Opinion
No. 04-03-00470-CR
Delivered and Filed: June 8, 2005. DO NOT PUBLISH.
Appeal from the 227th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas, Trial Court No. 2001-CR-5261, Honorable Philip A. Kazen, Jr., Judge Presiding. Affirmed.
Sitting: Alma L. LÓPEZ, Chief Justice, Karen ANGELINI, Justice, Phylis J. SPEEDLIN, Justice.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Richard Allen Martin pled nolo contendere to a retaliation charge on May 14, 2003. The trial court sentenced Martin to ten years incarceration, the statutory maximum for the offense, and a fine of $1,000. Martin's court-appointed appellate attorney filed a brief in accordance with Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), in which he concludes that the appeal has no merit. Counsel provided Martin with a copy of the brief and informed him of his right to review the record and file his own brief. See Nichols v. State, 954 S.W.2d 83, 85-86 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1997, no pet.); Bruns v. State, 924 S.W.2d 176, 177 n. 1 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1996, no pet.). Martin subsequently filed a pro se brief asserting ineffective assistance of counsel. Martin contends his plea was involuntary because it was made while he was under the influence of psychotropic medication and that his trial counsel was ineffective in failing to request permission to withdraw the plea on that basis. To prevail on a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel, Martin must first show by a preponderance of the evidence that counsel's performance was deficient, i.e.; that his assistance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984); Thompson v. State, 9 S.W.3d 808, 812 (Tex.Crim.App. 1999). In addition, Martin must show a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Thompson, 9 S.W.3d at 812. "There is a strong presumption that counsel's conduct fell within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance." Id. at 813. "To defeat the presumption of reasonable professional assistance, any allegation of ineffectiveness must be firmly founded in the record, and the record must affirmatively demonstrate the alleged ineffectiveness." Id. at 814. On appeal, Martin contends that his plea was involuntary and that he did not fully understand the effects of his plea because of the medication he was taking at the time he entered the plea. The record before us, however, does not support Martin's claim. A trial court may not accept a plea of guilty unless it appears that the defendant is mentally competent and the plea is made freely and voluntarily. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 26.13 (b) (Vernon 1989); Ex parte Evans, 690 S.W.2d 274, 276 (Tex.Crim.App. 1985); see also Stone v. State, 919 S.W.2d 424, 426 (Tex.Crim.App. 1996) (no contest plea has the same legal effect as a guilty plea). Article 26.13 requires a trial court to give specific admonishments to a defendant who intends to plead guilty or no contest. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 26.13 (a) (Vernon Supp. 2004-05). Proper admonishment by the trial court creates a prima facie showing that a plea was voluntary. Crawford v. State, 890 S.W.2d 941, 944 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1994, no pet.). The defendant then has the burden to prove that he did not understand the consequences of his plea. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 26.13 (c) (Vernon 1989); Rodriguez v. State, 933 S.W.2d 702, 706 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1996, pet. ref'd). We examine the record as a whole to determine whether a plea was voluntary. Brown v. State, 11 S.W.3d 360, 362 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2000, pet. ref'd). If the defendant asserts at the time of his plea that he understands the nature of the proceedings, the indictment allegations are true, and his plea is not the result of any outside influence, he has a heavy burden on appeal to prove that his plea was involuntary. Rodriguez, 933 S.W.2d at 706. Here, the record reflects that Martin received both written and oral admonishments. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 26.13 (d) (Vernon 1989) (admonishments may be given orally or in writing). Martin and his trial counsel signed a waiver and affidavit of admonitions stating that Martin's constitutional rights were explained to him by counsel, that he was competent and had not been threatened or coerced to enter his plea, that he had fully considered his plea and discussed its effects with counsel, that he understood the court's admonishments, and that he was satisfied with the advice and representation he received from counsel. The trial judge advised Martin of the proper range of punishment for his offense, and Martin responded that he understood the range of punishment. Martin's trial counsel stated on the record that he believed Martin had a rational and factual understanding of the charges against him, that Martin was mentally competent to waive his rights and enter a plea, and that Martin had been able to confer with him and assist in his own defense. Martin's bare assertion that his medication rendered him unable to make a voluntary plea is insufficient to satisfy his burden of proving that he did not understand the consequences of his plea. The trial court and Martin's counsel were satisfied that he was competent to stand trial and enter his plea, and Martin himself affirmed that he was competent both orally and in writing. In addition, the trial judge questioned Martin at length at the time of his plea and Martin responded lucidly and appropriately. See Stone v. State, 638 S.W.2d 629, 632 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1982, pet. ref'd) (clear and lucid testimony is evidence of competency). We conclude that the trial court complied with article 26.13 in questioning Martin regarding his understanding of the proceedings and charges against him. The record supports the trial court's finding that Martin's plea was freely and voluntarily made. Because there is nothing in the record to support Martin's contention that his plea was involuntary, we can not say that trial counsel's failure to request permission to withdraw Martin's plea on this basis constituted deficient performance. Without evidence in the record to both establish deficiency and rebut the prevailing presumption that trial counsel's actions were within the range of reasonable performance, Martin is unable to satisfy the first prong of Strickland and his claim of ineffective assistance must fail. See Thompson, 9 S.W.3d at 814. We have reviewed the record, counsel's brief, and Martin's pro se brief. We agree that the appeal is frivolous and without merit. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed. Appellate counsel's motion to withdraw is granted. Nichols, 954 S.W.2d at 86; Bruns 924 S.W.2d at 177 n. 1.
Martin was initially indicted and arrested on the charge in September 2001. The trial court ordered a psychiatric evaluation and set a hearing to determine Martin's competency to stand trial in July 2002. A jury found that Martin was not competent to stand trial, but that there was a substantial probability that he would attain competency in the foreseeable future. Martin was then committed to the North Texas State Hospital. In October 2002, Martin's treating psychiatrist and chief psychiatrist of the State Hospital's competency program advised the trial court that Martin had been evaluated as competent to stand trial. After a hearing on the issue, Martin's competency was restored by the trial court on May 13, 2003.