Opinion
Case No. A1-04-06
March 16, 2004
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS
Summary:
The plaintiffs' union initiated arbitration proceedings on the plaintiffs behalf in accordance with its collective bargaining agreement with the defendant. Dissatisfied with the arbitrator's decision, the plaintiffs sought to vacate the decision on the grounds that it was erroneous and irrational under North Dakota's Uniform Arbitration Act. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss, asserting that Section 301 of the federal Labor Management Relations Act preempted the plaintiffs' state law claims. The Court granted the defendants' motion and dismissed the plaintiffs' petition, finding that the plaintiffs' claims were inextricably intertwined with the collective bargaining agreement and/or substantially dependent upon an analysis of the terms or provisions of the collective bargaining agreement.
Before the Court is the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss the Plaintiff's Petition to Vacate Arbitration Award filed on February 10, 2004, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. For the reasons stated below, the motion is granted.
I. BACKGROUND
The plaintiffs, Greg Mayer and Mark Griffin, were employed by the defendant, Qwest Dex, Inc., as sales representatives. Qwest Dex terminated the plaintiffs in 2002. Thereafter, Mayer and Griffin filed grievances with their union, the Communications Workers of America, Local 7301 ("CWA"), and contended that Qwest Dex had violated the parties collective bargaining agreement. CWA initiated arbitration proceedings on the grievances pursuant to the agreement. The primary issue presented in the arbitration was whether Qwest Dex had provided Mayer and Griffin with written performance warnings and had terminated Mayer and Griffin without just cause in violation of Article 4, Section 4.3 of the collective bargaining agreement. On October 4, 2003, the arbitrator held that Qwest Dex had terminated Mayer and Griffin for just cause within the meaning of the collective bargaining agreement.
In January 2003, Mayer and Griffin filed a petition in state court to vacate the arbitrator's decision pursuant to North Dakota's Uniform Arbitration Act, N.D. Cent. Code § 32-29.2-01, et. seq., on grounds the decision was erroneous and irrational. On January 26, 2004, Qwest Dex filed a Notice of Removal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b), 1443, and 1446. On February 10, 2004, Qwest Dex filed a Motion to Dismiss Mayer's and Griffin's petition on grounds the state law claim asserted by Mayer and Griffin was preempted by Section 301(a) of the Labor Management Relations Act ("LMRA"), 29 U.S.C. § 185(a).
On March 10, 2004, Mayer and Griffin filed a response to Qwest Dex's motion and contended a dismissal would be premature and would deprive them of an opportunity to amend their petition to include claims arising under federal law. Mayer and Griffin requested leave to amend their petition.
On March 15, 2004, Qwest Dex filed a reply in support of the motion to dismiss. Qwest Dex renewed its assertion that the claims are preempted by federal law.
II. LEGAL ANALYSIS
In considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the Court must accept as true all of the factual allegations set out in the complaint and construe the complaint in a light most favorable to the plaintiffs. Fabisch v. University of Minnesota, 301 F.3d 797, 802 (8th Cir. 2002). The Court should dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim if it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiffs can prove no set of facts in support of their claims which would entitle them to relief. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957); Howard v. Coventry Helath Care, of Iowa, Inc., 293 F.3d 442, 444 (8th Cir. 2002). Judgment on the pleadings is appropriate where no material issue of fact remains to be resolved and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act provides that "[s]uits for violations of contracts between an employer and a labor organization representing employees . . . may be brought in any district court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties. . . ." 29 U.S.C. § 185(a). The Supreme Court has held this section preempts state law claims which allege a violation of a provision of a collective bargaining agreement. Local 174, Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95, 10 3 (1962); Oberkramer v. IBEW-NECA Service Center, Inc., 151 F.3d 752, 756 (8th Cir. 1998).
It is well-established that Section 301 preempts the entire field of disputes involving the interpretation or enforcement of collective bargaining agreements. Such claims must be resolved through grievance and arbitration procedures contained in the collective bargaining agreement or brought under Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act.Id. (citing Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 219-20 (1985)). "State law claims that are substantially dependent upon an analysis of the terms or provisions of a collective bargaining agreement or are inextricably intertwined with consideration of the terms or provisions of a collective bargaining agreement are also preempted by § 301." Id. Therefore, if an essential element of the claim involves a duty which would not have existed had it not been created by the express or implied terms of the collective bargaining agreement, or involves a duty the scope of which cannot be determined without reference to the agreement, the claim is not independent of the collective bargaining agreement and does not survive Section 301 preemption.
Mayer and Griffin claim in their petition that the arbitrator erroneously, irrationally, and inadequately ruled on issues affecting their unsatisfactory performance reviews and termination by Qwest Dex. It is unclear from the petition whether Mayer and Griffin are challenging a provision of the collective bargaining agreement or if they are simply challenging the arbitrator's decision. Nevertheless, it is clear from the pleadings that the plaintiffs' claims are inextricably intertwined with the collective bargaining agreement and/or substantially dependent upon an analysis of the terms or provisions of the collective bargaining agreement. As such, a challenge to the arbitration award rendered pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement is preempted by Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act and is subject to dismissal for failure to state a claim.
It should be noted that the plaintiffs arguably lack standing to pursue this action. An individual employee represented by a union is not a party to a collective bargaining agreement or to any arbitration proceeding between the employer and the union conducted pursuant to that agreement, regardless of whether the proceeding concerned that employee's grievance. See Martin v. Youngstown Sheet Tube Co., 911 F.2d 1239, 1244 (7th Cir. 1990). As a result, the employee lacks standing to challenge an arbitration award unless he contends the union breached its duty of fair representation. Id. However, this issue was not raised and need not be addressed.
III. CONCLUSION
Qwest Dex's Motion to Dismiss (Docket No. 5) is GRANTED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.