Opinion
Civil Action 3:22-CV-00854
12-28-2022
ADAM EUGENE MARTIN, Petitioner, v. WARDEN HOUY, Respondent.
RAMBO, J.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
KAROLINE MEHALCHICK CHIEF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Pro se prisoner-Plaintiff Adam Eugene Martin (“Martin”), an inmate currently incarcerated at the United States penitentiary in Coleman, Florida (“USP-Coleman II”), filed the instant petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, against Respondent Warden Houy (“Respondent”). (Doc. 1). For the following reasons, it is recommended that Martin's petition be denied for lack of jurisdiction.
I. Background and Procedural History
On August 18, 2004, Martin was convicted, following a jury trial, of eight counts of bank robbery, and subsequently sentenced to eight concurrent life sentences. United States v.Martin, 431 F.3d 846, 850 (5th Cir. 2005). Martin was sentenced subject to a mandatory enhancement under the “Three Strikes” statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3559, which states that a person convicted of a serious violent felony “shall be sentenced to life imprisonment if . . . the person has been convicted . . . on separate prior occasions . . . of . . . 2 or more serious violent felonies.” 18 U.S.C. § 3559(c)(1)(A)(i). At the time of sentencing, Martin had four prior felony convictions: two federal bank robbery convictions in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a); a Texas state robbery conviction, in violation of Tex. Penal Code § 29.02; and an Arizona state Aggravated Assault conviction in violation of Ariz. Rev. Stat. §§ 13-1203, 13-1204(A)(1), 13701, 13-801. Martin, 431 F.3d at 850. Martin filed a direct appeal of the judgment of conviction in the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, which was affirmed by a decision dated December 2, 2005. Martin, 431 F.3d 846. The Supreme Court denied a petition for a writ of certiorari. Martin v. United States, 547 U.S. 1059 (2006).
Martin's first collateral attack of his conviction and sentence was made on January 31, 2006, when he filed a § 2255 motion in the sentencing court, which was denied. See United States v. Martin, No. 1:03-CR-250 (W.D. Tx.), ECF No. 215. The Fifth Circuit denied Martin's motion for a certificate of appealability and also dismissed his appeal of the trial court's order denying relief on his section 2255 motion. See United States v. Martin, 1:06-CV-57 (W.D. Tex. May 24, 2006), certificate of appealability denied, No. 06-50962 (5th Cir. Jan. 5, 2007). Later in 2006, Martin filed a § 2255 motion, which was denied. (Doc. 3, at 2). Martin then filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to § 2241 in the Eastern District of Texas in which he asserted that he was unlawfully confined because the federal government did not have a waiver of jurisdiction from the state and he was, therefore, innocent. Martin v. Outlaw, No. CIV.A. 1:06CV804, 2007 WL 1138830, at *1 (E.D. Tex. Apr. 17, 2007). By memorandum order dated April 17, 2007, that petition was dismissed as having been inappropriately brought pursuant to § 2241. Martin, 2007 WL 1138830, at *1. In August 2008, Martin was sanctioned $350 and barred from filing any motion or action in the Western District of Texas until he receives permission from the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals to file a successive § 2255 motion. (Doc. 6, at 3). In December 2009, Martin was again barred from filing any motion or action in the Western District of Texas challenging his conviction until he receives permission from the Fifth Circuit to file a successive § 2255 motion. (Doc. 6, at 3).
Martin proceeded to file a second § 2241 petition in the United States District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia on January 26, 2009, in which he claimed: (1) the government withheld exculpatory DNA evidence, violating his Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth Amendment rights and that he was innocent of all charges; (2) the FBI requested his arrest until completion of the federal investigation, violating his Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth Amendment rights and his right to due process; and (3) the government violated Title 18 U.S.C. § 3000 by withholding DNA tests done by a state lab in violation of his right to due process. Martin v. Cross, No. 2:09CV12, 2009 WL 1034497, at *1 (N.D. W.Va. Apr. 16, 2009). By order dated April 16, 2009, the second petition was also dismissed as inappropriately being brought pursuant to § 2241. Martin, 2009 WL 1034497.
On an unspecified date, Martin sought DNA testing in the district court which was denied. The petitioner moved to proceed in forma pauperis in the Fifth Circuit. The Fifth Circuit denied the petitioner's request to proceed in forma pauperis and dismissed the appeal as frivolous noting that the evidence of the petitioner's guilt was overwhelming and included testimony from the petitioner's co-defendants regarding his participation in the robberies, as well as letters written by the petitioner that amounted to a confession. United States v. Martin, 377 Fed.Appx. 395, 396 (2010). The court further found that the petitioner had made no attempt to explain how DNA testing would raise a reasonable probability that he did not commit the bank robbery offense so as to satisfy the requirements of 18 U.S.C. § 3600. Martin, 377 Fed.Appx. at 396. Martin filed a petition for writ of certiorari which was denied by the United States Supreme Court on October 4, 2010. Martin v. United States, 131 S.Ct. 357 (2010).
On May 3, 2011, Martin filed a habeas petition in the Middle District of Pennsylvania pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, in which he argues that he can establish that he is actually innocent pursuant to the provisions of Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298 (1995). Martin v. Martinez, No. 3:11-837, 2012 WL 140420, at *1 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 18, 2012). On January 18, 2012, the Court denied the petition for failure to meet the stringent requirements of § 2241. Martin, 2012 WL 140420, at *5. In January 2022 Martin filed a motion to reduce his sentence under the First Step Act, which was denied. (Doc. 6, at 3).
Martin initiated this action by filing a petition for writ of habeas corpus brought under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, setting forth two grounds for relief: (1) actual and factual innocence of 18 U.S.C. § 3559(c); and (2) ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. (Doc. 1, at 4-6). On July 26, 2022, Respondent filed a response to the petition, arguing that “[t]he petition should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction because it is actually a § 2255 motion but Martin's claim does not trigger that section's savings clause.” (Doc. 6, at 3). On August 12, 2022, Martin filed a traverse, citing Borden v, United States, 141 S.Ct. 1817 (2021), for the first time. (Doc. 8). On August 22, 2022, Martin filed a motion for preliminary injunction/temporary restraining order (“TRO”). (Doc. 10). On August 26, 2022, Respondent filed a motion for leave to file a supplemental response, a brief in support, and a proposed supplemental response. (Doc. 11; Doc. 12; Doc. 13). On August 31, 2022, the Court granted Respondent's motion for leave to file. (Doc. 14). Martin filed objections to Respondent's supplemental response on September 8, 2022. (Doc. 15).
In the motion for preliminary injunction/TRO, Martin requests that the Court enjoin Respondent from transferring him from the Federal Transferring Institution at Allenwood (“FTI-Allenwood”) due to his having an ongoing habeas petition before this Court.1 (Doc. 10). On September 27, 2022, Martin filed a notice of change of address, notifying the Court that he is now currently incarcerated at the Federal Transferring Center at Oklahoma City, Oklahoma (“FTC-Oklahoma”). (Doc. 16). “A party seeking a preliminary injunction must show: (1) a likelihood of success on the merits; (2) that it will suffer irreparable harm if the injunction is denied; (3) that granting preliminary relief will not result in even greater harm to the nonmoving party; and (4) that the public interest favors such relief.” Kos Pharms., Inc. v.Andrx Corp., 369 F.3d 700, 708 (3d Cir. 2004). Because Martin has been transferred from FTC-Allenwood, he can demonstrate neither likelihood of success on the merits of his claim for prospective injunctive relief nor irreparable injury from the denial of preliminary injunctive relief, and therefore both are equally moot. Accordingly, it is recommended that the motion for preliminary injunction/TRO be DISMISSED as MOOT. (Doc. 10).
The petition has been fully briefed and is now ripe for disposition.
II. Discussion
Martin may not challenge his sentence by way of 28 U.S.C. § 2241. A federal prisoner generally must use 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to collaterally attack his conviction or sentence on constitutional grounds. Okereke v. United States, 307 F.3d 117, 120 (3d Cir. 2002). He “can seek relief under § 2241 only if the remedy provided by § 2255 is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention.” Manna v. Schultz, 454 Fed.Appx. 31, 33 (3d Cir. 2010).
28 U.S.C. § 2255 establishes a one-year statute of limitations applicable to § 2255 motions. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f). Also, before a second or successive § 2255 motion may be considered by the district court, it must be certified by a three judge panel of the appropriate court of appeals to contain:
(1) newly discovered evidence that, if proven and viewed in light of the evidence as a whole, would be sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence that no reasonable factfinder would have found the movant guilty of the offense; or
(2) a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable.28 U.S.C. § 2255(h).
A motion under § 2255 is inadequate or ineffective only if “‘some limitation of scope or procedure would prevent a Section 2255 proceeding from affording the prisoner a full hearing and adjudication of his claim of wrongful detention.'” Application of Galante, 437 F.2d 1164, 1165 (3d Cir. 1971) (quoting United States ex rel. Leguillou v. Davis, 212 F.2d 681, 684 (3d Cir. 1954)). “Section 2255 is not inadequate or ineffective merely because the sentencing court does not grant relief, the one-year statute of limitations has expired, or the petitioner is unable to meet the stringent gatekeeping requirements of the amended § 2255.” Cradle v. United States, 290 F.3d 536, 539 (3d Cir. 2002). “It is the inefficacy of the remedy, not the personal inability to utilize it, that is determinative.” Cradle, 290 F.3d at 538. The petitioner has the burden of proving that the remedy afforded by § 2255 is inadequate or ineffective. Brown v. Mendez, 167 F.Supp.2d 723, 726 (M.D. Pa. 2001). And when a petitioner improperly challenges a conviction or sentence under § 2241, the petition must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Gardner v. Warden Lewisburg USP, 845 F.3d 99, 104 (3d Cir. 2017) (affirming the District Court's order denying Gardner's § 2241 habeas petition for lack of jurisdiction).
In In re Dorsainvil, 119 F.3d 245 (3d Cir. 1997), the Third Circuit addressed the question of when a prisoner may bring a § 2241 habeas petition after being denied leave to file a second or successive § 2255 motion. The Third Circuit held that a federal prisoner barred from filing a second or successive § 2255 motion can resort to a § 2241 habeas petition if the prisoner “had no earlier opportunity to challenge his conviction for a crime that an intervening change in substantive law” negated. Dorsainvil, 119 F.3d at 251. “[T]he “safety valve” provided under § 2255” and as outlined in Dorsainvil “is extremely narrow and has been held to apply only in unusual situations, such as those in which a prisoner has had no prior opportunity to challenge his conviction for a crime later deemed to be non-criminal by an intervening change in law.” Brown v. United States, 413 Fed.Appx. 514, 516 (3d Cir. 2011); Bruce v. Warden Lewisburg USP, 868 F.3d 170, 180 (3d Cir. 2017) (stating that it permits access to § 2241 “when there is a change in statutory caselaw that applies retroactively in cases on collateral review” and the prisoner is ‘otherwise barred from challenging the legality of the conviction under § 2255.'”) (quoting United States v. Tyler, 732 F.3d 241, 246 (3d Cir. 2013)). In other words, the situations where the remedy under § 2255 is “inadequate or ineffective” are rare, and “Dorsainvil's interpretation of § 2255 provides only a ‘narrow exception' to [2255's] ‘presumptive' exclusivity.” Gardner, 845 F.3d at 103 (quoting Okereke, 307 F.3d at 120).
Martin submits that he has not had an “unobstructed procedural shot” to present his claim of actual and factual innocence on direct appeal or initial § 2254 petition because there is a new, clarifying material change of law relevant to his claims. (Doc. 1, at 4). Respondent contends “Martin has failed to cite a case that would give him access to the savings clause, so his § 2241 petition challenging his sentence must fail.” (Doc. 6, at 6). Further, Respondent argues Martin's petition should be dismissed because “the Third Circuit has ‘never applied Dorsainvil to issues that . . . arise regarding sentencing.'” (Doc. 6, at 6 n.1) (quoting Davis v.Warden Allenwood FCI, 818 Fed.Appx. 147, 149 (3d Cir. 2020)). Finally, Respondent contends the petition should be dismissed because Martin raised the same claims in a prior § 2241 petition in Martin v. Warden USP-Tucson, No. CV170371TUCCKJJR, 2018 WL 7140281 (D. Ariz. Aug. 30, 2018), report and recommendation adopted as modified sub nom.Martin v. UnknownParty, No. CV-17-00371-TUC-JGZ, 2019 WL 357900 (D. Ariz. Jan. 29, 2019), aff'd sub nom. Martin v. Kline, No. 19-15605, 2021 WL 6102175 (9th Cir. Dec. 22, 2021). (Doc. 6, at 6 n.1).
In Martin v. Warden USP-Tucson, Martin petitioned the District Court of Arizona for habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. 2018 WL 7140281, at *4. The court dismissed Martin's petition without prejudice, concluding that it lacked jurisdiction to consider a petition brought under § 2241 because Martin did not meet the requirements set out in § 2255(e). Martin, 2019 WL 357900, at *6. When a prisoner files a successive petition for habeas corpus relief, the abuse of the writ doctrine may bar his claim. Furnari v. U.S. Parole Comm'n, 531 F.3d 241, 250 (3d Cir. 2008). “[A] court may grant controlling weight to a denial of a prior application for habeas corpus when three criteria are met: (1) the same ground presented in the successive application was determined adversely to the applicant on the previous application; (2) the previous determination was made on the merits; and (3) ‘the ends of justice' would not be served by reaching the merits of the subsequent application.” Furnari, 531 F.3d at 250 (citing Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 9 (1963)). Because the District Court of Arizona dismissed the habeas petition without merit, the Court may not grant controlling weight to the denial of Martin's prior application for habeas corpus.
Having reviewed the petition and underlying record, the undersigned concludes that Martin has not met his burden of showing that § 2255 is an “inadequate or ineffective” remedy under the circumstances presented here. Martin is not in a position similar to the petitioners in Dorsainvil and similar cases. Martin does not claim that he was convicted of conduct later deemed to be noncriminal by a change in the law, nor does he claim he is actually innocent of the robbery convictions to which he was sentenced. Rather, Martin claims that his federal life sentence was erroneously enhanced under 18 U.S.C. § 3359(c), the federal three strikes law, which went into effect in 1994, on the basis of pre-1994 violent felony convictions. (Doc. 1, at 4). “Although [Martin] attempts to cast his claim as a claim that he is actually innocent of his sentence, such a sentencing claim does not fit within the narrow exception of Dorsainvil.” Spencer v. Oddo, No. 3:16-CV-00185, 2018 WL 2187791, at *2 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 6, 2018), report and recommendation adopted, No. CV 3:16-185, 2018 WL 2183298 (M.D. Pa. May 11, 2018), aff'd sub nom.Spencer v. Warden Allenwood USP, 759 Fed.Appx. 112 (3d Cir. 2019) (dismissing § 2241 habeas petition that challenged sentence under three strikes law, 18 U.S.C. § 3559(c)(1), for lack of jurisdiction because petition was an unauthorized successive § 2255(a) motion).
The Third Circuit has consistently “held that the challenges of federal inmates attacking sentence enhancements cannot be raised by means of a Section 2241 petition and a district court has no Section 2241 jurisdiction to reexamine or second guess the decision of the federal sentencing court.” Gauthier v. Ebbert, No. 3:CV-16-680, 2016 WL 3197709, at *2 (M.D. Pa. June 9, 2016). Thus, a § 2241 habeas petition “is not available for an intervening change in the sentencing laws.” Pearson v. Warden Canaan USP, No. 15-1488, 2017 WL 1363873, at *2 (3d Cir. Apr. 12, 2017); Selby v. Scism, 453 Fed.Appx. 266, 268 (3d Cir. 2011) (holding that the exception described in Dorsainvil does not apply to a prisoner claiming that he is “innocent” of a sentencing enhancement because of an intervening change in the law); Sorrell v. Bledsoe, 437 Fed.Appx. 94, 95 (3d Cir. 2011) (holding that the “District Court properly dismissed the § 2241 petition through which Sorrell sought to challenge his sentence enhancement” based on U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1); Santiago v. Bureau of Prisons, No. 4:17-CV-892, 2017 WL 2554538, at *3 (M.D. Pa. June 13, 2017) (observing that “challenges to career offender status are not properly raised under § 2241”).
Here, Martin relied on the United States Supreme Court's decisions in Taylor v. UnitedStates, 495 U.S. 575 (1990), Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614 (1998), Mathis v. United States, 579 U.S. 500 (2016); and Borden v. United States, 141 S.Ct. 1817 (2021). (Doc. 1, at 4; Doc. 8, at 1). Respondent argues that Martin's claim fails because: (1) “Bousley predates Martin's initial § 2255 motion in 2006 so it cannot qualify as a subsequent change in law;” and (2) Taylor and Mathis “deal with the 15-year mandatory sentence under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C.A. § 924(e)(1), (e)(2)(B)(ii), whereas Martin is contesting (as he did on appeal) the mandatory life sentence provision of 18 U.S.C. 3559(c).” (Doc. 6, at 56). Respondent contends none of the cases Martin cites “has the potential to negate his sentence such that he may proceed under § 2255's savings clause,” because those cases concern different sentencing enhancements. (Doc. 13, at 1-2).
Considering these arguments, the undersigned finds that Martin has not demonstrated that there has been a change in statutory caselaw that applies retroactively on collateral review. Bruce, 868 F.3d at 180. First, Martin cannot rely on Taylor or Bousley, as those decisions were made well before his sentencing hearing. Second, Respondent correctly states that Martin cannot rely on Taylor, Bousley, or Borden as those decisions concern the ACCA, which is not relevant to the present case. Third, Martin cannot rely on the Supreme Court's subsequent decision in Mathis, because the decision “did not change the settled substantive law.” Ham v. Breckon, 994 F.3d 682, 689 (4th Cir. 2021); seeIn re Hernandez, 857 F.3d 1162, 1164 (11th Cir. 2017) (explaining that Mathis merely “provided guidance to courts in interpreting an existing criminal statute”); see also (Doc. 13, at 1-2). Furthermore, the Supreme Court's decisions did not decriminalize the conduct for which Martin was convicted, and therefore, he is unable to satisfy § 2255's savings clause to seek relief under § 2241. Where, as here, a federal prisoner brings a § 2241 petition that does not fall within the scope of the savings clause, the Court must dismiss the unauthorized habeas motion for lack of jurisdiction. See Gauthier, 2016 WL 3197709, at *2; Selby, 453 Fed.Appx. at 268.
III. Recommendation
Accordingly, because a sentencing claim such as the one presented by Martin is not the type of claim that a federal prisoner may bring by way of a § 2241 habeas petition, it is respectfully recommended that Martin's petition be DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE for lack of jurisdiction. (Doc. 1). In addition, it is recommended that the motion for preliminary injunction/TRO be DISMISSED as Moot. (Doc. 10).
NOTICE
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the undersigned has entered the foregoing Report and Recommendation dated December 28, 2022. Any party may obtain a review of the Report and Recommendation pursuant to Rule 72.3, which provides:
Any party may object to a magistrate judge's proposed findings, recommendations or report addressing a motion or matter described in 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) or making a recommendation for the disposition of a prisoner case or a habeas corpus petition within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy thereof. Such party shall file with the clerk of court, and serve on the magistrate judge and all parties, written objections which shall specifically identify the portions of the proposed findings, recommendations or report to which objection is made and the basis for such objections. The briefing requirements set forth in Local Rule 72.2 shall apply. A judge shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made and may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge. The judge, however, need conduct a new hearing only in his or her discretion or where required by law, and may consider the record developed before the magistrate judge, making his or her own determination on the basis of that record. The judge may also receive further evidence, recall witnesses or recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions.