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Martinez v. State

Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
Apr 15, 2016
No. 05-14-01385-CR (Tex. App. Apr. 15, 2016)

Opinion

No. 05-14-01385-CR

04-15-2016

RAMON MARTINEZ, Appellant v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee


On Appeal from the 282nd Judicial District Court Dallas County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. F-1261013-S

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Before Justices Bridges, Lang-Miers, and Schenck
Opinion by Justice Schenck

Ramon Martinez appeals his conviction for aggravated sexual assault of a child younger than fourteen years old. In his first issue, Appellant challenges the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress statements he made during a police interview, arguing he did not knowingly and intelligently waive his rights under Miranda v. Arizona and article 38.22 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.22 (West 2016); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 478-79 (1966). In his second and third issues, Appellant alleges this Court should reform the judgment to reflect his plea of not guilty and to reflect there was no plea bargain agreement in this case. We affirm the trial court's judgment as modified. Because all issues are settled in law, we issue this memorandum opinion. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.4.

ACTUAL & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In October 2012, Y.A. lived with her mother, father, and siblings in their three-bedroom, two-bathroom home. Three of Y.A.'s maternal relatives, her grandmother, step-grandfather, and great-uncle, also lived in the home at that time. Appellant, who is Y.A.'s step-grandfather's uncle, lived in the converted shed in the backyard. Y.A. was ten years old, and doctors had diagnosed her with bipolar disorder, a mood disorder, and ADHD. These mental conditions caused her mental development to lag several years behind her chronological age.

On the morning of October 5, 2012, while Y.A.'s mother prepared to go to work, Y.A. did chores around the house. Y.A.'s mother told Y.A. to go to the backyard and retrieve the clothes from the clothes line, but when Y.A. did not return, her mother went to see if Y.A. was playing in the backyard. Y.A. was not in the backyard.

Y.A.'s mother approached the converted shed, saw Appellant's door cracked open, and heard Y.A. crying from within. Y.A.'s mother pushed the door open and saw Appellant with his pants down on top of her daughter Y.A. on his bed. Y.A.'s mother told her to pick up her pants and go inside the house, which she did. Y.A.'s mother proceeded to strike Appellant with her fists, and then ran into the house, with Appellant following her protesting his innocence as they proceeded. Y.A.'s mother retrieved a gun, pointed it at Appellant, and pulled the trigger. The gun did not fire. Y.A.'s step-grandfather came out of his room to learn why Y.A.'s mother was yelling and holding a gun in Appellant's face. Y.A.'s mother did not respond to his questions, but instead retrieved a screwdriver from among her husband's tools. When Y.A.'s mother attempted to strike Appellant with the screwdriver, Y.A.'s step-grandfather ran behind her and grabbed it from her. Still undeterred, Y.A.'s mother repeatedly struck Appellant in his face, demanding he admit what he had done. Finally, Appellant moved away from Y.A.'s mother, grabbed his cigarettes, and sat in a chair.

Y.A.'s mother called the police and encouraged them to hurry to her house before she killed Appellant. Appellant attempted to leave. Y.A.'s mother ended the call, grabbed Appellant, and resumed punching him to prevent his escape. The police arrived quickly and arrested Appellant.

The interviewing officer, Detective Lopez, read aloud to Appellant his rights and asked him if he understood them. When Appellant said he did not, the detective explained Appellant's rights to him separately and asked him after reading each right if Appellant understood. Appellant indicated he understood in each instance. After asking Appellant if he wanted to talk about his case with him, Detective Lopez began the interview. During the interview, Appellant admitted he penetrated Y.A.'s vagina with his penis earlier that day.

A grand jury indicted Appellant, and he was charged with aggravated sexual assault of a child younger than fourteen. Appellant pleaded not guilty and waived a jury trial. Prior to trial, Appellant moved to suppress the statements he made during his police interview. The trial judge denied Appellant's motion to suppress, found Appellant guilty as charged in the indictment, and sentenced him to twenty-two years in state jail. Appellant filed a motion for new trial, which was denied.

DISCUSSION

I. KNOWING AND INTELLIGENT WAIVER OF RIGHTS UNDER MIRANDA AND ARTICLE 38.22

In his first issue, Appellant argues the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress his statements because he did not knowingly and intelligently waive his Miranda rights or his rights under article 38.22 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. He complains that while the trial court made a specific finding that his statements to the police were voluntary, the trial court did not made any specific finding about whether Appellant knowingly and intelligently waived his Miranda rights or his rights under article 38.22. He further avers that the circumstances, including his diminished intellectual capacity and his numerous verbal representations to Detective Lopez that he did not understand his rights, would not support a finding of a knowing and intelligent waiver. The State responds that because Appellant failed to make an objection at trial, he has preserved nothing for review. The State alternatively argues the trial court did comment on the record regarding Appellant's ability to knowingly and intelligently waive his rights and that the record illustrates the totality of the circumstances surrounding Appellant's statement support the conclusion that he knowingly waived his rights.

A. Standard of Review & Applicable Law

In reviewing a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress, we apply a bifurcated standard of review. Wilson v. State, 311 S.W.3d 452, 457-58 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). Although we give almost total deference to the trial court's determination of historical facts, we conduct a de novo review of the trial court's application of the law to those facts. Id. at 458. As the sole trier of fact during a suppression hearing, the trial court may believe or disbelieve all or any part of a witness's testimony. Id. Furthermore, we examine the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court's ruling. Id.

In Miranda v. Arizona, the Supreme Court held when an individual is taken into custody and subjected to questioning, the following measures are required. 384 U.S. at 478-79. The individual must be warned prior to any questioning that he has the right to remain silent, that anything he says can be used against him in a court of law, that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so desires. Id. at 479. An individual given these warnings may knowingly and intelligently waive these rights and agree to answer questions or make a statement. Id.

Article 38.22 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure governs the admissibility of statements made by a defendant during custodial interrogation in a criminal proceeding. Herrera v. State, 241 S.W.3d 520, 526 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (citing TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.22 (West 2016)). Article 38.22 provides a defendant must be provided with warnings virtually identical to those required by Miranda, but also a warning that an accused has the right to terminate the interview at any time. Id. It also provides that an oral statement is admissible against a defendant in a criminal proceedings if, among other things, the defendant "knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily" waived the rights set out in the warnings. Id.

The State has the burden of showing that a defendant knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his rights under Miranda and article 38.22 by a preponderance of the evidence. Leza v. State, 351 S.W.3d 344, 349, 351 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011). In evaluating whether an individual waived his rights, courts look at the following (1) whether the waiver was made voluntarily, which is defined as being a product of a free and deliberate choice rather than intimidation, coercion, or deception; and (2) whether the waiver was made with full awareness of both the nature of the rights being abandoned and the subsequent consequences of that decision. Id. at 349-50, 352. Such an evaluation involves the totality of the circumstances, which requires the consideration of all the circumstances surrounding the interrogation, including the defendant's experience, background, and conduct. Joseph v. State, 309 S.W.3d 20, 25 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010).

B. Application of Law to Facts

Prior to trial as part of his omnibus pretrial motion and again at a pretrial hearing, Appellant requested a hearing under Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964), to determine the voluntariness and admissibility of any oral or written statements allegedly made by him. The State presented testimony from Detective Lopez and played the video recording of Appellant's interview. Appellant then requested the trial court delay ruling until he had decided whether or not to testify at trial. The State did not object to the delay, and the trial court agreed to delay its ruling on Appellant's motion. At trial, Appellant chose to testify. After both sides rested, but before closing arguments, the trial court ruled on the State's offer of Appellant's recorded interview, finding the statement was voluntarily made and admitting the statement for all purposes. After closing arguments, the trial court addressed Appellant and stated that after watching the recorded interview, "it sure seemed to me like you knew what you were being asked and it sure seemed to me like you made the statements you made without being forced or threatened in any manner." The trial court explicitly informed Appellant that his motion to suppress was denied thereafter.

We note that the record does not reflect any specific complaint—or any statements that could be construed as a specific complaint—by Appellant that his waiver of his rights under federal or state law was not knowing or intelligently made as required by article 38.22. However, the statement from the trial judge that Appellant appeared to know what he was being asked indicates the trial judge nevertheless found Appellant's waiver was both knowing and intelligent.

Appellant complains that his statements of "mm hmm" after Detective Lopez read through Appellant's rights were not indications he understood his rights, but were instead merely acknowledgements he heard the detective. The State responds that Appellant attempts to argue a higher standard of waiver than the law requires. We agree with the State. The question is not whether Appellant "explicitly" waived his Miranda rights, but whether he did so knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily. Joseph, 309 S.W.3d at 25.

Appellant also avers his illiteracy, poor educational record, and the results of his psychiatric evaluation all support a conclusion that he could not have made a knowing and intelligent waiver. We disagree.

There is no requirement that a person be literate or attain any particular level of academic achievement before his confession can be admissible. Westley v. State, 754 S.W.2d 224, 229 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988); see also Martinez v. State, 131 S.W.3d 22, 35 (Tex. App.—San Antonio, 2003, no pet.) (neither lack of education nor illiteracy means a defendant does not understand the nature of the rights he is waiving or cannot voluntarily give a confession). Furthermore, as evidenced by the video-recorded interview admitted into the record, Detective Lopez read aloud the rights to Appellant, and when Appellant indicated he did not understand, the detective read each right again separately, pausing before moving on to the next right to ascertain whether Appellant understood the right the detective had just read. Appellant then asked questions regarding the meaning of the right to terminate, which the detective answered and explained to Appellant. Only when Appellant said he understood his rights did the detective then proceed with the interview. Appellant's psychiatric evaluation describes Appellant as having "subnormal . . . [or] borderline intellectual functioning," which the psychiatrist believed would "probably make him less mentally acute than most defendants." However, the psychiatrist affirmatively indicated Appellant had "a sufficient present ability to understand the proceedings against him" and that he "seemed able to make reasonable choices in matters concerning his legal situation."

The psychiatric evaluation also reflects that Appellant reported that he suffers from physical instability that has led to his falling and injuring himself, sometimes striking his head. But the record does not reflect any other evidence of a head injury or medical records evidencing a mental incapacity that would affect the trial court's finding with respect to Appellant's waiver. Indeed, the psychiatric evaluation report specifically states that Appellant is not mentally retarded or mentally ill.

Finally, Appellant argues his testimony during trial was that he was a "slow learner," attending school only sporadically and receiving only failing grades. He testified Detective Lopez made him nervous, he did not quite understand the rights Detective Lopez read to him, and he had no recollection of telling Detective Lopez what he did to Y.A. The record also contains Detective Lopez's testimony at the hearing on Appellant's motion to suppress, as well as the recorded statement itself from which the trial court could judge the credibility of both the detective and Appellant. Wilson, 311 S.W.3d at 458. Detective Lopez testified Appellant had questions about his rights, which the detective answered and explained to ensure Appellant understood his rights. He also testified that while he would not say Appellant was "in the upper level," Appellant was able to hold a conversation.

Viewing the record in the light most favorable to the judge's finding of knowing and intelligent waiver, we conclude the trial court did not err. Id. We overrule Appellant's first issue. II. REFORMATION OF THE JUDGMENT

In his second and third issues, Appellant alleges this Court should modify the judgment to reflect his plea of not guilty and to reflect there was no plea bargain agreement in this case. The State concedes the judgment does not accurately reflect the record on both issues. We have the authority to modify the trial court's judgment truly conform to the record. TEX. R. APP. P. 43.2(b); French v. State, 830 S.W.2d 607, 609 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992). We note the judgment lists Appellant's plea as guilty and lists terms of his plea bargain. However, the record reflects Appellant offered a plea of not guilty, which negated any plea bargain offer the State made to him. We sustain Appellant's second and third issues and modify the trial court's judgment to reflect that Appellant's plea was not guilty and there was no plea bargain in this case.

CONCLUSION

We affirm the trial court's judgment as modified.

/David J. Schenck/

DAVID J. SCHENCK

JUSTICE DO NOT PUBLISH
TEX. R. APP. P. 47 141385F.U05

JUDGMENT

On Appeal from the 282nd Judicial District Court, Dallas County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. F-1261013-S.
Opinion delivered by Justice Schenck, Justices Bridges and Lang-Miers participating.

Based on the Court's opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is MODIFIED to reflect that appellant's plea was not guilty and there was no plea bargain in this case.

As modified, the judgment is AFFIRMED. Judgment entered this 15th day of April, 2016.


Summaries of

Martinez v. State

Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
Apr 15, 2016
No. 05-14-01385-CR (Tex. App. Apr. 15, 2016)
Case details for

Martinez v. State

Case Details

Full title:RAMON MARTINEZ, Appellant v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

Court:Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas

Date published: Apr 15, 2016

Citations

No. 05-14-01385-CR (Tex. App. Apr. 15, 2016)