 559 U.S. 34, 37 (2010).
Defendants argue that Plaintiff's excessive force claim should be dismissed because Plaintiff cannot show that any Defendant had involvement with the incident in question. ECF No. 74-1 at 4-5. As set out above, Plaintiff alleges that Hingleton used excessive force by kicking him in the back of his head, neck, and lower back. ECF No. 1 at 8.
Dwayne Hingleton provided a declaration in which he testified that he is employed as a Major at BRCI and did not have any participation in the use of force alleged by Plaintiff. ECF No. 74-5, Hingleton Decl. ¶¶ 1, 4. Further, Brian Rowe (“Rowe”), a Special Agent for SCDC's Office of Inspector General, testified in his declaration that he conducted an investigation into the incident in question. ECF No. 74-6, Rowe Decl. ¶¶ 1-2. After reviewing the investigative file, Rowe confirmed that Dwayne Hingleton did not have any involvement or personal participation in the use of force on Plaintiff, nor was Dwayne Hingleton identified by any witness as having any involvement or participation. Id. ¶ 3. In response, Plaintiff indicates that he did not bring a claim against Dwayne Hingleton. ECF No. 84 at 1. Plaintiff alleges that Rowe knows that there is more than one Hingleton and knows which Hingleton that Plaintiff is suing. Id. In reply, John Steadman (“Steadman”), the Deputy General Counsel for SCDC, testified in a declaration that he is familiar with the employment records at SCDC and BRCI and that the only individual named Hingleton who has been employed at BRCI is Dwayne Hingleton. ECF No. 87-1, Steadman Decl. ¶ 1.
Personal participation of a defendant is a necessary element of a § 1983 claim against government officials in their individual capacities. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676 (2009) (“[A] plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the official's own actions, has violated the Constitution.”); Herrera v. Finan, 176 F.Supp.3d 549, 568-69 (D.S.C. 2016) (citing Trulock v. Freeh, 275 F.3d 391, 402 (4th Cir. 2001) (applying this principle in the context of a Bivens action and stating that “liability is personal, based upon each defendant's own constitutional violations”)).
Plaintiff has failed to submit any evidence beyond his bare allegations that someone named Hingleton - who was not Dwayne Hingleton - kicked him in the back of his head, neck, and lower back. Because there is no evidence that any individual named Hingleton was involved in the incident in question or used excessive force on Plaintiff, Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment regarding Hingleton should be granted. See Matherly v. Andrews, 859 F.3d 264, 280 (4th Cir. 2017) (“Conclusory or speculative allegations do not suffice to oppose a properly supported motion for summary judgment, nor does a mere scintilla of evidence.”) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); Pronin v. Johnson, 628 Fed.Appx. 160, 161 (4th Cir. 2015) (“[A] party cannot withstand summary judgment by relying solely on his own self-serving allegations unsupported by any corroborating evidence.”) (citation omitted).
Supervisory Liability
Regarding the remaining Defendants, Stirling and Anderson, Plaintiff argues that they should be held liable based on supervisory liability. ECF No. 84 at 1. Plaintiff submits that Stirling put Plaintiff's “safety in harm” and Anderson trained “the CRT-response team security.” Id. In order to proceed on a supervisory liability theory, a plaintiff must show that (1) the supervisor had actual or constructive knowledge that a subordinate was engaged in conduct that posed “a pervasive and unreasonable risk” of constitutional injury to people like the plaintiff; (2) the supervisor's response was so inadequate as to constitute deliberate indifference or tacit authorization of the subordinate's conduct; and (3) there is an “affirmative causal link” between the supervisor's inaction and the plaintiff's constitutional injury. Shaw v. Stroud, 13 F.3d 791, 799 (4th Cir. 1994). In Randall v. Prince George's County, the Fourth Circuit concluded that, “[u]nder the first prong of Shaw, the conduct engaged in by the supervisor's subordinates must be ‘pervasive,' meaning that the ‘conduct is widespread, or at least has been used on several different occasions.'” 302 F.3d 188, 206 (4th Cir. 2002) (quoting Shaw, 13 F.3d at 799). Furthermore, in establishing Shaw's second prong, a plaintiff “[o]rdinarily ... cannot satisfy his burden of proof by pointing to a single incident or isolated incidents ... for a supervisor cannot be expected ... to guard against the deliberate criminal acts of his properly trained employees when he has no basis upon which to anticipate the misconduct.” Id. (quoting Slakan v. Porter, 737 F.2d 368, 373 (4th Cir. 1984)).
Here, Plaintiff has failed to show any constitutional injury. He cannot establish an affirmative causal link between any constitutional injury and any action or inaction by Stirling and Anderson. See Doe v. Rosa, 664 Fed.Appx. 301, 304 (4th Cir. 2016) (“There can be no supervisory liability when there is no underlying violation of the Constitution.”); Hinkle v. City of Clarksburg, 81 F.3d 416, 420 (4th Cir. 1996) (holding that the plaintiff's claim for supervisory liability failed because the plaintiff did not establish that the subordinate officer used excessive force in violation of the Constitution). Therefore, the undersigned recommends that the district court grant Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment.
Plaintiff also argues that Defendants' Motion should be denied because Defendants violated various SCDC policies. ECF Nos. 78 at 1; 79 at 1; 83 at 1; 84 at 1; 84-1 at 1. However, a violation of SCDC's policy, without more, does not equate to a constitutional violation. See Leverette v. Bell, 247 F.3d 160, 169 (4th Cir. 2001) (“That the search deviated from SCDC's formal policies and procedures does not render it unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment. Even if SCDC's policy against conducting body cavity searches on employees was violated here, such a violation does not in itself rise to constitutional dimensions.”); Joyner v Patterson, C/A No. 0:13-2675-DCN-PJG, 2014 WL 897121, at *4 (D.S.C. Mar. 6, 2014) (“Section 1983 provides relief from a violation of federal constitutional rights, not from a violation of prison-created policies or procedures.”), R&R adopted by 2014 WL 3909531 (D.S.C. Aug. 11, 2014), aff'd by 597 Fed.Appx. 748 (4th Cir. 2015).
Qualified Immunity
Defendants also argue that they are entitled to qualified immunity. ECF No. 74-1 at 11-12. Qualified immunity protects government officials performing discretionary functions from civil damage suits as long as the conduct in question does not “violate clearly established rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). Thus, qualified immunity is lost if an official violates a constitutional or statutory right of a plaintiff that was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation such that an objectively reasonable official in the official's position would have known of the right. Id. To determine whether qualified immunity applies, a district court must determine whether a plaintiff has alleged the deprivation of an actual constitutional right and whether the particular right was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation. See Tolan v. Cotton, 572 U.S. 650, 655-56 (2014); Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 609 (1999). Here, as discussed above, Plaintiff's allegations fail to demonstrate that Defendants violated his constitutional rights. Therefore, the undersigned finds that Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity.
Motion for Declaratory Judgment
As set out above, Plaintiff also filed a Motion for Declaratory Judgment, in which he generally refers back to the allegations set forth in his Complaint. ECF No. 77. Because the undersigned recommends that Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment be granted, the undersigned further recommends that Plaintiff's Motion for Declaratory Judgment be deemed moot.
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION
Based on the foregoing, the undersigned recommends that the district court grant Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 74) and deny Plaintiff's Motion for Declaratory Judgment (ECF No. 77) as moot.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
The attention of the parties is directed to the important notice on the following page.
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk United States District Court 250 East North Street, Suite 2300 Greenville, South Carolina 29601
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).