Opinion
C/A 6:23-cv-5176-SAL-KFM
07-12-2024
David C.,[1] Plaintiff, v. Martin J. O'Malley,[2] Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant.
REPORT OF MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Kevin F. McDonald, United States Magistrate Judge
This case is before the court for a report and recommendation pursuant to Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2)(a) (D.S.C.), concerning the disposition of Social Security cases in this District, and 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B). The plaintiff brought this action pursuant to Section 205(g) of the Social Security Act, as amended (42 U.S.C. 405(g)), to obtain judicial review of a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security denying his claim for disability insurance benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act.
A report and recommendation is being filed in this case in which one or both parties declined to consent to disposition by the magistrate judge.
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS
The plaintiff filed an application for disability insurance benefits (“DIB”) on August 27, 2018, alleging that he became unable to work on September 25, 2017 (Tr. 167-68). The application was denied initially (Tr. 72-82) and on reconsideration (Tr. 83-98) by the Social Security Administration. On May 1, 2019, the plaintiff requested a hearing (Tr. 113-14). On December 13, 2019, an administrative hearing was held at which the plaintiff, represented by counsel, and Karl Weldon, an impartial vocational expert, appeared and testified before an administrative law judge (“ALJ”) in Greenville, South Carolina (Tr. 30-71). On January 29, 2020, the ALJ considered the case de novo and found that the plaintiff was not under a disability as defined in the Social Security Act, as amended (Tr. 12-28). The ALJ's finding became the final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security when the Appeals Council denied the plaintiff's request for review on October 20, 2020 (Tr. 1-3).
On November 23, 2020, the plaintiff filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, and on January 10, 2022, the case was remanded to the Commissioner for further proceedings (Tr. 474-85). Cullen v. Comm'r Soc. Sec. Admin., C/A No. 6:20-cv-04061-SAL, 2022 WL 92616 (D.S.C. Jan. 10, 2022). On May 21, 2022, the Appeals Council issued an order remanding the matter to the ALJ to issue a new decision in accordance with the order (Tr. 490).
On November 30, 2022, a second administrative hearing was held at which the plaintiff, represented by counsel, and Tricia Muth, an impartial vocational expert, appeared and testified before the ALJ by telephone in Greenville, South Carolina (Tr. 397-425). On January 11,2023, the ALJ found that the plaintiff was not under a disability as defined in the Social Security Act, as amended (Tr. 375-96). The ALJ's finding became the final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security when the Appeals Council denied the plaintiff's request for review on August 15, 2023 (Tr. 363-67). The plaintiff then filed this action for judicial review (doc. 1).
In making the determination that the plaintiff is not entitled to benefits, the Commissioner has adopted the following findings of the ALJ:
(1) The claimant meets the insured status requirements of the Social Security Act through December 31, 2022.
(2) The claimant has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since September 25, 2017, the alleged onset date (20 C.F.R. § 404.1571 et seq.).
(3) The claimant has the following severe impairments: bipolar disorder; anxiety disorder; and avoidant personality disorder (20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(c)).
(4) The claimant does not have an impairment or combination of impairments that meets or medically equals the severity of one of the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 (20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(d), 404.1525, and 404.1526).
(5) After careful consideration of the entire record, the undersigned finds that the claimant has the residual functional capacity to perform a full range of work at all exertional levels but with the following non-exertional limitations: He can occasionally be exposed to hazards associated with unprotected dangerous machinery or unprotected heights; can concentrate, persist, and maintain pace sufficient to understand, remember, and carry out simple, routine tasks, involving simple work-related decisions, occasional independent judgment skills and occasional workplace changes; cannot perform work requiring a specific production rate (such as team-dependent assembly line work); can never have interactions with the general public, and only occasional interactions with co-workers.
(6) The claimant is unable to perform any past relevant work (20 C.F.R. § 404.1565).
(7) The claimant was born on May 9, 1970, and was 47 years old, which is defined as a younger individual age 18-49, on the alleged disability onset date. His age category subsequently changed to an individual approaching closely approaching advanced age (20 C.F.R. § 404.1563).
(8) The claimant has at least a high school education (20 C.F.R. § 404.1564).
(9) Transferability of job skills is not material to the determination of disability because using the Medical-Vocational Rules as a framework supports a finding that the claimant is “not disabled,” whether or not the claimant has transferable job skills (See SSR 82-41 and 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 2).
(10) Considering the claimant's age, education, work experience, and residual functional capacity, there are jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy that the claimant can perform (20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1569 and 404.1569a).
(11) The claimant has not been under a disability, as defined in the Social Security Act, from September 25, 2017, through the date of this decision (20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(g)).
The only issues before the court are whether proper legal standards were applied and whether the final decision of the Commissioner is supported by substantial evidence.
APPLICABLE LAW
Under 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A), (d)(5), as well as pursuant to the regulations formulated by the Commissioner, the plaintiff has the burden of proving disability, which is defined as an “inability to do any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1505(a).
To facilitate a uniform and efficient processing of disability claims, the Social Security Act has by regulation reduced the statutory definition of “disability” to a series of five sequential questions. An examiner must consider whether the claimant (1) is engaged in substantial gainful activity, (2) has a severe impairment, (3) has an impairment that meets or medically equals an impairment contained in the Listing of Impairments found at 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 1, (4) can perform his past relevant work, and (5) can perform other work. Id. § 404.1520. If an individual is found disabled or not disabled at any step, further inquiry is unnecessary. Id. § 404.1520(a)(4).
A claimant must make a prima facie case of disability by showing he is unable to return to his past relevant work because of his impairments. Grant v. Schweiker, 699 F.2d 189, 191 (4th Cir. 1983). Once an individual has established a prima facie case of disability, the burden shifts to the Commissioner to establish that the plaintiff can perform alternative work and that such work exists in the national economy. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A)). The Commissioner may carry this burden by obtaining testimony from a vocational expert. Id. at 191-92.
Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), the court may review the Commissioner's denial of benefits. However, this review is limited to considering whether the Commissioner's findings “are supported by substantial evidence and were reached through application of the correct legal standard.” Craig v. Chater, 76 F.3d 585, 589 (4th Cir. 1996). “Substantial evidence” means “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion; it consists of more than a mere scintilla of evidence but may be somewhat less than a preponderance.” Id. In reviewing the evidence, the court may not “undertake to re-weigh conflicting evidence, make credibility determinations, or substitute [its] judgment for that of the [Commissioner].” Id. Consequently, even if the court disagrees with the Commissioner's decision, the court must uphold it if it is supported by substantial evidence. Blalock v. Richardson, 483 F.2d 773, 775 (4th Cir. 1972).
ANALYSIS
The plaintiff, who was 47 years old on the alleged disability onset date, seeks disability based upon mental impairments that limit his ability to work. He has past relevant work experience as a software engineer (Tr. 389-90). The plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred by failing to appropriately explain his consideration of opinion evidence from Christopher Caston, M.D. (doc. 7 at 24-33). The Commissioner, on the other hand, asserts that the ALJ's decision is supported by substantial evidence and should be affirmed (doc. 11 at 13-25).
Medical Source Statements
As noted, the plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed to appropriately evaluate opinion evidence from the plaintiff's treating provider, Dr. Caston (doc. 7 at 24-33). For applications filed on or after March 27, 2017, such as the plaintiff's herein, a new regulatory framework for considering and articulating the value of medical opinions has been established. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c; see also 82 Fed.Reg. 5844-01,2017 WL 168819 (revisions to medical evidence rules dated Jan. 18, 2017, and effective for claims filed after Mar. 27, 2017). Most notably, the new regulations no longer require that special significance be given to opinions by a claimant's treating physician. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527 (noting that the treating physician rule only applies to claims filed before March 27, 2017). Indeed, the ALJ is not required to defer to or give any specific weight to medical opinions. Id. at § 404.1520c(a). Instead, the ALJ should consider and articulate in the decision how persuasive each medical opinion is based upon the factors of: (1) supportability; (2) consistency; (3) relationship with the claimant; (4) specialization; and (5) other factors that tend to support or contradict a medical opinion. Id. § 404.1520c(b), (c). Supportability and consistency are the most important of the factors for consideration, and the ALJ is required to explain how he considered the supportability and consistency factors in evaluating opinion evidence. Id. § 404.1520c(a), (b)(2). An ALJ may, but is not required to, explain how the remaining factors were considered. Id. § 404.1520c(b)(2). In evaluating the supportability of an opinion, “[t]he more relevant the objective medical evidence and supporting explanations presented by a medical source are to support his or her medical opinion(s) . . . the more persuasive the medical opinions . . . will be.” Id. § 404.1520c(c)(1). In evaluating the consistency of an opinion, “[t]he more consistent a medical opinion(s) . . . is with the evidence from other medical sources and nonmedical sources in the claim, the more persuasive the medical opinion(s) . . . will be.” Id. § 404.1520c(c)(2).
On November 13, 2019, Dr. Caston signed a letter about the plaintiff that was drafted by an individual who worked with the plaintiff's counsel (see Tr. 358). In the letter, Dr. Caston noted that the plaintiff reported regressing into a “mental fog.” The letter reported that the plaintiff had visual and auditory hallucinations that worsened in 2017, which later caused him to resign from his job. Dr. Caston reported that the plaintiff was too fearful to apply for jobs, and the plaintiff stated that his “brain [was] broken.” Dr. Caston reduced the plaintiff's medications secondary to the plaintiff's reports of sleeping twelve to fifteen hours per day. The plaintiff had rapid thought processes that would keep him up at night and result in sleeping all day the next day. The plaintiff was reclusive and paranoid about his condition and “unable to attend any sort of work without being unable to function.” The plaintiff had trouble communicating with other people. Dr. Caston further reported that the plaintiff's chronic delusions “diminished some” secondary to medication changes (Tr. 359-60).
The ALJ considered the opinion letter by Dr. Caston and found it unpersuasive (Tr. 385-87). The ALJ then went on to address specific evidence from Dr. Caston's treatment notes that did not support Dr. Caston's opined limitations as well as other record evidence that was inconsistent with the opined limitations (Tr. 385-87). Despite the foregoing, the plaintiff argues that the ALJ's opinion analysis erred in finding Dr. Caston's opinion vague, did not adequately address supportability and consistency, as well as that it ran afoul of Shelly C. (doc. 7 at 24-33). See Shelly C. v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 61 F.4th 341, 361 (4th Cir. 2023) (noting that an ALJ cannot rely on the absence of objective medical evidence to discredit a claimant's subjective complaints when evaluating chronic depression). As an initial matter, the majority of the plaintiff's arguments reference treatment records that were evaluated and considered by the ALJ in his decision, meaning that the plaintiff requests that this court reweigh evidence and come to a different conclusion, which is beyond the purview of substantial evidence review. Further, to the extent the plaintiff argues that the ALJ was required to request clarification from Dr. Caston regarding his opined limitations because it was vague, the undersigned finds this argument unavailing. An ALJ has a “duty to investigate the facts and develop the record independent of the claimant or his counsel.” Pearson v. Colvin, 810 F.3d 204, 210 (4th Cir. 2015). The duty to develop the record is triggered when the record is inconsistent, ambiguous, or otherwise insufficient to allow the ALJ to make a proper determination as to a claim. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1519a; Marvin F. v. Kijakazi, C/A No. 9:22-cv-03019-JD-MHC, 2023 WL 5056950, at *10 (D.S.C. June 12, 2023) (collecting cases noting that an ALJ cannot rely on a record that is “inadequate” (internal citations omitted)), R&R adopted by 2023 WL 5041324 (D.S.C. Aug. 7, 2023). However, an ALJ is not required to function as “substitute counsel” or supplement a sufficient record to correct deficiencies in a plaintiff's case. See Lehman v. Astrue, 931 F.Supp.2d 682, 693 (D. Md. 2013) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Instead, the plaintiff bears the burden through step four to provide evidence to support his application and demonstrate disability. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1512. Here, the plaintiff's contention that the ALJ was required to obtain additional information from Dr. Caston, in essence, asserts that the ALJ should act as “substitute counsel” to obtain a more favorable, supported, and consistent opinion for the plaintiff. Indeed, as noted, the opinion letter was drafted by someone who worked for the plaintiff's counsel after discussion with Dr. Caston (Tr. 358). Certainly, in this type of situation, the ALJ - with an otherwise complete record - was not required to “do a better job” for the plaintiff and obtain a more persuasive opinion from a treating provider. See Turner v. Kijakazi, C/A No 4:20-cv-02861-TER, 2021 WL 3758060, at *12 (D.S.C. Aug. 25, 2021) (noting that an ALJ is under no obligation to supplement the record and correct deficiencies in a plaintiff's case particularly when the plaintiff is represented by counsel (internal citations omitted)). As such, the ALJ did not err in noting that Dr. Caston's opinion was vague, and the ALJ had no duty to supplement the record by reaching out to Dr. Caston about his vague opinion.
Further, the ALJ's opinion analysis did not run afoul of Shelly C., as argued by the plaintiff. The court in Shelly C. specifically noted that because chronic depression was also a disease that does not produce objective evidence, the extension of the doctrine (first set out in Arakas) was appropriate. Shelly C., 61 F.4th at 361. Here, the ALJ - unlike the ALJ in Shelly C. - detailed the plaintiff's longitudinal treatment records in finding them unsupportive of and inconsistent with Dr. Caston's opined limitations (Tr. 385-87). Indeed, the ALJ - unlike in Shelly C. - specifically noted both positive and benign examination findings in analyzing the plaintiff's treatment records and finding that the plaintiff could engage in a range of work with certain non-exertional limitations. Moreover, Shelly C. involved the application of opinion analysis regulations not applicable to the plaintiff's application, which was filed after March 27, 2017. Shelly C., 61 F.4th at 353-55 (analyzing opinion evidence based on regulations applicable for claims filed before March 27, 2017). Further, here, unlike in Shelly C., the plaintiff (who is represented by counsel) has not argued error with respect to the ALJ's consideration of the plaintiff's subjective complaints, and the ALJ found that the plaintiff's subjective complaints were not consistent with the record evidence (seeTr. 382, 388-89). Shinaberry v. Saul, 952 F.3d 113, 124 n.5 (4th Cir. 2020) (noting that a plaintiff waived review of a claim by failing to raise it in her initial brief). Nevertheless, the undersigned will address the plaintiff's arguments regarding the ALJ's supportability and consistency analysis of Dr. Caston's opinion.
Here, the plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in the supportability analysis of Dr. Caston's opinion because the ALJ should not have noted the situational stressors relating to periods of deterioration in functioning and based on Brown v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration (doc. 7 at 29-30 (citing Brown v. Comm'r Soc. Sec. Admin., 873 F.3d 251, 270 (4th Cir. 2017)). As an initial matter, the material quoted from Brown and relied on by the plaintiff, involved an ALJ's evaluation of a plaintiff's subjective complaints in light of reported activities of daily living (“ADLs”); however, as noted above, the plaintiff here has not alleged error with respect to the ALJ's evaluation of his subjective complaints, making his reliance on Brown inapposite. See Brown, 873 F.3d at 270. Further, as noted by the ALJ, Dr. Caston's treatment notes were not supportive of his opined limitations. For example, as noted by the ALJ, Dr. Caston's notation that the plaintiff could not “attend any sort of work” was appears contrary to notations in Dr. Caston's records that the plaintiff had improvements and deteriorations in functioning especially when the deteriorations in functioning were regularly noted as involving situational stressors (such as encounters with the Greenville County Department of Social Services, divorce proceedings, custody difficulties with his ex-wife, difficulties with his children, and the plaintiff having to move in with his parents) (Tr. 343, 345, 346, 349, 350, 352, 669, 672, 678, 679, 680, 683, 684). Further, as noted by the ALJ, Dr. Caston's indication that the plaintiff could not engage in any sort of work was not supported by Dr. Caston's notations that the plaintiff was early or on time for treatment visits, was cooperative and appropriate with Dr. Caston (with only a few indications that the plaintiff was hostile during the longitudinal treatment records), had good hygiene, was appropriately dressed, and was fully oriented (Tr. 291, 294, 295, 296, 297, 298, 299, 300, 301, 302, 303, 341, 342, 343, 344, 345,346, 347, 348, 349, 350, 351,352, 353, 354 (noted as hostile), 355 (noted as defensive and hostile), 356, 357, 386, 663,664, 666, 667, 668, 669, 670, 671, 672, 673, 677, 678 (noted as hostile), 679, 680, 681 (noted as defensive and hostile), 682, 683, 684, 685, 686, 687). Dr. Caston also completed a letter on January 22, 2020, noting that the plaintiff was not a danger to his children or others and that the plaintiff was compliant with treatment (Tr. 665). Additionally, during this same time, as recognized by the ALJ, Dr. Caston continued conservative treatment for the plaintiff and noted that the plaintiff continued to make progress towards primary and secondary goals (Tr. 291, 294-303, 341--57, 663-64, 666-73, 677-87). Further, as noted by the ALJ, these examination findings and continued conservative treatment modalities did not support the severe restrictions opined by Dr. Caston. Although the plaintiff disagrees with the conclusion made by the ALJ, the ALJ (and not this court) is responsible for weighing evidence, and this court may not “undertake to re-weigh conflicting evidence, make credibility determinations, or substitute [its] judgment for that of the [Commissioner].” Craig, 76 F.3d at 589. As such, the undersigned finds no error in the ALJ's supportability analysis of Dr. Caston's opinion.
As noted, the plaintiff also argues that the ALJ erred in finding Dr. Caston's opinion inconsistent with other record evidence (doc. 7 at 31-33). First, the plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred by finding the plaintiff's reported ADLs inconsistent with Dr. Caston's opinion because the plaintiff reported spending some days doing nothing and needed encouragement to complete some ADLs (id.). The undersigned disagrees. Indeed, in finding the plaintiff's reported ADLs inconsistent with Dr. Caston's opined limitations, the ALJ referenced the limiting language utilized by the plaintiff in describing his ADLs (Tr. 386). For example, as recognized by the ALJ, the plaintiff reported in his function report that he could prepare simple meals, did light household chores, drove, went out alone, attended to his personal care routine, shopped in stores, shopped on the computer, could count change, paid bills, and managed personal finances (although the ALJ noted that the plaintiff reported forgetting to pay some bills) (Tr. 386 (citing Tr. 239-49)). The ALJ also noted other ADLs inconsistent with the severe limitations Dr. Caston opined, including the plaintiff's report during a consultative examination that he drove, shopped in stores, used a computer, paid bills online, took care of his personal care needs, prepped meals, occasionally performed household chores (cleaning and laundry), and did some yard work (Tr. 386 (citing Tr. 304-07)). Similarly, during the second administrative hearing, the plaintiff reported spending his day playing videogames or watching videos of other people playing videogames and was able to do his own laundry (Tr. 412-13), which was not consistent with Dr. Caston's opinion that the plaintiff could not “attend any sort of work” (Tr. 386). In light of the foregoing, the undersigned finds that the ALJ appropriately found the plaintiff's reported ADLs inconsistent with Dr. Caston's opined limitations.
The ALJ's decision references Exhibit 6F, but this appears to be a typo based on his reference to the plaintiff's function report, which can be found at Exhibit 6E.
The plaintiff also argues that the ALJ erred in finding other treatment records inconsistent with Dr. Caston's opined limitations - specifically records from James Ruffing, Psy.D., Joseph Friddle, P.A., and Al Edwards, M.D. (doc. 7 at 31-33). The undersigned disagrees. As recognized by the ALJ, on January 2, 2019, Dr. Ruffing performed a consultative examination of the plaintiff. As part of that examination, Dr. Ruffing noted that the plaintiff had linear, logical, relevant, and coherent thought processes; poverty of thought; no evidence of psychosis or lack of contact with reality; and no clear evidence of paranoia. The plaintiff was able to attend and focus during the evaluation, but Dr. Ruffing noted that the plaintiff would struggle with full focus and attention. The plaintiff had some slowing noted with speed of cognitive processing consistent with psychomotor retardation. Dr. Ruffing issued a mini-mental status exam (“MMSE”) where the plaintiff scored 30/30, with scores of 24 or higher suggesting mental status functioning within normal limits. Dr. Ruffing opined that the plaintiff could understand and respond to the spoken word, would have a moderate limitation in independent functioning, and would struggle to interact appropriately with others. The plaintiff could understand and comprehend simple tasks, but might struggle with complex tasks, and the plaintiff would have a moderate degree of impairment with concentration and memory (Tr. 304-06). The ALJ found Dr. Ruffing's opinion generally persuasive (which has not been challenged by the plaintiff as error herein), but specifically noted that it was not consistent with the extreme limitations opined by Dr. Caston (Tr. 385-86). For example, the ALJ noted that although Dr. Caston opined that the plaintiff would be unable to attend any work and had reduced academic/creative abilities, the plaintiff scored within the normal range (30/30) on the MMSE administered by Dr. Ruffing, and Dr. Ruffing noted that the plaintiff could manage his finances if awarded benefits; understand, comprehend, and complete simple tasks (though he may struggle with more complex tasks); and had only moderate impairments to his concentration and memory (Tr. 386).
Because the plaintiff has not asserted error in his initial brief regarding the evaluation of opinion evidence from Dr. Ruffing, it is waived. Shinaberry, 952 F.3d at 124 n.5.
Similarly, as recognized by the ALJ, Dr. Caston's opined limitations were inconsistent with treatment notes from Mr. Friddle (Tr. 386-87). Indeed, Mr. Friddle's treatment notes regularly mentioned normal examination findings, described the plaintiff's depression as situational in nature, and noted that the plaintiff refused to add an antidepressant to help control his symptoms (T r. 308-22, 386). Appearing to recognize that Mr. Friddle's observations were inconsistent with Dr. Caston's opined limitations, the plaintiff argues that these records were largely before the alleged onset date as well as that the ALJ ignored abnormal examination findings from Mr. Friddle's records (doc. 7 at 32). The undersigned finds the plaintiff's arguments unavailing. Although the plaintiff is correct that some of Mr. Friddle's treatment records were before the alleged onset date, that really only encompassed three of the visits, which span December 2016 through July 2017 (Tr. 308-14). The remainder of the visits, as recognized by the ALJ, were in the same month as the alleged onset date or occurred during the relevant period (Tr. 315-22). Further, contrary to the plaintiff's argument, the alleged abnormal findings reported were not examination findings noted by Mr. Friddle; instead, they were subjective symptoms reported by the plaintiff, which as noted above, the ALJ found inconsistent with other record evidence. Indeed, as recognized by the ALJ, during every treatment visit between December 2016 and January 2018 with Mr. Friddle, the plaintiff had a euthymic and stable mood, a congruent affect, clear sensorium, full orientation, intact short and long term memory, normal concentration and focus, regular speech, average fund of knowledge, average judgment and insight, appropriate dress and hygiene, logical thought processes, no psychosis, and no gross cognitive deficits (Tr. 309, 311, 313, 315, 317, 319, 321). These examination findings by Mr. Friddle, as recognized by the ALJ, were inconsistent with the extreme limitations opined by Dr. Caston, thus supporting the ALJ's determination that Dr. Caston's opinion was not persuasive.
The ALJ also found Dr. Caston's opinion unpersuasive because it was inconsistent with Dr. Edward's treatment records (Tr. 386-87). The plaintiff argues, however, that the ALJ erred in finding Dr. Edward's records inconsistent with Dr. Caston's opinion because the improvement noted by Dr. Edwards may have been temporary (doc. 7 at 32-33). The undersigned disagrees. First, although the plaintiff mentions Shelly C. in passing in support of this argument, he requests that the court assume what material may or may not be included in subsequent treatment records with Dr. Edwards, which does not undermine the substantial evidence supporting the ALJ's determination that the record evidence before him from Dr. Edwards was inconsistent with the severe limitations opined by Dr. Caston (Tr. 386). For example, as noted by the ALJ, the plaintiff's condition appeared to improve during his three treatment visits with Dr. Edwards, and Dr. Edwards noted abnormal examination findings of only low grade depression, fair judgment, and fair (but impaired) insight by his third visit with the plaintiff over a six-month period (Tr. 701-10). As noted by the ALJ, Dr. Edward's treatment records, noting substantial improvement over three treatment visits, with limited abnormal examination findings, were not consistent with Dr. Caston's opined limitations. As such, the ALJ appropriately found that Dr. Caston's opinion was not consistent with treatment records from Dr. Edwards.
As outlined above, the ALJ appropriately explained his findings regarding the persuasiveness of the opinion of Dr. Caston, as required by the regulations. This court should not disturb the ALJ's weighing of the medical opinion evidence of record absent some indication the ALJ dredged up “specious inconsistencies.” Dunn v. Colvin, 607 Fed.Appx. 264, 267 (4th Cir. 2015) (citing Scivally v. Sullivan, 966 F.2d 1070, 1077 (7th Cir. 1992)). As such, the undersigned recommends that the district court find that the ALJ's evaluation of Dr. Caston's opinion is based upon substantial evidence and without legal error and should be affirmed.
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION
The Commissioner's decision is based upon substantial evidence and is free of legal error. Now, therefore, based upon the foregoing, IT IS RECOMMENDED that the Commissioner's decision be affirmed.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
The attention of the parties is directed to the important notice on the following page.
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
250 East North Street
Greenville, South Carolina 29601
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).