Opinion
C. A. 9:22-cv-03019-JD-MHC
06-12-2023
Marvin F.[1], Plaintiff, v. Kilolo Kijakazi, Acting Commissioner of Social Security Administration, Defendant.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Molly H. Cherry United States Magistrate Judge
Plaintiff filed the complaint in this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), seeking judicial review of the Administrative Law Judge's (ALJ's) final decision denying his claim for disability insurance benefits (DIB) under the Social Security Act (Act). This case was referred to the undersigned for a report and recommendation pursuant to Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2)(a) (D.S.C.). For the following reasons, the undersigned recommends that the ALJ's decision be affirmed.
Citations to the record refer to the page numbers in the Social Security Administration Record. See ECF No. 6.
In November 2020, Plaintiff protectively applied for DIB, alleging disability beginning July 1, 2020. R.p. 10. He alleged disability caused by PTSD, diabetes, and high blood pressure. See R.p. 198. The state agency responsible for making disability determinations denied his claim initially and on reconsideration. R.pp. 115-18, 121-24.
At Plaintiff's request, an ALJ held a hearing at which Plaintiff, who was represented by counsel, and an impartial vocational expert testified. R.pp. 31-90. On October 27, 2021, the ALJ issued an unfavorable written decision denying benefits. R.pp. 10-21. The Appeals Council denied Plaintiff's request for review, making the ALJ's decision the Commissioner's final decision for purposes of judicial review. R.pp. 1-6. This appeal followed.
Plaintiff originally filed his appeal in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas in May 2022. See ECF No. 1. However, the case was transferred to this Court in September 2022. ECF No. 11. Prior to the transfer, the Record and Answer (ECF Nos. 5 & 6) were filed by the Commissioner, and a Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 8) was filed by Plaintiff. Because the Motion for Summary Judgment was filed while the case was still pending in Texas, it primarily cited case law from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. As this Court is within the Fourth Circuit, the undersigned mooted the Motion for Summary Judgment and granted Plaintiff leave to file a written brief that adhered to this District's Local Rules, and which cited to relevant case law from the Fourth Circuit. ECF No. 16. Plaintiff submitted a brief in support of his claims (ECF No. 19), and the Commissioner submitted a brief in response (ECF No. 23).
Because this Court writes primarily for the parties who are familiar with the facts, the Court dispenses with a lengthy recitation of the medical history from the relevant period. To the extent specific records or information are relevant to or at issue in this case, they are addressed within the Discussion section below.
II. APPLICABLE LAW
A. Scope of Review
Jurisdiction of this Court is pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 1383(c)(3). Under § 405(g), judicial review of a final decision regarding disability benefits is limited to determining (1) whether the factual findings are supported by substantial evidence, and (2) whether the correct legal standards were applied. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Walls v. Barnhart, 296 F.3d 287, 290 (4th Cir. 2002) (citing Hays v. Sullivan, 907 F.2d 1453, 1456 (4th Cir. 1990)). Accordingly, a reviewing court must uphold the final decision when “an ALJ has applied correct legal standards and the ALJ's factual findings are supported by substantial evidence.” Brown v. Comm r Soc. Sec. Admin., 873 F.3d 251, 267 (4th Cir. 2017) (internal quotation marks omitted).
“Substantial evidence” is an evidentiary standard that is not high: it is “more than a mere scintilla” and means only “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S.Ct. 1148, 1154 (2019). A reviewing court does not reweigh conflicts in evidence, make credibility determinations, or substitute its judgment for that of the ALJ. Hancock v. Astrue, 667 F.3d 470, 472 (4th Cir. 2012). “Where conflicting evidence allows reasonable minds to differ as to whether a claimant is disabled, the responsibility for that decision falls on the [ALJ].” Id. (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). However, this limited review does not mean the findings of an ALJ are to be mechanically accepted, as the “statutorily granted review contemplates more than an uncritical rubber stamping of the administrative action.” Howard v. Saul, 408 F.Supp.3d 721, 725-26 (D.S.C. 2019) (quoting Flack v. Cohen, 413 F.2d 278, 279 (4th Cir. 1969)).
B. Social Security Disability Evaluation Process
To be considered “disabled” within the meaning of the Social Security Act, a claimant must show that he has an impairment or combination of impairments which prevent him from engaging in all substantial gainful activity for which he is qualified by his age, education, experience, and functional capacity, and which has lasted or could reasonably be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve months. See 42 U.S.C. § 423. The Social Security Administration established a five-step sequential procedure in order to evaluate whether an individual is disabled for purposes of receiving benefits. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920; see also Mascio v. Colvin, 780 F.3d 632, 634-35 (4th Cir. 2015) (outlining the questions asked in the five-step procedure). The burden rests with the claimant to make the necessary showings at each of the first four steps to prove disability. Mascio, 780 F.3d at 634-35. If the claimant fails to carry his burden, he is found not disabled. Lewis v. Berryhill, 858 F.3d 858, 861 (4th Cir. 2017). If the claimant is successful at each of the first four steps, the burden shifts to the Commissioner at step five. Id.
At the first step, the ALJ must determine whether the claimant has engaged in substantial gainful activity since his alleged disability onset date. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(b), 416.920(b). At step two, the ALJ determines whether the claimant has an impairment or combination of impairments that meet the regulations' severity and duration requirements. Id. §§ 404.1520(c), 416.920(c). At step three, the ALJ considers whether the severe impairment meets the criteria of an impairment listed in Appendix 1 of 20 C.F.R. part 404, subpart P (the “Listings”) or is equal to a listed impairment. If so, the claimant is automatically eligible for benefits; if not, before moving on to step four, the ALJ assesses the claimant's residual functional capacity (RFC). Id. §§ 404.1520(d), (e), 416.920(d), (e); Lewis, 858 F.3d at 861.
The RFC is “the most the claimant can still do despite physical and mental limitations that affect her ability to work.”Mascio, 780 F.3d at 635 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
At step four, the ALJ determines whether, despite the severe impairment, the claimant retains the RFC to perform his past relevant work. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(e), (f), 416.920(e), (f). If the ALJ finds the claimant capable of performing his past relevant work, he is not disabled. Id. §§ 404.1520(f), 416.920(f). If the exertion required to perform the claimant's past relevant work exceeds his RFC, then the ALJ goes on to the final step.
At step five, the burden of proof shifts to the Social Security Administration to show that the claimant can perform other jobs existing in significant numbers in the national economy, considering the claimant's age, education, work experience, and RFC. Id. §§ 404.1520(g), 416.920(g);Mascio, 780 F.3d at 634-35. Typically, the Commissioner offers this evidence through the testimony of a vocational expert answering hypotheticals that incorporate the claimant's limitations. Mascio, 780 F.3d at 635. “If the Commissioner meets her burden, the ALJ finds the claimant not disabled and denies the application for benefits.” Id.
III. ADMINISTRATIVE FINDINGS
The ALJ employed the statutorily-required five-step sequential evaluation process to determine whether Plaintiff was disabled from the alleged onset date of July 1, 2020. R.pp. 10-21. The ALJ found, in pertinent part:
1. The claimant last met the insured status requirements of the Social Security Act on December 31, 2020.
2. The claimant did not engage in substantial gainful activity during the period from his alleged onset date of July 1, 2020 through his date last insured of December 31, 2020 (20 CFR 404.1571 et seq.).
3. Through the date last insured, the claimant had the following severe impairment: posttraumatic stress disorder (20 CFR 404.1520(c)).
4. Through the date last insured, the claimant did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that met or medically equaled the severity of one of the listed impairments in 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 (20 CFR 404.1520(d), 404.1525 and 404.1526).
5. After careful consideration of the entire record, the undersigned finds that, through the date last insured, the claimant had the residual functional capacity to perform a full range of work at all exertional levels but with the following non-exertional limitations: he could handle items frequently with the bilateral hands. He had frequent fingering limitations bilaterally and frequent feeling limitations bilaterally. He could never climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds. The claimant was limited to frequent near and far visual acuity. He could never work at unprotected heights and never operate a motor vehicle as an occupational requirement. He was limited to jobs where the noise intensity level does not exceed a moderate level (level 3). The claimant was able to understand, remember and carryout instructions to perform simple, routine tasks but not at a production-rate pace. He was able to
perform simple work-related decisions with regard to both use of judgment and dealing with changes in the work setting. The claimant could only occasionally interact with supervisors and coworkers; but the claimant could not perform tandem or teamwork tasks. The claimant could have no public contact work. Any time off task could be accommodated by normal breaks.
6. Through the date last insured, the claimant was capable of performing past relevant work as a floor waxer. This work did not require the performance of work-related activities precluded by the claimant's residual functional capacity (20 CFR 404.1565).
7. The claimant was not under a disability, as defined in the Social Security Act, at any time from July 1, 2020, the alleged onset date, through December 31, 2020, the date last insured (20 CFR 404.1520(f)).R.pp. 12-21.
IV. DISCUSSION
Plaintiff argues remand is warranted for four reasons: (1) he did not have a full and fair administrative hearing; (2) the ALJ erred in finding some of his impairments non-severe at step two of the evaluation process; (3) the ALJ erred in finding Plaintiff did not meet or equal a Listing; and (4) the RFC determination was not supported by substantial evidence. ECF No. 19 at 4-20. Upon review, none of these arguments merit remand.
Plaintiff was given leave to file a written brief that cited to relevant case law from the Fourth Circuit, though he submitted a brief that is substantially identical to the one originally filed in Texas. See ECF No. 19. The newly filed brief does not cite to any law from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, nor from any District Courts within the Fourth Circuit.
A. Full and fair hearing
Plaintiff argues the ALJ failed to provide a full and fair hearing, such that the ALJ's decision was not supported by substantial evidence. ECF No. 19 at 4-8. Specifically, Plaintiff contends that the hearing was “conducted in an unduly prejudicial and erroneous manner,” and maintains that “the ALJ was repeatedly abrasive, interruptive, and irrespective of [] [Plaintiff's] testimony.” ECF No. 19 at 5. He contends that, “[o]n multiple occasions, the ALJ asked drawn- out, leading, and compounding questions of the claimant; oftentimes interrupting or modifying the claimant's testimony to suit his narrative” and cites to testimony in the transcript that purportedly shows the ALJ's bias against him. ECF No. 19 at 5-7. Plaintiff's argument is without merit.
Due process principles apply to Social Security proceedings. Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401-02 (1971). Due process requires the “opportunity to be heard ‘at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner,'” Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976) (citation omitted), and an “impartial decision maker is an essential element of due process.” Bowens v. N.C. Dep't of Hum. Res., 710 F.2d 1015, 1020 (4th Cir. 1983). Because “Social Security proceedings are inquisitorial rather than adversarial,” the ALJ has a “duty to investigate the facts and develop the arguments both for and against granting benefits.” Sims v. Apfel, 530 U.S. 103, 110-11 (2000). “Although the ALJ has a duty to explore all relevant facts and inquire into the issues necessary for adequate development of the record, [the ALJ] is not required to function as the claimant's substitute counsel[.]” Bell v. Chater, 57 F.3d 1065, 1995 WL 347142, at *4 (4th Cir. Jun. 9, 1995) (unpublished table opinion) (internal quotations and citations omitted).
ALJs are “presumed to be unbiased” and thus the burden is on a claimant to rebut this presumption. Corley v. Colvin, No. CIV.A. 9:12-2676-TMC, 2014 WL 607706, at *3 (D.S.C. Feb. 18, 2014). A claimant alleging ALJ bias “bears a ‘heavy burden' of proof.” Warren v. Colvin, No. 4:14-CV-02517-JMC, 2015 WL 5673118, at *2 (D.S.C. Sept. 25, 2015) (citation omitted). Such bias “generally should be evident from the record and not based on speculation or inference.” Id. at *3 (citations omitted).
Here, due process was satisfied, and Plaintiff was afforded a full and fair hearing. R.pp. 31-90. Plaintiff appeared at the hearing with the benefit of his attorney, he was able to present testimony in support of his claim, and his attorney had the opportunity to cross-examine the vocational expert. See R.pp. 31-90; see also 20 C.F.R.§§ 404.944 (ALJ hearing procedures -general), 404.950 (presenting evidence at hearing before an ALJ).
Plaintiff's citations to the hearing transcript to support his argument that he did not receive a full and fair hearing are unavailing. See ECF No. 19 at 6-7. The ALJ's statements do not reveal prejudice or bias against Plaintiff. Even if this Court were to accept Plaintiff's characterization of the ALJ's statements as abrasive, Plaintiff has not shown that the ALJ committed any egregious act outside of the bounds of ordinary courtroom administration. The colloquies highlighted by Plaintiff reflect the ALJ's correction and clarification of what the ALJ was requesting from Plaintiff in terms of testimony, and do not run afoul of Plaintiff's due process rights. See Corley, No. CIV.A. 9:12-2676-TMC, 2014 WL 607706, at *3 (finding claimant failed to show ALJ's alleged bias and noting “judge's ordinary efforts at courtroom administration-even a stern and short-tempered judge's ordinary efforts at courtroom administration-remain immune”). Indeed, Plaintiff himself recognizes that expressions of “impatience, dissatisfaction, annoyance, and even anger” do not establish bias. ECF No. 19 at 7 (citing Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 55556 (1994)). At best, this is what the highlighted portions of the transcript reflect. See ECF No. 19 at 6-7. Consequently, Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that the ALJ “displayed deep-seated and unequivocal antagonism that would render fair judgment impossible.” Liteky, 510 U.S. at 566. Remand on this basis is not warranted.
B. Non-severe impairments at step two
Plaintiff claims that the ALJ erred by finding several of his impairments non-severe at step two. ECF No. 19 at 8-11. Specifically, Plaintiff takes issue with the ALJ classifying his hypertension, diabetes, depression, anxiety, bipolar disorder, history of alcohol use, and foot and hand pain as non-severe. He argues the ALJ's decision is “prejudicial and nonsensical” and argues these impairments were not accounted for in the RFC. ECF No. 19 at 8. Plaintiff has not shown reversible error.
At step two of the sequential evaluation process, an ALJ must determine whether a claimant has a medically determinable impairment or a combination of impairments that is severe. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(c), 416.920(c). A “severe” impairment is one that “significantly limits [a claimant's] physical or mental ability to do basic work activities.” Id. §§ 404.1520(c), 416.920(c). “Basic work activities” are “the abilities and aptitudes necessary to do most jobs,” examples of which include “physical functions such as walking, standing, sitting, lifting, pushing, pulling, reaching, carrying, or handling.” Id. §§ 404.1522(b), 416.922(b). An ALJ must consider all of a claimant's medically determinable impairments, even those that are not severe, in the RFC assessment. Id. §§ 404.1545(a)(2), 416.945(a)(2). An inadequate analysis of impairments at step two may be rendered harmless, if the ALJ later considers those impairments in subsequent steps. See Jenkins v. Colvin, No. 6:13-cv-02021-DCN, 2015 WL 1311694, at *4 (D.S.C. Mar. 24, 2015) (“Courts in this district have determined that an ALJ's failure to consider an impairment at step two is harmless when the ALJ considers the impairment in subsequent steps of its analysis.” (collecting cases)).
Here, at step two, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had the severe impairment of PTSD. R.p. 12-13. The ALJ further found Plaintiff had the following non-severe impairments: hypertension; diabetes mellitus; history of depression, anxiety, and bipolar disorder; history of alcohol use; foot and hand pain. R.p. 13. The ALJ found that these non-severe impairments did not meet the standard of severity because they did not impose more than minimal functional limitations on Plaintiff's ability to perform basic work activities. R.p. 13.
Specifically, the ALJ explained:
Although the claimant has a history of hypertension, treatment notes indicate his hypertension was generally controlled with medications, and there is no indication
that he sought significant treatment for hypertensive-related symptoms through his date last insured. Additionally, the claimant's cardiovascular examinations have been unremarkable. (Exhibit 2F). As such, the claimant's hypertension has been assessed as a non-severe impairment, as it no more than minimally affected the claimant's ability to perform work-related activity.
Although the claimant has a history of diabetes mellitus, treatment notes indicate that his diabetes was generally controlled with medications and diet, as he did not seek significant treatment for fluctuating blood sugars or hypo/hyperglycemic episodes through his date last insured. Medical records consistently reflect that he did not exhibit any peripheral neuropathy, diabetic retinopathy or other complications secondary to his diabetes, despite his subjective reports at the hearing. (Exhibits 2F). Therefore, the claimant's diabetes has been assessed as a non-severe impairment because there is no evidence that it imposed more than minimal functional limitations through his date last insured.
The claimant also has a history of depression, anxiety, and bipolar disorder. However, treatment of those conditions has been infrequent and sporadic, and treatment notes indicate that he has reported improvement of those symptoms with medications. There is no evidence that those conditions imposed more than mild limitations through the date last insured. Nonetheless, the undersigned has considered those conditions in conjunction with the claimant's other mental impairments in analyzing the “B criteria” under Section 12.00, set forth below.
Although the claimant has a history of alcohol use, there is no recent evidence of alcohol use in the medical record, and there is no evidence that his alcohol use imposed more than minimal functional limitations through the date last insured. Accordingly, it is a non-severe impairment. Although the claimant has alleged foot and hand pain, there is no evidence showing he has been diagnosed with a medically determinable condition relative to his complaints of foot and hand pain.R.p. 13.
The ALJ stated that he “considered all of the claimant's medically determinable impairments, including those that are not severe, when assessing the claimant's residual functional capacity.” R.p. 13. Later, in discussing the evidence that formulated the RFC, the ALJ noted Plaintiff testified that his diabetes is generally controlled by his diet and that his blood pressure is generally controlled by medications. R.p. 15. The ALJ also acknowledged treatment notes from July 2020 which reflected that Plaintiff exhibited mild depression and some signs of anxiety. R.p. 17. The ALJ further noted that other treatment notes later in October 2020 showed that Plaintiff denied all psychiatric symptoms and that his mental status examination was normal at the time with no serious objective mental status abnormalities. R.p. 17. Finally, the ALJ also discussed the prior administrative findings of the state agency physicians, who both found Plaintiff's impairments not severe. R.pp. 19, 94-96, 106-08. The ALJ rejected the state agency physicians' findings as to Plaintiff's PTSD but found their assessments to be persuasive to the extent they found Plaintiff's other impairments non-severe. R.p. 19.
Upon review, the undersigned finds no error here for three reasons. First, as to the ALJ's finding at step two, the ALJ supported his determination with substantial evidence. The ALJ explained his consideration of the evidence in the record and Plaintiff's subjective reports at the hearing, and he concluded that the above impairments were non-severe. See Hancock, 667 F.3d at 472 (noting a reviewing court does not reweigh conflicts in evidence, make credibility determinations, or substitute its judgment for that of the ALJ). The ALJ's discussion was sufficient, and the undersigned is not left to guess at why the ALJ determined the above impairments to be non-severe. See Biestek, 139 S.Ct. at 1154 (noting substantial evidence is an evidentiary standard that is not high: it is “more than a mere scintilla” and means only “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion”).
Second, and in any event, the ALJ considered Plaintiff's non-severe impairments in subsequent steps of the evaluation process, despite what Plaintiff appears to suggest. Indeed, the ALJ explicitly stated as much, as quoted above. See R.p. 13. The ALJ did not ignore Plaintiff's non-severe impairments; rather, he found the impairments did not warrant any further limitations in the RFC based on his review of the evidence:
In sum, the undersigned finds the above residual functional capacity assessment is supported by the documentation of the claimant's PTSD, as well as his subjective reports of handling and vision problems, although his subjective reports are not well-supported by the objective findings of record. There is no evidence showing
the claimant exhibited any physical conditions or strength deficits or gait abnormalities that would preclude him from performing work at all exertional levels.R.p. 19 (emphasis added). Thus, even if the ALJ erred in finding these impairments non-severe, such error was harmless. See Collier v. Colvin, No. 9:13-cv-3323-DCN, 2015 WL 1519796, at *7 n.3 (D.S.C. Mar. 30, 2015) (“To the extent [claimant] argues that the ALJ erred in finding her [impairment] non-severe at step two, such an error is harmless because the ALJ considered the [impairment] in subsequent steps.”).
Third, Plaintiff fails to show how the RFC did not accommodate his impairments. See Platt v. Colvin, No. CIV.A. 9:13-2435-BHH, 2014 WL 7192373, at *4 (D.S.C. Dec. 17, 2014) (“The plaintiff complains that the ALJ did not explain what limitations the depression caused. Apparently, the ALJ found none. And, the plaintiff has not recommended any, different than what the RFC already reflects. The ALJ specifically stated that he considered the combined effect of all of the plaintiff's impairments, both “severe and non-severe”[], and such consideration is sufficient.”); Robinson v. Colvin, No. 4:13-CV-00823-DCN, 2014 WL 4954709, at *14 (D.S.C. Sept. 29, 2014) (“However, Plaintiff must show that any alleged error in finding Plaintiff's depression to be non-severe harmed her.”). Indeed, the ALJ accounted for the limitations resulting from Plaintiff's non-severe hypertension, diabetes, depression, anxiety, bipolar disorder, history of alcohol use, and foot and hand pain by including manipulative, postural, environmental, visual, noise, and mental limitations in the RFC finding. R.p. 15.
Plaintiff's arguments urging for remand are unpersuasive. Plaintiff focuses on the ALJ's finding that his hypertension and diabetes were generally controlled with medications, and argues that, in fact, they were “poorly controlled” and points to evidence that allegedly supports this position. ECF No. 18 at 8-9 (citing R.pp. 44, 101, 267-68, 270, 274, 276, 372, 398). Thus, it appears that Plaintiff takes issue with how the ALJ interpreted certain evidence in the record, and then offers his interpretation of that evidence. In essence, Plaintiff asks the Court to accept his characterization of the evidence over the ALJ's and read the evidence differently. That is not the role of this Court. See Hancock, 667 F.3d at 472 (noting a reviewing court does not reweigh conflicts in evidence, make credibility determinations, or substitute its judgment for that of the ALJ).
Regardless, even assuming the ALJ erred in characterizing Plaintiff's hypertension and diabetes as generally controlled, remand is not warranted because (1) as noted above, the ALJ found in Plaintiff's favor at step two and considered his impairments in subsequent steps, and (2) the ALJ did not base his non-severity finding solely on these impairments being “controlled,” but rather also noted: Plaintiff did not seek significant treatment for hypertensive-related symptoms through his date last insured; his cardiovascular examinations were unremarkable; he did not seek treatment for diabetic-related symptoms through his date last insured; and his physical examinations failed to reflect complications secondary to diabetes despite his contrary allegations at the hearing. R.p. 13 (citing Exhibit 2F). Although Plaintiff argues his hypertension and diabetes are “consistently present” and “prevalent” in the record (see ECF No. 19 at 9), the mere diagnosis of a disorder does not compel an ALJ to find the disorder severe, nor does it preordain a disability finding. See Rouse v. Colvin, No. CIV.A. 0:11-2636-MGL, 2013 WL 6050163, at *5 (D.S.C. Nov. 14, 2013) (noting “functional limitations-not diagnosis-are the focus in determining disability”); see also Gross v. Heckler, 785 F.2d 1163, 1166 (4th Cir. 1986) (“However, a psychological disorder is not necessarily disabling. There must be a showing of related functional loss.”).
Plaintiff also suggests the ALJ improperly dismissed his subjective symptoms of vision problems, low energy levels, increased urination, fatigue, and pain when finding hypertension and diabetes were non-severe impairments. ECF No. 19 at 9-10. However, the ALJ recognized Plaintiff's complaints of those symptoms (see R.pp. 15-16) and accounted for them in the RFC finding to the extent they were supported by the record. R.pp. 15, 19. Insofar as Plaintiff suggests that he had even greater limitations, the ALJ reasonably found that “the medical evidence during the period from his alleged onset date through his date last insured does not provide a level of evidentiary sustainability to support the level of symptomatology and limitations as alleged.” R.p. 16. The ALJ relied on Plaintiff's routine and conservative treatment, the efficacy of his medications, and his unremarkable examinations to partially discount his subjective complaints and to conclude hypertension and diabetes had no more than a minimal impact on his work-related functioning. R.p. 13. Substantial evidence-a standard that is “not high”-supported the ALJ's fact-finding.
Ultimately, because the ALJ found in Plaintiff's favor at step two, proceeded through step five of the sequential evaluation process, and properly considered all of Plaintiff's impairments (both severe and non-severe) in evaluating his RFC, the undersigned finds remand is not warranted. See Sawyer v. Colvin, 995 F.Supp.2d 496, 509 (D.S.C. 2014) (“The undersigned agrees with other courts that find no reversible error where the ALJ does not find an impairment severe at step two provided that she considers that impairment in subsequent steps.”); Washington v. Astrue, 698 F.Supp.2d 562, 580 (D.S.C. 2010) (“Because the ALJ thus accounted for limitations that may have been caused by Plaintiff's arthritis, he did not commit reversible error in failing to find it severe.”). Ultimately, Plaintiff merely disagrees with the ALJ's conclusions as to the severity of his impairments, which is not a basis for remand.
C. Listing 12.15
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred at step three of the evaluation process by failing to properly evaluate his impairments. Specifically, Plaintiff argues he has sufficiently shown that his impairments meet or equal Listing 12.15 (trauma and stressor-related disorders). See 20 C.F.R. § Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1 § 12.15. Plaintiff has not shown remand is warranted.
The regulations provide that the burden of establishing disability under the listings is on the claimant. See 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(5)(A); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1512, 416.912; Mascio, 780 F.3d at 634-35. “Under Step [three], the regulation states that a claimant will be found disabled if he or she has an impairment that ‘[1] meets or equals one of our listings in appendix 1 of this subpart and [2] meets the duration requirement.'” Radford v. Colvin, 734 F.3d 288, 293 (4th Cir. 2013) (emphasis in original) (quoting 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iii)). It is not enough that the claimant has the diagnosis of a listed impairment; the claimant must also show evidence of the requirements for the listing of that impairment. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1525(d), 416.925(d). “For a claimant to show that his impairment matches a listing, it must meet all of the specified medical criteria. An impairment that manifests only some of those criteria, no matter how severely, does not qualify.” Sullivan v. Zebley, 493 U.S. 521, 530 (1990) (emphasis in original). There is no requirement that the ALJ provide “an exhaustive point-by-point breakdown” of each impairment when discussing the relevant listings at step three of the sequential analysis; rather, the ALJ is only compelled to provide a coherent basis for his determination. Keene v. Berryhill, 732 Fed.Appx. 174, 177 (4th Cir. 2018).
To meet Listing 12.15, Plaintiff must show a qualifying impairment that satisfies the requirements of parts A and B or A and C of the listing. See 20 C.F.R. § Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1 § 12.15. There is no contention that Plaintiff did not meet the part A criteria in § 12.15, as the ALJ found at step two that Plaintiff had the severe impairment of PTSD. R.p. 13. Further, Plaintiff does not challenge the ALJ's findings with regard to part C of the listing. Thus, at issue is whether the ALJ erred in his evaluation of the part B criteria.
To meet part B of Listing 12.15, a claimant must have an extreme limitation of one or a marked limitation of two of the following areas of mental functioning: (1) understanding, remembering, or applying information; (2) interacting with others; (3) concentrating, persisting, or maintaining pace; or (4) adapting or managing oneself. 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1 § 12.15(B). A marked limitation means the claimant's “functioning in this area independently, appropriately, effectively, and on a sustained basis is seriously limited.” 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1 § 12.00(F)(2)(d). An extreme limitation means the individual is “not able to function in [the] area independently, appropriately, effectively, and on a sustained basis.” 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1 § 12.00(F)(2)(e).
As to the part B criteria, the ALJ found the following:
In understanding, remembering or applying information, the claimant had a moderate limitation. Although the claimant has reported he has memory problems and requires his wife's assistance to remember appointments, the mental status examinations from the period at issue generally reflect that the claimant exhibited intact memory with normal cognition. (Exhibits 2F, 3F and 6F). Accordingly, there is no evidence showing the claimant had more than moderate problems in this domain.
In interacting with others, the claimant had a moderate limitation. The claimant has alleged difficulty interacting and being around others due to paranoia and angermanagement problems. He stated he generally does not leave his house. However, while the claimant's reports of paranoia may be supported by his diagnosis of PTSD, the examiners of record have not documented any significant objective social limitations. The claimant has routinely exhibited normal speech and cooperation, and none of the examiners has documented that the claimant demonstrated difficulty interacting or relating. (Exhibits 2F, 3F, and 6F).
With regard to concentrating, persisting or maintaining pace, the claimant had a moderate limitation. The claimant routinely exhibited intact attention and concentration during the period at issue. Nonetheless, in light of his history of
PTSD and reports of intrusive thoughts, the undersigned finds the claimant has moderate, albeit not marked, limitations in this domain. (Exhibits 2F, 3F, and 6F).
As for adapting or managing oneself, the claimant had experienced a moderate limitation. The claimant testified he experiences anhedonia and lacks the motivation to shower or brush his teeth more than a few days per week. He stated he generally watches television and does not perform household chores. However, there is no evidence showing the claimant reported such limited activities of daily living to his treating providers during the period at issue. (Exhibits 2F, 3F, and 6F).
Because the claimant's mental impairment did not cause at least two “marked” limitations or one “extreme” limitation, the “paragraph B” criteria were not satisfied.R.p. 14.
Upon review, the undersigned finds no error. The ALJ discussed each of the areas of mental functioning, explained his reasons for his findings, and supported his conclusions with citations to evidence. The ALJ did what he is “compelled” to do: “provide a coherent basis for his step-three determination.” See Keene, 732 Fed.Appx. at 177. Consequently, the undersigned is not left to guess at why the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff did not meet Listing 12.15 and finds the ALJ's determination is supported by substantial evidence. See Biestek, 139 S.Ct. at 1154 (noting substantial evidence is an evidentiary standard that is not high: it is “more than a mere scintilla” and means only “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion”); see also Dubose v. Kijakazi, No. 4:21-CV-03688-TER, 2023 WL 1960997, at *7 (D.S.C. Feb. 13, 2023) (“The ALJ provided more than a mere scintilla of record support for the paragraph B findings. The court does not weigh again evidence already weighed by the ALJ. The ALJ complied with the applicable regulations in making clear to a subsequent reviewer the reasons for the findings made.”).
Nevertheless, Plaintiff argues (1) he has an extreme limitation in interacting with others, (2) the ALJ failed to fully develop the record and “played doctor,” and (3) the ALJ erred in failing to adequately consider evidence from the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA). None of Plaintiff's arguments compel remand.
1. Evidence of extreme limitation
Plaintiff maintains that his medical records “show he has an extreme limitation in interacting with others since his PTSD causes aggressive and angry outburst toward others,” and cites to evidence which he argues supports an extreme limitation finding. ECF No. 19 at 14-15. But Plaintiff merely presents a disagreement with the ALJ's findings and urges this Court to view the evidence he highlights differently. It is the job of the ALJ to weigh evidence and resolve any evidentiary conflicts, not this Court. See Keene, 732 Fed.Appx. at 177 (“This court's function is not to substitute its own judgment for that of the ALJ, but to determine whether the ALJ's decision is supported as a matter of fact and law. There were a number of conflicts in the evidence here, and we do not second guess the ALJ in resolving those conflicts.”); Johnson v. Barnhart, 434 F.3d 650, 653 (4th Cir. 2005) (“In reviewing for substantial evidence, we do not undertake to reweigh conflicting evidence, make credibility determinations, or substitute our judgment for that of the [ALJ].” (citation omitted)).
2. Duty to develop the record
Plaintiff argues the ALJ failed his duty to fully develop the record. ECF No. 19 at 15-18. Specifically, without any citation to case law in the Fourth Circuit, Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ was required to obtain additional medical opinion evidence and argues the ALJ's failure to do so breached his duty to develop the record. He further suggests that, because the ALJ did not request more medical opinion evidence, the ALJ substituted his own interpretation of medical records.
The Fourth Circuit has long recognized that “an ALJ has a duty to investigate the facts and develop the record independent of the claimant or his counsel.” Pearson v. Colvin, 810 F.3d 204, 210 (4th Cir. 2015). This duty to develop the record is triggered when the record is inconsistent, ambiguous, or otherwise insufficient to allow the ALJ to make a proper determination as to a claim. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1519a, 416.919a (noting consultative examinations may be purchased when trying to resolve an inconsistency in the evidence or when the evidence is insufficient to support a determination on a claim); Cook v. Heckler, 783 F.2d 1168, 1173 (4th Cir. 1986) (noting an ALJ has a duty to inquire into the issues necessary for development of the record and cannot rely on evidence that is “inadequate”); see also Mayes v. Massanari, 276 F.3d 453, 459-60 (9th Cir. 2001) (“An ALJ's duty to develop the record further is triggered only when there is ambiguous evidence or when the record is inadequate to allow for proper evaluation of the evidence.”).
However, this duty does not impose an obligation on the ALJ to “function as the claimant's substitute counsel” nor does it require the ALJ to supplement a sufficient record to correct deficiencies in a claimant's case. Lehman v. Astrue, 931 F.Supp.2d 682, 693 (D. Md. 2013) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Indeed, the claimant bears the burden of proof through step four, and he is responsible for providing evidence to support his application and demonstrate disability. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1512, 416.912.
Despite these dueling considerations of an ALJ's duty to develop the record and the claimant's burden to prove his case, “it is reversible error for an ALJ not to order a consultative examination when such evaluation is necessary for him to make an informed decision.” Huddleston v. Astrue, 826 F.Supp.2d 942, 959 (S.D. W.Va. 2011) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); accord Holladay v. Bowen, 848 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1988). Thus, in analyzing this duty, the main consideration is whether the record had sufficient medical evidence for the ALJ to make an informed decision concerning the claimant's case. Lehman, 931 F.Supp. at 692; see also Ingram v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 496 F.3d 1253, 1269 (11th Cir. 2007) (“The [ALJ] has a duty to develop the record where appropriate but is not required to order a consultative examination as long as the record contains sufficient evidence for the [ALJ] to make an informed decision.”).
Here, there was no need for the ALJ to further develop the record with medical expert testimony. As an initial matter, there is no merit to Plaintiff's argument that the ALJ was required to obtain more medical expert opinions to address whether his PTSD medically equaled a listed impairment. See ECF No. 19 at 15-18. Although ALJs “may ask for and consider evidence from medical experts,” they are not required to do so. See SSR 17-2p, 2017 WL 3928306, at *15264-65 (S.S.A. March 27, 2017) (“If an adjudicator at the hearings or AC level believes that the evidence does not reasonably support a finding that the individual's impairment(s) medically equals a listed impairment, we do not require the adjudicator to obtain ME [medical expert] evidence or medical support staff input prior to making a step 3 finding that the individual's impairment(s) does not medically equal a listed impairment.” (emphasis added)).
Plaintiff argues the “Brister test” requires more medical opinions be considered, citing to cases outside the Fourth Circuit. See ECF No. 19 at 17-18. However, the undersigned is unpersuaded by these arguments and the cited cases. And, Plaintiff has not cited to any case law in the Fourth Circuit that supports his position.
It is unclear how Brister v. Apfel supports Plaintiff's position, as the court in that case affirmed the ALJ's decision and rejected “Plaintiff's argument that the ALJ erred by failing to hear from a medical expert following Plaintiff's submission of additional evidence.” See Brister v. Apfel, 993 F.Supp. 574, 578 n.2 (S.D. Tex. 1998).
The other cases Plaintiff string cites do not appear to support his position either. See ECF No. 19 at 18 (string citing cases). The bulk of the cases cited stand for the proposition that, without an expert opinion on medical equivalency in the record, the record lacks substantial evidence to support an ALJ's decision on medical equivalency-a problem that is not present in Plaintiff's case (as noted below with the opinions of Doctors Clausen and Neboschick). See, e.g., Ingle v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., No. SA-17-CV-1218-OG, 2019 WL 1313456, at *1 (W.D. Tex. Mar. 12, 2019). Some of the other cases appear to deal with a pilot program that is not relevant to Plaintiff's situation. See Thomas v. Colvin, 69 F.Supp.3d 1174, 1178 (D. Colo. 2014) (finding that the claimant's listings determination was made by a Single Decision Maker (“SDM”) and remanding because “the opinion of an SDM does not satisfy the requirement that the finding of medical equivalence be supported by the opinion of a physician or psychologist”); Stratton v. Astrue, 987 F.Supp.2d 135, 138 n.2, 151-52 (D.N.H. 2012) (noting the SDM pilot program was “part of an experiment initiated in New Hampshire and Maine to expedite processing of applications” and remanding where the listings determination was based on an SDM opinion).
In Plaintiff's case, the record had sufficient medical evidence for the ALJ to make an informed decision. Indeed, the record before the ALJ already contained the prior administrative medical findings of state agency psychological experts Doctors Clausen and Neboschick. R.pp. 96-97, 107-09. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1513a(b)(1) (stating that state agency psychological consultants “are highly qualified and experts in Social Security disability evaluation”). Doctors Clausen and Neboschick-who both reviewed all time-relevant evidence through Plaintiff's date last insured-specifically considered the evidence against the Listing 12.15 criteria and found the listing was not satisfied. R.pp. 96-97, 107-09. In addition, for the reasons explained by the ALJ in the decision, the other evidence did not reasonably support a finding of medical equivalence. R.pp. 13-15. Plaintiff's insistence that more opinion evidence was necessary is without merit, and cases within the Fourth Circuit do not support Plaintiff's position. See, e.g., Doretha B. v. Kijakazi, No. CV MJM-20-2962, 2022 WL 1052680, at *3 (D. Md. Apr. 5, 2022) (“The ALJ's analysis reflects a reasoned belief that the evidence does not reasonably support a finding of medical equivalence of a listed impairment; therefore, the AJL did not need to obtain medical expert evidence or medical support staff input under SSR 17-2p.” (emphasis added)).
Additionally, contrary to Plaintiff's suggestion (ECF No. 19 at 17-18), the ALJ was not required to develop the record further simply because he found the medical opinions and prior administrative medical findings unpersuasive. See R.pp. 18-19. Indeed, without any citation to Fourth Circuit case law, Plaintiff appears to suggest the ALJ's persuasiveness evaluations of opinion evidence constrain or otherwise dictate the ALJ's ability to make determinations on Plaintiff's impairments. However, the ALJ alone was responsible for determining whether Plaintiff's impairment met or medically equaled Listing 12.15, and he was not required to defer to any medical source to make that determination. See SSR 17-2p, 2017 WL 3928306, at *15265 (“Whether an impairment(s) medically equals the requirements of a listed impairment is an issue reserved to the Commissioner.”); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(a) (“We will not defer or give any specific evidentiary weight, including controlling weight, to any medical opinion(s) or prior administrative medical fmding(s), including those from your medical sources”). Thus, contrary to what Plaintiff suggests, the ALJ's decision does not need to be remanded because the listings determination- which is an issue reserved for the ALJ-was based, in part, on opinion evidence the ALJ found partially unpersuasive in the record. See generally Torres v. Saul, No. 2:19-CV-2000-MGL-MGB, 2020 WL 6264985, at *11 (D.S.C. July 22, 2020) (noting an ALJ “is not bound by [a] medical opinion in determining a claimant's RFC, nor is he required to adopt an opinion in its entirety” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)), report and recommendation adopted, No. CV 2:19-02000-MGL, 2020 WL 5810400 (D.S.C. Sept. 30, 2020); Fray v. Berryhill, No. CV 6:16-2916-TMC, 2018 WL 1224687, at *3 (D.S.C. Mar. 9, 2018) (finding that the ALJ was not required to tailor the RFC to include every limitation in a doctor's opinion, provided the ALJ's decision is supported by substantial evidence).
Consequently, Plaintiff's suggestion that the ALJ “played doctor” in making the listings determination is without merit.
Accordingly, the ALJ was not required to develop the record further by obtaining a medical expert opinion. See SSR 17-2p, 2017 WL 3928306, at *15264-65; Gray v. Berryhill, No. CV 0:16-3099-BHH, 2018 WL 1081499, at *4 (D.S.C. Feb. 28, 2018) (rejecting an argument that the ALJ should have further developed the record and finding “where, as here, [the ALJ] did not give controlling weight to all aspects of the treating physicians' opinions, [the ALJ] was under no obligation to seek favorable, additional evidence for the claimant.” (citation omitted)).
3. Department of Veterans Affairs.
Plaintiff argues the ALJ erred in inadequately incorporating favorable evidence from the VA, making the ALJ's decision “continually unsupported with substantial evidence.” ECF No. 19 at 18-19. He argues the ALJ improperly dismissed the VA disability rating, failed to give the VA determination any weight, and appears to suggest the ALJ erred by not giving such evidence “great weight.” See ECF No. 19 at 19. A simple reading of the current regulations does not support his position.
Under the current regulations, a decision by another governmental agency (including the VA) is “[e]vidence that is inherently neither valuable nor persuasive” such that an ALJ “will not provide any analysis about how we considered such evidence in our determination or decision, even under [§§ 404.1520c and/or 416.920c].” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520b(c), 416.920b(c). Instead, the applicable regulations provide, in pertinent part:
Other governmental agencies and nongovernmental entities-such as the Department of Veterans Affairs . . .-make disability, blindness, employability, Medicaid, workers' compensation, and other benefits decisions for their own programs using their own rules. Because a decision by any other governmental agency or a nongovernmental entity about whether you are disabled, blind, employable, or entitled to any benefits is based on its rules, it is not binding on us and is not our decision about whether you are disabled or blind under our rules. Therefore, in claims filed [ ] on or after March 27, 2017, we will not provide any analysis in our determination or decision about a decision made by any other governmental agency or a nongovernmental entity about whether you are disabled, blind, employable, or entitled to any benefits. However, we will consider all of the supporting evidence underlying the other governmental agency or nongovernmental entity's decision that we receive as evidence in your claim in accordance with [§ 404.1513(a)(1) through (4) and/or 416.913(a)(1) through (4)].20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1504, 416.904 (emphasis added).
Here, review of the ALJ's decision reveals no error in the ALJ's consideration of the VA disability rating and the underlying records. The ALJ specifically noted that Plaintiff had a VA disability rating. R.p. 19. He explained that he did not analyze Plaintiffs VA rating decision but had instead “considered all of the supporting evidence available in the record underlying the VA rating decision that was received as evidence in relation to [Plaintiff's] applications for Title II benefits.” R.p. 19. The ALJ ultimately determined this evidence did not support a conclusion that Plaintiff had disabling limitations under the Social Security Administration's regulations. R.p. 19. This is proper under the current regulations.
To the extent Plaintiff argues the ALJ was required to give the VA disability determination “great weight” or was required to discuss the VA disability rating more thoroughly, he is mistaken. As an initial matter, Plaintiff cites to no Fourth Circuit precedent that supports this contention. Moreover, the Fifth and Eleventh Circuit cases he does rely upon are twenty to forty years old and were thus published well before the regulations applicable to his case were implemented in 2017. See ECF No. 19 at 19.
Perhaps more importantly, the regulations explicitly state the ALJ is under no obligation to provide any analysis of a VA disability decision. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520b(c) (“Because the evidence listed in paragraphs (c)(1) through (c)(3) of this section is inherently neither valuable nor persuasive to the issue of whether you are disabled or blind under the Act, we will not provide any analysis about how we considered such evidence in our determination or decision, even under § 404.1520c.” (emphasis added)). Plaintiff's contention-that the VA's disability decision should have been accorded any weight or thoroughly discussed and analyzed-is incorrect. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1504, 416.904 (“[W]e will not provide any analysis in our determination or decision about a decision made by any other governmental agency or a nongovernmental entity about whether you are disabled, blind, employable, or entitled to any benefits.”); see also McClellon v. Kijakazi, No. 6:20-CV-3216-SAL, 2021 WL 6133847, at *5 (D.S.C. Dec. 28, 2021) (“Thus, the regulatory changes applicable in cases filed after March 27, 2017, no longer include VA rating decisions as evidence that must explicitly be considered.”).
Review of the ALJ's decision shows that the ALJ considered the evidence underlying the VA's decision, which is all that the regulations require. Remand on this basis is not warranted.
D. RFC determination
Finally, Plaintiff argues the ALJ improperly determined his RFC. ECF No. 19 at 19-20. Plaintiff suggests, again, that the ALJ failed to fulfill his duty to develop the record, rendering the RFC determination unsupported by substantial evidence. Plaintiff has failed to show remand is warranted.
A claimant's RFC, which represents “the most [she] can still do despite [her] limitations,” is determined by assessing all relevant evidence in the case record, including “all of the relevant medical and other evidence.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(1), (a)(3). As a result, an ALJ's “RFC assessment must include a narrative discussion describing how the evidence supports each conclusion, citing specific medical facts (e.g., laboratory findings) and nonmedical evidence (e.g., daily activities, observations).” SSR 96-8p, 1996 WL 374184, at *7 (S.S.A. July 2, 1996). Moreover, the ALJ “must discuss the individual's ability to perform sustained work activities in an ordinary work setting on a regular and continuing basis (i.e., 8 hours a day, for 5 days a week, or an equivalent work schedule), and describe the maximum amount of each work-related activity the individual can perform based on the evidence available in the case record.” Id.
In evaluating an RFC, an ALJ must “consider all of the claimant's ‘physical and mental impairments, severe and otherwise, and determine, on a function-by-function basis, how they affect [her] ability to work.'” Thomas v. Berryhill, 916 F.3d 307, 311 (4th Cir. 2019) (quoting Monroe v. Colvin, 826 F.3d 176, 188 (4th Cir. 2016)). “[A]n ALJ's RFC assessment must include an evaluation of the claimant's ability to perform the physical functions listed in 20 C.F.R. §[§ 404.1545(b),] 416.945(b).” Dowling v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 986 F.3d 377, 387 (4th Cir. 2021) (citing SSR 96-8p, 1996 WL 374184, at *1). “‘Only after such a function-by-function analysis may an ALJ express RFC in terms of the exertional levels of work' of which he believes the claimant to be capable.” Id. (quoting Monroe, 826 F.3d at 179) (emphasis added). Moreover, every conclusion reached by an ALJ when evaluating a claimant's RFC must be accompanied by “a narrative discussion describing [] the evidence” that supports it. Id. (quoting Thomas, 916 F.3d at 311) (alteration in original).
These physical functions are “sitting, standing, walking, lifting, carrying, pushing, pulling, or other physical functions [that] may reduce [a claimant's] ability to do past work and other work.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1545(b), 416.945(b).
Consequently, “a proper RFC analysis has three components: (1) evidence, (2) logical explanation, and (3) conclusion.” Thomas, 916 F.3d at 311. The ALJ's logical explanation is just as important as the ALJ's discussion of evidence and his conclusion. Id. Thus, in conducting an RFC analysis, an ALJ must identify both the evidence that backs his conclusion, and “build an accurate and logical bridge from [that] evidence to his conclusion.” Woods v. Berryhill, 888 F.3d 686, 694 (4th Cir. 2018) (alteration in original) (quoting Monroe, 826 F.3d at 189).
Here, the ALJ's RFC determination passes the “not high” bar of substantial evidence review. See Biestek, 139 S.Ct. at 1154 (noting substantial evidence is an evidentiary standard that is not high: it is “more than a mere scintilla” and means only “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion”). In assessing the RFC, the ALJ explained why the record supported the residual functional capacity finding for work at all exertional levels with extensive non-exertional limitations but did not support even greater restrictions. R.pp. 12-19. The ALJ relied on the evidence showing that: (1) Plaintiff received minimal and conservative treatment for his physical and mental complaints during the relevant period; (2) his physical conditions, including hypertension and diabetes, remained generally controlled with medications and dietary changes; (3) his mental health symptoms improved with medications; (4) he exhibited unremarkable physical and mental status examination findings; and (5) four reviewing state agency experts found his physical and mental impairments were not severe through his date last insured. R.pp. 15-19.
The ALJ included specific rationale to support his fact-finding about Plaintiff's RFC. R.pp. 17, 19. The ALJ discussed that he had “considered [Plaintiff's] history of PTSD in limiting him to simple, routine tasks but not at a production rate pace with reduced social interaction and only simple work-related decisions.” R.p. 17. The ALJ further explained that:
[T]he above residual functional capacity is supported by the documentation of the claimant's PTSD, as well as his subjective reports of handling and vision problems, although his subjective reports are not well-supported by the objective findings of record. There is no evidence showing the claimant exhibited any physical conditions or strength deficits or gait abnormalities that would preclude him from performing work at all exertional levels. The undersigned has also restricted him to jobs where the noise intensity level does not exceed a moderate level (level 3) to account for his subjective reports that loud noise exacerbate[s] his PTSD symptoms. However, for the reasons set forth above, the undersigned cannot find that he was incapable of all work activity during the period at issue to be consistent with the record as a whole.R.p. 19.
The undersigned is able to follow the ALJ's reasoning and substantial evidence supports his conclusions. See Woods, 888 F.3d at 694 (noting in conducting an RFC analysis, an ALJ must identify both the evidence that backs his conclusion, and “build an accurate and logical bridge from [that] evidence to his conclusion” (alteration in original) (quoting Monroe, 826 F.3d at 189)).
Plaintiff points to his testimony at the hearing which he argues supports his position and maintains that the RFC finding was “unreasonable.” ECF No. 19 at 20. In essence, Plaintiff asks the Court to accept his characterization of the evidence over the ALJ's and read the evidence differently. That is not the role of this Court. See Hancock, 667 F.3d at 472 (noting a reviewing court does not reweigh conflicts in evidence, make credibility determinations, or substitute its judgment for that of the ALJ); Walls, 296 F.3d at 290 (noting judicial review is limited to determining (1) whether the factual findings are supported by substantial evidence, and (2) whether the correct legal standards were applied).
To the extent the ALJ did not mention or omitted certain aspects of the record, the mere omission of some evidence does not require remand. See Jackson v. Astrue, No. C/A 8:08-2855-JFA-BHH, 2010 WL 500449, at *10 (D.S.C. Feb. 5, 2010) (“[A]n ALJ is not required to provide a written evaluation of every piece of evidence, but need only ‘minimally articulate' his reasoning so as to ‘make a bridge' between the evidence and his conclusions.” (citations omitted)). Quite simply, Plaintiff has failed to show reversible error in the ALJ's RFC assessment of the evidence. See Reid v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 769 F.3d 861, 865 (4th Cir. 2014) (“[T]here is no rigid requirement that the ALJ specifically refer to every piece of evidence in his decision.” (quotation marks and citation omitted)); Russell v. Chater, 60 F.3d 824, 1995 WL 417576, at *3 (4th Cir. 1995) (unpublished) (rejecting an argument that the ALJ's analysis was insufficiently specific and noting Fourth Circuit precedent “does not establish an inflexible rule requiring an exhaustive point-by-point discussion in all cases”); see also Craigv. Apfel, 212 F.3d 433, 436 (8th Cir. 2000) (“[A]n ALJ is not required to discuss all the evidence submitted, and an ALJ's failure to cite specific evidence does not indicate that it was not considered.” (citation omitted)).
The ALJ's decision was supported by substantial evidence. Consequently, remand is not warranted. See Biestek, 139 S.Ct. at 1154 (noting substantial evidence is an evidentiary standard that is not high: it is “more than a mere scintilla” and means only “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion”).
V. CONCLUSION
It is RECOMMENDED that the decision of the Commissioner be AFFIRMED.
The parties are directed to the next page for their rights to file objections to this recommendation.
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
Post Office Box 835
Charleston, South Carolina 29402
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).