Opinion
No. CV00-0159028S
January 14, 2004
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
I Background
The plaintiff, Jason McClure, filed a complaint on April 17, 2000, against the defendant Fairfield University ("University"). The following facts are undisputed. On September 12, 1998, at or about 1:43 a.m., the plaintiff, a University student, was injured while walking in a public street in Fairfield, Connecticut, by an automobile driven by a Ms. Colleen Capuzzi. Mr. McClure filed a lawsuit against Ms. Capuzzi alleging that her negligence caused the accident and his injuries. Mr. McClure also named State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company ("State Farm") as a defendant in the lawsuit against Ms. Capuzzi. Mr. McClure's claim against State Farm was for underinsured motorist benefits. The injuries Mr. McClure sought compensation for in the suit against Ms. Capuzzi and State Farm are the identical injuries he seeks compensation for in the present suit against the University.
McClure deposition at page 127.
Mr. McClure settled his claim against Ms. Capuzzi for $100,000. He entered final and binding arbitration to resolve his claim against State Farm. The three-person arbitration panel heard testimony in the matter and reviewed the documentary evidence presented by the parties. The arbitration panel rendered a written decision finding Ms. Capuzzi 70% and Mr. McClure 30% at fault for the accident. The panel found that McClure was entitled to gross damages of $62,000 economic and $325,000 non-economic and net damages in the amount of $140,800 for his injuries after reductions for his negligence, collateral source payments and the Capuzzi settlement. The arbitration panel, in its written opinion, "direct[ed] the respondent [State Farm] to pay said sum to claimant [McClure] as fair, just and reasonable damages." State Farm satisfied the net award to the plaintiff.
The current complaint alleges that the injuries and losses of the plaintiff McClure were caused by the negligence of the defendant University in one or more of eleven ways, including failure to adequately supervise and/or monitor off-campus drinking.
In its October 20, 2003 motion for summary judgment, it is the University's position that "the plaintiff is foreclosed from recovery in this case by the common law rule that prevents a double recovery for the same injury. Because the plaintiff has already litigated the issue of the value of his damages and has received full compensation for his injuries, as a matter of law, he is foreclosed from any recovery from Fairfield University." A memorandum in support was filed. The plaintiff countered with a memorandum in opposition, stating his position "that the binding high-low arbitration agreement entered into by the plaintiff and State Farm in this case constitutes a "release or settlement agreement" [under Connecticut General Statutes § 52-572h(n)], [and] the plaintiff is entitled to pursue his case against the defendant Fairfield University. Any award rendered by the jury, however, would be subject to a reduction by the percentage of liability attributed to the released tortfeasors by the jury in this case."
II Standard for Summary Judgment
Summary judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, affidavits and any other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the trial court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Although the party seeking summary judgment has the burden of showing the nonexistence of any material fact, a party opposing summary judgment must substantiate its adverse claim by showing that there is a genuine issue of material fact together with the evidence disclosing the existence of such an issue. It is not enough, however, for the opposing party merely to assert the existence of such a disputed issue. Mere assertions of fact are insufficient to establish the existence of a material fact and, therefore cannot refute evidence properly presented to the court in support of a motion for summary judgment." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Busque v. Oakwood Farms Sports Center, Inc., 80 Conn. App. 603 at 607 (2003).
III Discussion
The University moves for summary judgment on the ground that Mr. McClure arbitrated the measure of his damages and then received full compensation for his injuries by virtue of State Farm's satisfaction of the arbitration award. The University further argues that any compensation to Mr. McClure from the University for the exact same alleged injuries would constitute double recovery and as such is clearly foreclosed by prevailing case law. The plaintiff counters that his recovery against State Farm "does not necessarily represent a claimant's fair, just and reasonable damages but, rather, represents, in part, the parties' assessment of the risks of litigation." (Internal citations omitted).
There are two Connecticut cases on point with the instant case. Haynes v. Yale-New Haven Hospital, et al., 1995 Ct. Sup. 6650 (June 2, 1995, Gordon, J.); Neils v. Red Dog Saloon Cafe, Inc., et al., 1992 Ct. Sup. 7064 (July 27, 1992, Higgins, J.) ( 7 Conn. L. Rptr. 121). In Haynes, the plaintiff's decedent was involved in a motor vehicle accident. Haynes' decedent was brought to the defendant hospital for treatment immediately after the accident. She subsequently died.
Haynes made a claim against the driver of the other vehicle and that claim was settled for $20,000, the limits of the driver's liability insurance policy. She then pursued an underinsured motorist claim against her decedent's insurance carrier. That claim was arbitrated and the arbitration award was $650,000. The award was satisfied by the insurance carrier.
Haynes then instituted the action against Yale-New Haven Hospital and the doctor that rendered care to the decedent after the accident. Haynes claimed that the doctor and Yale-New Haven Hospital had committed medical malpractice which contributed to the decedent's death. The Connecticut Supreme Court affirmed the summary judgment decision rendered by the Superior Court on behalf of Yale-New Haven Hospital and the doctor.
The Superior Court held that the arbitration award regarding the plaintiff's damages was to be given res judicata effect on the issue of the plaintiff's damages. Since the issue of the decedent's damages had been determined, the trial court then granted summary judgment to the defendants on the basis that there could be only one recovery for an injury and that there was no dispute that the arbitration award had been satisfied. "A simple and time-honored maxim [states] that `[a] plaintiff may be compensated only once for his just damages for the sane injury.'" Gionfriddo v. Gartenhaus Cafe, 211 Conn. 67, 71, 557 A.2d 540 (1989). Where the same cause of action operates against all defendants, the plaintiff can only collect one satisfaction. Satisfaction obtained against one defendant reduces but does not preclude recovery against another defendant when the judgments obtained are for different injuries. "[W]hen a judgment is based on actual litigation of the measure of a loss, and the judgment is thereafter paid in full, the injured party has no enforcible [sic] claim against any other obligor who is responsible for the same loss." This is true if it is "shown that the injured party has received a full recovery." Haynes at 6653. (Internal citations omitted.) The Connecticut Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court decision.
In the Neils case, the plaintiff instituted a "dram shop" action against the defendants alleging that the tortfeasor that caused her decedent's death had been sold alcoholic beverages by the defendants prior to the subject accident. The defendants in Neils argued that the plaintiff had already been fully compensated for the alleged damages by virtue of the satisfaction of an arbitration award. Neils' decedent was a passenger on a motorcycle at the time of the accident. Neils made an uninsured motorist claim against the insurance company that insured the driver of the motorcycle. The plaintiff in Neils arbitrated the uninsured motorist claim and the insurance company had satisfied the arbitrators' award. The Court in Neils held:
The satisfaction of the arbitration award constitutes a "satisfaction of a judgment in an action in which the measure of the plaintiffs' loss was actually litigated." Accordingly, the plaintiff is unable to recover a judgment against the defendants because the satisfaction of the arbitration award is full compensation for the injuries suffered by the plaintiff's decedent. CT Page 222
Id. at 7068.
Finally, we are also persuaded by the Restatement of Judgments section on point with this factual situation:
The rule that payment of a loss, in whole or in part, by one of several obligors reduces the amount that may be obtained from other obligors also applies when the amount of the loss has been adjudicated. The adjudication of the amount of the loss also has the effect of establishing the limit of the injured party's entitlement to redress, whoever the obligor may be. This is because the determination of the amount of the loss resulting from actual litigation of the issue of damages results in the injured person's being precluded from relitigating the damages question. Therefore, when a judgment is based on actual litigation of the measure of a loss, and the judgment is thereafter paid in full, the injured party has no enforceable claim against any other obligor who is responsible for the same loss.
2 Restatement (Second) Judgments § 50, comment d.
Mr. McClure suffered his injuries in a single pedestrian/motor vehicle incident. Therefore, the issue becomes whether or not the previous arbitration proceeding was in the nature of an adjudication and, if so, whether the award of the arbitration panel covered the full measure of Mr. McClure's injuries and losses.
In regard to the arbitration, the documentation of the "Arbitration Award" is clear and unambiguous. In deliberating, the panel considered the factual testimony and documentary evidence and reached its unanimous conclusion as to the sum owed to the plaintiff as "fair, just and reasonable damages." For this court to do as requested by Mr. McClure, and deny the University's motion for summary judgment "because damages received in a high-low binding arbitration do not represent fair, just and reasonable damages" (plaintiff's memorandum p. 2) would be to twist the straightforward written conclusion of the arbitration panel. "A court will not torture words to import ambiguity where the ordinary meaning leaves no room for ambiguity, and words do not become ambiguous simply because lawyers or laymen contend for different meanings . . . When the plain meaning and intent of the language is clear, a clause . . . cannot be enlarged by construction. There is no room for construction where the terms of a writing are clear and unambiguous, and it is to be given effect according to its language." (Internal quotations and citations omitted.) Hansen v. Hansen, 80 Conn. App. 609 (2003).
All of the plaintiff's damages were addressed in the arbitration hearing and satisfaction of that award. The plaintiff may not collect twice for the same harm.
For the reasons stated above, the defendants' motion for summary judgment is granted.
ALVORD, JUDGE.