Opinion
February 6, 1995
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Kings County (Ramirez, J.).
Ordered that on the Court's own motion, the appellants' notice of appeal is treated as an application for leave to appeal, and leave to appeal is granted (see, CPLR 5701 [c]); and it is further,
Ordered that the order is reversed, on the law, with costs, the determination is confirmed, and the proceeding is dismissed.
The petitioner is precluded from bringing the present CPLR article 78 proceeding. The doctrine of collateral estoppel bars a party from relitigating an issue that was decided in a prior action in which the party had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue (see, D'Arata v. New York Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 76 N.Y.2d 659; Matter of Larch Realty Corp. v. Board of Appeals, 208 A.D.2d 630). Similarly, the Administrative Code of the City of New York precludes a party from relitigating "[a]n issue * * * which was decided, or could have been contested, in a prior court proceeding to secure a court order to repair" (Administrative Code § 27-2146 [c]; Department of Hous. Preservation Dev. v. 849 St. Nicholas Equities, 141 Misc.2d 258). Although the petitioner in this case was not a party to the prior proceedings in the Civil Court, Housing Part, it is bound by the determinations rendered against its predecessor-in-title authorizing the challenged lien (see, D'Arata v. New York Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., supra; Department of Hous. Preservation Dev. v. 849 St. Nicholas Equities, supra). In any event, there is a rational basis in the record for the determination of the Department of Housing Preservation and Development (see, Matter of Pell v. Board of Educ., 34 N.Y.2d 222). Ritter, J.P., Copertino, Joy and Hart, JJ., concur.