Opinion
A-13513
04-06-2022
DANNY MARTIN, Appellant, v. STATE OF ALASKA, Appellee.
David T. McGee, Attorney at Law, under contract with the Public Defender Agency, and Samantha Cherot, Public Defender, Anchorage, for the Appellant. Ann B. Black, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Criminal Appeals, Anchorage, and Treg R. Taylor, Attorney General, Juneau, for the Appellee.
UNPUBLISHED See Alaska Appellate Rule 214(d)
Appeal from the District Court, Fourth Judicial District, Fairbanks, Ben A. Seekins, Judge. Trial Court No. 4FA-18-02971 CR
David T. McGee, Attorney at Law, under contract with the Public Defender Agency, and Samantha Cherot, Public Defender, Anchorage, for the Appellant.
Ann B. Black, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Criminal Appeals, Anchorage, and Treg R. Taylor, Attorney General, Juneau, for the Appellee.
Before: Allard, Chief Judge, and Harbison and Terrell, Judges.
SUMMARY DISPOSITION
Danny Martin was convicted of driving under the influence after he crashed his car into a row of mail boxes and a subsequent serum blood test performed at a hospital revealed that there was 80 milligrams or more of alcohol per 100 milliliters of his blood. He raises two issues on appeal.
AS 28.35.030(a)(1). Martin was also charged with and convicted of one count of refusal to submit to a chemical test under AS 28.35.032(a), but he does not challenge that conviction in this appeal.
First, Martin argues that the trial court erred by admitting the results of the serum blood test because the State failed to establish a complete chain of custody. Alaska courts, however, have long rejected this argument, holding that proof of a strict chain of custody is not required for hospital-performed blood tests, and that the results of such a test are admissible as a business record (upon proper foundation, which Martin does not dispute was established here).
See Sullivan v. Anchorage, 577 P.2d 1070, 1073 (Alaska 1978); Galloway v. State, 2008 WL 4595172, at *3 (Alaska App. Oct. 15, 2008) (unpublished); Alaska R. Evid. 803(6).
Martin argues that his case is distinguishable because the blood test results in his case contained an explicit disclaimer stating that they were not to be used for legal purposes. But the hospital's laboratory manager testified that the disclaimer only means that the hospital did not follow strict chain-of-custody procedures (such as using sealed bags). Because Alaska courts have already held that proof of such procedures is not a necessary prerequisite for admitting blood tests performed at a hospital, the existence of this disclaimer has no effect on the admissibility of the blood test results.
Martin also makes a secondary, closely related argument: he contends that the trial court erred in allowing the expert testimony about the results of the blood test under Evidence Rules 702 and 703 and Daubert/Coon because, given the disclaimer and the lack of a chain of custody, the results were not "of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions or inferences upon the subject." See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 595 (1993); State v. Coon, 974 P.2d 386, 394 (Alaska 1999). But the tests were performed and used for medical purposes, and therefore they are "of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field." Indeed, the disclaimer upon which Martin relies states that the tests are "for medical purposes."
Second, Martin argues that the trial court erred by allowing a veterinarian, Dr. Molly Murphy, to testify about how to convert the results of a serum blood test into an equivalent whole blood test result (which was necessary because the statutory blood alcohol content limit set out in AS 28.35.030(a)(2) refers to the alcohol content of the whole blood, not serum blood). Martin asserts that Dr. Murphy should not have been qualified as an expert because she had no experience in human medicine, blood-alcohol testing, or the conversion of test results from serum blood to whole blood.
Dr. Murphy is an assistant professor of veterinary pathology at The University of Alaska, and she has a PhD in medical microbiology and a doctorate in veterinary medicine. Dr. Murphy testified that, as part of her work, she studies "blood and its components and how we test it, how we collect it, [and] what it means." Although Dr. Murphy studies animals, not humans, she testified that human blood is "very similar" to the blood in other mammals, and that alcohol would not behave any differently in human blood than in that of any other mammal. Furthermore, in preparation for the case, Dr. Murphy read peer-reviewed literature on blood-alcohol testing in humans, and she also reviewed the specific study used by the Alaska State Crime Lab for the calculation of blood alcohol.
Under Alaska's "liberal admissibility standard" for expert testimony, any person with relevant knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education may be qualified as an expert so long as their knowledge "can help the trier of fact understand evidence or determine facts in issue." It is not necessary that a witness's expertise be "in precisely the area upon which the expert proposes to comment." Instead, the trial court must balance such factors as "the value of the evidence against the danger of undue prejudice, distraction of the jury from the issues, and waste of time."
Marron v. Stromstad, 123 P.3d 992, 1002-03 (Alaska 2005); see also Ferrell v. Baxter, 484 P.2d 250, 267 (Alaska 1971) ("The trial court must determine as well whether the trier of fact will be able to receive appreciable assistance from the expert witness."); Lewis v. State, 469 P.2d 689, 694 (Alaska 1970) ("[I]f... the testimony will shed light on the conflicting claims that are presented, then its exclusion acts as a disservice to the jury.").
John's Heating Serv. v. Lamb, 46 P.3d 1024, 1039 (Alaska 2002) (quoting Colt Indus. Operating Corp., Quincy Compressor Div. v. Frank W. Murphy Mfr., Inc., 822 P.2d 925, 932 (Alaska 1991)).
Lewis, 469 P.2d at 696 (citing Love v. State, 457 P.2d 622, 627 (Alaska 1969)).
Here, Dr. Murphy's experience with blood testing, along with her research in preparation for this case, allowed her to determine an appropriate conversion factor and to calculate the approximate alcohol content in Martin's whole blood. This testimony helped the jury understand the evidence in this case, and did not result in prejudice, distraction, or a waste of time. We therefore conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it permitted Dr. Murphy to testify as an expert.
Martin does not challenge the scientific validity of Dr. Murphy's disciplines of medical microbiology and veterinary medicine, nor the validity of the conversion factor she used to calculate the approximate alcohol content of his blood. Rather, Martin challenges the relevance of her expertise to the question at issue in his case. Accordingly, the trial court's decision to permit Dr. Murphy's testimony is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. See State v. Sharpe, 435 P.3d 887, 889-90 (Alaska 2019) (whether a particular scientific theory or technique has been shown to be "scientifically valid" is a question of law reviewed de novo, but where scientific evidence passes muster under Daubert/Coon the trial court's case-specific determinations and further evidentiary rulings are reviewed for abuse of discretion).
The judgment of the trial court is AFFIRMED.