Opinion
No. 1227 WDA 2004.
Filed: July 12, 2005.
Appeal from the Order entered June 15, 2004, in the Court of Common Pleas of Washington County, Civil, at No. 2002-2855.
Before: HUDOCK, POPOVICH and JOHNSON, JJ.
¶ 1 This is an appeal from an order that granted judgment on the pleadings. We affirm.
¶ 2 Appellee, Maryland Casualty Company (Maryland Casualty), initiated the action underlying this appeal by filing a complaint in the court of common pleas on May 7, 2002. Maryland Casualty alleged that Appellants (Odyssey Contracting Corporation and Odyssey Painting Company, Inc.) were in breach of contract for failure to pay all of the premiums owed for workers' compensation insurance coverage. Specifically, Maryland Casualty sought damages in the amount of $140,528.00 plus interest from June 28, 2000, and costs. Appellants filed a counterclaim asserting that Maryland Casualty intentionally and knowingly applied an improper rate classification to calculate the exposures and to inflate the amount of premiums due.
¶ 3 The matter proceeded through discovery until August of 2003, when Maryland Casualty filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings against Appellants. The trial court heard argument and received briefs on the matter. On June 15, 2004, the trial court granted Maryland Casualty's motion. The docket indicates that notice was provided to the parties on June 16, 2004. Appellants filed a motion for reconsideration, which the trial court denied. Appellants' timely notice of appeal was filed on July 14, 2004. Although the trial court did not require Appellants to file a Rule 1925(b) statement, a full trial court opinion has been filed. Appellants present two issues for our consideration:
A. If a worker's compensation insurance policy incorporates more than one rate to distinguish between maritime exposures arising under the Longshore and Harbor Workers Act versus land-based exposures arising under various states' workers' compensation statutes, should the court of common pleas exercise its subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate a dispute between a policy holder and insurer concerning whether the proper policy rate was selected to calculate the final premium due by the terms of the policy?
33 U.S.C. §§ 901- 950.
B. Assuming arguendo that there was an administrative appeals process to be followed, is the Worker's Compensation Act unconstitutional as it applies to these policyholders for its failure to provide adequate notice of the 12-month limitation to initiate an administrative appeals process?
Appellants' Brief at 4.
¶ 4 As our Supreme Court has explained, appellate review of a trial court's decision to grant or deny judgment on the pleadings is limited to determining whether the trial court committed an error of law or whether there were facts presented which warrant a jury trial. Travelers Casualty Surety Company v. Castegnaro, 565 Pa. 246, 250, 772 A.2d 456, 459 (2001). In conducting this review, we look only to the pleadings and any documents properly attached thereto. Id. at 250-51, 772 A.2d at 459. "Judgment on the pleadings is proper only where the pleadings evidence that there are no material facts in dispute such that a trial by jury would be unnecessary." Id. at 251, 772 A.2d at 459.
In passing on a challenge to the sustaining of a motion for judgment on the pleadings, our standard of review is limited. We must accept as true all well pleaded statements of fact of the party against whom the motion is granted and consider against him only those facts that he specifically admits. We will affirm the grant of such a motion only when the moving party's right to succeed is certain and the case is so free from doubt that the trial would clearly be a fruitless exercise.
Minnich v. Yost, 817 A.2d 538, 540 (Pa.Super. 2003), appeal denied, 573 Pa. 710, 827 A.2d 1202 (2003)
¶ 5 Appellants first argue that the trial court improperly determined that an adequate administrative remedy exists to address their counterclaim that Maryland Casualty applied an incorrect final premium rate when charging for worker's compensation insurance coverage. Appellants assert that the policy issued by Maryland Casualty incorporates more than one rate depending on whether the coverage stems from maritime exposures arising under the Longshore and Harbor Workers Act versus land-based exposures arising under other statutory mandates. The trial court found that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate Appellants' counterclaim because Appellants failed to seek the appropriate administrative remedy before the Pennsylvania Compensation Rating Bureau. Trial Court Opinion, 6/15/04, at 4.
¶ 6 Our Supreme Court has held that "[i]t is fundamental that prior to resorting to judicial remedies, litigants must exhaust all the adequate and available administrative remedies." The County of Berks ex rel. Baldwin v. Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board, 544 Pa. 541, 550, 678 A.2d 355, 360 (1996). The failure to pursue a statutory remedy may be raised at any point in a proceeding by the parties or by the court sua sponte because such failure creates a jurisdictional defect. Muir v. Alexander, 858 A.2d 653, 660 (Pa.Cmwlth. 2004). Section 1504 of the Statutory Construction Act of 1972 provides that in all cases where a statutory remedy is provided or a duty is enjoined by any statute, the statutory remedy shall be strictly pursued rather than a remedy at common law. 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1504. A court is without power to act until statutory remedies have been exhausted. Muir, 858 A.2d at 660. Indeed, as this Court has explained, the courts of this Commonwealth have consistently held that when a remedy is provided by an act of assembly, the directions of the legislation must be strictly pursued and such remedy is exclusive. Panea v. Isdaner, 773 A.2d 782, 789 (Pa.Super. 2001) ( en banc), aff'd sub nom. Bell v. Slezak, 571 Pa. 333, 812 A.2d 566 (2002), appeal denied, 841 A.2d 532 (2003).
¶ 7 "Even where a constitutional question is presented, it remains the rule that a litigant must ordinarily follow statutorily-prescribed remedies." Muir, 858 A.2d at 660. "The additional element required to confer equitable jurisdiction is either the absence of a statutorily-prescribed remedy or, if such a remedy exists, then a showing of its inadequacy in the circumstances." Id. (quoting Borough of Green Tree v. Board of Property Assessments, Appeals and Review of Allegheny County, 459 Pa. 268, 276, 328 A.2d 819, 823 (1974)). Our Supreme Court has explained the rationale for the doctrine that administrative remedies must be exhausted before seeking relief from courts, stating as follows:
When the Legislature has seen fit to enact a pervasive regulatory scheme and to establish a governmental agency possessing expertise and broad regulatory and remedial powers to administer that statutory scheme, a court should be reluctant to interfere in those matters and disputes which were intended by the Legislature to be considered, at least initially, by the administrative agency.
Muir, 858 A.2d at 660 n. 17 (quoting Feingold v. Bell of Pennsylvania, 477 Pa. 1, 6, 383 A.2d 791, 793 (1977)). The purpose of the doctrine is to preserve the integrity of the administrative process. Id. In determining whether a litigant will be excused from exhausting administrative remedies, courts must look to whether an adequate administrative remedy exists. County of Berks, 544 Pa. at 551, 678 A.2d at 360. A litigant will be allowed to bypass seeking administrative relief before a state agency if that agency has no mandate to provide the requested remedies. Id. However, our Supreme Court has ruled that a litigant cannot be permitted "to circumvent the administrative process where the litigant can achieve full relief in front of the agency but the relief may be granted on bases different from those advocated by the litigant." Id.
¶ 8 In the present case, the trial judge has explained why he reached the conclusion that Appellants could have sought the relief they now request had they pursued a timely claim before the Pennsylvania Compensation Rating Bureau (the Bureau). Trial Court Opinion, 6/15/04, at 3-4. The trial court's decision rests, in part, on provisions contained within the Pennsylvania Workers Compensation Manual issued by the Bureau. This manual has been made a part of the certified record and was properly considered by the trial court. See Graduate Health Systems, Inc. v. Pennsylvania Insurance Department, 674 A.2d 367, 368 n. 2 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1996) (holding that it is proper for a court to take judicial notice of the Workers Compensation Manual if a copy of it has been placed in the original record). We agree with the trial court's reasoning and with its reliance on the provisions of Rule XVI (Appeals From Application of the Rating System Procedure) in the Workers Compensation Manual.
¶ 9 We are cognizant of Appellants' contention that the Bureau has no authority to adjudicate a contracts dispute. While this may be true, it does not alter the fact that the Bureau does have the authority to rule in a dispute over the application of rate classifications in a given case. Pennsylvania Workers Compensation Manual, Rule XVI (C). The courts of common pleas do not acquire authority to grant a remedy within the sole purview of the Bureau merely because the parties to a contracts dispute also dispute a particular insurance rate classification. We affirm on the basis of the trial court opinion with regard to this issue.
¶ 10 Appellants next contend that section 1035.17 of Title 77 provides no notice that there is a twelve month limitation period for filing an administrative appeal challenging a rate classification. Appellants argue that this lack of notice constitutes a denial of procedural due process. Thus, Appellants assert that section 1035.17 is unconstitutional.
¶ 11 In Pennsylvania, the Attorney General is the Commonwealth officer statutorily charged with defending the constitutionality of all enactments passed by the General Assembly. City of Philadelphia v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 575 Pa. 542, 570, 838 A.2d 566, 583 (2003) (citing 71 P.S. § 732-204(a)(3)). The nature of the constitutional challenge and the opinion of any other state officer make no difference to this requirement. Id. at 570-71, 838 A.2d at 583-84. Notice must be provided to the Attorney General, if the Commonwealth is not a party, whenever a litigant challenges the constitutionality of a statute in any court subject to the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure. Pa.R.C.P. 235. If the statute continues to be challenged on appeal, the Attorney General must be afforded a separate and additional notice pursuant to the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure:
Rule 521. Notice to Attorney General of Challenge to Constitutionality of Statute
(a) Notice. It shall be the duty of a party who draws in question the constitutionality of any statute in any matter in an appellate court to which the Commonwealth or any officer thereof, acting in his official capacity, is not a party, upon the filing of the record, or as soon thereafter as the question is raised in the appellate court, to give immediate notice in writing to the Attorney General of Pennsylvania of the existence of the question; together with a copy of the pleadings or other portion of the record raising the issue, and to file proof of service of such notice.
(b) Status of Attorney General. The Attorney General may be heard on the question of the constitutionality of the statute involved without formal intervention. If the Attorney General files a brief concerning the question the Commonwealth shall thereafter be deemed to be an intervening party in the matter.
Pa.R.A.P. 521. When the constitutionality of an act of the General Assembly is challenged on appeal, the Attorney General stands in representative capacity for, at a minimum, all non-Commonwealth parties having an interest in seeing the statute upheld. City of Philadelphia v. Commonwealth, 575 Pa. at 570, 838 A.2d at 584. As such, the Attorney General must be afforded notice of any appeal that raises the alleged unconstitutionality of a statute. Id.
¶ 12 In the present case, the certified record indicates that, on December 17, 2002, Appellants served notice upon the Attorney General's Office in both Pittsburgh and in Harrisburg that they intended to draw into question the constitutionality of the Worker's Compensation Act in a trial court proceeding. See Proof of Service, 12/18/02 (indicating that service was effectuated on December 17, 2002). However, there is no indication of record that Appellants provided notice to the Attorney General that they had filed an appeal challenging the constitutionality of a Pennsylvania statute. Neither the trial court's docket nor the Superior Court docket reflect any such notice as having been served. Furthermore, the certified record contains no copy of such notice. We must therefore deem Appellants' constitutional challenge to be waived on appeal pursuant to the requirements of Rule 521.
¶ 13 Order affirmed.