Opinion
February 24, 2000
John A. Cirando, Syracuse, for appellant.
David D. Willer, Canton, for respondent.
Michael Levato, Law Guardian, Canton, for Catherine "P" and another.
Before: CARDONA, P.J., CREW III, SPAIN, CARPINELLO and GRAFFEO, JJ.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Appeals from two orders of the Family Court of St. Lawrence County (Nelson, J.), entered March 17, 1998, which, inter alia, granted petitioner's applications, in two proceedings pursuant to Family Court Act article 10, to adjudicate respondent's two children and his stepdaughter to be neglected.
In May 1997 petitioner filed petitions against respondent alleging neglect of his two children and one stepchild. Orders of protection were entered which prevented respondent from having any contact with the children. After negotiations between the parties, respondent admitted to certain allegations contained in the petitions and Family Court adjudicated the three children to be neglected.
Respondent now appeals, contending that his admissions were insufficient to support Family Court's findings of neglect. We disagree. The record reveals that respondent admitted to specific and repeated acts of physical abuse, including hitting the three children in the head, face and back, which often left bruises and welts. Additionally, respondent physically abused the children's mother in their presence and compelled the children to strike their mother with threats of additional abuse. Hence, the record amply demonstrates that the children were subjected to physical harm and exposed to instances of domestic violence in which their physical, mental and emotional conditions were impaired as a result of respondent's failure to exercise a minimum degree of care (see, Family Ct Act § 1012 [f] [i] [B]; Matter of Kathleen GG. v. Kenneth II., 254 A.D.2d 538; Matter of Kim HH. [Jeanne II.], 239 A.D.2d 717; Matter of Tami G. [Mark G.], 209 A.D.2d 869, lv denied 85 N.Y.2d 804). Based on respondent's admissions and the hearing testimony, we conclude that Family Court's findings of neglect were adequately supported by a preponderance of the evidence (see,Matter of Tabatha WW. [Kennedy WW.], 260 A.D.2d 669, lv denied 93 N.Y.2d 815).
Next, respondent asserts that his admissions did not warrant the issuance of orders of protection which forbade contact with the children except as supervised by petitioner. It is well settled that a Family Court determination regarding visitation will not be disturbed unless it lacks a sound basis in the record (see, Matter of Shawn Y. [David Y.], 263 A.D.2d 687, 692 N.Y.S.2d 853). Family Court also has the authority to issue an order of protection (see, Family Ct Act § 1056) and require supervision for one year, which may be extended after a hearing upon good cause (see, Family Ct Act § 1057). Here, Family Court clearly did not abuse its discretion in granting orders of protection which it found to be in the best interests of the children, especially in light of the repeated instances of physical abuse and respondent's current incarceration on a rape conviction (cf., Matter of Joyce SS. [Sue RR.], 234 A.D.2d 797; Matter of Christina I. [Janet I.], 226 A.D.2d 789, lv denied 88 N.Y.2d 808; Matter of William GG. [Dawn GG.], 222 A.D.2d 752, lv denied 87 N.Y.2d 811).
To the extent that respondent argues that Family Court improperly extended the order of protection regarding his stepdaughter, that issue is not properly before this court since respondent did not appeal from that order (see, Finch, Pruyn Co. v. Niagara Paper Co., 228 A.D.2d 834, appeal dismissed 88 N.Y.2d 979).
We have considered respondent's remaining contentions and find them to be either unpreserved for appeal or lacking in merit.
ORDERED that the orders are affirmed, without costs.