Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County Super. Ct. No. GIE022018, Eddie C. Sturgeon, Judge. Affirmed.
McCONNELL, P. J.
Defendants, Dwight and Irene Rhodes, appeal a judgment for plaintiffs, Roy and Jean McConnaughey, on their action for breach of a land sale contract and related counts. The Rhodeses contend the trial court erred by granting Roy relief from its earlier order establishing the truth of matters set forth in requests for admissions to which he failed to respond. The Rhodeses assert the court's ruling was prejudicial because under the earlier order Roy was precluded from presenting any evidence to support his causes of action or damages claims. We are not required to reach the issue, however, because even if improper the ruling was not prejudicial. The Rhodeses did not propound requests for admissions to Jean, and thus she was free to submit evidence in support of her claims, which were identical to Roy's. We affirm the judgment.
When we refer to the parties individually we use their first names.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In April 2002 the McConnaugheys purchased approximately 7.2 acres of raw land in Jamul, California, from the Rhodeses for $152,000. The McConnaugheys intended to build a residence on the property. In early 2004 they sought a grading permit from the County of San Diego (the County), and the County denied the permit and informed them they must retain a certified biologist to proceed because of environmental issues. Roy contacted Dwight, who denied there were any environmental issues. Dwight sent Roy a packet of documents he had received from the County, and when Roy reviewed them he learned there were environmental constraints on development.
In May 2004 the McConnaugheys sued the Rhodeses for breach of contract, misrepresentation and related counts. The complaint alleged the Rhodeses breached a duty to disclose land use restrictions on the property, including its inclusion in the Multi-Species Conservation Program.
In February 2005 Dwight propounded requests for admissions to Roy. Among other things, the requests asked Roy to admit he had no facts to support any of the complaint's causes of action, and to admit he had not suffered any damages.
In an April 4, 2005 letter, after Roy's responses were past due, he "suggest[ed] that we set the completion dates for the written discovery to late July." In a May 13 letter, Dwight demanded responses by May 25. Roy did not comply, and in a June 6 letter Dwight demanded responses by June 9. Again, Roy did not comply.
Dwight scheduled an ex parte hearing for August 16, 2005, in an effort to resolve the discovery matter. Roy had notice but did not appear. The court scheduled a hearing for September 30 to consider Dwight's request for an order establishing the truth of the matters set forth in the requests for admissions and for monetary sanctions. Roy did not oppose the motion or appear, and the court granted the motion and imposed $440.45 in sanctions against him.
A bench trial was scheduled for January 11, 2006. On the previous December 30, the Rhodeses filed motions in limine to exclude evidence or argument pertaining to (1) the property's fair market value; (2) any loss of value; (3) any damages; and (4) any duty of disclosure. Each of the motions was based on Roy's deemed admissions.
During the hearing on the in limine motions, Roy orally sought relief from the September 30 order under Code of Civil Procedure section 2033.300, which allows the court on noticed motion to permit the withdrawal of an admission if it determines the admission resulted from mistake, inadvertence or excusable neglect and the propounding party will not suffer prejudice. (§ 2033.300, subds. (a) & (b).) The McConnaugheys' counsel, Janis Turner, represented that she did not receive the September 30 order pertaining to the requests for admissions, and received only other orders of that date compelling the McConnaugheys to respond to form interrogatories and special interrogatories by a certain date. Turner argued the Rhodeses would not be prejudiced because "we all know[] what's happening in this case," and because she arranged to have a court reporter in her office late that afternoon at her expense so the Rhodeses could depose Roy.
All statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure unless otherwise specified.
The Rhodeses' counsel, Jacob Zamora, advised the court he did serve the September 30 order on the requests for admissions on the McConnaugheys. The Rhodeses argued they would suffer prejudice because the discovery period was over and trial had begun. They pointed out that because of the deemed admissions, they had no cause to take Roy's deposition, and if they took it during trial they would be unable to conduct any further investigation or submit any additional exhibits in response to the deposition.
In reply, Turner conceded, "I don't doubt that Mr. Zamora sent it [the order on the admissions]. What I'm saying is that somehow it did not get to me, and I'm prepared to accept the [con]sequences." Turner offered to waive any time limitations on the submission of additional exhibits. The court took the matter under submission and proceeded with the trial.
After the McConnaugheys' opening statement, the Rhodeses moved for nonsuit based on Roy's admissions he had no facts to support any of his causes of action or damages claims. The McConnaugheys argued that regardless of any admissions by Roy, Jean could put on evidence because the Rhodeses propounded no requests for admission to her. The Rhodeses conceded the September 30 order was binding only on Roy, "[s]o there's [a] problem with that." The court also took the motion for nonsuit under submission. The court's ruling is not included in the appellate record, but it obviously denied the motion.
In his testimony, Dwight Rhodes conceded that "over the years" he received various documents from the County pertaining to development of the property and the protection of wildlife, and he did not disclose that to the McConnaugheys.
The McConnaugheys hired biologist Robin Church to "do the biological resources report that was being required by the County as a result of [their] application for a grad[ing] permit to build a single family residence." Church testified the property was within the Multi-Species Conservation Program and a "minor amendment" to it, which set forth strict environmental guidelines to protect endangered species. Church recommended to the McConnaugheys that they redesign their home to impact only one acre of their property and to limit the removal of soil to 200 cubic yards, so the County would not require a grading permit and its approval of the project would be ministerial instead of discretionary. Church testified that if any development of the remainder of the property required the removal of more than 200 cubic yards of soil, it would be subject to environmental review and mitigation requirements.
On the second day of trial, the court granted Roy relief under section 2033.330 from the September 30 order that established the truth of matters set forth in the requests for admissions propounded to him. The court did not further address the motions in limine, but it implicitly denied them.
The McConnaugheys' real estate appraiser, Perry Burnand, testified the property is in a conservation zone that limits development, and only one to two acres may be developed. He valued the property on the sale date at $90,000.
Roy testified that at his request the County reassessed his property taxes and lowered them based on a value of $95,000. He originally planned to move approximately 1,800 cubic yards of soil to accommodate an attached four-car garage, a yard and a swimming pool. Because grading was limited to 200 cubic yards, he was required to redesign the home and build a two-car detached garage on a lower elevation than the home.
The court ruled that before the sale, the Rhodeses knew their property was within the Multi-Species Conservation Program, they had a duty to divulge the information to potential purchasers and they breached their duty. The court also found the property had a value of $90,000 at the time of sale, instead of $152,000. The court entered a judgment of $118,064.46 for the McConnaugheys, which included $62,000 for reduced value, $8,000 for overpayment of interest, $900 for overpayment of property taxes, $38,797.91 in attorney fees and $7,566.55 in other costs.
DISCUSSION
The Rhodeses contend the court erred by granting relief from its order establishing as true the matters set forth in the requests for admissions Dwight propounded to Roy. The Rhodeses complain that Roy did not bring a noticed motion as required by section 2033.300, subdivision (a), the oral motion at the commencement of trial was untimely, and he made no showing of mistake, inadvertence, or excusable neglect, as required by section 2033.300, subdivision (b). The Rhodeses assert the court's ruling was prejudicial because they relied on Roy's admissions that he had no evidence to support his causes of action or damages claims, and it improperly allowed Roy to put on evidence on those matters.
"Any party may obtain discovery . . . by a written request that any other party to the action admit the genuineness of specified documents, or the truth of specified matters of fact, opinion relating to fact, or application of law to fact. A request for admission may relate to a matter that is in controversy between the parties." (§ 2033.010.) "Any matter admitted in response to a request for admission is conclusively established against the party making the admission in the pending action, unless the court has permitted withdrawal or amendment of that admission under Section 2033.300." (§ 2033.410, subd. (a), italics added.) "Notwithstanding subdivision (a), any admission made by a party under this section is binding only on that party and is made for the purpose of the pending action only." (§ 2033.410, subd. (b), italics added; Murillo v. Superior Court (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 730, 736; Valerio v. Andrew Youngquist Construction (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 1264, 1272.)
Because Dwight propounded requests for admissions only to Roy, only Roy could be bound by deemed admissions through his failure to respond. Roy and Jean alleged the same causes of action and damages in the complaint, and Roy's deemed admissions did not preclude her from adducing evidence and establishing her claims. Accordingly, even if the trial court's ruling under section 2033.300 was improper, the Rhodeses suffered no prejudice. In other words, had the court not relieved Roy of his deemed admissions, the result would have been the same.
We asked the parties for supplemental briefing on the effect of the propounding of requests for admissions only to Roy, and we have taken their responses into consideration.
The trial court relied on a different theory in allowing the case to proceed, but we are not bound by its reasoning. " 'No rule of decision is better or more firmly established by authority, nor one resting upon a sounder basis of reason and propriety, than that a ruling or decision, itself correct in law, will not be disturbed on appeal merely because given for a wrong reason. If right upon any theory of the law applicable to the case, it must be sustained regardless of the considerations which may have moved the trial court to its conclusion.' " (D'Amico v. Board of Medical Examiners (1974) 11 Cal.3d 1, 19, disapproved on other grounds in Woodland Hills Residents Assn., Inc. v. City Council (1973) 23 Cal.3d 917, 944.)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. The McConnaugheys are entitled to costs on appeal.
WE CONCUR: NARES, J., O'ROURKE, J.