Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Ronald S. Prager, Judge. Super. Ct. No. GIC 866955
HALLER, Acting P. J.
Sami Maywood appeals an order awarding attorney fees to Letitia Perez, the prevailing defendant on an anti-SLAPP motion. (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16, subd. (c).) We affirm.
All further statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure. All rule references are to the California Rules of Court.
RELEVANT FACTS AND PROCEDURE
Maywood sued Perez for slander and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Perez then successfully moved to dismiss the action under the anti-SLAPP statute. (§ 425.16, subd. (b).) The judgment in Perez's favor stated that attorney fees were awarded to Perez. Perez served the notice of entry of judgment on November 7, 2006.
Forty-five days later, on December 22, Perez moved for attorney fees under section 425.16, subdivision (c), which provides "a prevailing defendant on a special motion to strike shall be entitled to recover his or her attorney fees and costs." (Italics added.) Perez (who is an attorney) submitted an invoice from her counsel identifying the claimed fees ($15,632.50) and describing the services provided. Perez, however, did not include her counsel's supporting declaration.
Maywood opposed the motion on various grounds, including that insufficient evidence supported the amount and reasonableness of the fees.
In reply, Perez produced her attorney's declaration supporting the fees requested. Her attorney declared the billings "lodged with this motion are true and accurate and were prepared by me in the normal course of my business and billing practice." Counsel stated that his failure to submit his declaration with the initial motion was "an unfortunate oversight."
On January 19, 2007, the court denied Perez's motion without prejudice. The court identified two defects with the motion. First, the invoice was "hearsay," and the subsequent filing of counsel's declaration with the reply papers was insufficient to cure this defect because Maywood was not provided the opportunity to respond to the evidence. Second, the submitted invoice did not "clearly delineate" whether the services were related to work on the anti-SLAPP motion. The court denied the motion "without prejudice," and stated that Perez "may refile her motion by February 2 . . ., and have the motion heard in due course."
Less than two weeks later, Perez filed her revised motion, claiming $10,562.50 in attorney fees based on 32.5 hours of work at $325 per hour. Perez supported the motion with her counsel's declaration, which detailed his extensive litigation experience and the fact that Perez had agreed to pay his $325 billing rate. Counsel also described in detail the legal services provided to Perez, and stated all of his legal services were related to the anti-SLAPP motion because he recognized immediately that the complaint could not withstand an anti-SLAPP motion.
Perez also submitted her own declaration, stating that as a matter of professional courtesy, her counsel had reduced his fees by $5,000, and therefore she was requesting $10,562.50, rather than the total amount identified on the invoice.
Maywood opposed the motion on three grounds: (1) the motion was untimely under rule 3.1702(b)(1); (2) the motion did not meet the standards for a reconsideration motion; and (3) Perez sought fees for services that were not incurred in connection with her anti-SLAPP motion.
On March 9, the court granted the motion, rejecting each of Maywood's arguments. In finding the motion was timely, the court stated: "The California Rules of Court allow the Court to extend the timeframe within which a party must perform any act under the Rules, including those undertaken in Law and Motion[ ] proceedings. . . . Further, the Court may, for good cause, extend the time within which a motion for attorney's fees may be filed. ([Rule] 3.1702(d) . . . .) [This] Court denied Perez's initial motion for attorney's fees without prejudice on procedural grounds . . . . In doing so, the Court implicitly invoked its discretionary power to extend the filing period for the current motion. ([Rules] 1.10(c), 3.1702(d).) Thus, despite Maywood's current contentions to the contrary, the Court is not . . . improperly 'resurrecting' an already-expired filing period because it granted the extension in its January 19 order ruling on Perez's initial, and timely, motion for attorney's fees."
The court also rejected Maywood's arguments that: (1) the court lacked jurisdiction to hear the motion because Perez did not meet the procedural prerequisites of the reconsideration statute (§ 1008); and (2) Perez's requested fees were unreasonable and excessive.
The court thus granted Perez's motion and awarded her $10,562.50.
DISCUSSION
Maywood contends the court erred in granting Perez's attorney fees motion because it was untimely.
Rule 3.1702 sets forth the procedures for claiming attorney fees in the trial court and applies to anti-SLAPP motions. Subdivision (b)(1) provides: "A notice of motion to claim attorney's fees for service up to and including the rendition of judgment in the trial court . . . must be served and filed within the time for filing a notice of appeal . . . ." (Rule 3.1702(b)(1).) Subdivision (d) provides: "For good cause, the trial judge may extend the time for filing a motion for attorney's fees in the absence of a stipulation or for a longer period than allowed by stipulation." (Rule 3.1702(d).) A court has broad discretion to determine whether there is good cause for the extension. (See Lee v. Wells Fargo Bank (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 1187, 1198.)
In this case, Perez filed her first motion in a timely manner (45 days after service of the notice of entry of judgment), but the court found good cause to allow Perez an extension of time to file a revised motion. The court acted within its discretion in doing so.
The court was aware that a prevailing defendant on an anti-SLAPP motion is entitled to attorney fees as a matter of right. This right serves important public policies in discouraging and deterring meritless litigation brought to chill the exercise of a party's constitutional free speech and petition rights. (See Navarro v. IHOP Properties, Inc. (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 834, 839.) Because the first motion was not supported by sufficient evidence to permit the court to determine the proper amount of fees, the court decided the best course of action was to deny the motion, and then to permit Perez to file a renewed motion within two weeks. This procedure provided Maywood with the opportunity to fully respond to Perez's evidence and arguments in support of her request. The court could have accomplished this same result by merely deferring its ruling and continuing the original motion to permit the parties to file additional papers. Under the circumstances, the court acted within its discretion to allow an extension of time to file a renewed motion.
Maywood argues the good cause element was not met because Perez did not request an extension of time. However, rule 3.1702 does not require that the party request the extension. A court may grant an extension on its own motion. Additionally, we find unavailing Maywood's argument that the order cannot be upheld because it "fails to identify the basis for good cause . . . ." There is no requirement that a court set forth its reasons for finding the existence of good cause. The court specifically stated that it granted an extension "for good cause," and we are required to presume the court made all the findings necessary to support its determination.
Maywood's reliance on Save Our Forest and Ranchlands v. County of San Diego (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 1757 is misplaced. The issue in that case concerned the commencement date for filing an attorney fees motion under a recently amended version of former rule 870.2. The court held that although the prevailing party's motion was untimely under rule 870.2, the party was entitled to relief under section 473. This holding is unhelpful to Maywood's position. The Save Our Forest and Ranchlands court did not consider the matter at issue here concerning good cause for an extension to file a motion under rule 3.1702.
Because we conclude the court had good cause to permit an extension to file the renewed motion for attorney fees under rule 3.1702(d), we do not reach Maywood's arguments pertaining to motions for reconsideration. (§ 1008.) Perez's motion was timely, and therefore there was no need for Perez to seek a reconsideration or for the court to order a reconsideration.
In responding to this appeal, Perez requests attorney fees incurred on the appeal. The proper forum for this request is in the superior court. Upon the issuance of the remittitur in this case, Perez may bring a motion in the trial court seeking the additional attorney fees reasonably incurred in responding to Maywood's appeal.
DISPOSITION
Order affirmed. Maywood to bear Perez's costs on appeal.
WE CONCUR: McDONALD, J. McINTYRE, J.