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Mayer v. Kopp

California Court of Appeals, Fourth District, First Division
Sep 23, 2008
No. D051569 (Cal. Ct. App. Sep. 23, 2008)

Opinion


LAURA L. MAYER, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. STARK ALEXANDER KOPP, Defendant and Respondent. D051569 California Court of Appeal, Fourth District, First Division September 23, 2008

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County, John S. Meyer, Judge. Super. Ct. No. GIC870063

McCONNELL, P. J.

Laura L. Mayer appeals a judgment of nonsuit entered in her action for fraud and related counts against Stark Alexander Kopp. Mayer contends the court erred by finding a previous unlawful detainer action Kopp brought against her, in which the parties entered into a settlement agreement, precludes this action under principles of res judicata. We affirm the judgment.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In mid-May 2005, after advertising for a roommate, Kopp sublet a room in his rented home to Mayer. The parties' agreement was oral, the tenancy was month-to-month and the monthly rent was $675. Mayer paid her rent through the end of June and then quit paying rent.

In August 2005, Kopp brought an unlawful detainer action against Mayer. She requested a jury trial, and on September 14, Judge Charles Gill called the matter. Before a jury was impaneled, Mayer explained that she and Kopp had developed a "very unusual" "personal relationship" that involved "psychic activity" and "psychological and emotional abuse." Although unclear, she appears to have taken the position that in late June 2005, either expressly or through bad conduct, Kopp "waived" her rent obligation.

We grant Mayer's unopposed request that we take judicial notice of the reporter's transcript in the unlawful detainer action. (Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (d).)

The court explained that issues of character are irrelevant in an unlawful detainer action, and it would not allow evidence of "psychic activity" because there was no scientific basis for it. The court encouraged settlement. The parties agreed they should not be living in the same house and Mayer said she "[a]bsolutely" intended to move out. Kopp was willing to forego arrears in rent and dismiss the action with prejudice if Mayer would move out by a certain date. The parties entered into a settlement agreement on the record that required Mayer to vacate the premises by October 9 or be subject to a writ of possession. Kopp was to advise the court on October 11 if Mayer had moved out, and if so, the court would dismiss the action with prejudice.

The trial court and the parties have referred to the date of stipulated settlement as September 19. However, the reporter's transcript from the unlawful detainer proceeding is dated September 14.

In early October, Mayer moved ex parte for a dismissal of the unlawful detainer action. The motion stated that on October 3 Mayer had learned Kopp "brought this case completely fraudulently," as he had secretly telephoned Mayer's mother, who lived in Texas, and convinced her to send him Mayer's rent for July, August and September based on lies about his relationship with Mayer.

The parties represented themselves in the unlawful detainer action and have represented themselves throughout this action.

Mayer did not move out of Kopp's home by October 9, and on October 11, the court issued a writ of possession that required her to move out by October 26. On October 11, Mayer moved ex parte to stay her eviction date until November 1, 2005, because she had not found a new roommate. Mayer also sought "reconsideration in the issuance of a writ to the plaintiff, who has brought a mockery of a lawsuit to this court."

Judge Gill denied the motion because of the stipulated settlement. He noted, "your decision to vacate the premises, on a date acceptable to all parties, was consistent with your stated belief that you and Mr. Kopp should no longer be roommates."

On October 18, 2005, the court entered a judgment for restitution of the premises. On October 21, Mayer moved ex parte to set aside and vacate the judgment based on Kopp's alleged fraud by secretly accepting rent from Mayer's mother and simultaneously pursuing Mayer in court for nonpayment of rent. Mayer attached a letter from her mother and copies of canceled checks she had written to Kopp. Her mother's letter confirmed that she paid Kopp her daughter's rent for July, August and September 2005, and Mayer was previously unaware of that because mother and daughter "have not been in close contact during the time that she has been living with [Kopp]."

Judge Gill denied the motion and explained the "issues raised in your materials have been previously addressed as not relevant to these proceedings," and "your requests are not timely."

On October 25, Mayer filed an ex parte motion for reconsideration of her previous request for a stay of eviction. She sought an additional five days to vacate the premises because she could not move into her new place until October 30. She also filed a motion for a new trial based on Kopp's alleged fraud, and a motion to disqualify Judge Gill based on his previous rulings.

Judge Gill denied the motions because of the stipulated settlement and untimeliness. On October 27, the San Diego County Sheriff's Department removed Mayer from Kopp's home.

On November 2, Mayer again requested relief from the court based on Kopp's alleged fraud. The appellate record does not show any response by the court, but it obviously denied any relief. The record does contain a December 7 order in which the appellate department of the superior court denied Mayer's petition for writ relief. Mayer then filed a petition for writ of mandate with this court, and we summarily denied it. (Mayer v. S.Ct. (Feb. 27, 2005, D047736).) Mayer's petition for review by the California Supreme Court was also unsuccessful. (Mayer v. S.Ct. (April 12, 2006, S141892).)

In August 2006, Mayer brought this action against Kopp for fraud and other counts. In October she filed a second amended complaint (hereafter complaint). The complaint alleged that it arose from the unlawful detainer action and Mayer "designates all of the record" in that action as part of the record in this action. The complaint also included the same sorts of allegations Mayer made in the unlawful detainer action about the parties' personal relationship, and alleged the unlawful detainer action was fraudulent because Kopp received rent from Mayer's mother. The complaint also alleged that Kopp disrupted Mayer's quiet enjoyment of the premises they shared. Among other things, the complaint prayed for a return of all rent, for a vacatur of the judgment in the unlawful detainer action and for its expungement from the record.

Mayer's mother was included as a plaintiff in the caption of the second amended complaint, which included a cause of action for elder abuse. It appears that the mother never prosecuted any claim, and in any event, she is not involved in this appeal.

A bench trial was held on June 15, 2007. The court explained it had "a little trouble following exactly what the nature of the case is." Mayer agreed the action "results from your renting a room in the defendant's home." In her opening statement she claimed the unlawful detainer action and settlement agreement were fraudulent because her mother had paid her rent. She also claimed that when she brought the fraud to Judge Gill's attention in the unlawful detainer action, he should have held a hearing. She explained that attorneys had told her she made a mistake by not appealing the unlawful detainer judgment.

On its own motion, the court granted a judgment of nonsuit after Mayer's opening statement based on principles of res judicata.

DISCUSSION

I.

"The doctrine of res judicata rests upon the ground that the party to be affected . . . has litigated, or had an opportunity to litigate the same matter in a former action in a court of competent jurisdiction, and should not be permitted to litigate it again to the harassment and vexation of his opponent. Public policy and the interest of litigants alike require that there be an end to ligation." (Panos v. Great Western Packing Co. (1943) 21 Cal.2d 636, 637.)

Res judicata principles apply when the issues decided in the prior adjudication were identical with those presented in the later action, there was a final judgment on the merits, and the party against whom the plea is asserted was a party or in privity with a party in the prior adjudication. (Lyons v. Security Pacific Nat. Bank (1995) 40 Cal.App.4th 1001, 1015.) " 'A judgment [entered] . . . by . . . stipulation, is as conclusive a . . . bar as a judgment rendered after trial.' " (De Weese v. Unick (1980) 102 Cal.App.3d 100, 105; Talman v. Talman (1964) 229 Cal.App.2d 39, 42.)

In this action Mayer seeks to rehash her claims pertaining to Kopp's alleged character flaws and psychic abilities. Mayer contends Judge Gill erred by refusing to hold a hearing on Kopp's receipt of rent from her mother, and the lack of a hearing on the matter renders the res judicata doctrine inapplicable.

Indeed, Kopp's pursuit of Mayer in court on the ground she had not paid rent is troublesome. The issues pertaining to the settlement agreement, however, including Kopp's alleged fraud in procuring the settlement, were litigated in the unlawful detainer action. Before judgment was entered Mayer submitted evidence that Kopp had received rent from her mother, and Judge Gill reviewed it and responded to Mayer. In Judge Gill's view, the rent issue was immaterial to the settlement terms as Mayer conceded that because of intolerable personal issues unrelated to rent, she and Kopp should not live under the same roof and she intended to move out. Judgment was entered in the unlawful detainer action on October 18, 2005, but Mayer did not appeal it and it has long been final. She could have argued in an appeal that the court erred by determining her evidence of Kopp's receipt of rent from her mother was immaterial, and her failure to do so does not justify a collateral attack on the judgment. We agree that the res judicata doctrine bars this action, as all required elements are present.

Mayer's complaint included a cause of action for conversion, which alleged that between the date she was evicted, October 27, 2005, and the following November 5, she left boxes of personal belongings at Kopp's home, from which he removed certain items. Mayer, however, raises no particular issue pertaining to this cause of action and thus has waived appellate review of any argument pertaining to it.

II.

Kopp requests that we order Mayer "to pay me for my time and court costs in this matter which to date is over $8,350." Kopp, however, cites no legal authority in support of his request, and thus we deny it. "[P]arties are required to include argument and citation to authority in their briefs, and the absence of these necessary elements allows this court to treat appellant's . . . issue as waived." (Interinsurance Exchange v. Collins (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 1445, 1448.)

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed. Kopp is entitled to costs on appeal.

WE CONCUR: AARON, J., IRION, J.


Summaries of

Mayer v. Kopp

California Court of Appeals, Fourth District, First Division
Sep 23, 2008
No. D051569 (Cal. Ct. App. Sep. 23, 2008)
Case details for

Mayer v. Kopp

Case Details

Full title:LAURA L. MAYER, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. STARK ALEXANDER KOPP…

Court:California Court of Appeals, Fourth District, First Division

Date published: Sep 23, 2008

Citations

No. D051569 (Cal. Ct. App. Sep. 23, 2008)