Opinion
November 13, 1995
Appeal from the Surrogate's Court, Nassau County (Radigan, S.).
Ordered that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs payable by the father.
Contrary to the father's contention, SCPA 1750-a does not require that the court make a specific finding of fact that the person requiring guardianship is mentally disabled. Rather, where there is evidence presented that the person has been certified by a licensed psychologist and a licensed physician as developmentally disabled, and it appears to the satisfaction of the court that it is in the developmentally-disabled person's best interest to appoint a guardian of that person, the court is authorized to do so (see, SCPA 1750-a).
The medical reports submitted by the father in support of his petition to be appointed guardian indicate that a clinical psychologist and psychiatrist examined his daughter and determined that she was permanently developmentally and mentally disabled. Moreover, although the parents had agreed, pursuant to the divorce judgment, that the daughter would live with each parent 50% of the time, and that the parents would share the responsibility of her care, the record indicates that the bitterness between the parties affected the daughter's ability to live a happy and productive life. In any event, the court provided a specific explanation for its determination to appoint a guardian, which was supported by the record. Under these circumstances, the court did not improvidently exercise its discretion by appointing an independent temporary guardian to protect the daughter's best interests (see, SCPA 1750-a).
We have examined the father's remaining contentions and find them to be without merit. O'Brien, J.P., Pizzuto, Santucci and Krausman, JJ., concur.